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r
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THE CHRISTIAIf PHILOSOPHY OP RELIGION
IN ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT,
tSSitj^ tj^e ®ntl{tu of a Ssstem.
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PRINTED BY MORRISON AND GIBE,
FOR
T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH.
LONDON, HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND 00.
DUBLIN, GEO. HERBERT.
NEW TORE, .... 8CRIBNEB AND WELFOKD.
PUBLISHERS' NOTICE.
It has been thought desirable to publish at once this volume^ which com-
prises tJie ^^ History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion from tJte
Reformation to Kant,'' and which is complete in itself As tciü be seen from
Professor Flvit^s Preface, a considerable time elapsed between the publication
of the first volume and the completing volume of the work in the German
original, but the translation of the latter is proceeding, end will be published
in a few months.
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HISTOEY
OF THE
CHMSTIM PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
FROM THE REFORMATION TO KANT.
fi^^.r^ 4" -'Ö^,^ERNHARD PÜNJER.
Stan6Ute^ from tbe Oecman
BY
W. HA ST IE. B.D.
vnitb a preface
BY
BOBEET FLINT, P.D.. LLD..
FR0FES80B OF DIVINITT, VNITERSITT OF EDINBURGH.
V/.. X
6
EDINBUEGH:
T. & T. CLAEK, 38 GEOEGE STEEET.
1887.
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Leviores gustus in philosophia movere fortasse ad atheismnm,
sed pleniores haustus ad religionem reducere.
Baco Verülamus.
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fcU
5\
PREFACE.
fllHIS preface will very probably seem unnecessary. Tbe
-*• merits of Dr. Piinjer's work are so great and obvious,
that they can hardly fail to be recognised by all who become
acquainted with it. I should gladly have left it to speak for
itself; but, after having represented to the publishers and
translator the desirability of making it accessible to English
readers, I have not felt free to decline their request to write
a few lines of introduction to it in its new form.
When Dr. Ptinjer died, about two years ago, he was only
in the thirty-fifth year of his age. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that his name should be almost unknown in this country
beyond the circle of professioned theologians. But a brief
sketch of his life may be, on this account, all the more
appropriate and welcome. I derive the materials for it from
the necrological notice written by Dr. Lipsius, and published
in the fourth volume of the Theologischer Jahresbericht.
George Christian Bernhard Pünjer was bom on the 7th of
June 1850, at Fredericksgabekoog, in Holstein. In that
obscure and uninteresting region his father was a school-
master, and there the boy grew up and was educated until
qualified to enter a gymnasium, when he was sent to Meldorf,
doubtless, in part at least, on account of its nearness. During
1870 and the two following years he studied theology at
the Universities of Jena, Erlangen, Zürich, Eäel, and again
Jena. He thus heard many of the most distinguished theo-
logical teachers of Germany. The two who exercised most
influence on the formation of his religious convictions were
Biedermann of Zürich and Lipsius of Jena, — the former long
the ablest exponent of Hegelianism in the sphere of Dogmatics,
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VI PREFACE.
and the latter an equally talented worker in the same
department, who from Neo-Kantian principles has arrived at
very similar conclusions. Pünjer implicitly accepted neither
the speculative standpoint of the one nor the subjective
standpoint of the other, but he was in essential agreement
with them as to results.
In 1874 he took the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
The subject of his dissertation was "Die Keligionslehre
Kants," and thus by his earliest publication he entered on
what was to be the chief field of his labours during the rest
of his life. It was the origin of the work now translated.
He had resolved to devote himself to the cultivation and
teaching of theology, and in Germany every man of suflBcient
learning and talent who forms such a resolution has an
opportunity afforded him of trying to carry it into execu-
tion ; he has simply to show evidence of competency, and
go to work. Accordingly, in the summer of 1875, Pünjer
qualified as a Docent of the Theological Faculty of Jena.
The treatise which he submitted, [and which was published
the following year, — De Michaelis Serveti doctrina comvientatio
dogmatico-historica, — consists of a careful account of the whole
doctrinal system of Servetus, a reasoned estimate thereof, and
an indication of how it was related to certain forms of ortho-
dox and heretical teaching.
While a student, consumption had laid its hold on our
author ; now on the threshold of his public career he was
prostrated by typhus. He recovered, and for nine years it
seemed as if the fever had expelled the constitutional malady.
He was able about Easter in 1876 to begin his lectures, and
until a few weeks before his death he only once required to
Ije absent from his class-room. He lectured on almost all
parts of Systematic Theology, on some periods of Church
History, and on the Philosophy of Eeligion, which exercised
more and more attraction on him. In 1880 appeared the
first volume — that now published in English — of his Hist^yry
of the Christian Philosophy of Religion. It was at once
recognised in Germany to be a work of exceptional and
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PREFACE. VU
permanent value. In the same year its author became a
professor extraordinarius. In 1881 he founded the well-
known and highly useful Theologischer Jahresbericht. He
was a leading contributor to the first four volumes, reviewing
in each the works which had appeared during the past year
on the History of Eeligions, the Philosophy of Religion,
Apologetics, Polemics, Encyclopaedia, Church Unions, and
Missions. At the same time he not only lectured assiduously,
but wrote largely in theological journals, in encyclopaedias,
eta In fact, he must have laboured to an extent which
was excessive and imprudent in a man of unsound physical
constitution. A German privat-docent or professor extra-
ordinarius, however, must study to live as well as live to
study, and generally finds it very difficult to solve the two
problems combined. In 1883, Professor Pünjer published the
last volume of his History of the Christian Philosophy of
Beligion ; and in the same year he received the diploma
of an honorary doctorship from the University of Heidel-
berg. Only a short period more of life had been allotted
him. Early in 1885 disease of the lungs again made its
presence known, and it finished its fatal work on the 13th of
May 1885.
The life of Pünjer was short, and poor in outward success
or honour ; a life of self-denial, and of toil which had no
reward save the consciousness of being the faithful perform-
ance of useful work. He died before he had even attained
an ordinary professorship, and before he had shown to the
world the full measure of his powers. Yet his life was far
from futile or unfruitful. On the contrary, it may justly
be regarded as a fine example of the kind of life which
has made the theology, the philosophy, and scholarship of
Germany the admiration of the world ; and it produced,
notwithstanding its brevity, much good work which will long
bear witness to its worth.
It was our author's intention to follow up his History of the
Christian Philosophy of Beligion with a volume setting forth
his own view on the chief questions with which a religious
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Vlll PREFACE.
philosophy should deal. Death prevented him from accom-
plishing his purpose ; but he had so far proceeded with the task
that a Grundriss der Rdigionsphüosophie could be edited from
his MSS., and this was done by Dr. Lipsius in 1886. It
would be unjust to take this work as a criterion of its author's
constructive ability. It is not what we would have been
entitled to expect from him if his life had been prolonged.
But, although inadequately developed, it is judicious and
instructive so far as it goes, and clearly and even popularly
written ; and as it forms the natural conclusion of the History,
it is hoped that it will be a welcome addition to the next
volume of this translation.
A few remarks may now be made on the work here
presented. It merely professes to be a History of the
Christian Philosophy of Eeligion. It does not profess to be
a Universal History of the Philosophy of Eeligion. There
have been Hindu, Jewish, and Mohammedan Philosophies of
Beligion. A good account of these would be of interest and
value, but we can have no right to complain of not finding it
in this work, since Piinjer warns us by his very title that he
will confine his researches within the area of Christendom.
On the other hand, his book is not merely a History of the
Philosophy of the Christian Eeligion — a History of the Philo-
sophy of Christianity. Koppen, Weisse, and others have
published what they designated Philosophies of Christianity.
Pünjer was entitled, in conformity with his purpose and plan,
to give an account of such works, if of sufficient importance ;
but they had no exclusive, or even special, claim to his notice.
He aimed at being the historian, not merely of the Philosophy
of Christianity, but of the Philosophy of Eeligion, so far as it
had sprung up on a Christian soil and under Christian
influences. The title of his work served to indicate his
intention, and was thus far justified. Otherwise, however,
it can hardly be deemed appropriate. Spinoza, the English
deists, Diderot, and Voltaire, for example, cannot with pro-
priety be held to have been Christian philosophers. They
certainly made no claim to be so considered. Further,
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fBEFACE, IX
althoQgli it is easy enough to understand how in a sense there
may be a philosophy of Christianity, it is difiScult to conceive
of a distinctively Christian philosophy of religion, notwith-
standing that many have professed to propound a philosophy
entitled to be so called. Is such a philosophy anything else
than the true philosophy of religion, or, more simply and
quite as accurately, the philosophy of religion ? If not, how
is it a distinctive philosophy ? If yes, must it not be some-
thing less or other than true ? Indeed, there are no traces
either in the Greschichte or Grundriss that Dr. Pünjer supposed
that there was any exclusively and specifically Christitm
philosophy of religion. Hence the title of his work, although
it served one important purpose, would seem to have been by
no means a just expression even of his own thought
Due attention should be given to this other fact. The
book is merely a history of philosophico-religious theories,
not a history and criticism of these theories. For this limi-
tation there is in the present day no need of apology. The
historian of ideas is no more bound to constitute himself the
judge of their truth or falsity, than the historian of events is
bound to pronounce on their wisdom or folly, rightness or
wrongness. The sole duty of the historian, alike of ideas and^
events, is to give us a complete history of them — such a
history as will of itself imply the true judgment of them. It
may sometimes be desirable to add critical reflections to the
history, but it ought to be clearly recognised that these are
not the history, and should not be substituted for it ; that, on
the contrary, the space allotted to them is space deducted
from the history ; and that indulgence in them is even very
apt to be detrimental to the truthfulness of the historical
representation. The characters and functions of the historian
and the critic are so diiBferent, that when an attempt is made
to act as both, the critic is not unlikely to discredit and injure
the historian. The best historians of philosophy and theology ^
have now, accordingly, come to dispense with philosophical
and theological criticism, and to confine themselves to historical
narration and exposition. Their motto is, as was that of
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X PBEFACE.
Pünjer, "Darstellung, nicht Beurtheilung." He scarcely
needed, therefore, to give any reason for his procedure in the
above respect. But he gave two, and one of them has
afforded to his reviewers the chief matter for criticism which
they have found in his book. To the first, namely, that a
continuous criticism of the theories which he expounded would
have greatly increased the size but comparatively little the
value of his work, nothing, of course, could be objected. But
the second — ^that he did not feel free to assume the oflBce of
critic and judge, seeing that he could not claim to be himself
in possession of a complete system of religious philosophy,
and wished to come to history, not to impose his doctrine
upon it, but to learn from it — was a positive temptation to
superficial critics to endeavour to show their superiority to
this, perhaps, too modest author. Hence such critics have
naturally spent, in the assertion and defence of the thesis,
that whoever ventures to write a history of the philosophy
of religion should have a complete philosophy of religion of
his own, the strength which they should have given to
the study of the history submitted to them. Piinjer's con-
fession, that he set to work on his History before he had
such a philosophy, has been characterized by them as naive.
In reality, the naivete is their own. Although Pünjer began
his History before he deemed himself to have thought out a
complete philosophy of religion, he did not begin it until he
hftd attained a wide knowledge of the phenomena of religion,
and of all the special sciences which deal with these pheno-
mena» Further, before he began to write he had come to the
conclusion that by the philosophy of religion, the history of
which he undertook to trace, could only properly be meant
the thorough or scientific comprehension and elucidation of
all the phenomena of religion. Such being the case, why
should he need, when he had any hypothesis, doctrine, or
philosophy of religion before him, to judge it by an hypothesis,
doctrine, or philosophy of his own? Why should he not
judge it directly by the laws of reason on the one hand, and
by the phenomena which it professes to explain on the other ?
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PREFACB. XI
The principles of logic and the facts of experience are, in
reality, the only proper criteria either of our own theories of
religion or of those of others. To judge of other men's
theories by our own is an altogether illegitimate procedure.
It is akin to, and inevitably leads to, judging of facts by
theories, instead of testing theories by facts.
The merits of Piinjer's history are not difficult to discover ;
on the contrary, they are of the kind which, as the French
say, sautent aux ymx. The language is almost everywhere as
plain and easy to apprehend as, considering the nature of the
matter conveyed, it could be made. The style is simple,
natural, and direct; the only sort of style appropriate to
the subject The amount of information imparted is most
extensive, and strictly relevant. Nowhere else will a student
get nearly so much knowledge as to what has been thought
and written, within the area of Christendom, on the philo-
sophy of religion. He must be an excessively learned man
in that department who has nothing to learn from this
book. As regards the prime quality of historical truthful-
ness, accuracy in reporting and reproducing what has happened
or been held, it may safely, I believe, be accepted as unim-
peachabla What Piinjer says was maintained by any one,
the reader may feel assured was maintained by him, and
substantially as affirmed. The work is also characterized by
an almost perfect impartiality. With the exception of the
harsh estimate of Modern Methodism given on p. 283, scarcely
a trace of prejudice is anywhere to be detected in it. A
great many theories are set forth in it of which its author
must have wholly disapproved, but the delineation of them
is not thereby affected, not coloured or distorted, or even any
the less carefully executed. Closely connected with this
characteristic of the work is, to adopt a convenient German
term, its objectivity. The historian here never obtrudes
himself between us and the history. He has effaced himself
before his subject, in order that it alone may be öeen, and
precisely as it is. His personal feelings and convictions, his
subjective peculiarities and predilections, are kept in abeyance,
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XU PREFACE.
and his mind is made to serve as a pure and uncöloured
medium for the transmission or reflection of the objective
reality, matter, or contents of the history. This self-abnega-
tion is the supreme virtue of the historian, as without the
objectivity only to be obtained by it there can be no true
history, but merely some more or less plausible semblance of
it. If devoid of this virtue, a great man may possibly write
^ a great book^n history, but not a great or even a good history.
Dr. Dorner*s History of Protestant Theology is a very suggestive
and valuable theological work, but it has far too much of Dr.
Domer's own individuality in it to be a trustworthy history,
^^he realm of historical truth, like the kingdom of heaven,
can only be entered through self-renunciation. And such
renunciation deserves all the more to be commended because
it is so apt to be unappreciated. The more a work of history
is soaked in, and saturated with, the subjectivity of its author,
and consequently the less truly historical it is, the more
popular it often is. History means "the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth," and that has little charm
for vulgar minds.
The criticisms which may most fairly be made on the
present work seem to me to be the following. First, The
chronology, the order of succession, of the theories described
is not always so carefully attended to as history requires.
Patritius, for example, should have been ti*eated of before
Campanella, and Eamus before Taurellus. Paracelsus should
have been dealt with immediately after Cusanus. His
significance is only truly seen when his doctrines are regarded
as springing from sources anterior to the Eeformation. It is
quite erroneous to place English Deism before Cartesianism.
Blount should not be made to follow Hobbes and precede
Locke, but to follow Locke and precede Toland, or rather
Tindal, who is also wrongly located. More and Cudworth
should have been treated of before Locke.
Secondly, The method of exposition adopted by Piinjer
sometimes fails. Whenever he treats of a system at any
considerable length, he endeavours to give a careful summary
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PKEFACE. XIU
of what is essential in it, so far as professedly relevant to
religion. In most cases this leads to a satisfactory result ;
but not in all. There are systems which it is useless to
attempt to summarize. That of Jacob Böhme is an instance.
With laborious conscientiousness our author has striven to
give a complete account of it Will the ordinary reader find
the account even intelligible? I shall leave it to himself
to answer. I venture, however, to think that he would have
had more reason to be grateful to Dr. Pünjer had he, so to
speak, melted the system down in the crucible of his own
mind, extracted the precious ore, presented that only in his
book, and left the residue or slack to kindly oblivion.
Thirdly, The work of Dr. Pünjer is lacking in recognition
of religious speculation outside of Germany. In fact, there
is no recognition in it at all of recent English, French, or Italian
religious philosophy. This criticism applies, of course, only
to the second, and otherwise the most interesting and valuable
volume of the work. So long as the scholars of France, Italy,
and England leave the composition of histories of philosophy
in general, and in its departments, almost entirely to Germans,
they must expect to see the philosophical movements in their
own countries largely ignored.
Notwithstanding the above and such other objections as
may fairly apply to Dr. Pünjer's work, it is one of great
value, Bud indispensable to the student of theology and
philosophy. The only other history of the philosophy of
religion which is of any worth is that contained in Dr.
Pfleiderer's Philosophy- -(^ Edigion, o» ihe hasiU of History^ *
and which has now been made accessible to English readers
in the excellent translation of Prof. Alexander Stewart and
the Eev. Allan Menzies. It is a work of distinguished ability,
and will be found a valuable supplement to that of Pünjer,
owing to its vigorous criticism of the principal modem German
systems of religious philosophy. It has, however, neither the
same fulness nor objectivity as Pünjer's treatise, and cannot
properly serve as a substitute for it. The whole field of
history, for example, covered by the present volume is but
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XIV PREFACE.
slightly touched by Pfleiderer. Those who read the one work
will be the more likely, and the better prepared, to read the
other. The translators of both have rendered a manifest
service to the cause of religious enlightenment and science.
There need be no fear that the circulation of either work will
injure that of the other.
It will not be expected that I should enter on any dis-
cussion of the nature, limits, methods, or problems of the
Philosophy of Eeligion. I cannot, however, too earnestly
commend the study of it to our younger theologians. It is
the all-inclusive theological science, — at once the foundation,
the vital breath, the goal and crown of every theological
discipline. All the special theological sciences are worth just
what they contribute to it, or, in other words, to the complete
comprehension of religion. If theology is to tnake real pro-
gress among us, old dogmatic methods of inquiry and proof
must be abandoned for such as are truly philosophical, and
the old theological system give place to another, larger and
richer, and organized by a truly philosophical spirit. For the
modem theologian, the study of the Philosophy of Eeligion is
an incumbent duty, an urgent necessity. The Philosophy of
Eeligion deals with all the root-questions of theology ; and
we can as justly apply to theology as to any other kind of
science the dictum and illustration of Bacon — " If you will
have a tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is not
anything that you can do to the boughs, but it is the stirring
of the earth, and putting new mould about the roots, that
must work it."
The translation will, I have no doubt, be found well
executed. It is the work of a thoroughly competent scholar,
whose knowledge of the systems and literature of religious
philosophy is unequalled by any one known to me.
R FLINT.
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CONTENTS.
INTEODUCTION.
DEFINITION OF THE SUBJECT, AND SÜBVEY TO THE REFOKMATION.
L The Histobt of the Philosopht of Religion defined and
JUSTIFIED^ . . ' .
IL The Ancient Church, .....
^-The ApologifltBy .....
Minucios Felix, Amobius, aud Lactantius,
t^ Gnoeticism, '......
The Ecclesiastical Qnosis. Clement and Origen,
Neo-Platonism« Ammonius Sakkas. Plotinos. Porphyry,
Dionjsius Areopagitica, .
Maximus Confessor. Synesius, .
Joannes Philoponos. John of Damascus,
The Latin Church,
^Augustine, ....
Boethios. Cassiodorus. Isidore of Seville,
III. The Middle Ages—
The Movement of the Middle Ages generally,
Scholasticism, ....
The Intellectual Enlightenment and the Beligious Op
position,
Joannes Sootns Erigena,
Realism and Nominalism. Roscellinus,
"^Anselm,
Universals,
^ Albertus Magnus,
^ Thomas Aquinas,
Duns Scotus,
Raymundus Lullus,
William of Occam,
Peter D*Ailly. John Gerson.
Berengar of Tours,
Raymond ofSabunde,
7
9
10
13
15
17
18
19
20
21
23
25
26
28
29
31
32
32
33
34
34
85
36
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XVI
CONTENTS.
' Abelard, ....
Averpoes, ....
Simon of Toumay. John of Brescain,
Boger Bacon. De tribus Impostoribus,
William of Auvergne,
Mysticism (Bernard of Clairvaux, Bonaventura, etcX
Amalrich of Bena,
David of Dinant Joachim of Floris,
Beghins and Beghards,
Meister Eckhart. (Tauler, Snso, and the QermoLn Theology\
IV. Transition to thb Reformation —
The Humanists, .
Pomponatius,
Georgius Qemisthus Pletho,
Marsilius Ficinus,
Pico of Mirandola,
Justus Lipsius. Montaigne. (Charron, Sanchez),
Mutianus. John Beucblin,
Erasmus. Ulrich von Hütten, .
Enlightenment and Mysticism,
Petrus Waldus. John Hubs. John Wicklifie, .
Thomas ä Kempis. John Wessel, •
Division of the Subject from the Beformation Period,
PAGE
36
39
40
41
42
42
43
44
45
45
49
60
52
53
55
56
57
58
59
60
60
61
BOOK I.
HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION FROM THE
REFORMATION TO KANT.
Section First. — ^Thb Beginnings or Independent Specttlation.
I. Nicolaus Cusanus, ......
66
II. Telesius and Cardanus, . . . . .
89
III. Giordano Bruno, ......
93
lY. Thomas Campanella, . . . . .
101
V. Nicolaus Taurellus, .....
113
VI. Petrus Ramus, ......
118
I. Martin Luther, .....
125
II. Melanchthon, .....
131
III. Osiander, Illyricus, and Orthodox Lutheranism, .
137
IV. XJhrich Zwingli, .....
145
V. John Calvin, .....
155
VI. Protestant Controvei-aes. Vedelius and Musaeu»,
158
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CONTENTS.
XVll
SicTioN Third. — ^Thb Cultivation or Philosophy before Descartes.
L Arifltotelianism and Eamism,
IL The Daniel Hofmann Controversy,
168
178
Sbction Fourth. — The Oppositional Movements within
Protestantisk.
I. The Purely Intellectual Opposition. Socinianism, .
n. The Anabaptists. Joris. Niclas. Independentism.
Quakers,
HL The Mystics. Servetus. Paracelsus. Carlstadt Münzer.
Frank. Schwenkfeldt,
IV. Valentin Weigel,
V. Jacob Böhme,
Swedenborgianism,
Irvingism (Edward Irving),
VL The Practical Opposition. Pietism, .
21inzendorf and the Moravians, .
Methodism,
193
207
217
231
243
265
267
268
280
282
Section Fifth.— The English Deism.
The English Keformation. The Levellers,
285
Lord Bacon, ......
286
Newton. Bojle, ......
288
The general character of Deism, ....
289
The Three Periods of English Deism,
289
I. The Beginnings of English Deism —
Lord Herbert of Cherbury, ....
292
Sir Thomas Browne, . ...
300
Thomas Hobbes, ......
302
Charles Blount, ......
314
XL The Full Development of Deism-
John Locke, ......
315
JohnToland, ......
321
Anthony Collins, ......
329
F*arl of Shaftesbury, .....
330
Matthew Tindal,
338
Thomas Chubb, ......
342
Thomas Morgan, ......
345
in. Special Controversies and the Apologetic Works —
1. The Controversy on Immortality ; Dodwell, .
861
2. The Controversy on Prophecy; Whiston, Collins,
Bullock, Sykes, Jeffery, ....
352
8. The Debate on Miracles ; Woolston, Peter Annet, .
b
353
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XVIU
CONTENTS.
• IV.
4. The Apologists — Henry More,
Cadworth, .
Bentley, Ibbot, Gibson,
John Conybeare, .
Bishop Butler,
David Hume, .
Section Sixth.— Descartes and Spinoza.
I. Descartes, ....
II. Opponents and Adherents of Descartes,
Christoph Wittich,
Heidanus, Deurhoff, F. A. Lampe,
A. van Dale, Balthasar Bekker, .
Hermann Alexander Boell,
Geulinz, ....
Malebranche,
III. Spinoza, ....
IV. Opponents and Adherents of Spinoza — •
Bappoltus, Blyenburg,
Guffelarius, Musseus, Kortholt, .
Eichard Simon, Jacob Verschoor,
Matthias Knutzen,
Stosch (Stossius), .
Edelmann,
PAOK
354
356
356
357
358
359
389
392
397
398
399
401
402
404
407
434
435
436
437
439
489
Section Seventh. — ^The Eighteenth Centurt in France.
I. Scepticism — ^Pierre Bayle, ..... 446
Le Vayer, Huet, Saint Evremont, 447
II. Deism — Maupertuis, ...... 453
Voltaire, ....... 454
III. Materialism and Sensationalism —
CondDlac, ....... 460
DelaMettrie, ...... 461
Helvetius, Diderot, ..... 462
I^Holbach, ...... 463
IV. The Opposition of Religious Feeling —
Eousseau, ....... 468
Section Eighth.— Leibniz and the German Aufklärung.
General Character and Belations of the AufkUirtmg (Enlighten-
ment), ........ 476
I. The Doctrines of Leibniz, ..... 480
II. Wolff and the Popular Philosophy —
Wolff's Philosophy, ..... 615
The Popular Philosophy, ..... 524
Grotius, Pufendorff^ ..... 525
Christian Thomasius, ..... 526
Relation of the Wolffian Philosophy to Theology, . 528«
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CONTENTS.
XIX
Ganz, Reinbeck, Köthen, Carpov,
PAOS
530
Keusch, ......
531
Darjes, Ribow, Schubert, Kappelier,
532
III. The Aufklärvmg and its Chief Kepresentatiye»—
Sulzer, Nicolai, Basedow, ....
586
Moses Mendelssohn, ^ .
537
The Physico-theologies ; Brockes,
539
J. J. Spalding, W. A. Teller,
541
Sack, F. W. Jerusalem, ....
542
J. L. Schmidt and the Wertheim Bible, .
543
J. H. Schulz, .....
544
Andreas Riem, G. Schade,
545
Karl Friedrich Bahrdt, ....
546
Beimarus, ......
550
Section Ninth.— The Oppo8Ition to the Aufklärung.
The Hifltorico-critical Movement —
Wettstein, Qriesbach, £ichhom, Michaelis,
559
Emesti, Semler, .....
560
Geliert, Klopstock, ....
562
Matthias Claudius, Teerstegen, Lavater, .
563
The Chief Representatives of the New Movement—
I. Lessing,* ......
564
II. Herder, ......
585
ni. Hamann, ......
607
IV. Jacobi,
621
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IlfTRODUCTIOK
DEFINITION OF THE SUBJECT, AND SURVEY TO
THE EEFOEMATIOK
I.
Tde Histoby op the Philosophy op Eeugion defined
and justified.
WHOEVER undertakes to write the History of a Science
is confronted at the outset with the great difißculty
of having to define correctly the matter that has to be dealt
with. The conception of a science is that about which there
is most dispute, and in the setting forth of which there is
the greatest diversity of procedure. Should, then, the ex-
pounder of a science pass silently over all those views of it
which he does not recognise as correct ? This is impossible.
Moreover, a comprehensive and systematic treatment of any
subject in a scientific way is only attained after a long
period of prior effort. May, then, the historical treatment
of a science leave all the beginnings and all the early
imperfect attempts in the way of scientific explanation of
its subject-matter unnoticed? Certainly not Were any
one, for example, to undertake to write a History of Ethics,
he could neither leave out of view all those precepts of
action that were not yet brought into the form of a strictly
completed system, nor could he omit any of those systems
vhich based the Science of Ethics upon other definitions than
the one which he himself held to be correct. The historian
of a science must not merely review all the expositions of his
science actually presented in history, but he must also draw
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2 INTRODUCTORY DEFINITION AND SURVEY.
into the sphere of his exposition much that is only significant
as preparatory effort, as weak and unsuccessful attempts
towards the later form of the science.
What, and how much, should a History of the Philosophy
of Beligion contain ? In point of fact the question is still
discussed as to whether the Philosophy of Religion should
merely give a phenomenology of the religious consciousness,
or should also enter into the domain of metaphysics, or in
addition should also apply to its own use the results of the
history of Eeligion. The History of the subject ought properly
to take all these relations into account. But if it were to
confine itself to an exposition of the complete systems of the
Philosophy of Religion, it could hardly begin with anything
before Hegel's Philosophy of Beligion, or, at most, with Kant's
Beligion within the Limits of mere Beason, and not earlier.
Such a limitation would withdraw from it all the philosophical
speculations about Religion which lie at the basis alike of the
philosophical systems and the expositions of the Christian
faith. This would certainly be circumscribing our subject too
narrowly. Hence it is necessary to adopt a wider standpoint,
and we must be guided to it by the proper conception of the
Philosophy of Religion, if we are to avoid running off into
other subjects. At first there appears to be a contradiction
involved in such combinations as, " Philosophy of Religion,"
" Philosophy of Right," " Philosophy of Nature," and similar
terms. For the characteristic of Philosophy is that it occu-
pies itself with the universal in contrast to the particular
details of the several sciences, a distinction which holds
whether Philosophy is defined to be the universal all-
embracing science as distinguished from the special sciences,
or as the science of the principles of Being as well as of
Knowing. These two sides of Philosophy, when deeply
apprehended, agree with each other, and the nature of the
Philosophy of Religion may be determined by reference to
them. It considers Religion in connection with all the other
manifestations of the spiritual life of man as well as with all
the other forms of existence, because it is the application of
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HISTOBT OF THE PHIL080PHT OF RELIGION DEFINED. 3
thought to the scientific and rational comprehension of
Beligion« Its aim is not merely to obtain empirical knowledge
of the forms ^hich religion has assumed in doctrine, practice,
and cultus at different times and among different people ; it
aims at comprehending what and why religion is, and how it
is connected with the nature of man and his position in the
universe as well as its relation to the being and working of God.
And thus it has also to take into account how and wherefore
it has assumed a certain form at any particular time among
a particular people, and similar questions. The task of the
Philosophy of Religion is the thoughtful, rational con-
sideration of religion. The term " Religion " indicates first
of all a something objective, — ^the sum of the theoretical
and practical propositions concerning God, His relation to the
world, and our own action, which are accepted as valid in a
particular community. These propositions claim to be divine
truth ; and, in the case of a right relation on the part of the
individual to the objective religion of his Church, they
correspond to the inner experience of his consciousness so
completely that it is only a late and far advanced develop-
ment of independent thinking that induces the attempt to
consider them objectively and without prepossession, with the
view of incorporating the religion which they represent, along
with other objects of knowledge, in the form of an all-
embracing theory of the universe. As regards the Christian
religion, it is manifest that it could only enter of its own
accord into such a universal system, when philosophical
thinking had acquired such strength among the Christian
peoples that it no longer shrank from boldly attempting to
conceive the whole of being in a speculative way. This
highest stage in the application of thought to Religion is,
however, prepared for in various ways. If the adherents of a
religion try to refute the doubts which arise here and there
regarding it, or strive to make what is first presented from
without as a doctrine and tenet a possession of their own
heart and a subject of personal conviction, they must then
advance to the consideration of it in thought. And any one
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4 INTRODUCTORY DEFINITION AND SURVEY.
vrho might undertake the task of defending the truth of his
religion from attack, or of making it known to the followers
of another creed, could not always stop at an appeal to its
divine origin, but must often try to show that its doctrines
recommend themselves to the rational thinking of men as
truth. "^Again, the examination of Beligion as an objective
fact must always return to the subjective side, and this must
lead a step farther. If the modification of the human self'-
consciousness, which we call Beligion, precedes the establish-
ment of doctrines and observances as binding upon the agent,
we must already recognise in this fact an activity of thought
As regards the result of this thinking, the contemporary
philosophical speculation is of importance to it as well as the
special character which the religion in question bears in itself
in the self-consciousness of the individual, and which therefore
asserts its influence upon his reflection. Further, the learned
cultivation of Theology likewise proceeds under the influence
of the position assigned to Philosophy, as a universal organon
of knowledge. All these are relations of thought to
Eeligion, which, although not yet constituting a Philosophy
of Religion, assuredly prepare for such a Philosophy.
A History of the Philosophy of Eeligion will, therefore,
necessarily have to take them all into account And if it
should appear at the first glance as if we were giving much
which should have a place only in a History of Theplogy, or
even in a History of Philosophy, a more careful examination
will make it plain to every one that it really belongs to our
subject For it will be seen that all this contains the begin-
nings of what appears afterwards only in more scientific form
as the Philosophy of Eeligion; and although there may
always be dispute about individual details, yet it will be
evident from the whole that these historical facts ought not
to be passed over in silence.
This position may seem the reverse of justifying our
intention to begin in the exposition of the subject with the
Eeformation. This limitation of our task, however, is not to
be understood as meaning that the movement of thought
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fflSTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF REUGION DEFINED. 5
"which comes in time to a complete Philosophy of Eeligion
only began at that date. But every historian has the right
to limit the subject of his exposition at pleasure, and the
Eeformation, in point of fact, indicates such a powerful
turning-point in the history of the Christian life, that an
examination of the most real efforts to apprehend religion by
thought may very properly commence from it Nevertheless,
in order to escape from objection to this limitation, we shall
give at least a brief sketch of the earlier attempts of the kind.
But can the Philosophy of Beligion, and consequently a
History of it, be justified at all ? This has been often con-
tested by those who see in Eeligion something that is
absolutely transcendent ; but certainly their view is erroneous.
The very question as to whether Religion is essentially super-
natural, or whether it has grown into existence out of the
connections of human nature and of things generally, requires
fundamental investigation and philosophical examination, in
order that a decision of it in the one sense, rather than in the
other, may not be arbitrarily and groundlessly assumed. It is
a fact — and it is well for us that it is so— that the vitality of
the religious life does not depend upon the extent of the
philosophical insight into the essence and nature of Beligion.
Indeed, many feel no need whatever to apply their thought
so as to examine the doctrine of the Church, which is accepted
by them as objective truth, nor to analyse the inner life which
the presence of God makes known to them in their own
hearts. For such men a Philosophy of Eeligion is not
required. On the other hand, those who are so far dominated
by the interest of scientific knowledge that they can rest in
nothing so long as they do not comprehend it, desire a
Philosophy of Eeligion. For how could they exclude from
their striving after a conception of all things by thought, that
religion which is the most important interest of all? In
the present age, however, it is especially the interest that is
concentrated in Apologetics which demands a Philosophy of
Eeligion. There is a double current pressing strong upon
the Church of Christ at present, in the practical rejection of
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6 INTKODÜCTORY DEFINITION AND SÜBVEY,
religion by the uneducated masses, and in the theoretical
antagonism to theology of anti-religious science. The masses
cannot b^ got hold of by learned explanations, and therefore,
on this side, the remedy must come from active, helpful,
edifying love; and if the ecclesiastical parties could but
resolve to join hands here like brethren, instead of wrangling
with each other in dogmatic rancour, it would be better for
our Church. The practical rejection of religion is, however,
not entirely independent of the theoretical antagonism. Yet
gradually, although slowly, do the results of scientific inquiry
become a common possession of the people with all that is
beneficial in these results. Indirectly, therefore, it is practi-
cally conducive to the furtherance of religious life, when the
justification and explanation of Beligion are theoretically
established over against the attacks of science. And to do
this is the task of the Philosophy of Religion.
If, then, the Philosophy of Beligion can assert its right to be,
a History of it is not at all superfluous. Any one who under«
takes to deal with a problem for the solution of which the
greatest minds have put forth their best powers for centuries,
will do well before beginning his own effort to take a survey
of what has already been attempted. The past will furnish
him with much instructive guidance from many instances as
to which path will lead astray, and as to which will offer a
prospect of reaching true and permanent results.
II.
The Ancient Church.
Christianity is the Beligion of the redemption and recon-
ciliation with God received through Jesus of Nazareth. The
consciousness of redemption and reconciliation obtained
through Jesus was the new life which took root in the
believing followers of Jesus, and it formed their subjective
religion. It then became an indispensable task for Chris-
tians to exhibit this consciousness objectively in theoretical
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THE AKCIENT CHÜECH. 7
expressions, relating primarily to the Person and the Work of
Christ, and to the nature of God and man and their mutual
relations. This process of giving objectivity to the religious
consciousness, and thus constructing dogmas, attached itself at
first to the Old Testament form of the Messias. Then came
next the immanent dialectical impulse which, affected but to a
small degree by the changing philosophical currents outside
the Church, and starting from the consciousness of the
redemption received in Christ, came to rest solely in the
system of the doctrines of the Church, when they had been
developed on all sides and carried out logically into authorita-
tive dogmas. Bedemption through Christ, the God-man, is
the centre of the Christian dogmas, and what they essentially
contained. At the same time, the consciousness of the self-
felt truth of these dogmas was so strong that the conflict of
dogmatic theology with philosophy and reason did not disturb
in the least the faith of those who held them.
The need of a justification of Christianity before human
Eea.son took form at first in the early Apologetics of the
Church. In relation to the Jews, it was sufficient to show
that Jesus of Nazareth was, in fact, the Messias promised in
the Old Testament, but in relation to the heathen the
Apologists had to take their stand on the common ground of
natural Eeason. It may be asked in what then did the
Apologists consider the essence of Christianity to consist?
According to their view, it consists in the knowledge of the
one true God and in rightly serving Him. That God is one
only and not many; that He is a Spirit, infinite, self-
sufficient, exalted above everything finite and imperishable ;
that He is not a product of human art, nor mortal, nor in
need of anything ; that the true worship or service of God
consists in devout sentiments of the heart and in moral purity
of life^ and not in cruel displays, nor in abominable lusts, nor
vain sacrifices, — these are the doctrines which we find as
the centre and sum of the whole Christian faith in all the
Apologists of the second Century. It is a meagre creed,
indeed, when compared with the later developments of the
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8 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
Christian dogmas. Their Christology is put on a parallel
with heathen myths in order to make it acceptable. The
work of Christ retreats into the background, and it consists
less in redemption and reconciliation with God than in the
fact that Christ brought us the knowledge of the one true
God, and taught us how He would be honoured. This know-
ledge is sometimes represented as the pure and only true
original religion which existed in Paradise before the FalL
Having been lost by sin, this religion was entirely unknown
to the heathen, and among the Jews it was corrupted by
much that was alien to it Through Christ it was first fully
and completely restored again.
The second point worthy of consideration in the Apologists
is the arguments by which they seek to convince their
opponents of the truth of Christianity and of the untruth of
heathenism. The judgment pronounced by them on the
pagan philosophy is different according to their individual
tendencies. Tatian, with aU the incisiveness of his passionate
nature, objects to the heathen philosophers, that the one was
the opponent of the other, that instead of the oneness of
truth, there prevailed among them but the strife and the
diversity of error, and that their knowledge was but vain
boasting and illusion. Tertullian exclaims: ''What have
Athens and Jerusalem, what have the Academy and the
Church, what have the heretics and the Christians in common
with one another ? " Philosophy stamps arbitrary forms upon
things, identifies them at one time and then separates them
at another, judges the uncertain by the certain, refers to
examples as if everything were to be made an object of com-
parison, and so on. The Lord Himself has called the wisdom
of the world foolishness, and, to the shame of philosophy, has
chosen what is foolish in the eyes of the world. Justin
Martyr, on the other hand, as the Apologist in the mantle of
the philosopher, along with similar judgments, pronounces
others that are entirely different, such as that Christianity is
nothing absolutely new, but that it goes back beyond Judaism
to the original religion. Its truth consists in the fact that in
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THE ANCIENT CHÜKCH. d
it the Logos comes fully and wholly into active reality. The
very same Logos, however, has already been operative in the
pre-Christian world and led it to a certain knowledge of the
truth. He who lived with the Logos was a Christian even
though living as a heathen or a Jew ; and such were Socrates,
Heraclitus, Abraham, Elias, and others. Athtiiagoras refers
the truth in the possession of the philosophers to an affinity
CD their part with the Spirit of Grod. Still more common is
the view that they had borrowed the best of their wisdom
from the Old Testament
The utterances of heathen poets and philosophers regarding
the unity of God were willingly used, and they were zealously
gathered in order to prove the truth of Christianity. Bational
principles were continually brought into the field against
pagan polytheism. Thus it was declared that what the
heathen said regarding their gods was entirely unworthy and
contradictory in itself; that the mythologies contained the
most ludicrous and unworthy and even immoral things con-
cerning the life of the gods and their relation to one another ;
that the gods of the heathen were defective, and had wants,
and could not live without the sacrifices and gifts of men ;
nay more, that they were nothing else than works of human
contrivance, and that they were therefore utterly unworthy of
reverence. Athenagoras even tries to prove that the existence
of two gods is contrary to reason ; for if there were two gods,
they must either be in the same place or in different places,
and either alternative is impossible. Tertullian appeals to
the universal consciousness with which, as with a dower, God
has vouchsafed to adorn the souL In the same consciousness
the soul realizes certain truths, as that there exists a good, just,
all-knowing, and all-powerful God, to find whom it aspires
towards heaven ; anima naturaliter Christiana. The teaching
of Scripture is only a further addition to the consciousness of
God that springs from the contemplation of the world.
Minucius Felix, Amobius, and Lactantius deserve to be
specially mentioned here. They have not inappropriately
been designated " Christian popular philosophers." Lactantius
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10 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
already reflects so much upon the nature of Beligion that he
even searches after the etymology of tb£ word, and in an often
quoted passage he derives religio not from religere, with
Cicero, but from religare, Beligion is thus represented as a
connection with God on the two sides of knowledge and of
worship. Minucius takes up the sceptical questionings as
to whether there is a God, and as to whether there is a
Providence ; and he already answers them with a rational
proof of the unity and existence of God. If we consider the
wise order of the universe, as in the change of the seasons, the
fertilization of Egypt by the 'Nile, and such like, we must, he
says, reason to a Lord and Governor as if from the appearance
of a well-ordered house. There is only one such Lord ; for
the history of the nations already teaches that a plurality of
governors is pernicious, and besides our immediate conscious*-
ness knows only of one God. These three Christian writers
agree in their apprehension of Christianity. As a religion it
consists in the knowledge of the true God and in the obser^
vance of the right worship of God. In both relations
Christianity is the true religion. The heathen worship images,
works of human art, and lower celestial powers ; it is only
the Christians who know the one Supreme God. The
heathen seek to serve their gods by sacrifices and outpourings
of blood, by obscene plays and spectacles; the Christians
alone perform the true worship in devout sentiment and moral
purity of conduct. This true religion can only be obtained by
revelation, and the merit of Christ just consists in the fiEu^t
that He has taught us the true religion.
In the earliest times of the Christian Church there sprang
up a movement which is rightly designated as the first
attempt to work out a Christian Philosophy of Religion. It
took form at first in the Church, but was afterwards expelled
from it as heretical It was what is now known as Gnosticism-.
In the New Testament the striving after a deeper compre-
hension of the religious faith already makes itself manifest.
Paul and Peter both speak of the Gnosis as a special gift of
God. Nor did the heretical Gnosis arise by merely bringing
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THE ANCIENT CHURCH. 11
heathen, and particularly Oriental, religions into Christianity ;
rather did it stand entirely on Christian ground. All the
representatives of this movement hold it as an indubitable
fieu^t that Christianity is the highest and most perfect of all
religions, and that all philosophical speculation and represen-
tation of the world, as well as all religious history, only serve
to prove this significance of Christianity. The heretical
Gnostics certainly liberate themselves from the authority of the
Church, partly by declaring that mere faith is insufficient for
salvation, and partly by interpreting the New Testament
according to arbitrary allegories, mutilating it by the excision
of alleged falsifications, and putting a secret tradition beside it
as a source of knowledge of at least equal value. Gnosticism,
according to its general character, is speculation; and, in
particular, it is a speculation which specially refers to religion.
Of the historical religions, consideration is given to Heathen-
ism, Judaism, and Christianity. They are put in relation to
difierent powers of the universal process of the world. Christi-
anity is referred to the Supreme God ; Judaism, to the Creator
of the world; Heathenism, to matter. They indicate like-
wise different periods in the divine process of creation, the
chief turning-points of which are formed by the entering of
God into matter, and His return from it again. The redemption
through Christ, as the fundamental dogma of Christianity,
forms the centre of the Gnostic speculations. This redemp*
tion, however, is not conceived merely from the ethico-religious
point of view, as the redemption of men from sin and the
reconciliation of sinners with God, but it is regarded as a
cosmical process, bringing back to God, as the Infinite, the
finite world, which hath arisen from God, and become estranged
from Him. Hence all the metaphysical questions regarding
the relation of God to the world, the nature and origin of
evil, and the divine government of the course of the world in
history, fall within the range of the Gnostic systems.
Taken apart from the fantastic and mythological dress in
which they are presented, we may attempt to exhibit briefly
the common leading thoughts of the various and different
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12 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
Gnostic systems as follows: — ^The primal dirine Being is
conceived in the greatest possible abstraction and as infinite.
GU)d appears not merely as absolutely spiritual and immaterial,
infiniter and transcendent, and therefore as incomprehensible
by us, but likewise as unfathomable in His essence and with-
out determination. With this conception of God there is
necessarily involved the utmost separation of Him from the
world. This separation shows itself primarily in the fact that
the Creator of the world is distinguished from the Supreme
God. The Creator of the world is represented at one time
as a lower, but not hostile power, serving the Supreme Deity,
and while not knowing God, yet fulfilling His will. At
another time the creative Power is represented as the
principle that is consciously hostile to God, because it is evil
in itself. The Supreme God thus appears as the God of
Christianity, and the Creator of the world as the God of
Judaism ; and this is the ground of the more or less direct
antagonism of the two religions. Further, matter, as the
substratum of the creation, is removed to the utmost possible
degree from God. 'It appears either as existing from eternity
along with God, in complete independence,, and as decidedly
opposed to Him ; or it is represented as having issued from
Him by emanation, but after its emanation as forthwith opposing
itself independently to God. In both cases matter is the
ground of evil and of badness. In order to fill up the gulf
fixed between God and the world, a series of iEons was made
to proceed from God, which, according to their distance from
this primal source of all being, share to diflferent degrees in the
divine perfection. These iBons are represented in some
systems as means of the divine self-revelation, and in others
more as the means of establishing a connection between God
and the world. There are not wanting points of attachment
in the world for this connection, although the world, on
account of its origin from matter, is essentially hylic or
material, and is consequently morally bad; yet it is not
entirely wanting in germs and traces of the Pneumatic or
Spiritual, and consequently of moral goodness, this element of
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THE ANCIENT CHURCH. 13
goodness being referred to the fall of one of the .^ns into
matter, or to the command of the Supreme God to create the
world. Some systems further derive from the Creator of the
world a third element, which is the Psychical, and to it they
assign an intermediate position. As is the case with the world,
so does Man likewise appear as bipartite, being hylic and
pneumatic ; or as tripartite, being hylic, psychic, and pneu*
matic The final goal of the whole process of the world is,
that the Pneumatic becomes separated out from its unnatural
conjunction with the Hylic, and is again received into the
Absoluta The communication of the true knowledge of God
as the revelation of the hitherto unknown True God, was
generally r^rded as the means of realizing this redemption.
Christ appears in all the systems as the bearer of this new
revelation. He is an -^n sent from the Supreme God ;
it is He who has made known to the world the Supreme God
and His kingdom of iEons ; and in doing so He used the
man Jesus as His medium. Christ and the religion founded by
Him, or the knowledge of the Supreme God which He brought
with Him, thus form the turning-point in the process of the
world's history ; and this history, since the founding of
His religion, leads no longer away from God, but back to Him
again. These systems, as the earliest products of the Christian
Philosophy of Religion, certainly deserve to be noted, and
it must be recognised that the strenuous mental activity
exhibited in them endeavoured to solve the most difficult
questions. The fantastic mythologies in which the unbridled
phantasy clothed these attempts prevented their attaining any
permanent result.
The heretical Gnosis was combated from two sides. An
empirical and realistic method contested the extravagant
speculations of the Gnostics by appealing to the doctrine
established by the authority of the Church, to the clear and
simple word of Scripture, and to the episcopal tradition. A
speculative method, again, sought to overthrow the opponent
with his own weapons, and to oppose an ecclesiastical Chiosis
to the heretical systems. This method had its seat in
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14 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
Alexandria, and its chief representatives in Clement and
Origen.
The speculative method of the Church is essentially
different from the heretical Gnosis which it combats. In
the first place, the historical element of religion retreats
entirely into the background. This was quite natural, for
Christianity is no longer regarded as the highest stage of
a development equally embracing all the religions ; it is the
absolute standard or norm of Beligion. The doctrine of
Christianity is the truth ; the doctrine of the Church is the
highest authority. Hence mere faith is sufficient for the
attainment of salvation, and therefore this Gnosis extends no
farther than the objectively established doctrine of the Church.
Origen accordingly subjects his own speculations expressly to
the ecclesiastical confession, and will only apply them to those
doctrines which have not yet been precisely determined
by the Church. And while his allegorical interpretation of
Scripture finds occasion for many divergent opinions in
doctrine, his asserted agreement with it on the whole is really
a fact. \j
Two points deserve to be here specially considered in con-
nection with the ecclesiastical form of the movement — first,
the judgment pronounced regarding the pagan philosophy and
its relation to Christianity ; and secondly, the positions taken
up concerning the relation between Faith and Knowledge.
Christianity itself appears as a mode of knowing, or as-*a
possession of the truth, and so far it is put on the same line
with philosophy. The only question remaining in reference
to this point can only be as to what kind of knowing comes
nearest the truth, so as to deserve the preference ; or, as it is
put, what knowledge has the greatest share in " the One Truth
which is geometrical truth in geometry, musical truth in music,
and is Hellenic truth in what is true in philosophy" ? The
answer to this question is undecided and different. At
one time Philosophy and Christianity are represented as
entirely equal in worth. Thus it is said, as we obtain har-
mony from the different strings of the lyre, mathematical
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THE ANCIENT CHURCH. 15
magnitudes from straight and curved lines, and such like, so
from a combination of all the Oriental and Hellenic systems
with Christianity we get the one complete truth. Again,
the prerogative of Christianity is indubitably maintained \yhen
Clement says that philosophy has the truth, but the several
systems tear the one truth asunder, as the Bacchse did the
limbs of Pentheus, while they yet assert that they possess the
whole truth; Christianity, on the other hand, possesses the
truth full and entire. The distinction between them is still
more accentuated. Thus Philosophy is likened to the ray
of the sunbeam that falls through a glass filled with water ;
Christianity is like the unbroken ray ; both come from God,
but Philosophy only comes indirectly, whereas Christianity
comes directly from Him.
Clement, to whom Origen attaches himself throughout,
expresses himself regarding the relation between faith and
knowledge in terms that are still variously interpreted. In
our opinion the arrangement of his principal writings, as well
as the clearest of his expressions, admit only of this being his
view, that the Christian passes through four stages. The
Knowing, which forms the starting-point, is a mere external
acquaintance with the Gospel and the doctrine of the Church.
This information is next followed by Faith, which is the accept-
ance of this external knowledge, and the holding of it as true
mainly upon the authority of the Church and without a rational
comprehension of what is believed. The third stage is the pure
Moral Life, as a consequence of this belief. The goal of the
development is reached in the Gnosis or perfect knowledge of
the truth. This final knowing is primarily a rational under-
standing of the subject-matter of the belief. It is then, further,
the knowledge of all divine and human things that flows from
this rational understanding of the object of faith. And it is
completed in the immediate vision of God (ßecDpia) by the
morally renewed man.
About the middle of the third Century the heathen world
braced itself up once more for a grand achievement From all
the systems of the early ages the truth, which they were
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16 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
supposed to contain was gathered, and this was brought into
the service of the Christian idea of redemption« Thus arose
Neo-Plaionism. This twofold relation is its special character-
istia Redemption and reconciliation with God had become an
actual reality in Christianity, and was participated in by every
believer. The efibrt exhibited the longing to escape fh)m the
nothingness of finite sinful existence, and to find the highest
happiness in perfect union with God. This longing was the
psychological root of Neo-Platonism. Its aim was to still this
feeling by the aid of human wisdom ; and as it wanted the
power to produce anything new, it contented itself by borrow-
ing edectically suitable thoughts from earlier systems, and
especially from Platonism, which it professed to restore in
its purity. Prepared by Ammonius Sakkas (c. 200), Neo-
Platonism was developed by Plotinus (205-270) on all sides
to a complete and closed system. All existence is referred,
not to two principles, but only to one. God, or the primal
Essence, is the simple unity that lies above all multiplicity.
As such, God is without thought, because thinking requires
plurality; and without will, because willing presupposes duality.
God is the absolutely transcendent One, exalted above every-
thing, above consciousness and unconsciousness, above rest and
motion, above life and being. Hence God is entirely unattain-
able in our knowledge. Thinking must here abandon itself
and become Not-thinking, if it is to apprehend God in blessed
vision, and unite itself with Him. But at the same time God
is the original source and ground of all things ; finite things
arise out of Him by emanation of what is absolutely simple
unfolding itself into an ever-advancing series of finite things,
that are always the more imperfect the farther they are
removed from God. In all things, therefore, there is only
one divine power and essence, but in diflferent degrees of per-
fection, so that every higher existence embraces the lower with
itself. Finite things long for a return to their origin, and this
is especially true of the human soul, which, banished into this
earthly life as a punishment for former sin, strives to soar aloft
to its higher home. There are two ways of attaining to this
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THE ANCIENT CHURCH. 17
goal: moral action and rational knowledge. Moral action
consists above all in the combating of the sensuous impulses,
and therefore in the strictest asceticism. Bational knowledge
is the pure thinking of Ideas, as it is by the vov<;, its higher
part, that the soul participates in the pure Ideas. The highest
goal is immediate intuition of the primal divine Being. This
is the true philosophy, the perfection of the spirit, and likewise
the highest happiness. By such intuition the soul becomes
completely one with the primal Being, and sinks in ecstasy
into deity.
Porphyry (233-304), the learned editor and commentator
of Plotinus, brings Neo-Platonism into a still closer relation to
Keligion. Religion and worship minister to the union of the
soul with God, and even in heathen doctrines and usages
he seeks to find a higher truth by spiritual interpretations.
Jamblich us (f 303), a Syrian influenced by the Oriental re-
ligions, turned himself still more to mythology, and came by
the personification of conceptions to a world of gods arranged
according to the system of triads. The liberation of the soul
is no longer man's own work, but is accomplished by the aid
of higher beings. The door was thus thrown open for the
entrance of all mantic and magic arts, for astrology and mere
mystic play with numbers. Neo-Platonism was thus lowered
to the level of theurgy by Jamblichus, and still more by
Proclus (412 - 85), until it became connected with every
conceivable superstition.
Neo-Platonism exerted a far-reaching influence even upon
Christianity. This appears most directly and most imdis-
guisedly in the mysticism of Dionysius Areopagita. He
determines the idea of God in a twofold manner. On the one
side God lies above all determinate individual existence ; He
is therefore without name, for He is the infinite, mysterious,
supernal God ; He is supra-divine, supra-perfect, supra-inex-
pressible, supra-incognizable. On the other hand, God is the
all-nameable, and as such the starting-point and original source
of all things. All finite existence arises through a gradual
eradiation and communication of God ; and therefore God is
vou L B ^ ,
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18 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
the only true Being in all existence But the farther things
are removed from God, so much the more imperfectly do they
image forth the primal One ; and hence evil is not a positive
thing, but only a defect. The first eradiation of the divine is
the heavenly Hierarchy, which consists of three stages, each of
three orders. To it corresponds the order that exists among
men in the three classes of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, and
their parallel in three classes of the people. This hierarchical
order merely serves the end of attaining reunion with Grod.
The goal of an immediate union with God is not reached by
moral conduct, nor even by objective knowledge ; but in
immediate contemplation, which presupposes entire renuncia-
tion of individual thinking and acting. This union can be
participated in at every stage only by the mediation of the
next higher stage. The communication involved is secret, and
known only to the initiated, according to the habit of the
ancient mysteries, and it appears to run out into empty
formulfti and allegorical interpretations of the ecclesiastical
symbols. Belief and knowledge, theology and philosophy, are
identical as regards their aim and substance. Faith is
an immediate certainty of the reality of the supersensible ;
knowing is a certainty of the same reality mediated by
conceptions; the highest object of both is God. Maximus
Confessor, a follower of Dionysius, represents the closer attach-
ment of this school to the doctrine of the Church. He strikes
out the offensive doctrine of emanation and refers the union
with God, not to the activity of the Church in liturgical
formulae and symbolical practices, but to the moral action and
the pure knowledge of the individual. How circumspect the
Church was in its relation to Neo-Platonism, is shown par-
ticularly by the case of Synesius. Called to the Bishopric of
Ptolemais (409), this scholar of Hjrpatia declared quite openly
in what points he deviated from the doctrine of the Church.
" Never shall I be able to believe," he says, " that the soul is
later in its origin than the body, or that the world and its
separate parts perish together ; and in the doctrine of the
resurrection, which I regard as a sacred allegory, I differ
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THE ANCIENT CHURCH. 19
entirely from the opinions of the multitude/' He declares
quite generally that light and truth, the eye and the people,
have a certain resemblance. " For as the eye cannot bear too
strong a light without being injured, and as darkness is more
wholesome to those who have diseased eyes, so do I maintain
that falsehood is advantageous to the multitude, whereas the
truth is hurtful to those who are not able to turn their mind
directly to the clearness of things. Should I therefore accept
the episcopal dignity, I must be allowed to hold by my
previous convictions and to philosophize within, while I out-
wardly expound fables to the people."
In this form the alliance with Neo - Platonism greatly
damaged the Church, and it therefore came soon to an end.
Already, as at all times, the practical ecclesiastical direction,
and not the speculative tendency, had gained the position of
chief influence upon the formation of the Church. Its home
was at Antioch, and it was based upon historical and philo-
logical exegesis. In 529 a decree of the Emperor Justinian
inhibited the Neo-Platonic philosophy on account of its oppo-
jsition to the ecclesiastical doctrines. And now Aristotle
obtained always more authority in the Greek Church. This
was quite natural, for as soon as the ecclesiastical dogmas
were developed on all sides. Philosophy was no longer required
for the determination of their actual contents, but was only
needed for the formal and external elaboration of what was
already established. For this purpose Aristotle, the founder
of formal Logic, was best fitted to furnish the aid required.
The first important Aristotelian was Joannes Philoponus
{e. 550). He was led, by applying the Aristotelian concep-
tion of oifiTia to theology and Christology, into the heresies of
tritheism and monophysitism. In the dogmatic compilation of
Joannes Damascenus (t c 754) the appreciation of Aristotle
is much more external. Nor does his Source of Krwwledge
(vfiyrf rpHoaet»^) really present anything new. The third part
is theologically the most important (exOeai^ äKpißfi<; 1^9 opdo-
ho^ov iriarem). It contains no special investigations nor
any new speculations about the doctrines of the Church, but
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20 DTTBODÜCTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE BEFOBMATION.
only brings together what distinguished teachers of the
Church before him had taught But even as a collection of
what was necessary and indispensable, as a summary of the
principal points in the doctrines already established by the
Church, the work obtained afterwards a wide influence when
originating power had decayed. This dogmatic compendium
is preceded by a condemnation of 103 heresies, and under
the K€<f>dKaui there is also presented a survey of formal
logic drawn partly from Aristotle and partly from Porphyry.
In the fact that logic is almost the only part of philosophy
that is taken into account, it is implied that philosophy has
not assigned to it the position of an independent source of
knowledge within theology, but that its function is that of
an Organon by which the theological knowledge otherwise
established is to be brought into a right form. Indeed, he
says expressly that as every artist uses an instrument, so
theology, the queen of the sciences, has her handmaid. As
physical and ethical knowledge have no value in themselves,
80 logic is only of importance in that it gives order to what
is certain of itself in the divine revelation. With the dog-
matic theology of John of Damascus the logic and ontology
of Aristotle came afterwards to the West ; and they came in
this relation of express subserviency to the theology of the
Church.
The Eoman people were never inclined to speculation. In
consequence they have neither produced independent results
in philosophy, nor have they even accomplished anything
noteworthy in their eclectic elaboration of Greek thoughts.
The Koman Church shows a similar aversion to speculation,
and accordingly it turns to the practical questions and
problems of life. The teachers of the Greek Church appre-
hend Christianity as a new kind of knowledge, as a deeper
knowledge of the truth. The Latin Fathers regard it as a
new power of life, as the transforming energy of the truly
moral spirit. The Greek thinkers dispute about questions of
doctrine, the Latin Churchmen contend about questions of
ecclesiastical discipline and constitution. The Greeks develop
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THE ANCIENT CHXTRCH. 21
the speculative doctrines of the Trinity and Christology ; the
Latins unfold the practical doctrines of Anthropology. The
Greeks sketch, at least partly, most comprehensive speculative
systems; the Latins hold to the letter of what has been
delivered to them as the already established doctrine of tlie
Church. The only theologian of the Western Church in
whom are found at least the b^nnings of a philosophical
consideration of his faith is Augustine (354-430).
Li the philosophical relation Augustine attaches himself
essentially to Plato, or rather to Neo-Platonism. The way in
which he establishes the certainty of our knowledge in oppo-
sition to the scepticism of the Academics reminds one of
modem thoughts. The necessity of certain knowledge is
deduced from our desire of happiness ; for mere striving after
truth would leave us unsatisfied. The same position is shown
by reference to our consciousness. We only know certainly
that we think ; and whoever is certain even that he doubts,
can no longer doubt that he lives, remembers, perceives, wills^
thinks, judges, and knows. In the self-consciousness the
point is therefore found which no scepticism can shake.
From this self-certainty of the rational mind an advance is
then made to wider cognitions. The mind reflects upon itself,
and thus it distinguishes the external senses, the internal
sense, and the reasoa To this ascending process on the
subjective side there corresponds a series of gradations on the
objective side, in the mere existence of bodies, the life which
embraces the lower sphere of the plant along with the higher
of the animal, and the rational self-conscious mind. It is
true that we can only believe that bodies exist; but this
faith is absolutely necessaiy, and without it we would fall
into worse error. Continued self-contemplation shows to us
Ukewise that our own mind is not the highest. The human
spirit is changeable, and therefore it must rise to something
eternal and unchangeable which is higher than itself. Higher
truths present themselves to it as its highest rules. It finds
the highest rules of knowledge in ideas, the highest rules of
beauty in ideals, and the highest rules of goodness in moral
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22 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
laws; and these are more perfect than the human mind,
because man judges by them and does not set himself up to
judge upon them. These rational truths are identified with
the Logos, or even with God Himself. " If there is anything
more exalted than truth, it is God ; and if there be nothing
more exalted, then truth itself is God." So far, then, philo-
sophy, and especially the Platonic philosophy, is capable of
leading to God as the highest of all beings. From this i)oint
of view Augustine can even say that theology and philosophy
in their perfection are identical, because both have to do with
the knowledge of God, the highest truth and the highest life.
But, on the other hand, he declares that philosophy is incapable
of attaining the highest knowledge, for she belongs at the same
time to the *' city of the devil," which, on account of the con-
fusion prevailing in it, is called BabeL From the insuflBciency
of philosophy is deduced the necessity of the divine revelation
which is to be accepted in faith. Faith is thinking with
assent. Upon faith all the relations of human society rest ;
and it is especially necessaiy in relation to divine things
which cannot be seen. Everywhere authority precedes
reason, and faith precedes insight; but at the same time
authority rests upon reason, in so far as one authority is
preferred on rational grounds to another. Religion thus
begins with faith, that is, with recognising and submitting to
the authority of the Church ; but we ought to exert all our
powers in order to advance from faith to rational insight
Apart from his peculiar anti-Pelagian views about sin and
grace, the system of Augustine bears a Neo-Platonic character
throughout, and it was especially through it that Neo-Platonism
was introduced into the theology of the Middle Ages.
After Augustine, the Eoman Church has no very dis-
tinguished theologians to show. In the following age a wide
influence was exercised by Boethius, Cassiodorus, and Isidorus
of Seville, and they were the means on the Western side of
introducing Aristotle into the Mediaeval theology. Isidore
(t 636) is the Latin parallel to John of Damascus. His
SeiUentianim Libri Tree formed a text-book of dogmatics and
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THE MIDDLE AGES. 23
morals which was afterwards much used ; it contains hardly
anything of his own, but only puts together the most important
utterances of the earlier Fathers about Christian faith and
practice. Boethius (470-520), although himself a Keo-
Platonist, has deserved especial credit by his translations of
the logical writings of Aristotle and Porphyry. These widely-
spread translations were for a long time the only means
through which the Christian Church of the Middle Ages
obtained its knowledge of Aristotle, and they laid the founda*
tions of his influence. Cassiodorus (c 479-575), in like
manner, only aimed at collecting what was most needed out
of the investigations of earlier times. His treatise. De Artibm
ae Disciflxnis Ziberalium Idterarum, which is based especially
upon Boethius, was adopted almost universally as a text-book
for centuries, and it considerably furthered the spread of the
Aristotelian philosophy. By these men the philosophy of
Aristotle was thus carried down to the Middle Ages.
III.
The Middle Ages.
The development of the Christian Church and doctrine has
not advanced in an uninterrupted course nor in a straight
lina In its own sphere it was also deeply affected by the
violent influences which began to break in upon the Boman
Empire hardly a century after its emperors had adopted the
new faith. like an all-destroying storm, the migrating
hordes swept over the Empire. The imperial government of
the world was broken to pieces, and new nations, mostly of
Crermanic origin, divided the inheritance. In the exuberant
vitality of natural power they subdued the seats of the
ancient culture. Then there arose a spiritual conflict with that
culture to which they had themselves in turn to yield. As
settlers in the Boman Empire, the new peoples had already
received the elements of a higher civilisation, and even the
germs of the Christian faith. This process of reception
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24 INTEODUCTOBY SURVEY DOWN TO THE BEFOBBIATION.
continued to go on slowly but incessantly. The hordes that
were victorious in the field of battle went for their religion
and spiritual culture into the school of the conquered nations,
and became like them the recipients of its spiritual life. The
Eastern half of the empire, with its capital, Byzantium, held
out somewhat longer than the Roman West, and even braced
itself in the sixth Century after severe overthrow yet again for
powerful deeds. But with the founding of Islam (c 622)
there arose a new religious power hostile to the Christians,
and full of blind fanaticism. It sought to spread the sway of
the prophet by war and the sword. Thus the Eastern Empire,
and Christianity along with it, lost one province after another.
In the East the position of things was otherwise than in the
West. The hostile power that prevailed in the former was
not merely national, but was essentially religious ; and hence
the Christian faith and Christian culture were not adopted by
the conquerors, but violently suppressed. It was with diffi-
culty that the Christians here and there even maintained their
existence. A free development under Mohammedan oppression
was not to be thought of. The north of Africa and Spain,
the south of Italy, and Byzantium itself fell, at least for a
time, into the hands of the Arabs ; and in consequence the
Germanic nations became almost the only representatives of
the Christian life and civilisation.
This revolution has to be carefully considered if we would
understand the spiritual life of the Middle Ages. In the
case of the Germanic nations all science was historically
•connected in the closest way with their religion. It is no
wonder, then, that for centuries the unity of this connection
continued the indubitable principle of their spiritual life.
Besides, the general state of civilisation among the Germanic
peoples must be noted. It was on the whole remarkably
scanty ; it had not a trace of science and culture, or of real
knowledge, secular or theological, empirical or speculative.
Christianity had taken its rise among a more highly cultivated
people, and it had been brought into objective forms under
the influence of the highly advanced civilisation of the Greek
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THE MIDDLE AGES. 25
and the Boman world. It was only by a strong sensualiza-
tion of its spiritual contents that Christianity could be brought
near enough to the uncultured German races for them to be
able to receive it And how often was the adoption of it
but a merely external and sometimes even a violently
compelled self-subjection under the formulae and practices
of the Church ! History has indeed furnished us from this
example with a magnificent proof of the educative value of
outward order ; but the inevitable consequence was, at least at
first, an unconditional belief on authority, and an accepting
of religion by the command of external power without inner
understanding of it Slowly, however, and gradually, the
advancing culture of the nations emancipated itself from
authority, till they began to try to comprehend what they
had hitherto only believed. Then there could for a time be
nothing more thought of but how to prove what was believed
as infallibly certain. The idea of impartial criticism could
not yet be entertained. Further, the fact has to be taken
into consideration that religion did not present itself to the
Germans as a new power of life. Only after it had worked
for a considerable period in the life of these barbarous peoples
could the creative and morally vitalizing power of Christianity
be recognised. But at first the new religion appeared as a new
doctrine, as a kind of knowledge, as incontestably certain truth.
All these conditions taken together determined an insepar-
able unity of theology and philosophy, and a merely subservient
relation of the latter to the former. This constitutes the
character of that spiritual tendency in which the distinguish-
ing peculiarity of the Middle Ages is so frequently seen, and
which is still designated Scholasticism. In it likewise is
found the origin of two distinct currents which, along
with Scholasticism, move the life of that period. Opposition
was raised from two sides against the mingling of theology
and philosophy. As soon as thought acquired independent
strength, it could recognise no authority over itself without
examining it ; and the religious life, as soon as it stirred with
power of its own, could not respect the formulated propositions
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26 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
of the dogmatic theology as a restricting limit, nor could it
let the spirit be quenched by the letter. The former tendency
constituted the intdUäual Enlightenment, the latter the religious
Opposition of the time. This opposition either broke through
all the established rules of doctrine and practice in the form
of a wild Fanaticism, or shot forth splendid blossoms in the
efflorescences of a profound Mysticism.
The name *' Scholastics," doctores seholastid, assigned at first
to the teachers of the septem Artes liberales, was afterwards
applied to all those who were engaged in the schools with
the cultivation of science, and especially of philosophy. The
expression Sdiolasticism thus came to be limited to that
method of the Mediaeval Philosophy which put philosophy
altogether into the service of the established dogmas of the
Church. Starting from the infallibility of the ecclesiastical
doctrine and the essential unity of philosophy and dogmatic
theology, the Scholastics employed philosophy in part as an
Organon for the formal construction of the absolutely true
theology, and in part they sought to adapt it to theology by
the accommodation of any existing divergences between them.
Joannes Scotus Erigena {c, 810-877) comes before what
is properly designated Scholasticism. He made the works of
Dionysius the Areopagite accessible to the West by his
translation of them into Latin, and he also drew the chief
principles of his system from them. He therefore represents
Neo-Platonic ideas, although many Aristotelian conceptions
are adopted by him, and he attempts to approach the doctrine
of the Church. Notwithstanding this, the Church afterwards
condemned his doctrine as heretical (1050 and 1225). In
his work. De dimsione Naiwroe, Erigena divides all existing
things into four classes: (1) the Nature which creates and is
not created; (2) the Nature which is created and creates;
(3) the Nature which is created and does not create; and
(4) the Nature which neither creates nor is created. The
uncreated creative Being is God, and to Him alone real
existence belongs. God is exalted above all existence. No
predicate can be applied to Him, not even the designation
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THE MIDDLE AGES. 27
essentia, when strictly taken, for God is super-essentiaL On
another side God is the source and foundation of all being
and essence, so that He is the substance of all finite things ;
God is the beginning, middle, and end of all things; yea,
God and Nature are one. The Trinity can only be maintained
when interpreted as follows. God is one essence in three
substances ; as being He is the Father, as wisdom the Son,
as life the Holy Ghost — The eternal archetypes of things
constitute the created Nature, which is again itself creative.
Those eternal archetypes are Ideas contained in the divine
wisdom or the Son. They are actualized by the Spirit in
finite things, which are all self-manifestations of God. — The
Nature which neither creates nor is created is identical with
the first nature, which is God, but not as being itself the
ground, but as constituting the final end of all things. All
physical and all intellectual Nature returns ultimately to God
in order to enjoy eternal rest in Him.
Under reference to the authority of Augustine, Scotus
Erigena asserts the identity of the true philosophy and the
true religion. " What else then is philosophy but an exposi-
tion of the rules of the true religion ? Hence it foUows that
true philosophy is true religion, and conversely true religion
is true philosophy .** Our philosophical investigations cannot
therefore come into conflict with our belief in the revealed
truth. In general it is true that reason has the pre-eminence,
if authority comes into antagonism with it. " Authority flows
from true reason, but never reason from authority. All
authority which is not justified by true reason appears to be
weak, whereas reason does not need the support of authority
if it is supported by its own powers." In particular, how-
ever, it is said that "nothing agrees more with the true
reason than the authority of the holy Fathers." The true
authority can never come into contradiction with reason,
because they both flow from the same source, which is the
divine wisdom. The true authority is the truth found by
reason, and it has been handed down to us in writing from
the Fathers.
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28 INTRODÜCTOBY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
Scotud Erigena, however, is a solitary gleaming light, a
meteor which passes over the midnight sky, to vanish im-
mediately again without leaving a trace behind. The tenth
Century is notorious for its spiritual barbarism, and for its
utter want of science, but it is the age in which there
flourished crass superstition and belief in external thaumaturgy.
It was only towards the end of the century that an estimable
scholar appeared in Gerbert, who is known as Pope Sylvester
IL (t 1003); but he was likewise alone without worthy
associates or scholars. It was not till afterwards that the
Scholasticism grew up which can be pointed to as achieving
anything. At first its only productions were in theology and
logic, after acquaintance with Aristotle had increased. It
falls into essentially distinct periods. Up to the middle of
the twelfth Century the writings of Aristotle were known
only in the Latin renderings of Marcianus Capella, Boethius,
and Cassiodorus; and these renderings were so incomplete,
that of the logical writings even the two Analytics and the
Topics were unknown. Plato again was known only from
the writings of the Church Fathers, with the exception of a
part of the Timoeus,
The chief problem and impelling power of this first period
of Scholasticism (up to the middle of the twelfth Century)»
lay in the controversy between Bealism and Nominalism
concerning the meaning of Universals (universcdia). In this
controversy the question is also discussed as to whether
Aristotle or Plato is to be recognised as the highest authority.
The close relation of this question to theology is apparent, and
it becomes manifest in the history of the time. Boscellinus,
a canon at Compi^gne, was accused of tritheism on account
of his application of the Nominalist doctrine to the dogma of
the Trinity. The "person" is in his view the substantia
rationaiis, and in application to Gk>d this notion can signify
nothing else. The three persons are eternal, and therefore
there are three eternal persons. There are accordingly three
separate persons, although they are one in will and power.
In 1092, Eoscellinus was compelled to recant at the Synod
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THE MIDDLE AGES. 29
of Soissons, but he continued to bold bis views, and certainly
in the bona fide belief that they were not contrary to the
doctrine of the Church. This incident decidedly contributed
to the result that in the next age Nominalism numbered but
few adherents, and most of them kept their views secret ; for
complete subordination was made incumbent upon all who
were inclined to the freer cultivation of philosophy. As
Petrus Damiani (e, 1050) expresses it: "Quae tamen artis
humanse peritia si quando tractandis sacris eloquio adhibetur,
lion debet jus magisterii sibimet arroganter anipere sed velut
ancilla dominae quodam famulatus obsequio subservire ne si
praecedit oberret"
Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) exercised important
influence upon the formation of the ecclesiastical doctrine.
In his work, Cur Deus Homo, Anselm develops the theory of
satisfaction which was afterwards universally received, and he
develops it purely out of principles of reason without the aid
of revelation. He also gives a twofold argument for the
existence of God. In his Monologium he develops the
Cosmological Argument by rising from the particular to the
universal in closest attachment to the realistic doctrine
represented by him. Universals have not merely an existence
immanent in individuals, but an existence that is independent
of the individual things. All relative goods presuppose an
absolute good, and the Summum honum is God. Every
existing being presupposes an absolute Being through which it
is ; but that absolute Being is itself through itself, and this is
God. The series in the scale of beings cannot go on without end ;
there must be a being above which there is no other, and this
highest Being is God. — The Trinity is also construed merely
from principles of reason. God has created all things
out of nothing. Things were eternally present in God's
understanding, and these archetypical forms are the inner
Word of God, just as thoughts are the inner word in man.
The speaker and the word spoken by him are two, and yet
in their essence they are one. Hence with this self-duplica-
tion there must again be connected a reconciliation and a
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30 INTRODÜCTOEY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
reunion, and this is the Holy Ghost In his Prodogium,
Anselm develops the Ontological Argument which seeks to
deduce the existence of Grod from the mere conception of God.
By God we understand the greatest thought which the mind
can think. " Credimus te (ix. Deum), esse bonum quo majus
bonum cogitari nequit." This thought is in our intellect It
is even in the intellect of the fool who says, in his heart, there
is no God. For when he hears the word "God," he also
understands by it the greatest object that can be thought.
This greatest object of thought cannot be in the intellect only ;
for in that case something greater might be thought as that
which was both in the intellect and in the outer sphere of
reality. The weakness of this argument is at once quite
correctly pointed out by Anselm's contemporary, Gaunilo, in his
treatise, Pro insipiente, when he says that Anselm confounds
the " in iiUdlectu esse " and " irUelligere aliquid esse" The real
being of an object must first be established if we are to infer
its predicates from its essence. By the same manner of
reasoning, the existence of a perfect island might just as
rightly be asserted. At the same time Anselm is a decided
representative of the unconditional subordination of philosophy
to theology. Knowledge rests upon faith ; and it is not to be
said conversely that faith rests upon previous knowledge.
" Credo %ut intelligam" not " irUelligo ut credam" It is true that
knowledge appears as higher than belief, and that it is a duty
to advance to knowledge. We receive the mysteries of
Christianity into ourselves at first by faith, but it is culpable
negligence if we do not strive afterwards to understand what
is believed. Yet it is not the free examination of the contents
of faith that is thereby meant ; faith has an eternal fixedness,
and it can neither be shaken nor can it gain a higher sted-
fastness by our examination. If we are not able to attain to
insight, we ought not to reject what is believed, but must bow
under the higher truth. "Christianus per fidem debet ad
intellectum proficere, non per intellectum ad fidem accedere,
aut si intelligere non valet, a fide recedere."
Scholasticism underwent an important revolution in the
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THE MIDDLE AGES. 31
twelfth Century when the . Logic of Aristotle, as well as his
Metaphysics and Physics, became known, in the Greek
language. The West learned of them at first through Arabian
and Jewish translations and renderings, and thereafter the
original Greek texts were brought from Constantinople to the
West and translated into Latin. This new knowledge seemed,
however, to be dangerous to the doctrine of the Church ; at
least it gave occasion to the movement of the Amalrichians,
and in a Synod held at Paris in 1209 the writings of
Aristotle were forbidden, and excommunication was threatened
against any one who might copy, read, or even possess them.
In 1225 this decree was so far modified that only the use of
the Aristotelian Metaphysics and Physics was forbidden,
while the employment of the Logic or Organen was allowed.
In 1231 a dispensation of Pope Gregory IX. determined that
those books which treated of the Natural Philosophy of
Aristotle should remain excluded from the schools until they
were purged from all suspicion of containing errors. At
last, in 1254, the free use of the metaphysical and physical
writings of Aristotle was also allowed. This change of opinion
in favour of Aristotle was founded upon the conviction that
dangerous pantheistic views sprang from Platonizing modifica-
tions of Aristotle, whereas the genuine Aristotle was thoroughly
free from danger and purely theistic. Aristotle thus gradually
gained unlimited authority in the Church. It was usual to
represent him as the " precursor Christi in Twiuralibusl* and to
put him on a parallel with John the Baptist as the ''precursor
Christi in grcUuitis." Aristotle was in a manner regarded as
the unconditional rule of truth, and his sole supremacy in the
Church continued undisputed for several centuries. And
under these circumstances some of the doctrines of Aristotle,
such as those concerning the soul and the eternity of the
world, which were contrary to the ecclesiastical dogmas, were
silently accommodated to the higher doctrinal truth of the
Church.
During this second period of scholasticism and on to the
restoration of Nominalism by William of Occam, the con-
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32 INTRODUCTOKY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
troversy about Universals fell almost entirely into the back-
ground. There prevailed an essential agreement thus far that
Universals have a threefold being, (1) htfort things, in so far
as the universal conceptions are in God as typical ideas and
are thought by Him ; (2) in things, in so far as individuals
have only being and subsistence through their participation in
the Universal ; and (3) after things, in so far as we by the
abstractions of our thought form universal conceptions that
embrace many particulars. In respect to our present subject
the distinction of Natural and Revealed Theology is especially
noteworthy in this period of scholasticism. The irrefragable
truth of the established doctrine of the Church and the mere
subservient relation of philosophy to it, was accepted by all the
scholastics at this time, and was in no way called in question
by them. But certain subjects were kept separate from the
ecclesiastical doctrine, and these were regarded as capable of
being attained by philosophy through the natural insight of
reason and from knowledge of Nature ; and they could there-
fore be materially demonstrated. All the other subjects were
excluded from such rational proof. It was necessary to accept
them upon the basis of divine revelation, and in relation to
them merely a formal use of reason was allowed.
4 Albertus Magnus, the Doctor universalis (1193-1280),
aims at excluding the specific doctrines of the Christian
Revelation from the sphere of what is knowable by reason.
"Ex lumine quidem connaturali non elevatur ad scientiam
Trinitatis et Incarnationis et Eesurrectionis." The human soul,
according to his view, can only know that of which it has the
principles in itself. Now as the soul finds itself to be a
simple substance, it cannot think the Deity as tri-personal,
since it is not raised to this point of view by a special gift of
grace and illumination from above.
Thomas Aquinas, the Doctor angelicus (1225-74), was the
head and most brilliant representative of scholasticism, and he
is still regarded as a high authority in the Catholic Church.
He represents Ij like manner a precise demarcation of the
limits of Natural Theology as distinguished from Divine
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THE MIDDLE AGES. 33
Eevelation. As r^rds the doctrine of God, by our natural
reason, and in particular by proofs ä posteriori^ we can attain
to the knowledge of what relates to the unity of the divine
nature. The uninterrupted chain of causes and effects in the
world necessarily presupposes the existence of God as a first
mover and a first cause. The order in the world enables us
to infer an intelligent orderer. The contingent existence
of the world points to a necessary being, and the degrees of
difiTerence in the perfection of finite things points to a most
perfect and most real Bemg. God is the absolutely simple
form ; He is pure actuality, actus purus. We cannot know
the Trinity by mere reason, but only with the aid of divine
revelation. Neither can the natural reason know of itself the
doctrines of the creation in time, of original sin, of the incar-
nation of the Logos, of the sacraments, of purgatory, of the
resurrection of the body, of the judgment of the world, and
the twofold final state. In regard to these doctrines, reason
may indeed refute the objections of opponents, and point out
certain analogies or establish some grounds of probability, but
it cannot prove them to be true from its own principles.
The acceptance of these doctrines rests upon the recognition
of Sevelation, and this is not founded upon the principles of
reason, but partly upon an internal invitation of God (interior
instincttis Dei irmtantis) and peirtly upon miracles. And
because these doctrines of faith are not denionstrable, the
believing acceptance of them is meritorious, since it is in fact
a proof of trusting in the divine authority. Hence faith is
primarily a thing of the will and not of the intellect. But as
Nature is the preliminary stage of grace, so in like manner
these truths as knowable by the natural reason are the pre-
ambula ßdei. These may certainly be proved by rationes
demonstrativcB ; but because many men are incapable of
grasping this demonstration, revelation has also brought them
by its supernatural communication to men.
Joannes Duns Scotus (1274-1308), the great opponent of
Thomas Aquinas, occupies essentially the same standpoint inrefer-
ence to this distinction between Natural and Eevealed Theology.
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34 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
The distinction waa combated from two sides : first, from
the assumption that all the propositions of theology may be
demonstrated ; and, secondly, on the ground of the opposite
view, that all theological propositions are indemonstrable.
Eaymundus LuUus (1234-1315), the inventor of the "Great
Art," undertakes to demonstrate the Catholic doctrines merely
with the aid of scientific dialectics as propositions of the
highest rationality. Eeason is not twofold, but only one;
hence there is also only one rational science. All the dogmas
of the Catholic Church are purely intelligible propositions which
can be proved by demonstration. The truths of revelation are
not supra-rational ; for how near does this lie to regarding the
supra-rational as irrational! The method of demonstration,
however, which LuUus applied to the conversion of unbelievers
and the convincing of doubters, appears to have had little
success. And he himself, along with this purely rational
demonstration, refers to the special evidence of the immediate
apprehension of religion.
William of Occam, the Doctor invincibilis 8, Venerabilis
inceptor (t 1347), was the renovator of Nominalism. Only
individuals, as individual things, have meaning. Univei'sals
as common conceptions are only abstractions made by our own
understanding from these individual things (concq>tu8 mentis
significantes univoce plura singularia). Therewith the way
was paved for the empirical method of thought through
observation of individual things and the derivation of universal
principles from inductive experience. And thereby the
approach to a Bational Theology was at the same time closed ;
for such a theology would only be possible on the ground that
God, like every other individual being, could be intuitively
known. All knowledge which transcends experience is thus
to be assigned to faith. To faith also belong the precepts of
morality ; for, in virtue of his unlimited freedom, God could
also sanction other precepts as good and just To this sphere
also belong all the principles of faith, and even the existence
of God cannot be proved either ä priori or ä posteriori.
Nominalism gained a wide influence, and the extent of it
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THB MIDDLE AGES. 33:
was shown by the controversy that now arose in almost all the
Universities between the Antiqui and the Modemi. Of the
latter we may here mention Peter D'Ailly (1350-1425), who
prepared the way for scepticism by the Nominalist assertion
that our own existence only, and not that of external objects,
is certain. John Gerson (1363-1429) may be likewise
mentioned as having been led by Nominalism to Mysticism.
According to his view, it is not worldly science and human
philosophy that lead to the truth, but it is receiving the
revelation of Qod in a coutrite and believing heart. Gabriel
Biel (t 1495) was also distiuguished for his clear exposition
of Nominalism. The Nominalistic separation of Theology and
Philosophy comes most decidedly to expression in Kobert
Holkot (t 1349) and in Baymund of Sabundi (c. 1430).
In the first book of Holkot's IktermiTuxtumea qtmrundam ques-'
iianum (the authorship of which, however, is doubted), the fifth
question treated of is the Trinity, and the common distinction
between a logica fidei and a logica naiwralia is asserted. The
Aristotelian logic is to be called formal, not in the sense that
it is valid and authoritative ** in omui materia," but only as
being such " quae per naturalem inquisitionem in rebus a nobis
sensibiliter nobis non capit instantiam." A logica singtUaris is
valid in theology, for in reference to the Trinity the principle
applies "* aliquam rem esse unam et tres," and in Christology
*' oportet concedi contradictoria cum speciftcatione diversarum
natorarum," a principle which the philosophers did not even
know. Baymund in his Theologia naturalis puts natural
theology by the side of revealed theology. The latter rests
upon immediate revelation presented in Scripture, and it
contains certain doctrines only thus attainable; the former
draws merely from the book of Nature by means of our natural
knowledge, and it therefore lies nearer to us. Ascending
through the four stages of " Being," " Life," " Sensation," and
" Beason," and supported upon external experience or observa-
tion of Nature, but still more upon internal experience or the
facts of our own consciousness, Ba}nnund advances proofs
for the existence and the triunity of God, as well as for the
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36 INTKODUCTOEY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
immortÄlity of the soul. The goal of his theology is the
complete union of the loving soul with God ; and it betrays
the influence of mysticism.
Along with Scholasticism we early find traces of a purely
inteUeäual EnligkUnment. One of its earliest representatives
appears in Berengar of Tours (t 1088). With regard to
Scripture, Berengar turns himself zealously against the
theologians of the letter, who have not the spirit that maketh
alive, nor any idea of a scientific method of interpretation«
They turn the Scriptures into a book of fables ; for liteirally
and verbally understood it contains a sensuous and utterly
untenable notion of God, with innumerable impossibilities and
absurdities. Tradition is uncertain, for unbounded abuse is
too often carried on in its name. Nor is the majority of a
Synod the right tribunal for finding the truth, since majorities
and truth fly asunder, while error and the majority are wont
to combine. Were all the decrees of Synods true, we would
have a truth that contradicted itself ; and as the later decrees
revoke the earlier ones opposed to them, we would thus have
a changing truth. Both of these positions are equaUy absurd.
Authority and truth are seldom identical, but are mostly
opposed to one another, and the authority is to be overturned
by the truth. Truth is to be sought for in reason; it is
grounded in the natural organization of human nature, which
makes us capable of finding the truth. Hence anything that
is "contrary to truth" is the same as being "contrary to
reason," or " contrary to rational principles " and " contrary to
conscience." " But nobody can be contrary to truth, contrary
to reason, and contrary to conscience." — The efibrts of Berengar
appear to have had some success ; and even Anselm repeatedly
laments about unbelievers who would not accommodate them-
selves to the faith unless they were convinced by rational
grounds, about people who were bold enough to raise objections
against the ecclesiastical dogmas, and believers who were at
least unsettled by such objections.
Peter Abelard (1079-1142) was the most impoitant
representative of this intellectual method and tendency. How
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THK MIDDLE AGES. 37
little he i^rds the tradition of the Church is shown bj his
bold cittack upon it in the treatise. Sic et Nan. His funda-
mental principle is that insight must give a foundation to
faith, for without insight faith is not certain of its truth.
Autboritj may sufiBce so long as reason has not jet attained
to full self-knowledge, but now it is no longer tradition, but
criticism or doubt that is the waj to truth. Reason is earlier
than any tradition; it is the principle of unity amid the
divisions of authority ; it gives what is necessary in distinction
from the contingency of special revelations. Season alone
has the right to supreme decision even in matters of religion.
Every alleged divine revelation must be known as true before
it oan be held to be divine. Along with these decidedly
rationalistic expressions, there are found, however, also others,
which declare, on the contrary, that Season is inadequate or
incongruent to divine things. In any case, the free exercise
of Season is only for the few who have attained the maturity of
reascm, and not for the great mass of the imnjature in thought.
Abelard also turns his attention to the religions that are
outside of Christianity. The heathen philosophy and poetry
is equally with the Old Testament a vehicle of divine reve-
lation before Christ. Even Prophets and Apostles have
borrowed much from the works of the Hellenic wisdom. It
is true that the doctrines of the pagan thinkers and poets are
referred again to the natural consciousness of Grod, while the
doctrines of the Old and New Testament are attributed to
immediate divine inspiration; but this difference of their origin
does not cause them to be reckoned as of different value. The
distinction consists properly in this, that what only a few
specially gifted individuals obtained insight into in the ancient
times was made universally known by Christianity. The
most important thinkers among the Greeks and Somans were
precursors of the gospel ; they were genuine thinkers before
Christ; but what only a few knew then has now become
manifest to the whole people without exception. This progress,
however, is accompanied by a regress that runs parallel to it;
for morality stood higher in the ancient times than it does
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'38 INTRODUCTOEY SÜBVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
under Christianity. The historical Beligions have nothing
peculiar in them, nor anything essentially new. Christianity
is as old as the world. It is only the name that is new,
along with its wide diffusion among all peoples and nations.
— If the heathen Wisdom and the Christian Religion are
essentially one, it immediately follows that they are to be
referred to the same source, which is the natural human
reason. This is done by Abelard in his Dialogue hetween a
Christian, a Jew, and a Philosopher, The Moral Law is
xinchangeable in all men, and therefore belongs to universal
human nature ; it is therefore older than all that is called
Supernatural Revelation ; it is the sufficient rule of action,
iand it extends to all natural religion. Hence it cannot be
abrogated by any authority, but is itself the supporting basis
of all that gives itself out as revelation. The Old Testament
confirms this in recording of Abel, Enoch, Abraham, and
others, who did not know the Mosaic Law, that they lived so
as to please God. The Mosaic Law contains, besides genuine
moral precepts that are inseparable from human nature, others
that were given only from regard to temporal relations, and
they are therefore changeable. These two elements stand
side by side without inner connection, and yet the whole Law
claims to be divinely revealed. Jesus brought nothing new,
but only restored the original truth. He was not the founder
of a new religion, but the restorer of the pure Moral Law.
The Sermon on the Mount contains the original doctrine of
Jesus ; it is essentially the renovation and deepening of the
eternal law of morality under continual reference to blessedness
as the highest good bestowed by God. The claim of Philosophy
to form a similar connection with virtue and morality, and
therefore to be completely identical with Christianity, is objected
to because Christianity as a historical reality stands on higher
ground. But the mode of proof leaves the reader in doubt as
to whether this is the author's true opinion. The philosopher
is astonished that Scripture proofs are brought forward against
him, and the Christian confesses openly that he has not pre-
sented them as his own opinion, but only as expressing the
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TH£ MIDDLE AGES. 39
faith of the Elders ; for himself he is at one with the
philosopher in not founding upon authority, but upon reason.
There were not wanting follow«^ of Abelard's teaching;
and other events of the time gave further occasion for the
formation of a critical attitude of mind towards the Christian
Heligion« The unfortunate issue of the Crusades, that had
been undertaken from a holy enthusiasm for the honour of
God, could not but shake the faith of a people accustomed to
see the judgment of God in success. Besides, the Crasades
led to a closer acquaintance with other religions and those who
professed them, and this necessarily gave rise to a more
unprejudiced comparison of them. The contemporary moral
corruption of the Church also aroused the opposition of the
CfUhari, and it could only be suppressed in streams of blood.
Moreover, Philosophy became alienated from Eeligion by the
wide-spreading influence of the Arabians, and especially of
Averroes.
Averroes or Ibnroshd (1126-98) represented a mode of
interpreting Aristotle which appeared to be particularly
dangerous to religion from its denial of personal individuality.
The intellect is represented as a substance completely different
from the soul, and there is only one intellect in all men. We
continue, indeed, to exist after death, but not as individual
substances ; we continue only as a constituent of the universal
understanding that is common to the whole human race. — It
is true that Averroes seeks to avoid antagonism to religion by
representing religion as containing the same truth as philo-
sophy, but only in the form of figurative representations.
All religions are true in so far as they contain incitements to
the moral life ; nay more, they are equally true in so far as
they contain these incitements in the h%hest degree that is
possible for those who receive them. All religions, again, are
false, and even equally false ; for along with the rational they
also contain the irrational, and they present superstition side
by side with morality. They are products of natural history
and of the natural human reason, which, by its very idea of
a supernatural revelation, shows how insufQcient thought of
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40 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
itself is. The ignorant multitude accept the precepts of
religion according to the letter ; the philosophers and all who
have knowledge pass by allegorical interpretation beyond
what is positive and understood as a fact of the spiritual life,
to what is the purely philosophical substance of the religion.
Hence there are many truths which hold in theology but not
in philosophy.
It was mainly in the University of Paris that Averroism
found its adherents and zealous representatives. It was
there that Simon of Toumay (e. 1200) first spoke forth his
view of The Three Impostors (Moses, Christ, and Muhamed).
For his proud audacity in venturing by his rational principles
and dialectical argumentations to weaken the Christian religion
even more than he had hitherto strengthened it, he is said to
have been punished by a sudden loss of speech. The Aver-
roistic distinction of a theological and a philosophical truth
found a point of attachment in the scholastic distinction of
natural and revealed theology. For this latter view also
recognises a twofold truth, one flowing from Natural Beason,
and the other from Supernatural Bevelation. This was not
far from the view that turned the supra-rational into the
irrational, and the two truths hitherto proceeding side by side
into the opposites of each other. Already in 1240 a series
of propositions which were partly Averroistic had been con-
demned at Paris as antagonistic to the Christian faith ; and
twelve other propositions were set up against them as forming
a rule of faith and doctrine. In 1247, John of Brescain
sought to escape the accusation of heresy by alleging that he
had not established his propositions theologically, but philo-
sophically. This excuse was not accepted, and the rigid
observance of the limits laid down by the Faculty between
Theologians and Artists was made a duty in the University of
Paris. This was without success, for, in 1270 and 1276, the
Archbishop of Paris again finds occasion to proceed against
the University. Not less than 219 propositions are cited,
regarding which it was asserted that they were true in
philosophy, but were not in accordance with the theological
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THE MIDDLE AGES. 41
faith. Among these were the following : " God is not triune ;
God cannot beget one similar to Himself; a futore resur-
rection is not to be admitted; there is onlj one intellect
numerically ; the world is eternal ; there are fables and false
statements in the Christian religion just as in the other
religions."* It is not probable that these philosophers actually
included themselves among the number of believers, or that
they felt in themselves any breach between faith and know-
ledge. Probably they employed this distinction only in order
to bring forward in a disguised form all possible objections
against religion, and to show that tliey were at least philo-
sophically tenable.
The freedom of rational thinking in opposition to theology
was thus expressed in principle. We then find it brought
into application by Boger Bacon (1214-94). This, however,
is not done &om any wish to attack or reform theology on
the ground of the natural knowledge of reason. In Theology,
according to Boger Bacon's view, faith stands first, experience
second, and understanding third. It is not Philosophy but
Theology that is supreme, for all the wisdom that is useful for
man is contained in the Scriptures. But, at the same time,
Boger Bacon aimed at the knowledge of Nature, and held
that this was to be attained by empirical inquiry, by exact
observation, and by careful experience, Nature being to him
the only authority, induction the only method, and experiment
the only means of proof. Thus the world is viewed as a
relatively independent whole, as a certain quantum determined
by immanent laws, and not changeable at every moment by
the interference of uncalculable powers. This was a view
which still lay far from the ideas of that age, and it neces-
sarily led to further consequences.
We will merely allude to the purely intellectual and often
directly anti-religious tendency of the time of Prederick II.
This tendency is sufficiently illustrated by the work entitled
De TrSms Imposuorilms. Comparison of the different religions
was then the order of the day. It sometimes led to the
rejection of all religion, and at other times to separation of
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42 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
the universal moral precepts of religion as what is essential
to it from its peculiar positive determination as something
incidental to it In William of Auvergne (t 1249) we find a
view which has even been attributed to more recent times as
their own peculiar discovery. It was already indicated by
some of the Fathers of the ancient Church, and was applied
at least to the Old and New Testament The view referred
to is the idea that the historical revelation is nothing but
a divine educoHon of the human race. According to William
of Auvergne, the Old Testament was given as a book of
elements to the Jewish people, that is, to the human race in
its childhood. The Jewish people being incapable of attaining
to deeper insight and to philosophical knowledge, were to be
trained only to moral obedience and to learned knowledge.
Hence all the commandments were given as positive injunc-
tions of God ; and, on account of the sensuous nature of the
people, they were corroborated by promises and threatenings.
The people were, however, destined to attain gradually to
insight through the continuous divine guidance. Christianity
is the higher Bevelation. It agrees partly with the Moral
Law of the Old Testament, and, like it, with the natural
moral law; and it is also partly a fulfilment of what was
prophetically announced, as well as a rejection of what was
only ritualistic. Mohamedanism is represented as an excep-
tion from this development; it is even a i*etrogression as
compared with the Old Testament
The Beligiaics Opposition referred to made itself felt as soon
as the new religion laid hold of men as a new power with
inner irresistible energy. It was then felt that religion is
much too rich to be confined to the narrow formulae of a
dogmatic system. When such internal experience becomes
immediately represented in objective doctrinal expressions, it
produces the forms of Mysticism. In religion man feels him-
self one with his God. When this immediate feeling of unity
with (Jod is made a principle of knowledge, we obtain the
expression of the essential unity of the soul with God in
reason and will This principle is the centre of all Mysticism,
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THE MIDDLE AGES. 43
whether it leads in a more spiritual way to the appeal to
immediate revelation, or, adopting a more rational method,
sees in knowledge the means of attaining to complete union
with God.
The first beginnings of a mystical movement, after the time
of Scotus Erigena, show themselves in the twelfth Century.
They are connected with the names of Hildegard of Bingen
(t 1197) and Elizabeth of Schonaü (t 1165). Among the
celebrated teachers of the Church who belong to this school
may be mentioned Bernard of Clairvaux (f 1153), Hugo of
St Victor (t 1141), Eichard of St Victor (t 1173), Bona-
Ventura (t 1274). Others were excluded from the Church
as heretics because their fanatical views went too far. Among
these was Amalrich of Bena (1203). Of his doctrine only
three propositions have been transmitted to us with certainty :
(1) God is all ; (2) every Christian must believe that he is a
member of Christ, and this faith is as necessary to blessed-
ness as the faith in the birth and death of the Bedeemer ;
(3) no sin is imputed to those who walk in love. In these
propositions there is already clearly enough expressed the
Pantheism and the spiritualistic rendering of Christology,
along with the historical denial of its facts, and that moral
libertinism, which the later followers of Amalrich brought
more clearly into view. These " Amalricans," as they were
called, adopted, perhaps only as an external ^me for holding
their representations, the theory of three ages of the world
propounded by Joachim of Floris (f 1202). This theory
held that the indwelling of God in Abraham was the Age of
the Father, the indwelling of Gkxl in Mary was the Age of
the Son, and the indwelling of God in the Amalricans was the
Age of the Holy Spirit By this Holy Spirit they can hardly
have understood the natural Beason, but rather the immediate
influences of the divine Spirit They reject the sacraments
and all external actions, because the Spirit works inwardly.
The stirrings of fleshly desire within them are not sin, because
the Spirit of God has become flesh in them. Hence they
proclaimed and practised free lova
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44 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
At the Synod of Paris in 1209, the doctrines of Ainalrich
and the writings of David of Dinant were condemned. Of
the latter we know bnt little. He was accused of having
taught that the materia prima, or the substratum of all
corporeal things, the vwi or the principle of all individual
souls, and God or the source of the heavenly Essences, were
one and the same, because they are indistinguishable in being.
The " Ortliberians " were closely related to the Amalricans.
They held that the external orders of the Church are of no
value, and that the rejection of them when conjoined with
rigid asceticism leads to the highest perfection, and even to
the reception of immediate divine revelation. Thereby man
is raised to God ; nay more, by a process of deification he
attains, as his highest goal, complete oneness with God. —
Joachim of Floris (t 1202) represents the same tendency.
Founding upon special revelations of the divine Spirit, he
wished to carry back the priests to an apostolical abnegation
of the world, and by a rigid monastic life in place of fleshly
extemalization to attain to the true inward spiritualization,
and thus to bring about a new period of the Church. Joachim
gained adherents particularly among the Franciscans, who
were already strongly characterized by a tendency to fanati-
cism derived from their founder. The outlines of Joachim's
Eternal Gospel may be summarized as follows. The history
of the Christian Church runs through three great periods : the
Age of the Father, extending from the creation of the world to
John the Baptist ; the Age of the Son, from the incarnation of
Christ to the year 1260 ; and the Age of the Holy Spirit^
which was regarded as beginning with that year. This last
period is prepared by a boundless increase of abominations in
the Church and life, as well as by the appearance of the
Antichrist, who is more or less distinctly indicated as
Frederick XL The characteristic of this new Age is to be
derived from the contemplative life in which, with the right
understanding of Scripture, the whole of previous history will
come to appear in its true light — These views were very
widely spread by the Brethren and Sisters of the Free Spirit, or
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THE MIDDLE AGES. 43
the Beghins and Beghards, after the middle of the thirteenth
Century. They likewise boasted of immediate revelations;
and they regarded themselves, in virtue of these revelations,
as above the external institutions of the Church in doctrine
and practice. They professed to realize God in their imme-
diate experience, and therefore did not need religious instruc-
tion from others. They did not even require the precepts of
Christ, for what the Spirit said to them was truth. On the
basis of these views, the Church with its external orders was
violently attacked. It was declared to be a sin to confess to the
priest Masses, confessionals, confirmation, ecclesiastical fasts
and festivals, the worship of saints, and all such institutions
are to be rejected. There is no sin for one who is united
with God ; for nothing is sinful which is not reckoned to be
such.
From this fanatico -spiritualistic tendency we must carefully
distinguish that sober and profound mysticism which culmi-
nated in the Middle Ages in Meister Eckhart (1260-1328).
He leans, indeed, everywhere on the doctrines of earlier thinkers,
but, with bold originality and peculiar power, he knows how
to breathe new life and his own spirit into the elements
derived from others. Eckhart seeks to comprehend the essence
of God as a process in which beginning, middle, and end pass
eternally into one another. The common principle to which
everything must be referred is the Essence of being. It is
the Primality which contains all things ; it is God in His
essence as the Deity. This essentiality constitutes a beginning
in God Himself; it is, however, not a beginning in time, but
a b^inning that does not begin, as the distinction of the
Divine Persons is present from the first in the singleness of
an unmodified being. ; The primal essence, or the Deity, is
tiierefore the all-potenü possibility of all things. The simple
distinctionless Being which contains the ground of all existence
is Nature ; it is the first extemalization or objectivation of the
essence, but it is not really a mode of being different from the
Essence ; it is the essence as tqrja and image. The Essence
is also called " Father," and Nature is called " Word ; " but as
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46 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
the impersonal WorA The Deity becomes Person or God by
the union of Essence and Nature. This sudden starting into
self is cognition, and this cognition is the birth of thought.
God's thought of Himself constitutes the Person of the Son.
Father and Son now know each other as articulated and com-
pleted unity ; and in this knowledge the Essence apprehends
itself in a new form as personal Commonwill or as Holy
Spirit. This Commonwill is the Being of the Deity satisfied in
itself ; it is the love of the Father and the Son. This process
of self-revelation is an act that eternally renews itself, and
only on this ground is God the Living God. For life is a
circling movement in which the end continually returns into
the beginning, and the beginning continually resolves itself in
the end.
Finite things are in the Deity, and so far they have essence,
but all essence is grounded in God. This does not assert the
eternity of things, nor even the eternity of the determinate
ideas of individual things, but only that the Deity, as the
original ground of all being, also contains the possibility of all
things in Himself. Creation, like all revelation, is the work of
the tri-personal Gk)d. The Father in looking upon the Son
begets and brings forth the creaturely forms or the world of
Ideas, and after it the world of manifestation, both out of
nothing. As regards the order of the world, all life, according
to Eckhart, passes in gradual transition and enfeeblement
from the higher Essences to the lower. This transition takes
place in such a way that the higher member of the series,
with its essentiality) is continually in the lower member, and
the lower has at the same time its proper home and resting-
place in the higher. Hence the higher, by its influence,
illumines and strengthens the lower, and the lower again longs
to rest in the higher. The end of Creation is that the gracious
God may communicate Himself in the Creation, and in the
highest measure to man, as the image of the Trinity. Every
creature must be subservient and minister, in order that man
may reach his goal ; and, at the same time, it is man who, as
the higher unity of the lower creation, brings it back to God
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TRANSITION TO THE REFORMATION, 47
In order that men may be again united with God, a Man must
appear with this unity; and the Man who so appears is
Christ. Eckhart, however, lays little importance upon the
historical person of Christ, or upon His death ; he sees therein
only an example of what ought to happen with us all upon
the way of deification. '' God has become man that I might
become God ; God has died that I might die to all the world
and to all created things." This unification with God is the
highest aim of our striving, but it is by no means the annihila-
tion of the individuality. Neither does the thinking of the
divine Person become the thinking of the man, nor is the
thinking human personality made to vanish by the union with
God, nor is there required any regression of the human life
into mere passivity. It is only the mode of cognition that
becomes other than it was ; it is then no longer a sensuous
mode of knowledge, but it becomes mediated by the nature of
God. Hence even our personality shall not be annulled. But,
as in sensuous cognition we pass so much into one with the
object cognized that, as Eckhart expresses it, the wood that is
seen is our eye, and our eye is the wood, so in this union
with Grod our personality is restored to its true personality by
becoming active in and with the personal God.
Eckhart founded a school with many adherents. Its chief
representatives were Joannes Tauler (t 1360), Heinrich Suso
(t 1365), and the author of the old work called the German
Theology.
IV.
Transition to the Reformation.
With the Middle Ages new nations appeared on the stage
of history. The Church, the only spiritual power which was
saved from the terrible catastrophe of that age, undertook their
education, and every impartial student must testify that it
achieved a great result But as the individual outgrows the
instruction of his teacher, and as he ought to be led by it to
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48 INTBODÜCTOEY 8URVEY DOWN TO THE EEFOKMATION.
recognise the truth afterwards by his own judgment, and to
choose the right, so it is likewise with the nations. In the
course of centuries the Germanic peoples had come to maturity
under the guidance of the Church, and now their independence
began to show itself. Hitherto the only spiritual interest
that had received effective care and furtherance was that of
religion, but now the spirit of the time demanded also the
active and thoroughly independent cultivation of the secular
sciences. Hitherto the Church had presented itself in the
sphere of religion as the Divine Institution through whose
mediation alone the individual could approach his God; but
now the religious subject claimed to be able even without this
intervention to obtain peace with God, and he becomes zealous
against the unbounded secularization that professed to be
divine. The liberation of the mind and the self-activity of the
individual indicate the fundamental tendency of the powerful
revolution which was effected in the fifteenth and sixteenth
Centuries, and which separates the Modem world from the
Middle Ages. We call it the Reformation, borrowing the name
from its transformation of the religious and ecclesiastical rela-
tions ; but no side of life remained unaffected by it. An
important change came over the social relations with the rise
of the influential class of burghers, to whom commerce and
trade brought prosperity, while their dwelling together in cities
made them secure. Numerous inventions, such as gunpowder,
the mariner's compass, and the art of printing, aroused the
mind of the age, and enlarged the circle of vision. The dis-
covery of distant continents and of the ocean routes to the
East Indies and America, turned the attention to distant lands
and to entirely strange relations undreamed of before. The
science of Copernicus and Kepler compelled men to think of
the earth as no longer the centre of the universe, but as a
planet circling around the Sun along with other planets ; and
this thought, in consequence, completely transformed their
whole view of the world. Far-reaching results were to follow
from the revival of the classical studies. The Middle Ages
had known but a few fragments of the rich treasures of the
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TRANSITION TO THB BEFOEMATION. 49
Greek mind, and, moreover, most of them bad been only
accessible in the Latin translations of ecclesiastical writers.
But when, in the fourteenth Century, the danger that threat-
ened Constantinople made a reconciliation with Borne appear
desirable, and above all, when, after the fall of the city in
1453, many Greek scholars found a refuge in Italy, the
Hellenic antiquity seemed to arise into new life. It was an
entirely new world which thus appeared upon the stage, a
world that had existed without the knowledge of Christianity,
and yet with a greatness of its own that commanded respect.
Italy was seized first by this spirit ; and fertilized by that
Hellenism which had just been discovered again, the Italian
poetry attained its highest bloom in Dante, Petrarca, and
Boccaccio. The liberal patronage of the highly cultured
Medicis made Florence long the centre of all the scientific
strivings of the time. The less deeply the Christian religion
had struck its roots in many of the minds of the age, so much
the greater was the temptation for them to turn with the re«
novation of the Hellenic spirit to a revival of paganism.
How frequently this occurred is shown by the general lamenta-
tion that the "Humanists" showed themselves particularly
indifferent or even hostile to religion. And even where men
held fast ontwardly to the ecclesiastical forms, yet the inner
estrangement came to light in the decay of the moral life and
in the more confidential utterances about religion. This was,
for instance, the attitude of the Popes of that age. In such
circles even the view of religion expounded by Macchiavelli
(1469-1527) found an echo. He takes good care not to
attack decidedly the Church and her doctrine; he is even
firmly convinced of the high value of religion for the wellbeing
of the people. But he regards it merely from this point of
view, as an extremely useful means of keeping the multitude
in check ; and hence, being only too often invented by prudent
statesmen, it is worthless for all who see through this decep-
tion. Thomas Campanella complains in bitter words about the
wide spread of this view of the nature of Keligion.
Philosophical inquiry was also influenced by the Human-
uigitizea oy >^jVJVJV IV^
50 INTKODUCTOKY SUEVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
istic movement The long supremacy of Aristotle, which
had lasted for centuries, was shaken. The attempt was
naturally first made to purify and animate the dry formalism
of the Aristotelian logic by combining it with rhetoric, and by
introducing examples from the writings of the ancients. This
effort is represented by Laurentius Valla (1407-1457), well
known as the first scientific opponent of the Constantinian
donation, and by Eudolph Agricola (1442 - 1485), and
Ludovicus Vives (1492-1540), all precursors of Peter Ramus
(tl572). The authority of Aristotle, however, was far more
endangered by a controversy about the interpretation of him.
Hitherto Averroes had been accepted as the only safe guide in
the explanation of the great Greek thinker ; he was regarded
as " the Commentator " par excellence, and Aristotelism was
nothing but Averroism. There was still no lack of repre-
sentatives of Averroes, the most important of whom were
Gennadius, Patriarch of Constantinople (tl461), George of
Trapezunt (1396-1486). In the school of Padua, the
Averroistic doctrine held its ground till the middle of the
seventeenth Century. To the Humanists, however, Averroes
appeared as barbarous, and, in so far as they kept to Aristotle,
they chose for themselves at least one other leader, the
ancient commentator Alexander Aphrodisiensis. The Church
assumed the same attitude to both parties, for they both denied
the immortality of the soul, and it was of the utmost in-
diflference to her that the Averröista founded this denial on
the unity of the intellect in all men, while the Alexandrists
founded it on the natural mortality of the individual souL
The Lateran Council of the 19th December 1512 condemned
both views.
Petrus Pomponatius (1462-1525), a teacher of philosophy
and a physician at Bologna, was the chief representative of
the Alexandrists. He expounded his views regarding Im-
mortality in the work. De Immorialüate Animce, 1516. He
held that what thinks and feels in man is necessarily one and
the same, because in one subject there cannot exist several
substantial forms. Thinking and willing appear as immaterial
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TRANSITION TO THE REFOEMATION. 61
and immortal, and the lower powers of vegetation and sensa-
tion as material and perishing. Hence it is doubtful whether
we should say that the soul is essentially mortal and only
relatively immortal, or that it is essentially immortal and
only relatively mortal. The former expression, however, is
more correct, because even knowing and willing are dependent
throughout on material impressions and corporeal organs.
The idea of immortality has been excogitated by prudent
politicians in order to give an impulse to those who can only
be induced to do good by the prospect of eternal reward;
that he who is really virtuous will, even though believing
in the mortality of the soul, do what is good for its own sake.
The treatise, De Incantationibtts 8. de Naturalivm Effectuum,
admirandorum Causis, investigates the wonderful processes in
Nature, and declaims against the view that these are to be
referred to the operation of spirits, angels, and demons, for
everjrthing happens from natural causes. Among these
natural causes the stars take the first place, and they exercise
a far-reaching influence upon men and their fates. Even the
imagination of the credulous is taken into account in the
explanation of cures and such like. His work. De Libertate^
seeks to combine the Stoical view of the world as a regulated
and all-comprehending cosmos with the Christian idea of the
Creator ; and this leads to the rejection of the freedom of the
human will. In all these three writings Pomponatius comes
to assertions which are contrary to the doctrine of the Church.
Nevertheless he wished to subject his own doctrines to those of
the Church, according to the principle, "I believe as a Christian
what I cannot believe as a philosopher." He is therefore a
representative of the theory of " the double truth," although
it was expressly condemned by the Lateran Council of the
19th December 1512 in the words, "As what is true can
never contradict what is true, we determine that every pro-
position which is contrary to the truth of the revealed faith
is entirely false." Pomponatius tries to find a deeper founda-
tion for the assertion of a double truth. Reason, he says,
is twofold; there is an intellectual reason and a practical
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62 INTEODUCTORY SÜEVEY DOWN TO THB KEFOKMATION.
reason. Philosophy rests upon the speculative reason and
investigates natural truths ; theology rests upon the practical
reason and regulates life and morals. The former is most
unequally distributed ; the latter is the common inheritance
of all men.
Besides the Church, there was another spiritual power by
which both the Aristotelian Schools were equally detested as
irreligious. This was the newly - revived Platonism of the
time. The first impulse to the revival of the Platonic
doctrine was given by Georgius Gemistus Pletho (1355-1452).
He came from Constantinople on the occasion of the treaties
of union at the Council of Ferrara-Florence, and he remained
many years in Italy. His exposition of Plato was, however,
accompanied with an obscure intermixture of Neo-Platonic
thoughts. In one of his writings he accentuates the dis-
tinction between Aristotle and Plato, and impugns the former
in the most important points. In the " Nofioi,'* which have
come down to us only in fragments, he seeks, on the basis
of the Platonic wisdom, to bring about a reform of the whole
religious, political, and moral life. Happiness is the common
aim of all men ; it is only the means applied to attain it that
are different. True happiness consists in the full satisfaction
of our whole nature ; and it therefore rests chiefly upon a
knowledge of man and of the universe. The world points
to a First Cause which, while an absolute identity, contains
everything in itself in unity, and produces everything out
of itsel£ This cause is described as the good, and it is the
first stage of existence. The second stage is formed by the
gods of the second order, that are generated immediately
by God as an image like to Himself, and they are compre-
hended in Poseidon, the cause of all forms. Among them are
distinguished the genuine and the bastard sons of Zeus. The
former, as the Olympians, beget the immortal beings, or gods
of the third order, divided into the stars and demons ; the
latter, as the Titans, with the assistance of the planets, beget
the mortal beings. Man is the centre between the mortal
and the immortal beings, for his spirit is derived from the
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TfiANSinON TO THE REPOKMATION. 53
Olympians and his body from the Titans. The highest virtue
is religion, for by it we enter into fellowship with the higher
gods. The struggle thus inaugurated between Aristotelianism
and Platonism was continued by his follower Bessarion (1389-
1472), Patriarch of Constantinople, well known for his in-
clination towards a union with Boma He points out that
Plato was more akin to Christianity than Aristotle, and was
therefore indispensable as auxiliary to Apologetics. He
also lays the foundation of a more impartial and purely
historical study of the two philosophers.
Marsilius Ficinus (1433-1499) obtained great influence
by his translations of the writings of Plato and Plotinus. At
his instigation Cosmo de Medici founded the Platonic
Academy at Florence. His own views were chiefly expounded
in his treatise, De Rdigione Christiana^ and his Thedogia
Platanica de Immortalitate Animorum^ L xviii The latter
work begins with the following argument: "Were man
not immortal, he would be the most unhappy of all beings,
for in this world he leads the most unhappy life on account
of the unrest of his soul) the weakness of his body, and his
many wants. It is impossible that man, who is raised nearest
to the Deity by religion, should fall below all other creatures
in respect of happiness. Hence we must ascribe to him
immortality." This indirect argument is accompanied by a
direct proof. Ascending from the lower to the higher, Marsilius
traverses the whole series of existences: Corpus, gualitas,
anima, angeltts, Deus. Body is without motion, and merely
passive. Form or quality is active indeed, but along with
matter it is divisible. The Soul is always the same, only
it is variously active in time. Angels are likewise taken out
of time, and do not strive after perfection, because they have
already complete reality. God is the highest being; He is
unity, truth, and goodness in one. There is only one Grod,
and He is of infinite power. He is eternal and omnipresent,
and as such He moves and preserves all things. By his own
nature God is Elnowing and Willing. He knows everything
in Himself, as the original source of all life, and the arche*
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64 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION,
typal form of all things; for things are nothing else than
expressed thoughts of God. His Will is at once free and
necessary ; free, in so far as no higher power commands Him ;
and necessary, in so far as the sufficient ground for all action
lies in His own essence. In the succession of the five stages
mentioned above, all being proceeds from God. The soul
forms '* the mean,'' and it is therefore the connecting member
between the higher and the lower stages of being. There are
three kinds of rational souls : the soul of the world, the souls
of the spheres, and the souls of animated beings. Three
principles govern the world. From God comes the Unity in
all plurality ; from the Spirit, comes the Order of all fulness
and variety; and from the world-soul comes Motion. The
souls of the spheres move each its sphere in its own circle,
and they also exercise an important influence upon earthly
things. All finite things, even earth and water, are ensouled ;
for they contribute to the generation of beings with souls.
All souls are immortal, because they move themselves, and
have a substantial existence, and are connected with the
divine, and are indivisible, and so on. The human soul is
indivisible and divine ; it is all-present in every part of the
body ; it is independent of matter, and is only dependent
on God. It is em error to suppose that there is one common
soul in all men, rather has every man his own particular indi-
vidual soul. The Soul rises through the four stages of Sense,
Imagination, Phantasy, and Intellect to true insight. It is
nourished, not by earthly matter, but by the truth, and finds
itself always the more, the more it separates itself from the
body and everything material. The striving of the soul is
after union with God, but this goal will only be completely
attained in the world beyond. — Two wings carry the soul
towards union with God ; they are Knowledge and Action.
The former carries it by the way of philosophy ; the latter by
the way of religion, and they stand in the closest relation to
each other. Eeligion is entirely peculiar to man. All the
other endowments which distinguish man are found likewise
among the lower animals, but not this relation to the divine.
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TEANSrriON TO THE REFORMATION. 55
To man, on the other hand, reKgion is as natural as neigh-
ing is to the horse, or barking to the dog ; for it springs " a
Deo atqae humana speciei communi natura." Hence all
nations have religion, the worship of Gk>d, and belief in an
eternal life. The essence of religion consists in the union of
the soul with God; it rests upon the essential affinity of
the Soul and Grod, and it strives everywhere to unite with
itself what has affinity to it. As only an eye that is full
of light sees light, and only the ear that is filled with air hears
sound, so it is only the soul that is filled with God that can
rise to God, and it can rise to God just so far as it is
illuminated by divine light and kindled by divine warmth.
The Christian Eeligion is the most perfect religion. In Christ
the eternal Word became man, and this was entirely in con-
formity with the nature of God, on account of the most
inward relationship between Grod and man. The end of the
incarnation was that man might be again raised to God by
the Word of God. Christ worked by His teaching and His
virtuous example. His vicarious sufferings are not exactly
denied, but they are pressed completely into the background.
Of the representatives of the reviving Platonism, the best
known is John Pico of Mirandola (1463-1494). In addition
to the Platonic doctrine, he sought to turn to account the
Jewish Kabbala, a philosophical literature of doubtful origin
and mysterious contents. Philosophy has the same goal as
theology ; and this is the highest good in perfect communion
with God. The writings of Moses are the source of all
wisdom, for all the philosophers have drawn their knowledge
from them. The most correct and valuable interpretation of
these writings is contained in the Kabbala. In order to be
able to make a really fruitful use of these authorities, we
need immediate illumination by the Holy Spirit. In the
substance of his doctrines, Pico moves throughout in the
well-known lines of Neo-Platonism. The idea of God is
defined on two sides. In Himself God is determined as the
absolutely simple and infinitely perfect Being, elevated above
everything that is finite and inexpressible, because He is
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56 mTRODÜOTORY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
unthinkable. In relation to things, Grod is represented sis the
real immediate essence of all that exists, as the cause of all
things, and as the fulness of all being. Over against Grod
stands matter, as the formative object of the divine opera-
tions ; according to the measure of its resistance, the every-
where equal power of Grod works out in it a graded series of
finite beings. These fall into three Worlds, with nine orders
in each. In the angelic World, God Himself forms the
cent^ ; in the heavenly world, the centre is the tenth heaven,
the Empyrean ; in the earthly world, the central point is the
first matter. Man as the microcosm forms the central
member between the upper and the lower world ; and to the
three worlds correspond the three parts of His being, the
rational soul, the spirit, and the body. By a free decision of
wül at the Fall, man turned himself away from God ; by the
redemption, he was to be led back to Him again. Complete
union with God is the goal towards which man, in his desire
after happiness, strives. The way to it is shown by philo-
sophy as well as by theology ; it leads, through purification
from the influence of sense and through the immediate
illumination of knowledge, to perfection, which, however, is
only to be really attained in the other life.
Justus lipsius (1547-1606) is named as the renovator of
Stoicism, but we do not find that his efforts had much success.
On the other hand, the renewal of scepticism by Montaigne
(1532-1592) had considerable influence. According to
Montaigne, philosophy seeks true science and certainty. The
dogmatic philosophy asserts that it has reached this goal ;
the Academics are satisfied with probability instead of truth ;
the Sceptics or Pyrrhonians refrain from pronouncing judg-
ment The last view is the only tenable one. All our
knowledge rests upon the senses; but the senses are un-
reliable ; and accordingly there at once arises a conflict about
sense-perception. The number of the senses is limited, and
hence the possibility that things possess qualities which
necessarily remain hidden from us. Again, the senses
perceive only their own modifications, and hence the un-
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TRANSITION TO THE REFORMATION. 57
certainty as to whether the things themselves are not perhaps
quite different from their appearances. Our knowledge of
God is still more uncertain. We know God only according
to our limited power of apprehension. The infinite power,
beauty, and goodness of God, however, bear no comparison with
such insignificant beings as we are. Our practical judgments
are just as uncertain. In nothing do we find satisfaction, but
we long continually for more splendid things, which, however,
could satisfy us just as little. In the estimate of things the
same difference of opinion prevails as in regard to moral
precepts. The voice of conscience is also dependent on
custom, education, and other influences. We must accordingly
renounce all inquiry of our own ; and hence we can obtain
the truth only by a believing acceptance of the divine revela-
tion.— ^These thoughts were entirely borrowed from the
ancient Sceptics; and neither Charron (t 1603) nor Sanches
(t 1632), who followed in the same track, passed beyond them.
Humanism spread from Italy into Germany. We find its
indifierence to what is positive in the Christian religion in
the confidential utterances of Mutianus (1472-1526). The
religion of Christ, he says, did not begin merely with His
incarnation, but it existed from eternity, like the generation
of Christ from the Father. For the true Christ, the proper
Son of God, as Paul says, is nothing else than the Wisdom of
Grod, which was not communicated only to the Jews in the
narrow region of Syria, but also to the Greeks, Romans, and
Grcrmans, in spite of the difference of their religious practices.
There is only one God, and one Goddess, but many forms and
names. This, however, is not to be proclaimed openly, but
must be veiled in science like the Eleusinian mysteries ; for,
in matters of religion, we must use the covering of fables and
enigmaa Acute as are the judgments which Mutian expresses
in his letters on the Biblical Scriptures, and all the external
ecclesiastical institutions, he yet takes care not to shake the
opinions of the multitude, for without them everything would
sink into chaos. John Eeuchlin (1455-1522), well known
from his controversy with the Dominicans of Cologne,
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58 INTRODUCTOEY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION.
furthered the study of the classical antiquity by the produc-
tion of a Latin dictionary and a Greek grammar. Stimulated
by Pico of Mirandola, he applied himself to the mysteries
of the Kabbala, and by his Hebrew grammar (1506) he
introduced the study of the Hebrew language into German
science. Erasmus of Rotterdam (1467-1536), by his edition
of the Greek New Testament, as well as by a series of
fearless attacks upon the worldly spirit of the Church, con-
tributed powerfully to bring about the Eeformation. But
when the Church was threatened with being driven from her
position as the sole mediator of salvation, he turned away
from the spirit which he had himself conjured up. The
Humanistic culture entered into the immediate service of the
Eeformation only in Ulrich von Hütten (1488-1523).
It is but a superficial view that could lead any one to
derive the reformation of the Church from the Humanistic
movement Their mutual furtherance of each other must
indeed be recognised. But it is just as unmistakeable that
they were two entirely independent fruits of the same revolu-
tion whose general character consisted in the free unfolding
of the spirit that had now ripened to independence. The
Church aimed at being the medium of salvation to the
individual believers as the institution appointed by God
Himself for this end. But from the world, which it was
instituted to rule and to transform into a kingdom of God,
the Church once and again received corrupting elements into
herself, so that her divine form became marred, and the vicar
of Christ was perverted into Antichrist. Gregory VII.,
along with the complete subjection of all worldly powers and
strivings, had likewise aimed at a lasting purification of the
Church. The monastic orders, and especially the Dominicans
and Franciscans, sought with noble zeal and transitory success
to stem the increasing tide of worldliness. It was all in vain.
In the fourteenth and fifteenth Centuries the Church presents
such a picture of corruption that anything more repulsive can
hardly be conceived. The Popes, by their moral licentious-
ness and frivolous unbelief, almost rivalled their most
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TRANSITION TO THE BEFORMATION. 59
notorious predecessors of earlier centuries. The Papacy could
not but lose its respect when, by the exile to Avignon, it had
been subordinated in an ignoble way to French influence, and
entangled in external controversies by a schism of thirty
yeara The priests sank into ignorance and debauchery.
The whole activity of the Church was turned into a system
for extorting as much money as possible by the sale of
ecclesiastical offices, the granting of numerous dispensations
of various kinds, and above all by the shameless sale of
indulgences. Thus the salvation of the soul was bought and
sold, and in consequence the mass of the people sank the deeper
into boundless ignorance and unbridled immorality, while the
public worship, in consequence of the excessive adoration of
images and relics, as well as the complete exclusion from it
of the vernacular tongue, sank into mere lip-service.
Under such circumstances opposition could not fail to
come. But the opposition of the intellectual thinking in the
form of Enlightenment, and that of the immediate religious life
in the form of Mysticism, although strong enough to over-
throw the Church of the time, were incapable of creating a
new ecclesiastical community. The reformation of the Church
could therefore only proceed from an opposition of a different
kind. This began to work towards the end of the Middle
Ages, and it likewise showed a twofold aspect At one in
zeal against the intolerable worldliness of the papal Church,
the two tendencies diverged upon the question as to what new
institution was to be put in its place. The one form of
opposition wished to maintain the divine intermediation of the
Church as the sole dispenser of salvation to the individual ;
but, while leaving the papacy and the hierarchy as a divine
order untouched, it aimed only at removing imdeniable abuses
in detail The other form of opposition impugned directly
the position of the Church and the hierarchy. The Church
was not the divine mediator of salvation, but the communion
of those who, in virtue of their personal faith, had become
participators of salvation on the ground of their personal
relation to God. The hierarchy was declared to rest merely
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60 INTRODUOTOEY SXTEVBY DOWN TO THE EEFOEMATION.
upon human ordinances, and it may perhaps have still to be
recognised from this point of view. Tlie source of religious
truth is not the tradition of the Church, but the word of
Scripture alone. The ground of salvation is not found in
external works, but in internal living faith. The former mode
of effort long laboured in vain, trying to effect a " reform in
the Head and the members/' and it at least in part reached
its goal in the purification of Catholicism from its woi-st
outgrowths at the Council of Trent (1545-1563) by way of
a reaction from^ the formation of independent Protestant
Churchea The other effort attained its goal only at the price
of a schism which, at the first, had not been even thought of.
In the Waldensian valleys of the south of France and north of
Italy, Petrus Waldus had as early as 1160 been zealous
against the abuses of the Church; and on the ground of
Scripture he had demanded holiness of sentiment and life.
In England, John Wikliflfe (1324-1384) had preached the
Scripture as the only source of truth, Christ as the sole
mediator between God and man, His death as the only
ground of the forgiveness of sin, faith as the only means of
appropriating forgiveness, the Church as the communion of the
saints, and our salvation as dependent solely on the divine
decree. In Bohemia, John Huss (1369-1416), aroused by
Wikliflfe, gained numerous adherents to his views of reform.
In the Netherlands, the Brethren of the Common Life sought,
in all stillness, to bring about a renovation of the religious
life. From their midst came forth Thomas k Kempis (t 1471),
who by his Imitation of Christ has worked, as few have done,
to establish a pure Christianity in the soul within. John
Wessel (1419-1492) belonged to the same circle. Well
acquainted with all the science of his age, he came nearest to
Luther in his decided accentuation of the Scriptures as the
only source of divine knowledge, and of faith as the only con-
dition of justification. This movement, however, only attained
to the power of permanently transforming the Church when
Luther and Zwingli appeared.
We have thus reached the grand revolution of the religious.
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TRANSITION TO THE BBFORMATION. 61
ecclesiastical, and even of the whole spiritual life which we
call the Befonnation. As our historical exposition is to begin
in detail from this point, it only remains for us to close our
introduction ^ by a glance over the division and arrangement
which may be best given to our material
And» in the first place, it may be remarked that we have
almost completely to look away from the Catholic Church. In
the Council of Trent the position of that Church was so
based upon the principle of authority, that no room remained
for that freedom of thought which the Philosophy of Keligion
from its essential nature cannot dispense with. The few
isolated attempts which have been made within the Boman
Church in this direction, have only resulted from the influence
of certain philosophical systems that grew up on Protestant
soil, and they have therefore to be discussed in connection
with these systems. Even the Mysticism in the Catholic
Church since the Beformation has been far more inclined to
quietism than to speculation.
The progress of philosophy which has taken place has been
made entirely within the range of Protestantism, and that
progress has been not a little influenced by its liberation of the
individual The appearance of Kant forms such a decisive
turning-point in philosophy, that it is antecedently probable
that the Philosophy of Beligion before and after Kant will
show an entirely diflferent character. The following exposi-
tion will confirm this and justify it, so that we will consider
the period before Kant in the first Book, and Kant and the
period after him in the second. The Period before Kant may
be again divided into two periods. The question regarding
revelation, so important in relation to the application of
* This introductory survey of the history of the subject in the Ancient Church
and the Middle Ages does not claim to present anything new, and it rests only
in part, at least as regards the Middle Ages, on special knowledge of the sources.
Along with a number of other works, the following may be referred to :— Huber,
Die Philosophie der Kirchenvater, München 1859. H. Reuter, Geschichte der
i^ligiösen Aufklarung im Mittelalter, 2 Bde. Berlin 1875-7. W. Gass, Gen-
nadius u. Pletho, 1844. F. Schnitze, Georgios Gemistos Plethon, 1874. G.
Dreydorff, Das System des Johannes Pico, 1858. D. F. Strauss, Ulrich von
Hütten, 1 Bd. 1858.
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62 INTRODUGTOEY SURVEY DOWN TO THE REFORMATION,
thought to religion, is not closely examined by the early
Protestant Church. But tliis question is taken up afterwards,
and then developments become possible, such as the English
Deism, the French Materialism, the Philosophy of Des
Cartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, the movement of the German
Enlightenment, and the superseding of it by Lessing and
Herder, Hamann and Jacobi. In the first centuries of the
Protestant Church we likewise find attempts at independent
speculation ; but springing mostly up within the Catholic
Church they gain little influence. Besides these, we have
to consider the character of the doctrine of the Protestant
Church, the manifold oppositions directed against the Church,
and the' scholastic cultivation of philosophy. The contents of
the several Sections in our History of the Period before Kant
are thus briefly indicated.
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BOOK I.
HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
FROM THE REFORMATION TO KANT.
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SECTION FIEST.
THE BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
THE introductory survey has already shown us Philosophy
in a state of profound fermentation. The authority of
Aristotle, after having ruled all science for centuries, was now
accepted only by a small band of followers. At the same
time almost all the systems of the ancients were renewed,
and even the mysterious wisdom of the Eabbala found
enthusiastic disciples. None of these attempts exhibits much
that is new or independent, and not one of them gained lasting
recognition. More importance must undoubtedly be attached
to a series of productions which we must now consider.
At their head stand the works of Nicolaus Cusanus, the learned
Bishop of Brixen. Although belouging to the fifteenth
century, he comes under our consideration more properly in
this period, because he undoubtedly formed a turning-point
in the philosophical inquiry of that time. Writing in obscure
and ditGcult language, and full of new verbal forms and bold
constructions, he puts forth laborious efforts to embody his
thoughts in words. In his matter, Cusanus unites in himself,
as in a focus, the thoughts of the Mediaeval Scholasticism in
their fruit, and the problems of Modem Speculation in their
germ. — Metaphysical thought receives a new impulse from
Nicolaus, and the Platonic element exerts an important
influence on speculation. On the other hand, Telesius and
Cardanus founded a distinctive philosophy of Nature. It is
true that this Natural Philosophy, in default of exact individual
observation, still operates with certain universal principles,
but it at least directs attention to the processes in Nature,
and thus gives a new direction to thought. The influence
both of the metaphysics of Cusanus and of the natural
VOL. L ® r^ T
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66 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPEPULATION.
philosophy of Telesius, is shown in the writings of Giordano
Bruno, Thomas Campanella, Franciscus Patricins, and Julius
Caesar Vanini. All these men worked in Italy (Cusanus also
living latterly at Rome), and Italy was most powerfully
afifected by the new soientifio movement. Unfortunately, I
am not in a' position to say anything definite about the extent
to which their views were spread ; I cannot even find evidence
in detail for the natural conjecture that this philosophical
movement was essentially connected with the strivings after
religious reform.^— -An isolated position is held by Peter
Bamus and also by Nicolaus Taurellus, the former working at
Paris, the latter at Altorf. The two are at one in carrying
on a violent opposition to Aristotle, but Bamus aims at
vitalizing the purely formal and schematic Dialectics of the
time by connecting them with Ehetoric, while Taurellus
aims at making Philosophy the servant of Theology, as,
like the Law, it inclines us to the believing acceptance of the
GospeL Bamus alone gained numerous adherents and lasting
influence.
NicoLAUS Cusanus (1401-1464).
Nicolaus Chrypfifs or Krebs was born in the first year of
the fifteenth centuiy at Kues (Cusa), a village on the Moselle.
His life began amid rustic surroundings, and almost in
circumstances of poverty. His brilliant spiritual gifts, how-
ever, made him rise rapidly into high position in the service
of the Church. At the Council of Basle, he already attempts,
by his " concordantia catholica" to co-operate in the generally
desired "reform of Head and members," not merely of the
^ Unfortrmately the historians of Philosophy have hitherto greatly neglected
this moyeroent, and we have as yet no adequate representation of the lives and
doctrines of these men. We may refer to Rixner and Siber's Beiträge zur
Oeschichte der Physiologie, 7 Hefte, Sulzbach 1819-26, but their exposition is
quite insufficient. M. Carrifere*s Die philosophische Weltanschauung der Be/or-
mationszeitf 1847, in spite of great excellences, is unreliable, as the author too
frequently introduces his own Hegelian philosophy into the earUer systems.
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NICOLAUS OF CÜSA. 67
Church/ but likewise also of the Empire; entirely after the
idea of Grerson. Afterwards joining the party of Eugenius IV.,
Nicolaus took part in the embassy to Constantinople, which
introduced the negotiations about union. We next find
him in his priestly office at Coblenz, where he performed
distinguished service, especially as a preacher. In 1448,
having been made a Cardinal, he completed the revision and
reorganization of the monasteries of Germany ; and in 1450
he received the Bishopric of Brixen. After having devoted
himself in this office, with rare zeal, to the practical improve-
ment of the relations of the Church, he spent the last years
of his life in Rome. But although thus busily occupied with
the affairs of the Empire and the Qiurch, Nicolaus always
found time to devote himself to the enjoyment of the work
of speculative thought.*
Intimately acquainted with the achievements of former
thinkers, Nicolaus does not attach himself slavishly to any of
them ; but freely examining into what may be correct in their
productions, he emphatically claims freedom from all authority.
In the character of an " Idiotes^ Nicolaus presents a man of
so-called common sense objecting to a *' pedant'* puffed up
with book-learning, in these terms : " You are a horse which,
although free by nature, is tied to its manger, where it eats
nothing but what is put before it. Your mind, tied to
authority, is nourished on strange nutriment that is not natural:
for, doth not Wisdom cry ? and Understanding put forth her
voice ? She standeth in the top of high places ; she crieth
at the gates. Unto you, 0 men, I call ; and my voice is to the
sons of men ! (Prov. viii. 1). We do not attain to knowledge
by the books of men, but by the books of God, which He has
written with His own finger, and which are found everywhere."
In like manner, he says in his Sermons, that in order to
^ The Basle Edition of the works of Cusa (1565) has nttuiorous Diisleading
errors. The Paris Edition of 1514 is much more correct. Many works have
b»!en written on Cnsa, and mention may particularly be made of F. A. Scharptt's
Der Cardinal tmd Bischof Nicolams von Cum ah Reformator in Kirche^ Reich
vvd Philosophie des 15 JcJirhniidertSy Tübingen 1871. But a complete and
adequate exposition of his system is still a desideratum.
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68 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
attain Icnowledge "we do not need to take books into our
hands ; their number is without end, and they would lead us
only to unbounded vanity. Bather let every one imagine
that he is an Adam and alone upon the world, and let him
consider only the world in itself." — Cusanus is accustomed to
designate philosophy proper as a learned ignorance, doeta
ignarantia. This, however, does not mean a thoroughgoing
scepticism and despair of knowledge, but a mode of knowing
which is conscious that precise cognition is impossible, and
which, on the ground of this principle, seeks to attain an
approximative or conjectural knowledge {de conjeduris).
We shall consider, in the first place, the metaphysical views
of the learned Cardinal, and then his attempts at a historico-
psychological explanation of Eeligion. On the whole, we will
find between these two sides of his doctrine a wonderful
congruence, although certainly not a complete unity ; but who
would require from a man of the fifteenth century what is
even now hardly ever attained ? His metaphysical statements,
however, may be grouped most simply in the order which the
author himself observes in his Docta IgnorarUia. We shall
therefore consider, first, his doctrine regarding God, in so far
as He transcends reason ; then his theoiy of the world, in so
far as all that is, is through God ; and, lastly, his view of
Christ, in so far as He completes the whole system by
mediating between God and the world.
1. According to Nicolaus, it is superfluous to prove the
existence of God, The finite and limited necessarily presupposes
something from which it has its beginning and limitation;
and thus finite being is only possible if there is a something
limiting and grounding it. The mind has absolute certainty
of an absolute Unity, because it exists entirely in this Unity,
and is active by it. The mind cannot raise a question which
does not already presuppose this Unity. The question as to
whether it is, already presupposes its being. The question as
to what it is, presupposes its essence. The question as to
why it is, presupposes it as the ground of all things. And
the question as to what is its goal^ presupposes it as the goal
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NICOLAUS OF CÜSA. 69
of all things. What is thus presupposed in all doubt, must
be the most certain of all things. — ^The question regarding
the cognition of Ood is not so simply resolved. Various
ways lead to it, and yet the reality of it as knowledge is
again denied. Finite sensible things are effectuated by God ;
every effect is to a certain degree like its cause ; and hence
earthly things are signs and symbols for bringing the incon-
ceivable God nearer to us. This is the basis of his so-called
Symbolical Theology. Thus the absolute Seeing of Qod, which
is at once universal and particular, is illustrated by a picture
whose look is continually directed to the beholder in the
same way, whatever position he may take up towards it.
The Eternity of God is symbolized by the image of the dial on
which all the hours are continually present, and yet each one of
them is only indicated at a particular moment of time. The
Causality of God in His relation to the creature, is seen by
the image of light, which without itself being a colour yet
makes all the different colours arise out of itself. Far more
striking and appropriate symbols are, however, presented by
Mathematics ; for while the forms of sense are presented in a
state of constant change, the abstract elements of mathematics
have great stedfastness and certainty. Hence, after the
example of the greatest of the earlier philosophers, Cusanus
embodies the theory of numbers in his system. God appears
as the absolute Unity, which is at the same time the
absolutely greatest and the absolutely least And still more
do geometrical figures serve to make the absolute conceivable,
at least approximately. But in this connection, reference
is expressly made to the condition that we must transfer the
relations of finite figures not merely to infinite relations, but
even to the absolutely Infinite itself, which is without figure.
Thus €rod appears under the image of the infinite straight
line, of the infinite triangle, of the infinite circle, and of the
infinite sphere. — Such a merely symbolical denotation of
Grod is, however, not suflBcient for us ; the worship of God
in spirit and in truth necessarily demands positive expressions
regarding God. This Aßrmatwe Theology must start from
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70 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
the contemplation of finite earthly things, and this contempla-
tion is justified inasmuch as the world is the representation
and the work of Grod. Positive names are assigned to God
in all His relations to the creatures. He is called ** Life " in
so far as He is the cause of all life, and "Creator" in so
far as He creates all things. But it is an error to hold that
the attributes thus attained are real distinctions in God,
or to believe that the Divine Nature in itself can be thus
determined. — In order that God may not be honoured as a
mere creature, our contemplation of Him must necessarily be
justified by the Negaiim Theology. God is ineffable, because
He is greater than everything which can be named; and
hence we think of Him more correctly by the way of
exclusion and negation, as Dionysius, Solomon, and all the
Philosophers have done. To this Negative Theology, G<Mi is
nothing but infinity. Yet, according to Cusanus, Infinity is
not a negative or entirely empty notion ; but because finite
being is continually limited and is therefore not-being, negation
primarily applies to the finite, as finiteness is not-being, and
God as the infinite one, is tlius the true, positive, highest
Being. — Yet our philosopher will not stop even here, but
aims at rising by means of the Mystieal Theology to a know-
ledge of the essential nature of God.
We know the essence of Ood only by the help of the idea
of the Coirundence of Opposite» or Contradictories. Nicolaus
himself confesses that on his return from Greece he received
the principle of the coincidence of contradictories like a
revelation, through the grace which is from above, from the
Father of lights from whom cometh every good and perfect
gift This principle is the key to the solution of all difficult
questions, ''for the whole striving of our mind must be
directed with all earnestness to rise to that simplicity in
which contradictories coincide." This principle is diamet-
rically opposed to the principle which the understanding
maintains as its highest rule, namely, the Law of Contradic-
tion or the incompatibility of opposites ; and whoever adopt«
this principle as the starting-point of his speculation, enters
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NICOLAUS OF CUSJL 71
thereby into direct antagonism with the scholasticism of the
nnderstanding.
Grod is the infinite being ; He is therefore the absolutely
greatest being. As the absolutely greatest, He is all that
can be ; He cannot therefore be less than He is, and He is
thus ako the absolutely least In God then the greatest and
the least coincide, and God is elevated above all contouiictions.
Contradictions and opposites occur only in the sphere of the
concrete, and not in what is absolutely greatest This
absolute is therefore above all affirmation and negation.
All that it is according to our oonc^ions, such it is even
as it is not such ; and conversely. It is as the individual
in the same way in which it is likewise All; and it is
All in the same way that it is nothing of all ; and it is
this in the way that it is also least this, — If I say that God
is light, this means nothing else than that God is most " light,''
even He who is least "light" Kay more, even the most
general expressions, such as " substance " or '' being," are not
applicable to God, because they involve a contradiction in the
implied ideas of "* accident " and '' not-being," which does not
pertain to God in the common way, or even does not pertain
to Him at all This is the reason why neither Affirmation
nor Negation can reach the essence of God ; they both move
in the sphere of contradictions and opposites ; an affirmation
is opposed to a negation, and a negation to an affirmation.
The truest conception of God is therefore not such as affirms
both contradictories on the ground that even the contradictory
coincides in Him, such as that God is being and not-being,
or light and darkness ; but the real conception is that which
rejects both contradictories, at once disjunctively and copu-
latively. Hence the best answer to the question as to whetlier
God is, is this : that He neither is nor not-is, and that He
is not " is and not-ia" But even this is only conjecture.
As the infinite, God is at the same time Unity. The
consideration of number leads to this ; for in number there is
not an absolutely greatest, but there is a least, which is unity.
God is thus at once the greatest and the least ; He is the
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72 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
absolute unity. Grod is likewise threefoldness, and He is
therefore triuue ; He is unity as naturally prior to alterity,
equality as prior to inequality, and connection as prior to
separation. Equality proceeds out of unity by generation,
that is, by a repetition of the same nature. The arising of
connection implies procession. The teachers of the Church
called this unity the Father, this equality the Son, this con-
nection the Holy Spirit ; but like all the names of (rod, these
are also borrowed from human relations. Nor is this the only
definition of the divine trinity ; it is also represented as
follows. As intelligence, God is the subject knowing, the
object known, and the process of being known, in one. As
love, (jod is the loving Love, the loveworthy Love, and the
interunion of both. As the Creative Ground of all existence,
God is the capability of producing, the capability of becoming,
and the capability of having become, in one ; or He is the
absolute possibility, actuality, and the union of both. The view
that the oneness and threefoldness in God is of a mathematical
kind, is expressly repudiated ; it is a mode of life, and without
this triune life in God there is no eternal joy or supreme
perfection. As all finite things form a representative image of
God, they likewise bear in themselves this threefold oneness
representatively. From the Father they have being ; from the
Son, power ; and from the Spirit, activity.
God is thus in His essence the coincidence of all opposites.
He is the absolute unity in which the Greatest and Least,
Being and Not-being, Past, Present and Future, Being and
Becoming entirely coincide. But He is not this as being
absolutely void and empty, but as including everything in
Himself. In finite things, what constitutes their being
bestows upon one thing this being and on another that being ;
and all this is also in God, only not yet as individualized
opposition. God is really all that of which the possibility of
being can be expressed ; for nothing can be which is not God.
God is thus really all that is possible ; He is everything
complicüe. All that in any way is or can be, everything that
is produced or is still to be produced, is contained in (Jod as
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NICOLAUS OF OÜSA, 73
its grooDcL Substances, qualities, and such like are God in
God ; just as when they are unfolded as creatures, they are
the world. Hence God is most appropriately designated as
^'jpossestl* that is, as potentiality and being. When God, there-
fore, in the beginning, wished to reveal the knowledge of
Himself, He said : *' I am the God who is able to be everything,"
that is. He is the actuality of all possibility. This name
carries us above all the knowledge of the senses, of the under-
standing and of the reason, to that mystical intuition which
is the end of all ascending knowledge, and the beginning of
all revelation of the unknown God. — At this point we come
to the view given by Cusanus of the finite world and its '
fetation to God as its absolute archetype and its infinite cause.
^2. As infinite cause, Grod is the ultimate ground and Creator
of alb^nite things. He is the absolute possibility of becoming ;
nor is He merely this, but He is also the possibility of pro-
ducing or making to be, which necessarily precedes becoming.
He is thus the absolutely active principle. Further, there is
no eternal matter out of which the world could be formed.
It is true that the world appears to be mixed up of oneness
and otherness, or of being and not-being ; and most of the
expressions used make the not-being, as hetei-eity or darkness,
appear to be something that exists by itself out of and in-
dependent of God. Thus it is said we have to think of the
universe and all the worlds as formed from a unity and a
hetereity that pass into one another. This unity is repre-
sented as an animating and formative light ; the hetereity as
a shadow and regression from the first and simplest mode of
being, and as material condensation. The universe then
appeats under the image of two pyramids of light and of
darkness blending into one another. Or again, the not-being
is represented as without ground in itself, and as having a
purely contingent connection with finite things. Creaturely
being, says Cusa, has from God its being but not its finiteness.
From God the creature has the characteristics of being one,
distinct, and yet connected with the universe. But the fact
that its unity is found in plurality, its distinctness in con-
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74 BEGINNINGS- OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
fusion, and its connection in disharmony, is not in it from
God nor from any other positive cause, but is purely contingent
(contingenter ex corUingerUi). Hence the being of finite creatures
is utterly inconceivable, although they are regarded as, in a
manner, a mixture of absolute necessity and contingency. — It
is to be admitted that Nicolaus, in opposition to this, expresses
only in an isolated way the thought that even not-being is
contained in the infinite possibility, or in the "passest" and that,
in God, not-being is all-being. Yet the opinion is decidedly
to be rejected which holds that there lies at the ground of
finite things any other being than God, whether as active or
as passive principle. God is rather the sole ground of all
existence, the creator of all finite things. He who has brought
them out of nothing into being. To Him are referred the
three productive principles of the ancient philosophers, matter,
form, and motion. Their eternal matter points to Him as
the eternal possibility of making and becoming ; their form
points to Him as the form of all forms, the nature of all
natures ; their motion points to Him as the original source of
all force, and as at once absolute motion and rest — Thus it
appears that Cusa's conception of the Creative Cause is strongly
influenced Jy the conception of the archetypal or ideal form.
Nioolaus usually indicates the relation of God to the
world by this formula : " the absolute unity is the totality of
all things, or Aeir compHcaiio^ while the finite creation is the
evolution of all things, or their explieatio.** This expression
along with some others has brought upon our philosopher the
reproach of pantheism, and yet they are only traces of his
struggling with language. Looked at more precisely, he has
with all decisiveness repudiated all the views which were
afterwards branded with this name, such as that which holds
that all things are God. He also rejects every form of
emanation, whether it is conceived mediately or immediately ;
and all the attempts which he makes to bring the essentially
inconceivable ffow of the origin of the world as near as
possible to us, rest upon the fundamental view of a creation.
" If you consider things without God, then they are nothing.
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NICOLAUS OF CUSA, 75
as number is nothing without unity; if you consider God
without things, then He is and they are nothing." Grod is the
eomplieatio, the comprehending whole; the world is the
ezplicatio, or the unfolding of alL This is made more dktinct
by some examples. Thus the pdnt is the unity, as the com-
prehension or the complication of quantity ; hence there is in
the line, the surface, and the solid body nothing but the point
Rest is the conception of motion in its unity, and hence motion is
the imfolding of rest The mathematical symbols particularly
illustrate this. As the infinite straight line forms at the same
time the curved line, and the circle, and the triangle, and the
sphere, so is God the ground and the measure of all things.
According to the analogy of the infinite circle, God is in
everything as its centre ; He embraces all things as their
periphery, and He penetrates all things as their diameter. As
centre. He is the beginning of all ; as periphery, He is the end
of all ; as diameter. He is the middle of all. As centre, He is
the producing cause or creator ; as periphery, He is the final
cause or the preserver ; as diameter. He is the forming cause or
the governor. Nevertheless, the mode and the manner of this
process of embracing things in Himself, and of unfolding
things out of Himself, goes beyond our understanding.
As the pure faculty of seeing embraces in itself in un-
divided unity the acts of seeing here and there, near and
far, distinctly and indistinctly, so does God as the coincidence
of all opposites, and as the undifferentiated identity of the
absolute unity, include all finite being in Himself In so far
as finite things are, they are from God ; they would not be,
and could not be, if they did not participate in the divine
being. Further, a cause cannot bring forth an effect which is
not essentially similar to itself, and the same cause must effect
the same thing in everything. Hence Nicolaus can say that
God is in the sun, in the moon, and in all things, but not in
80 far as they are this or that determinate thing, or a parti-
cular object distinguished from other objects, but in so far
merely as they are, and are all identical with one another.
Again, He is not iu them as the matter lying at the ground of
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76 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
all things, nor yet merely as the power working in all things,
but as the one being in which all participate, and as the unity
which finds itself as such in spite of all plurality and hetereity.
Hence he can say that God through all is in all, and that
all is through all in Ood, and that all is in all and every-
thing in everything. That i<) to say, there is only one being,
which is Ood ; this being is in all things, and therefore God
is in all things, and they are in God ; and hence all things
are one and the same. But they participate in a different
way in the one being, and therefore they are thus different.
On this position rests the fact that the world is an organism.
It is an ordered cosmos. The world consists of many finite
things which are wholly different firom one another. They
differ so much from one another, that there cannot be found
two things or motions or such like that are completely
identical with one another. Nevertheless they form a unity,
since all things participate in one and the same unity, which
is God as the sum of all essence ; and they are different only
on account of the different degree of their participation therein.
Hence results the distinction of substance and accident, and
the greater or less value of substances and accidents. But
in this diversity there is also harmony and order, for in a
continuous series of gradations all finite things range them-
selves in connection with one another, from the lowest degree
of imperfection up to the highest d^ree of perfection, so that
the highest being of the lower order always coincides with the
lowest being of the next higher order.
But God does not enter immediately into finite existence, nor
do finite things immediately participate in God. As in the
sphere of numbers unity unfolds itself only by means of the
quaternary into numerical fulness, so likewise is it with
God. God is the first and the absolute unity. The second
unity is the Universe, which is the concrete unity, and only
through it is Gh>d in things, and do things participate in God.
God is the absolutely greatest ; He is the absolute maximum ;
and therefore He is negatively infinite, that is. He alone is
that which can exist in omnipotent fulness. The universe is
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NICOLAUS OF CÜÖA. "77
tbe concretely greatest ; it is a concrete maximum ; and there^
fore it is privatively infinite, äiat is, it is without limits, and
so it is the greatest possible imitation of God. The universe
came into existence by simple emanation of the concrete
maximum from the absolute maximum. The universe is like-
wise a unity, but a concrete unity. It is the Infinite
limited, the Simple compounded, the Eternal in succession ;
it is necessity limited by possibility. The opposites do not
precede it but arise along with it, and they are contained in
it undivided and unresolved. The universe is likewise triune,
but it is so only in the concrete ; that is, its unity subsists
only in trinity, as the whole in its parts. It consists of what
is capable of concreteness (corUrahtbile), of what makes con-
creteness (corUraAens), and of the connection between them
{nexus). The Universe, as the second unity, unfolds the first
or absolute unity in the concrete form of the decade, that is,
in the totality of ten highest Univeraalities.
Thereby the Universe passes over into the third unity,
which is called the Quadrate. Here arise the genera and
species which are the ideas of things or the forms of the
world of Nature. How these arise through God, the pure
Spirit, is illustrated by imagea, such as the teaching of a
scholar by speech, and especially by the making of glass from
a glowing mass by means of blowing. The Word of God, by
which He creates all things, is the fulness and comprehension
of all ideas. As independent existences they are the
universale which, according to the order of nature, are before
things. They have concrete reality only in things ; and, in so
far as we abstract from things in the process of knowledge,
they are conceptions of the understanding. The fourth unity,
corresponding to the cube, is constituted by individual things.
The four Unities are God, Reason, Soul, Body. To these four
unities correspond /(mr Modalities of being : (1) Things as in
God in absolute necessity, (2) as in the universe as true
images, (3) as in the genera and species as forming the deter-
minate possibility of being this or that in reality, (4) as in
finite things by way of pure possibility. Hence arises the
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*iS BEGINNIKGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
distinction of the three Worlds : (1) The highest World with
God as its centre, (2) the middle World with reason as its
centre, and (3) the lowest World with the understanding as
its centre. The sphere of sense is the dense rind stretching
around the third world. To it corresponds our Faculty of
Cognition^ which includes the Senses, the Understanding, the
Reason, and immediate Intuition. Everything is in the first
world, everything is in the second world, and eveiything is in
the third world, but in each world in a particular way. A
thing is in the first world in its Truth, in the second world in a
more distant Besemblauce, in the third world in a most distant
shadowy Image. Hence we know everything either divinely,
as it is the truth ; or rationally, as it is, not the truth indeed,
but true ; or psychically, as it is probable ; or corporeally,
when instead of probability it presents confusedness.
3. Ood and the World find their reciprocal mediation in the
Person of Christ. In the universe as the concrete unity there
are, between the greatest and the least, always greater or less
d^ees of concrete being, but these are not infinitely many.
Hence, in the concrete, there is no ascending to the absolutely
greatest, nor descending to the absolutely least The universe
therefore does not reach the highest degree of the absolutely
greatest, nor does it ejchaust the infinite, absolutely greatest
power of Grod. If we were to think of the greatest as
existing concretely and really in a determinate species, it
would be in reality all that lies in the whole possibility of
that species ; it would be really its highest possible perfection.
Such a maximum in the concrete would pass beyond the whole
nature of- the concrete, and be its culmination ; it would not
be merely and purely concrete, but would be at once God and
Creature, absolutely and concretely, in a concreteness which
would have no existence of itself unless it rested in the
absolute maximum. Such a union would imply that what is
thus united in maintaining the character of concreteness, is
the concrete and produced perfection of a determinate species ;
and at the same time, in consequence of the hypostatical
union, it is God and all. Such a union would certainly
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NICOLAUS OF CÜSA. 79
far transcend our understanding. It is not a unification of
contradictories, nor a combination of two things which were
formerly separated, nor a combination of parts into a whole,
nor a combination of form with matter; but it is more
sublime than all thinkable unions. This concrete maximum
is to be thought as God, but so that it is at the same time to
be regarded as a creature, and to be so regarded us a creature
that it is at the same time to be viewed as the creator, being
both creature and creator without intermixture or composition.
Now it is manifest that that being could first unite with the
absolute which has most relationship with the totality of
being. This is Man, who, as the connecting member and centre
of the lower and the higher nature, and as the microcosm, is the
most fitted of all beings for elevation into the absolute unity
of God, Man in such elevation would be the Son of Grod, or
the Word through which everything is made ; He would be
the identity of being itself, without, however, ceasing to be Son
of man and man. This Man woidd be the goal and the end
of the creation, being before all things, and He through whom
and for whom all things exist. And since, without this union,
nothing can attain to higher perfection, it undoubtedly is
established as real on rational grounds. The First-born of
the oreation, who existed before all time and before all things
with God, Juts appeared in the fulness of time in the person of
Jesus.
In Him we have the completion of all things, redemption
and forgiveness of sins. God is all in unity with the greatest
humanity in Jesus, without change of His essence in the
identity of being. The eternal Father and the Holy Spirit
are in Jesus ; and everything is in Him as in the Word. The
greatest humanity can neither be begotten in the natural way,
nor be entirely without participation in the nature of man ;
and hence it is conceived from the Holy Ghost and bom of
the Virgin. The voluntary and undeserved death of Christ
on the cross as the man who alone was free from carnal
desires, served as a satisfaction and purification for all the
carnal desires of human nature. The perfect humanity in
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80 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
Christ has accordingly made up and completed the defective-
ness of all men. Christ died, yet not so that in the moment
of death His soul or body was separated from the divine
person ; in respect of the centre on which His humanity
rested, He remained hypostatically united with the Deity.
And thus Christ arose in a true, glorified, unsuffering, moveable,
and immortal body, in order that human nature might also rise
to eternal life, and that the animal and mortal body might
become a spiritual and indestructible body. So Jesus is the
mediation between Grod and man, the centre and at the same
time the completion of the whole creation.
Let us now see how, on the basis of these metaphysical
conceptions, Nicolaus gave form to his general view of Religion.
Man, as the connecting link between the purely spiritual and
the sensible, is a synthesis of spirit and body, which are
connected with one another by the souL The Spirit is
immediately created by God ; it is a divine seed implanted in
the body ; it is a substance to which movement is essential ;
it is the living image and reflection of God ; and hence it is
immortal As our corporeal nature requires material nutriment,
so does our spiritual nature require spiritual nutriment This
spiritual nutriment is Truth, which the spirit lays hold
of with eagerness. Wisdom is the immortal food which
immortally nourishes the spirit. This wisdom shines forth
from various relations, and the spirit seeks it chiefly in the
knowledge of God. The knowledge of the truth is a relishable
spirit-refreshing mode of knowing; it is realized in tasting
the divine love ; and it is the life and the nourishment of the
spirit The rational motion within us would know the ground
of its life, and it finds immortal nourishment in this knowledge
by nourishing itself from the supreme source of its being.
This occupation of the mind with the spiritual and eternal,
this investigation of truth, is the inner essence of religion ;
and so Cusa identifies those who are contemplative with
those who are religious.
Elsewhere, Religion is referred to the human striving after
happiness. Every religion, he says, aims at happiness. " In
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NICOLAUS OF CÜSA. 81
this there is no deception, because this hope by an inborn
desire is common to all ; and consequently religion, which is
the fruit of this hope, is in like manner innate in all." The
two points of view, however, coincide. The desire of wisdom
is the same as the desire of happiness ; for knowledge is
happiness, and it is so because it is union with God. God is
Season, as the knowing Beason, the knowable Beason, and the
combination of the two ; and hence the created reason can
attain in the knowable Grod to union with Him and so to
happiness. In like manner, the created loving Will can
realize a union with the God of love, and so realize happiness.
It is only because God is lovable and spiritually apprehensible
that man can become united with Him. This union, from its
inwardness and stedfastness, obtains the name of filiation or
sonship. This sonship is the highest happiness and perfection.
The essence of Religion is tJierefore the knowledge of Ood and the
happiness arising from that knowledge in union with Him. This
contains what is common to all Eeligions, and at the same
time the diversity of their knowledge forms the ground of
their diversity as religions.
The essential agreement of all the Eeligions rests on the fact
that most of the founders of these religions sought to express
the eternal Word in their religious systems; and thus the
several religious systems are so many expressions {qwjedam
locutiones) of the Word of God or the eternal Reason. This
is the fundamental thought of the remarkable work entitled
De pace sive eoncordantia fidei dialogus. Grieved by the horrors
which had been practised from religious zeal on the taking
of Constantinople, a devout man sees himself raised in the
spirit to the heavenly Council, where the departed souls,
under the presidency of the Almighty, resolve upon a union of
their religions in order that a permanent religious peace may
prevail, and this is grounded on the agreement found among
them in spite of all their differences. The highest of the
Angels, in an address to God, expresses himself as follows :
" All that the creature possesses has been given to it by God ;
its body formed with so much art as well as the rational
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82 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
spirit which can rise in knowledge to God and become united
with Him in love. A great multitude, however, cannot exist
without producing diversity. Besides, only a few have the
leisure required for seeking after God by independent inquiry.
Hence God sent, at sundry times, various prophets and kings,
who instructed the ignorant people and instituted religions.
The people honoured their laws as if God Himself had given
them; and as they are wont to hold fast by a custom when it
has become a second nature, as if it were the truth, there arose
disunion between the various religious communities." " It is
on account of Thee, whom they alone worship in what they all
adore, that this rivalry consists. Each strives, in what he
seems to strive after, only to realize the good which is in
Thee. Thou, who art the Dispenser of being and life, art
therefore He who is sought in the different religions in
different ways and designated with different names, because
Thy true being is to all unknown and unutterable." It is
because there is no proportion between the finite and the
infinite that the creature is not capable of knowing G^d, and
only a revelation can bring him to see " that in the diversity
of the religious practices there is only One Eeligion." "If this
diversity of practice cannot be done away with, or if it be not
advantageous to do so, in as far as the diversity effects a
heightening of the honour of God owing to the zeal manifested
by the several countries, yet as Thou art One, so may there
exist one religion and one worship."
An intelligent representative of every nation is raised to
heaven to take part in the Dialogue, and its aim is to reduce
all religious differences, in consequence of a universal agree-
ment, to one religion. This aim is more precisely determined
as the reduction of the diversity of the Religions to the one
orthodox Faith, The Word opens the discussion. The
dialogue proceeds with a Greek and an Italian ; and the one
of them says that everything is created in wisdom, and the
other that ever3^thing is created in the Word. It is then
pointed out that they say the same thing ; for the Word of the
Creator by which He created all things, can only be His
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NICOLAÜS OF CUSA. 85
wisdom. To the Arabian interlocutor it is shown that even
polytheists and monotheists are fundamentally at one, since
even the former assert one deity in which their many gods
only participate. The Indian learns that images and statues
of gods are in place as illustrative representations of God, but
not as objects of worship. The Chaldean, the Jew, the
Scythian, and the Gaul accept the Trinity in the form of
^t;y, equality, and connection, as a designation of the
creative fertility. Peter then explains the Christological
doctrines in dialogue with a Persian, a Syrian, a Spaniard, a
Turk, and a German. That the Word has become flesh, that
human nature is thus indissolubly attached to the divino
nature, and subsists in it alone without either of them being
changed, is not incompatible with the unity or the immuta-
bility of God. The striving after happiness is common to all
religions ; and this happiness is constituted by the union of
human life with its source, which is the divine immortal life.
This striving presupposes that the common human nature has
been raised in one person to this union with God, in order
that this person may become the medium to all men of the
ultimate goal of their longing. The universal belief that some
saints at least have reached eternal happiness everywhere,
presupposes these positions even among those who deny
Christ's death, resurrection, and ascension. While the Jews
hope for earthly goods, the Mohammedans for sensuous enjoy-
ments, and the Christians for spiritual bliss, they all agree in
wishing a happiness which goes beyond everything that can
be described or expressed, because it consists in the fulfilment
of every longing, in the enjoyment of the good at its source,
and in tlie attainment of the immortal Ufa — The more
external questions of religious worship and of the Christian
life are explained in a discussion between the Tartar, the
Armenian, the Bohemian, the Englishman, and PauL Paul
mainly sets up the principle that it is not works but only
faith that justifies, and yet that faith without works is dead ;
he then seeks to establish the Roman conception of the
sacraments, and finally counsels his hearers not to let the
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64 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULAnON.
unity of the faith be disturbed by the diversity of worship
and of ceremonies. — On this basis the union of the religions
is concluded in the heaven of reason, and the commission is
given to the wise to guide their nations towards the unity of
the true worship.
Another work of his, entitledi)« CrtbmtioneAlchoran,hTeB^e9
the same spirit throughout. Its tendency is " to establish the
truth of Christianity even out of the Koran." By a reference
to the most important doctrines of the Christian faith, it is
shown that what is true in Islam springs from Christianity,
with which it was historically connected through the medium
of Nestorianism. To Islam is assigned the task of preparing
the Oriental polytheism for Christianity by means of its
monotheism, and thus to guide the Oriental peoples to Christ..
— In like manner, the essential identity of Judaism and
heathenism is asserted. All believe in the one supreme Grod,
and worship Him; but the Jews and Sissennians worship
Him in His simplest unity as the source of all things;
whereas others, like the heathen, worship Him wherever they
perceive the unfolding of His deity, assigning to Grod various
names according to His various relations to the creatures.
But as in the finite world generally unüy passes into
plurality, so is it likeivise in Religion. Religion rests upon
the knowledge of God, and it is realized in four stages. As an
object seen in the far distance appears at first merely a thing,
and coming nearer it appears as a living being, and then
nearer still as a man, and lastly, in close proximity, is
recognised as a particular person, so did the truth appear
at first in the distance as a form of confused existence
in Nature; then it appeared in the Law; and thereafter
it appeared in the Son of God. The fourth stage at which
we will see and know the truth without mediation, as it
is, has yet to come. To these appearances of truth there
correspond ew tnany stages of Religion; and they all rest
upon the working of the Word of God, but upon different
modes of its working.
1. Tlie Religion of Nature rests upon the knowledge of
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NICOLAUS OF OTTS A. 85
God which we can attain by our natural powers. All men fall
into the three classes of religious^ servile, or ruling men, accorcU
ing as they devote themselves to the investigation of the truth
or give themselves up to what is sensuous, or stand between
these two. The religious class, again, falls into three distinct
divisions. " Some apprehend religion in a lofty and noble way
as above all understanding and sense ; others draw it into the
sphere of the understanding ; others, again, bring it down to the
sphere of the senses. Accordingly, among all men religion is
found in peculiar forms ; and hence those who are spiritually
freer find the goal of immortality^ which religion promises to
all men, in the life which in its purity and sublimity
transcends everything that the understanding and the sense
can grasp. Others draw happiness into the sphere of the
understanding, and find their goal in the knowledge and
enjoyment of things. Finally, others in the most irrational
way seek their happiness in sensuous delights. Thus the
unity of the religion of reason is only found in a diverse
otherness, and thus does the religious life fluctuate between
the spiritual and the temporal." The distinctions of Natural
Eeligion are still further explained. In the northern regions
of the earth the spirit is more in a potential condition, and is
sunk in sense ; the more, we advance towards the equator,
80 much the more freely does the spirit come forth. Hence
in India . and Egypt we find Beligion in a state of pure
spirituality; among the Greeks and Romans we find the
understanding specially developed ; and in the North we find
more empirical and mechanical dexterities. In addition to
these defects of Natural Seligion, the fact has also to be taken
into account that the ignorant crowd blindly follow certain
teachers, or fall into idolatrous worship by taking the
unfolding of the Deity into many forms, not as an image
but as the trutL
The Word of God that is inscribed in Nature con^-
sponds to the sense of man, and cauTwt make him blessed. To
show this is the object of the Doeta Ignorantia, and its
chief value lies in the proof thereof. All knowing is
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86 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
described as a comparing by means of a proportion ; it is a
seeking out of the unknown from its relation to what is
already knowa Hence a cognition of God is impossible, for
there exists no relation between the infinite and the finite.
Further cognition continually moves in contradictories,
whereas the absolute is the coincidence of all contradictories.
In like manner, it is impossible to cognize the finite, partly
because nothing can be cognized without its cause, and God
is incognizable ; and partly because in the finite world no two
things coincide with one another, and therefore an exact
proportion is nowhere found. To this it has to be added,
that in consequence of our descent from Adam, the animal
nature in us has so greatly gained the predominance over the
spiritual, that we are entirely incapable of reaching beyond
the temporal to the eternal. God can therefore be knowa
only by that way which appears to all men, and even to the
most learned philosophers, to be wholly inaccessible and
impossible. This is only to be attained if we go beyond the
highest height of reason to that which is unknown to every
reason. The knowledge of God we attain only through
Christ. The philosophy of the Docta Ignorantia, therefore,
refers us to Him. At the same time, however, it shows that
God is in truth the goal and end of all our longing. God is
such indeed, only in so far as He is infinite and unknowable ;
for if Grod did not remain infinite. He would not continue to
be the goal of our longing. Thus Doda Ignorantia is
negatively and positively the way to the acceptance of the
perfect knowledge and religion in Christ
2. This acceptance is prepared for by the Law and the
Prophets. The Old Testament contains the same truth as is
in Nature and Christ. And hence Nicolaus agrees with
Moses, not because he is a Christian and bound to the Law,
but because reason forbids us to think otherwise. The
truth, however, is in the Old Testament in a pectdiar
form ; it is there in the form of the letter or of the Law
which works fear, and thus it corresponds to the under-
standing. Nor can the Law bring blessedness, for works
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NICOLAÜS OF CÜSA. 87
cannot justify, because we must justify ourselves by these
works.
3. It is therefore only the Way of Grace, or the third
Stage of Eeligion, which is ührütianüy, that leads to salva-
tion. It corresponds to Season ; and as the senses ought to
serve the understanding and the understanding the reason, so
should ]^ature serve the Law and the Law serve Grace. It
has already been shown that we have in Christ the perfect
knowledge of the absolute God, and why we have such know-
ledge. The knowledge that is mediated by the revelation in
Christ likewise passes through several stages. For all the
spheres of knowledge, the principle holds that faith is the
beginning of knowing. Certain propositions are everywhere
presupposed as axioms which are only apprehended by
faith, and out of which the knowledge of the object to be
investigated is then developed« Knowledge receives its
direction through faith; faith receives its development
through knowledga This holds also of the truth itself, that
is, of Christ. By faith in Christ the greatest and deepest
mysteries of God become manifest to the childlike and humble
heart, because in Him are hid all the tJreasures of wisdom.
The belief in the incarnation of a Word of God forms the
beginning. As this sweet faith in Christ expands and
unfolds itself, in a gradual process of ascent, it leads us into
the truth itself, by which we become the children of God.
The starting-point is formed by hearing, which is in a
manner a sensuous kind of knowledge; and it may be
compared to the knowledge of Christ according to the flesh
of which Paul speaks. When we gradually attain to some
of the ineradicable traces of His footsteps by hearing the
voice of Grod Himself in His holy organs, we then come to
know God more distinctly by manifold principles of the
understanding. The believers ascend yet higher to simple
rational intuition, by advancing as from sleep to waking,
or from hearing to seeing, when they see what cannot be
revealed because no ear is able to catch it, nor any voice
to convey it. This is the reason why there are so many
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88 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
errors and irrational conceptions of God. It is because
many cannot rise to the highest stage, but stop short upon
the lower stages.
The activity of faith consists in the inward union of the
believer with Christ. This union is inconceivable and
indescribable, but it has its ground and its possibility in the
fact that Christ is the most perfect humanity, and therefore
all men are in Him and He is in all men. Faith makes the
individual like to Christ He withdraws Himself from the
defilement of the flesh, walks with fear in the way of God,
and is all spirit. He rises above all that ia visible; He
has even power over nature, and commands the evil spirits.
Perfect fiaith is vitalized by love. As every living being loves
life and every thinker loves thought, so we cannot have faith
in Jesus as the immortal life and as the infinite truth without
loving Him in the highest. It is love that becomes the
animating principle of faith, and bestows upon it real being.
A great faith is not even possible without the hope of yet
enjoying Jesus Himself. Whosoever does not believe that he
will attain the promised eternal life, cannot possibly face death
for Christ's sake.
As the diverse finite things, notwithstanding their plurality,
are comprehended in the concrete unity of the universe, so
Christians, however diverse they may be in faith, have their
concrete unity in the Church. The Church is the mystical
body of Christ, and it is the medium of the union of the
individual with Christ through the Word and the Sacraments.
4. Even the most perfect Christian cherishes hope, as a
longing and yet trustful outlook towards a still more perfect
state, and thus Christianity points to a fourth stage of know^
ledge and religion. This stage begins when, in complete union
with God, we know Him without mediation entirely as He is,
wholly enjoy Him without limit, and find in this enjoyment a
happiness which will still all our longings for ever. This
stage of completion will only be realized in the world beyond
the present. It far transcends our common understanding
and comprehension as well as all speech and despription.
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TELESIUS AND CAKDANÜS. 89
The Bishop of Brixen lived in friendly relations and
frequent scientific communication with the Benedictines in
the monastery of Tegemsee, and their Prior, Bernhard. Many
a message passed hither and thither over the great Brenner
highway that lay between them. At one time rare books
were sent for from the library of the Bishop, which the
monks studied and copied. At another time there passed
a friendly letter from the Bishop full of affection, or one
was received from the monks bearing their expressions of
reverence, and deferential requests for instruction. And, again,
the Bishop would transmit the works he had composed, that
they might first be submitted to his sympathetic friends ; or
Bernhard sent those he had written, composed for the elucida-
tion and vindication of the Docta Ignorantia. Along with many
friendly supporters, the doctrine of Nicolaus also found
opponents in Germany, such as Yench in Heidelberg, Gregory
of Heimberg, and others. Among his adherents were reckoned
some whose names are stUl known, such as Faber Stapulensis
(Jacques Le F6vre d' Etaples, 1450-1537), Professor of
philosophy at Paris, one of the most zealous precursors of the
Beformation in France, and Carolus Bovillus (Charles Bouill^,
1470-1553). In Italy, during the lifetime of Nicolaus, his
philosophy already found numerous Mends and followers.
IL
Telesius and Cardanüs.
Bemardinus Telesius (1508^1538) begins a new move-
ment in philosophy.^ His method first drew nature into the
circle of philosophical speculation, with full consciousness
of what was new in this sphere. However imperfect the
beginnings of this Natural Philosophy might be, and how-
^ The principal work of Telesius is his De rerum natura Juxta propria
prinäpiaj L. ix., Naples 1586. The accompanying and often very violent polemic
against the Physics of Aristotle and the later Peripatetics, which goes through
the whole work, iills ap the greater part of it.
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90 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
ever much it was impeded by too close an attachment to
ancient philosophers as well as by the want of exact observa-
tion, the principle of it at least became clear, and thereby the
human mind broke with the past, both in its general attitude
and tendency. In the Prooemium of his principal work
Telesius expresses himself generally as follows. — ^The reason
why former inquirers have achieved so little is specially due
to the fact that they trusted themselves too much, and did
not consider things and their powers sufficiently. Entering
into a sort of rivalry with God for wisdom, they ventured to
investigate the principles and grounds of the world by reason,
and assuming that they had found what was really not found,
they fashioned a universe for themselves after their own mere
opinion. We, on the contrary, he says, have undertaken to
consider the world itself and its parts, in their passiveness,
their activity, and their working. For these will reveal the
essential nature of every separate thing.
In the execution of his work, Telesius certainly is far from
actually carrying out this programme. Following the view
of Parmenides, he reduces the Universe to three principles :
two of them being incorporeal and active, namely. Heat and
Cold, and one corporeal and passive, which is Matter. Matter
is in itself entirely inactive, inert, and wholly passive, but it
can be permeated and formatively modified by Heat and Cold
in equal degrees, being expanded by the former and condensed
by the latter. Heat and Cold everywhere seek to diffuse
themselves, and reciprocally to overcome each other ; but as
in this they never entirely succeed, they are limited to a
determinate place with the Matter that is necessary for
their subsistence. The sun is the bearer of heat, the earth
is the bearer of cold. From these, as their inexhaustible
sources, heat and cold diffuse themselves throughout the
universe, and the diversity of things rests upon the diverse
ways in which heat and cold are mixed. The principal eflTect
of heat is motion. Those beings that move themselves appear
to be animated, and hence the soul, in its ultimate relation,
is to be referred to heat. Sensation belongs even to inanimate
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TELESIÜS AND CARDANUS. 91
beings, because they are mixed of heat and cold. The soul of
plants and animals grows from their seed ; man, on the other
hand, has in addition to this vital corporeal spiiit, called the
Spiritus Turvosus, a soul immediately created and infused into
him by God; and this soul is incorporeal and immortal
Perception and sensation rest upon the expansion and contrac-
tion of the vital spirit which dwells in the nerves and in the
brain, and is accessible to the influence of air and light. The
passions are related to the highest good, which is the self-
preservation of the spirit. Whatever subserves this highest
good is good, and whatever is contrary to it is bad. On the
basis of this principle Telesius gives a somewhat detailed
sketch of Ethics. The naturalism of the system, however,
is considerably attenuated by the position being expressly
emphasized that this whole creation is not the effect of a
reasonless contingent cause, but is the work of the will and
the wisdom of God who has thus arranged all things.
Those indications of the system may suflSce here. The
Natural Philosophy of Telesius did not remain without
influence. His admirers and patrons induced him to give up
his quiet country life at Cosenza and to teach philosophy in
Naples. Here there gathered around him a circle of followers
some of whom were greatly celebrated, and they formed
the Cosentinian Academy, which contributed much to the
furtherance of the study of natural science, and to the over-
throw of Aristotelianism. The writings of Telesius were put
upon the Index Expurgatorius, but with the addition donee
expitrgerUur. Among his opponents we may mention
Antonius Marta and Andreas Chioccus, and among his
scholars, Franciscus Patritius and Thomas Campanella.
Hieronymus Cardanus (1501-1576) deserves to be named
along with Telesius as one of the principal founders of Natural
Philosophy.^ He was a man of an extremely restless spirit,
1 The collected works of Cardan were published by C. Spon at Lyons in 1668,
in 10 vols, folio. Reference is made here only to the contents of his two principal
writings, De SubtilitaU, L xxL (Lugd. 1552), and his De VarieiaU rerum,
1556.
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92 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
and of a character that was without stay or stedfastness,
thrown hither and thither from one position in life to
another, and immoderately addicted to carnal pleasure. In
spite of his high endowments and indefatigable industry.
Cardan rather led his followers astray in science, like an
ignis fatuus, than shone as a stedfast light We may here
pass over his astrological dreams, and the principles of his
Chiromancy and Alchemy, which were expounded with all
earnestness, and in all which Cardan was truly a son of his
age. According to Cardan, there lie three principles at the
basis of all finite things : Matter, Form, and Soul. Matter is
everywhere, but it is nowhere without Form, which first
bestows upon it determinate and proper being. Matter and
Form are connected by the moving and arranging activity of
the SouL There are three elements : Air, Water, and Earth.
The soul, or rather the heavenly heat, with light as its reflec-
tion, permeates and connects all things. Hence the universe
is a living organism in which every one thing is related to
and acts on every other. This vital heat in the universe
is in uninterrupted activity ; and all origination and destruc-
tion of things is in truth nothing else than a changing
formation of matter, through the one form -giving heavenly
heat
God is the one eternal Being that has no participation
in not-being. He contains all things in Himself, and rules
immeasurably and infinitely over everything as the highest
power. As the One, God is also the Good. He is the Subject
that knows the Object that is known, and the Love which
combines these two with each other. As power, knowledge,
and love, the one supreme God is, at the same time, a triad.
Man, on whose account all finite things were created, stands
in the middle between what is heavenly and what is earthly.
On this fact it rests that the position of the stars shows his
character and his fates. The artistic formation and the ravish-
ing beauty of the body are already wonderful. But what
especially distinguishes man is his spirit. It is not corporeal,
but is an inner light that illuminates itself; it is simple.
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GIORDANO BRUNO. 93
elevated above what is perishable, and immortal. This immor-
tality is conceived as a transmigration of souls, and according
as their striving is good, spirits enter into higher or lower
forms of life. The essential nature of the spirit consists of
thinking. As God is* the highest Being and the giver of all
good, the knowledge of God is the highest goal, and the true
blessedness of life. All cognition rests upon the fact that we
become one with the object, and hence the knowledge of God
leads also to our becoming one with Him. To know one's self
and God in one's self, is the highest happiness and the true
wisdom. In this knowledge the human spirit is wedded to the
divine ; and if we worship God in purity of spirit, we will
become purified from all guilt and sin, will be united with
Him in eternal rest and joy, and will form a ray of His own
light
IIL
Giordano Bruno* (c 1555-1600).
The Metaphysics of Giordano Bruno rest essentially upon
the thoughts of Nicolaus of Cusa. In his Physics he takes
into account those of Telesius. His own independence as
a thinker comes out especially in his view of the unity of
1 Bnmo was bom aoon after the middle of the sixteenth Centory, at Nola in
the kingdom of Naples. While a Dominican he became equally familiar with
the philosophers and the poets of antiquity, but owing to the repeated collision
of his views with the roles of the Dominican Order, he was forced to leave his
country in 1580. Thereafter he led an unsettled life in Switzerland, France,
England, and Germany, but everywhere showed himself an enthusiastic teacher
of his philosophy. With the certainty of death before him, he returned to his
country, was seized at Venice in 1592, and after being confined eight years in
prison, he was burned at Rome on the 17th February 1600 as a heretic and
apostate. Of a poetic nature and full of lofty enthusiasm, he wrote many works
in high soaring verse. Bruno has also shown himself to be an acute observer and
a witty but caustic delineator of the weak points of others, in his Comedies
and Satires. A large number of his writings are of a mnemotechnic nature, being
continuations and improved forms of the Lullian art For our subject the follow-
ing writings have to be considered : — ** Dialoghi de la Causa, principio et uno,"
Venet. 1584 ; "Del* infinito Universo, et de* i mondi," Venet 1584 ; "De
triplici Minimo et Mensura, etc." 1591 ; " De Monade, numero et figura, etc.*'
1591 ; ** De Immenso, etc" 1591.— Carrie's account of Bi-uno may be specially
referred to.
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94 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
the universe regarded as an all-permeating world-souL Matter
he regards as embraced with Form into a unity in God, who
is the self-knowing spirit. Individual things are conceived as
individually different monads. The whole of his philosophy is
attractive, not only from showing the pure enthusiasm of
an elevated surrender of self to the AU-One, but from its
being full of fruitful thoughts, although many of them are
still obscure, and some of them were not clearly developed till
a later age.
Bruno determines the relation of philosophy to theology in
the usual manner of his time. The dogmas of the Church
are recognised as incontrovertible truth, and then they are set
aside without further consideration as a sort of Noli me tangere.
Philosophical investigation is prosecuted with entire free-
dom from prejudice, as if this were the one way to truth. In
many cases this recognition of the ecclesiastical dogma, which
is sometimes expressed with great emphasis, may have been
only an act of precaution ; but it was not so in the case of
Bruno, a man who owed the whole uncertainty of his life only
to this incautious zeal for the truth, a zeal which afterwards
brought him to the stake. According to his view, revelation
and natural knowledge cannot contradict each other, for both
refer to God as their one common ground. Where a contra-
diction appears, as in relation to the Copemican theory of the
system of the world, Bruno points out that Scripture gives
revelations only in reference to morals and the doctrine of
salvation, and not in regard to physics, in reference to which
it accommodates itself to the ideas of the time. A dis-
tinction between revelation and natural knowledge is founded
on the fact that God lies far above what is attainable by our
rational thinking, the true knowledge of His nature being only
attainable by revelation. Entirely in the spirit of Cusa, Bruno
also expounds a connected doctrine of God by the way of the
negative philosophy, and its result may be thus briefly indi-
cated : God is infinite, and as such He is elevated far above
our finite faculty of knowledge. We cannot know God from
effects, partly because these are very far removed from Him,
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GIORDANO BBÜNO. 95
proceeding, as they do, not from His substance, but as it were
from His accidents, and partly because we are not able entirely
to comprehend even effects. As regards morals and theology
it suffices to know God in so far as He reveals Himself, and
it is the sign of an unconsecrated spirit and of boundless pre-
sumption, to enter upon investigations regarding things which
go beyond our reason.
At the same time, however, to strive after the knowledge of
Grod, in so far as Nature itself gives traces of Him or reflects
Him, deserves the highest praise. The conceptions of Cause and
Principle stihserve this striving. Whatever is not itself an
ultimate Principle and an ultimate Cause, has a principle and
a causa In the sphere of Nature we call the internal ground
of a thing a principle, as that which contributes essentially to
its production and continues in the product ; and we call the
external ground of a thing a cause, as that which externally
contributes to the production of the thing, but remains outside
of the product. We call God the ultimate Principle and ulti-
mate Cause of all things. We accordingly thus designate One
Being, viewed, however, in different relations, regarding Him as
a principle, in so far as all things yield to Him in nature and
dignity according to a determinate series, and regarding Him
as a Cause in so far as all things are different from Him, as
the effect is different from the effector.
A Cause is either efficient^ or formal, or fmal. The physical
universal efficient Cause is the universal Keason ; it is the
supreme and chief faculty of the World-Soul. The universal
Eeason is the inmost faculty, and a potential part of the
world-soul ; it is an identity which fills the whole of things,
illuminates the universe, and instructs Nature how to produce
her kinds. It brings forth natural things as our reason brings
forth conceptions. It is the internal artist that forms matter
and shapes it from within. From the seed it develops the
stem ; from the stem it shoots forth the branches ; from the
branches it fashions the twigs ; and so on. There is therefore
a threefold Eeason : the divine Reason which is all, the World-
soul which makes all, and the Beason of individual things
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06 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
which becomes alL This World-soul is both internal and
external cause ; it is an internal cause, as it does not shape
matter from without but by inherent energy, and it is an
external cause in so far as it has a being entirely distinct from
the substance and essentiality of what is produced.
The formal Cause cannot be separated from the End or
Final Cause. For whatever is active according to rational
laws, works in accordance with an idea of the thing, and this
is nothing else than the form of the thing itself that is to be
produced. The World-soul must therefore involve all things
in itself according to a certain formal conception, as the
sculptor has in him the idea of the statue. Hence there are
two species of forms, one according to which the efficient
cause works, and one which the efficient cause produces in
matter. The end which the working cause sets before itself is
the perfection of the universe, which consists in this, that all
forms receive actual existence in the different parts of matter.
And as the efficient or working Cause is universally present in
the universe, while it is particularly and specially present in
its parts and members, so is it also with its Form and its End.
Thus does the world-soul appear as Cause and Principle at
once. That it can be both is explained by the example of the
helmsman in the ship, and of the soul in the body. In so far
as the helmsman is moved at the same time with the ship, he
is a part of it ; in so far as he steers it, he is an independently
active being. In like manner the soul is on the one side wholly
in the body, and on another side it is a something separate
from the body. So it is with the world-soul ; in so far as it
animates and shapes, it is the indwelling and formal part of
the principle of the world ; in so far as it guides and rules, it Ls
the cause of the world. Hence we may think of the world
and its members according to the analogy of the lower animals.
All finite things are animate ; and this holds true not merely
of the world as a whole, but of all its parts, and again of their
parts. If, then, there is soul found in all things, the soul is
manifestly the true reality and the true form of all things.
There is one and the same world-soul in all things, but in
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GIORDANO BBUNO, 97
proportion to the different receptivity of matter, it brings forth
difierent formations or stages of soul It is only these forma-
tions, which are in a way external forms, that change ; whereas
the Form itself, or the spiritual substance, is as imperishable as
matter is.
" Never doth perish the soul, but rather its earlier dwelling
Is changed for its new abode, in which it liveth and worketh.
Everything changes, but nothing perishes ever at all."
This form is not to be conceived as a mere external quali-
fication of matter, but we must accept two modes of being as
Form and Matter. For there must be an ultimate sub-
stantial efficient principle in which the active capacity of all
things exists ; and there must likewise be a substratum in
which the passive capacity of all things exists. Form separated
from matter is one ; it is unchangeable in itself, and it is
through its connection with matter that it first passes into
plurality and difference. It is the active and determining
principle. The passive principle, or matter, is in its essence
that which is determined, and it has a capacity for receiving
all possible forms into itself
There is therefore one Reason which gives everything its
essence ; one soul which forms all things, and fashions them
into shape ; and one matter out of which everything is made
and formed. Matter may be regarded in a twofold way, as
povoer and as substratum. As power we find it again in a
certain way in all things. Bruno, however, takes power in a
still higher and more comprehensive sense. Power is regarded
either as active in so far as it is efficient, or as passive in so
far as it is receptive, and serves as a basis for an operating
agent. This passive power or capacity must be predicated
of everything to which we attribute being ; and the passive
capacity completely corresponds to the active power. If, there-
fore, the power to make, to produce, or to create has always
been, so likewise the power to be made, produced, or created has
always been ; for the one includes the other, and necessarily
presupposes it. Hence the passive power belongs in the
same measure as the active to the supreme supernatural prin-
V0L.L ^ n \
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98 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
ciple. The ultimate principle is all that can be, and it would
not be all if it had not power to be alL Reality and power
to be, are here one and the same. It is not so, however, with
finite things. Ko one of these is all that it can be ; any one
of them might as well not be, or as well be something else
than it is. It is not so with the universe. It is, indeed, all
that it can be, in so far as its species continue the same, and
it constitutes the whole of matter. But there remain in it
distinctions, determinations, specific differences, and individuals ;
nor is any one of its parts really what it could be. Hence
the universe is only a shadow of the primal reality and of the
primal power. Further, the universe is all that it can be, only
in an explicated, dispersed, differentiated mode, whereas the
highest principle is all that it can be in a single and un-
differentiated mode. Death, evil, errors, and defects are not
realities and powers, but are deficiencies and impotences ; they
are in the explicated things, because these are not all that
they might be. The first absolute principle is therefore in
itself sublimity and greatness, and it is so to such an extent
that it is all that it can be. It is the greatest of all and the
least of all ; it is infinite, indivisible greatness ; it is not the
greatest, only because it is likewise the least, and it is not the
least, only because it is likewise the greatest The absolute
power 13 what can be everything ; it is the power of all
powers, the reality of all realities, the life of all lives, the soul
of all souls, the substance of all substances. What is other-
wise contradictory and opposite, is in this absolute power one
and the same ; and everything in It is one and the same/
This absolute reality, which is identical with absolute possi-
bility, can be conceived by the understanding only by negations ;
but the Scripture reveals it when it says, '' as is His darkness
so ako is His light" (Ps. cxxxix. 12). Hence the whole
universe as regards its substance is one ; and if we, in descend-
ing to finite' things, come upon a twofold substance in the
^ That Bruno calls this principle ** Matter," and " Matter *' in this sense
** God," must be carefully noted in considering the question as to his Material-
ism. Bruno knows nothing of ** Matter " in the usual meaning of the tenu.
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GIOBDANO BBUNO. 99
spiritual and the corporeal, we must, however, refer them
both to one essence and one root.
Regarded as a substrcUum, matter is not the mere prope nihil
of many philosophers, pure naked capacity without reality
and without power or energy, as they represent it, but it is
like a pregnant female about to discharge and liberate her
fruit It is not to be designated as that in which everything
comes to be, but as that out of which every natural species
arises.
Unity is thus attained. Being, the One, the Good, the
True, are all the same. God is the Being in all that has
being, the universal substance by which all things exist, the
essentiality of all essences, the internal creative nature of all
things. This One does not perish, because all existence is
the existence of Itself ; it neither decreases nor increases ;
' it is not subject to change ; it is neither matter nor form,
because it is One and AIL The conception of the Infinite
resolves all individualities and differences, and all number and
quantity, into unity. We are not farther from or nearer to
this identity as man than we would be as an ant or as a
star. The Infinite is all in all, but not wholly nor in all its
modes in any one individual. As the soul is indivisible and
is only one essence, yet is all of it present in every part
of the body ; so, in like manner, the essence of the universe is
one in the infinite, and yet is actually present in every
individual tJiing. And now we comprehend the principle of
contradictories which Bruno, under reference to Cusa, also
seeks to establish by his own arguments. The highest
good and the highest perfection rest upon the unity which
comprehends all things. The more we know this Ooe, so
much more do we know AIL " Praised be the gods, praised
by all that lives be the Infinite, Simplest, Singlest, Sublimest,
and Absolutest, as Cause, Principle, and One."
The All as the unfolding of the Infinitely-One, is likewise
infinite. God alone is absolutely infinite, because He excludes
every limit from Himself, and each of His attributes is one
and indivisible, and because He is all in all the world, and in
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100 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
each of its parts. The universe, whose parts are finite, is
infinite only in so far as it is not limited in space. The
development of the One is at the same time differentiation.
Of finite things there are not two which are completely like
each other ; but because they arise from the One, different
things are connected into order and harmony. All that is,
is one ; the least is one as an atom or monad ; the greatest
is one as comprehending all, or as the monad of monads.
The monads have their being from the highest Being or
God; and it holds of the least as well as of the greatest
that it is an indivisible one, incapable of increase or diminu-
tion ; it is a union of all contradictories. The same infinite
essentiality of being enters into every individual, only it is in
every one in a different way. In boundless space, the primal
fact is the opposition of heat and cold. Heat appears in fire,
cold in water ; the former has its seat in the sun, the latter
has its seat in the earth. Life proceeds from their mutual
permeation. — The earth, like the other planets, rolls in in-
finite space around the sun, and the sun too sweeps along
among the universal cycling movements of the stars.
Man stands in the middle between the Divine and the
Earthly. The soul is the formative monad in the body;
around it, as the active centre, all the atoms encamp. In this
lies the guarantee of our immortality, which is conceived as
a migration of souls into higher or lower forms of existence,
according as we have lived well or ilL — Everything strives
after the goal of its own nature. Man consists of soul and
body, and has therefore the double goal of spiritual and
corporeal perfection. The spirit is elevated above the body,
and therefore the goal of the spirit is the highest ; it is union
with God through knowledge of Him. God as spirit forms
Ideas; the Ideas effectuate things, and our conceptions,
obtained from the contemplation of things, are shadows of the
Ideas. Knowledge passes through four stages. Starting
from Sense-perception, it passes through the Phantasy, and
again through the Understanding, till it becomes the know-
ledge of Beason. Season rises to unity and recognises one
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THOMAS CAMPANELUU 101
subject as the root and vital principle of all things.
Finally, the intuitive mind attains to the All by one Intui-
tion. We have to raise ourselves to this truth in order to
become united with God. God is likewise the good ; evil
does not pertain to Him, but has its principle in the finite*
In the moral life, we therefore also find union with God.
Love is inseparably connected with knowledge and action ;
it lays hold of the will and draws it on towards the divine
beauty. By love we are also raised with our thinking and
being to God, and are transformed into Him in whom our
nature reaches the ground of its existence. Thus does the
finite return to the infinite as to its true being, the being
from which it starts and into which it is raised again. — On
two points Bruno does not give us sufficient explanation.
One is that theology has first to bring us the true know-
ledge of the divine Being, and yet philosophy is made to
show us the way to it. The other is that the world-soul
as a second unity, is expressly distinguished from God as
the first unity ; but it is not said bow the former proceeds
from the latter, and many expressions leave us doubtful as to
whether they are meant to be applied to God or the world-
souL
The Church with her strong arm seems to have checked
the contemporary influence of the thoughts of Giordano Bruno,
but their influence afterwards upon Spinoza, Leibniz, Schell-
ing, and others is obvious in the affinity of their systems to
his ideas.
Thomas Campanblla (1568-1639).
Campanella,^ like Bruno, attaches his doctrines to the
Metaphysics of Nicolaus of Cusa and to the Physics of
^ Campanella was bom at Stilo in Calabria. Haying early reached maturity,
he became a preacher in his sixteenth year. Trained in the philosophy of his
age, Campanella became subject to doubt, and was led to give up authority and
examine the original and living Nature herself, and in this he specially took Telesius
as his guide» In his twenty-second year he already began to write out his views in
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102 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
Telesius, but in an entirely independent way. Wholly in the
spirit of modern speculation, he begins by doubting the trust-
worthiness of OUT knowledge, as narrowly limited and as
obscured by the medium of the senses. Hence he starts with
Ä penetrating investigation of the faculty of cognition. The
soul is corporeal; it is the warm, mobile, nervous spirit.
Things work upon this spirit, thereby assimilating it to them-
selves. The change thus produced remains in the spirit like
a scar. The active operation of perception relates to this
capacity of being affected, and it forms ideas corresponding to
those ideas which lie at the foundation of things as their
cause. Further, the principles of knowledge are innate in us.
All finite things are compounds of being and not-being,
and more particularly of finite being and infinite not-being.
Thus man is man inasmuch as humanness belongs to him, and
all other being is regarded as not belonging to him. This
not-being viewed absolutely is, however, not real or actual
being; but in this way there is only the Being or God.
God is absolute. He is the One, the Simple, the Infinite.
He is the unity of all being ; from His unity no individual
determinate being is excluded, and to it no not-being is
attributable. To being there belongs three Primalities
(primalitates) or primal essentialities : Activity, for everything
is because it has power or capacity to be ; Wisdom, for every-
thing knows about its being and its preservation ; and Love,
for everything strives to preserve itself. Power, Wisdom, Love
thus form in God a triad in the unity of being. The Not-
being consists of the corresponding three principles of power-
lessness, ignorance, and hate. As all finite things have their
being from God, they participate in these three Primalitates ;
but as they are limited at the same time by not-being, these
retirement at Balbia. From 1599 to 1626 he pined in a prison under an accusa-
tion of treason, but was liberated by the intervention of Pope Urban VII. and
brought to his Court From fear of the Spaniards he fled to France, and died
in exile at Paris held in high honour. Of his numerous works we have specially
to note the foUowing : — Prodromus Philosophise instaurandse, 1617 ; De sensu
remm et Magia, 1620 ; Realis Philosophise epilogisticse p. iv. 1623 ; Atheismus
triumphatus, 1681 ; De Prsedestinatione, etc 1686 ; Universalis Philosophise,
L. zviii 1638. A complete exposition of his doctrines is still awanting.
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THOMAS CAMPANELLA. 103
primal essentialities are present in them only in a finite way.
Power is directed to existence; wisdom to truth. Cognition
rests upon the fact that the soul receives its objects into itself,
and as it were becomes the objects themselves. All cognition
is self-knowledge, and therefore Grod knows everything,
because all existence is contained in His being. Love is
directed to the good, which consists primarily in self-preser-
vation ; and hence the striving to escape death by the im-
mortality of one's name and the propagation of the species.
The true being and life, however, is God ; and hence the true
and final satisfaction of love, is participation in the Deity.
Because all being comes from God, there is actually neither
death nor eviL Death is only a transformation of the form
of existence ; evil is only a defect, because the limit of not
being continually makes its appearance as soon as plurality
proceeds out of unity. Evils therefore do not exist as such in
relation to the whole, but they have existence only in relation
to the parts.
The ideas of all things are in God, and by these Ideas
all things participate in God. His beholding of these Ideas is
also the production of things. God is the Subject that knows,
the object that is known, and the act of knowing at once
in one. He is in like manner the subject that loves, the
object that is loved, and the love, at tiie same time, in one.
From the three " Primalitates " there proceed as many effects
in finite things. These effects are Necessity, Fate, and
Harmony, to which, as effects of the not-being, there corre-
spond Contingency, Perchance, and Disharmony. In order to
form the world, God first created space as an embracing
receptacle, put into it the inert, invisible, corporeal mass that
is called matter, and superadded to their formation two in-
corporeal powers as active principles, namely, heat and cold.
Heat and cold have their seat respectively in the sun and in
the earth; and in conflict with each other, and by varying inter-
mixture, they produce out of matter all finite things. This is
only possible if sense and sensation belong to all things. Dke
individual things, the world as a whole is also animated.
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104 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
On the basis of these views, Campanella has expressed
himself in detail regarding Beligion in his Uniotrsalis Philo^
Sophia, as well as in his Atheismus Triumphatus. In the
former treatise he has discussed Beligion in connection with
his whole system; in the latter» he has reviewed it with
the express intention of showing that the Beligion of all men
was originally the same, and entirely conformable to Nature,
and that it was only split up into a plurality of religions by
the jealousy of sophists and the political calculation of those
in power.
In all things there is implanted a striving after self-preser-
vation. They find their essentiality actually preserved in the
principle that is peculiar to them. AH things therefore strive
after this ; and this striving forms their natural religicm, as
a return to their proper principle. Hence four kinds of
Beligion may be distinguished: Bdtgio naiurcUis, animalis,
rcUionalis, et supenuäuralis. By Natural Beligion all things
strive back to their Lord and Creator, and offer to Him praise
and worship ; as David sings, '' The heavens declare the
glory of God," eta Most finite things do not proceed im-
mediately from God, but arise through the medium of other
things. Hence it is that they frequently strive, not back
to God as the highest principle, but to what lies nearest them,
as heat to the sun, and water to the sea. This return forms
the religion of all things ; as they thus strive again toward
their principle, and thereby confess that out of that principle
no immortality or permanence can be found for their being.
What is called Animal Beligion superadds the obedience which
the animals exhibit towards higher powers. Thus elephants
bow the knee before the moon, and birds sing to the rising sun«
national Beligion belongs only to beings endowed with
reason, and who know and worship the wisdom of God and
God Himsell The soul likewise strives after its principle,
but it does not, like the most of things, strive after mere finite
principles, but after God Himsel£ Hence the soul alone
really attains what it strives after, namely, immortality. This
striving is implanted in the soul, after the analogy of all other
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THOMAS CABiPANELLA« 105
tliingd, and therefore religion beta not been devised from mere
political considerations, as tbe Maccbiavellists, in a foolish
and godless way, assert. Beligion being the retnm of the
soul to God as its principle, is much rather the "Law of
Nature," and on this account it is also one and the same for
all men. Nothwithstanding the diversity that appears among
religions, they are, in truth, essentially identical with one
another. This innate Beligion is perfect and true. It shows
to man the way from the world of alienation back to Grod.
It is likewise of divine origin, for, from the eternal Law —
that •* Word of God " by which God leads all things to their
goal — there flows also the natural law of action, which only
becomes a positive law for the several nations by reference to
the contingency of their modes of life, and as such it perishes
with the nations.
Beligion^ in its essence, is union of the spirit with God.
Hence it has two sides. On the side of action, it is the
turning away of the heart from external sinful acts to the
internal life, to goodness, to the true service of God. On the
side of knowledge, it is insight into divine and human things.
It is from the combination of these two that religion attains
its highest perfection in the essential union of the spirit with
Qod. Beligion is in its essence entirely inward, but this
inwardness necessarily demands external exhibition and active
manifestation in divine worship. This external activity has,
however, no value in itself, but is valuable only when it corre-
sponds throughout to the internal life. External religion is of
importance only for the State, which cannot continue to exist
without having a religious basis.
We can only love and "strive after" what we know.
If we are to love and strive after God in religion, we must
therefore know- Him. And if all the religions are funda-
mentally one, the natural knowledge of God that lies at their
foundation must also be one. To this innate cognition
(cogniiio irmata) there is, however, continually superadded
a further acquired cognition (cognitio ülata\ and thus there
is a religion also superadded to the natural religion (religion!
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106 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
natural! accedit superaddita). The natural religion is true
and perfect, and is the same among all nations and in all
times; what is superadded is subject to error, and all the
differences and controversies regarding religion are founded
upon it. We are not, indeed, able to know God as the First
Mover, as Aristotle alleges, but reason is spread throughout
the whole world, and it points to a First Eeason which is the
ground of all things. In like manner the consideration of all
forces points to a first Power, and the fulness of the various
finite strivings points to a first Leva Thus do we apprehend
God, not in the manner of Aristotle, as the soul of the world or
as the highest heaven, but as the supreme Being, the Good, the
True, the One.
This knowledge of God, however, is limited, for we cannot
know precisely what is elevated above us, nor can our actions
correspond to this knowledge. This is the ground of the
diversity presented by the religions. Every individual
honours God just as he knows Him, or as another person
represents Him. As most men are prevented by the occupa-
tions of daily life, and by their anxiety for the necessaries
of existence, from seeking the truth for themselves, they are
therefore compelled to follow others, such as their fathers or
lawgivers and philosophers. The various religions are Uius
true and good in so far as they rest upon the innate knowledge
of God ; and they are fake, erroneous, and contradictory in
so far as our knowledge is defective as being borrowed from
sensible objects.
In the very errors and the multiplicity of the religions which
all lay claim to the sole exclusive truth, there is implied a
necessity that God shall reveal Himself in a special manner.
A foundation is tlius laid for Supernatural Religion. Natural
Beligion awakens the cousciousness that we need help from
above in order to return to God as our Principle. Eevelation
gives us the right knowledge of God. When internal revelation
prepares us for its reception, it produces illumination of know-
ledge, strengthening of power, and sanctification of will. This
revelation comes to us through angels and prophets. But as
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THOMAS CAMPANELLA. 107
even their appearance did not keep men from falling into
idolatry, God Himself became man, and even suflfered death in
order to confirm the truth. Begarding the mode and possi-
bility of an immediate revelation us a communication of true
knowledge, Campanella does not give us any independent
views of his own, but he lays down rules by which we may
distinguish a divine revelation from one that might be from
the deviL These rules are : 1. The devil continually mixes
truth with falsehood ; 2. The devil often pursues other ends
than the union of the soul with God ; 3. The devil appears
mostly in a hideous form, or leaves behind him something that
is repugnant.
We almost feel ourselves transported into the age of the
eighteenth century Enlightenment, when we read in Cam-
panella such passages as the following : " Marks by which the
metaphysician concludes which religion is from God, and
which from the devil ; " or when he tries to find out which is
the true religion among the many religions '' by the common
natural reason" (per rationem communem naturalem), and
proceeds to prove its " rational credibility " (rationabilis credi-
bilitas). Of such " marks " (notae) he enumerates ten in the
Philosqphia Universalis and sixteen in the Atheismus Trium-
phatus. The most important of these marks are the follow-
ing. (1) The moral precepts must correspond to universal
nature, and allow no vice that is contrary to natural virtue.
(2) The doctrines must be credible, true, and compatible with
reason; and, if they go beyond reason, they must not be contra-
dictory or fabulous. The true faith, in fact, is not merely a
historical thing, but an internal affection of the mind, and it
makes the individual know and will the divine. (3) The
fact that prophets have been actually sent from God, must be
established by their miracles, prophecies, virtuous life, and
stedfast martyrdom. (4) The true religion is spread by
miracles and virtue, but not by arms, and to it alone does
God give lasting existence. (5) There can only be one
divine religion corresponding to human nature and perfecting
it ; it alone applies to the whole world, and responds to the
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108 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
various manners of men, and is suitable for all places and
times. — By these marks the Christian religion is then com-
pared, in the several points of doctrine and of ritual, with the
other religions. And under reference to the distinctiou
between what is contrary to reason and what is above reason,
Christianity is shown on all points to be the only true reli-
gion. The result comes, in short, to this. There is a Law in
the whole world which brings men, in conformity with reason,
to the true life. Christianity is in harmony with this Law,
and it is therefore the true religion.
Fbanciscus Patbitius.
Patritius (1529-1593),^ in the introduction to his Panurchia,
attains to the supreme and single principle of all things in two
ways. Things are either unmoved or moved ; and the latter
are either moved by other things or by themselves. Hence
there are three kinds of substances : Bodies, Souls, and Spirits.
Those souls whose care is the movement of the heavens and
the order of the world, participate in reason. This points to
another higher Spirit which exists independently of souls.
Life precedes this spirit ; Essence precedes life ; the essentially
One precedes essence ; Unity precedes the essentially One ;
and the First-One precedes all (Unum primum). Thus we
rise to a First-One, which is before and above all things. —
Further, what is, is either one in its mode, so that it contains
no plurality ; or it is a plurality in its mode, so that it con-
^ Patritios, notwithstanding his unsettled life, of which he only spent the last
eighteen yean in rest as a teacher of the Platonic Philosophy at Ferrara, was a
versatile and prolific writer. By his Delia Historia Dieoe Dialoghi, 1560, he
acquired a distinguished place among the historians of his time. In his Dis-
cussiones i)eripatetic», in 4 vols. (1571-1581), he gives an investigation,
unique for its time, on the Aristotelian Philosophy in its relation to Plato and
the older philosophers. Its purpose was to show that all that was false in the
system was peculiar to Aristotle, and all that was true in it was borrowed from
others. He also translated the Commentary of Joannes Phüoponus on Aristotle,
and wrote important works on the Military Art and on Poetry. His principal
philosophical work is his Nova de (Jniversis Philosophia, Ferrara 1591. It
is divided into four parts : Panaugia, or the Doctrine of Light ; Panarchia, or
Metaphysics ; Panpsychia, or Psychology ; and Pancosmia, or Cosmology.
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FRANCISCÜS PATKITIÜ8, 109
tains nothing simple ; or it is at once one and many ; or it is
neither one nor many. Of these four possibilities one only is
thinkable, namely, that individual things are at once one and
many. This points to a higher uniting nature, which is
neither one nor many, but is absolutely one, and nothing else
but on a This one is not a body ; it is not nature ; it is not
the soul ; it is not the understanding ; it is not life ; it is not
essence ; it is not unity ; but it is the One absolutely, which
is the principle of all things, and therefore it is likewise the
First of all things.
In this First-One there is already contained everything
that afterwards comes out of it ; and this holds not merely in
possibility, but really. However, it is not yet in full unfolded
reality, but only as it were in seed (seminaliter). By the
seminal activity (actione seminali) everything proceeds from
the One ; and, in assuming proper independent form, the One
splits up into the plurality of the various genera. The order
and harmony in the universe, refer unmistakeably to this unity
in plurality. This primal one is the simplest of all things ;
it is out of all relations of space and of time, of rest and of
motion, and even of essence ; it can neither be known nor
named ; it is the first and absolute Good. As numbers arise
from numerical uni^, so is this One the principle of all things.
Hence, in the One, all things are contained in a manner that
is unique (unitery ivuiiayi) : and the One is both One- All and
All-One at the same time (unomnia). This Infinite, this First-
One, which is at the same time All-One, we likewise call God.
This unity is, however, at the same time threefold ; it is a
Triunity or Trinity. The One first of all, in accordance with
its unity, lets One arise out of itself; this One is similar to
it-^nay, they are both essentially the same as one another,
and are only distinguished by the eternally processional act
of letting go forth and of going forth. The two form an
indissoluble communion with each other ; they are a Triad,
indicated in the ecclesiastical expression of the Trinity as
Father, Son^i and Spirit, and in the philosophical terminology
as All-One, Possibility, and Spirit.
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110 . BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
It is by the mediation of this Triad that creation, as the
origin of the many tilings from the All-One, comes to pass.
For although all things are in the First-One, and on account
of this participation are complete, they do not proceed out of
it immediately, but only arise in a certain succession of stages,
each with its own degree of perfection. The first thing gene-
rated of the All-One is the primary Unity, called by Plato the
Idea of the Good, and called by the Church the Son of Grod.
This primary Unity creates with the Father the secondary
Unities, or the Ideas which it comprehends in itself ; for the
Idea of the Good cannot remain unfruitful By its resem-
blance to the One it is also a unity, and in its difference from
the One it produces plurality. When the primary Unity
turns itself in essential love to the Father, there proceeds from
the Father the third principle, which is Being, or the Essence
in which all essences are contained. To this Unity of essence
there are attached the unities of Lives, Spirits, Souls, Natures,
Qualities, and Bodies. In nine stages, all being descends,
without gap and without leap, from the highest All-One down
to the lowest thing. Throughout these stages the primary
Unity stands in uninterrupted union with the Plurality, and
particularly in the order of pervasion. All higher things are
contained in reality in the lower, according to the measure of
their capacity ; all lower things are contained in the higher,
according to the measure of their excellence. The ideas which
exist by themselves in the primary Unity are intellectual con-
ceptions in the rational spirit ; they are eflBcient causes in the
soul ; and they are forms in matter that fiU the world.
Patritius also designates the origin of the many things as a
creation out of nothing, in as far as no self-subsisting matter
lies at their foundation. He thinks of them rather as proceed-
ing out of God, like the word proceeding out of the mouth ;
and in such a way, that things out of God are no longer quite
the same as they were in Him. This process is effected by
Light. In so far as God by His infinite power gives power
and life to all finite things. He is fire and light. This cor-
poreally incorporeal Light, emanating from God, is always
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JULIUS CiBSAB VANINI. 111
combined with Heat ; both penetrate the universe of space, and
they constitute the properly efficient principle in all things.
The third principle, of which the effect is resistance, is Fluidity.
It does not interest us here to trace further how, according to
Patritius, the universe is constructed out of these principles. It
may only be further observed that the return to God is designated
as the end and goal of Philosophy ; and that Religion is not
specially discussed.
Julius CiESAE Vaninl
Julius Csesar Vanini (1585-1619)^ met the same fate as
Giordano Bruno; he was burned at Toulouse, in February
1619, after having been found guilty of atheism, blasphemy,
and other crimes. Yanini, however, is not to be put on a
level with Bruno, either as to power of thinking, or moral
earnestness, or in holy enthusiasm for his convictions. In the
first period of his life, of which the most important monument
is the AmphithecUrum, he zealously combats the atheists, but
moves almost entirely in Cardan's circle of thought. The
existence of God, he argues, does not follow, as Aristotle
supposes, from the fact that motion requires a First Mover,
but from the principle that finite and contingent being incon-
trovertibly demands an infinite and necessary Being, or that
limited being demands an unlimited Being. God alone knows
what God is, and, if I knew it, I would be God. All that can
be known from His works is that God is the first all-embracincr
Being, and hence He is the highest good. God is not an
essence, but Essentiality. He is not good, but Goodness.
He is not wise, but Wisdom. He is all, everywhere, and in all
things, but not enclosed by them ; He is above all things, but
not excluded from them. He is all, above all, in all, before all,
and after all. Everything finite has been created by God.
His creating, however, constitutes Cognition, and hence the
1 Of his writings, see particularly his Amphitheatrum ^temse providentice
dirino • magicom, etc., Lugd. 1615; De admirandis Natura Regius
Desque mortalium arcauis, L. iv., Lutet 1616. Carri^re, 495-521.
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112 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
divine Cognition, or the divine Providence, supports and
penetrates all things. This divine Providence is explained in
detail, and vindicated against the objections of Diagoras,
Protagoras, and Epicurus. The antagonism between divine
Providence and the freedom of the human will, is cleared
away ; and emphasis is laid upon the fact that Providence
relates not merely to what is general, but to what is special —
All human cognition rests upon the condition of becoming one
with the object known. Knowledge is the life of the Spirit,
and the knowledge of the highest truth or God is its goal and
blessedness. In this knowledge all men become one with
each other, and are, at the same time, united with God.
The chief monument of the later period of his life is the
treatise De admirandis Naturce Bcginoe Dec^ice mortalium
arcanis, " Of the wonderful secrets of Nature, the Queen and
Goddess of mortals." It is clothed in the same literary form,
atheists bringing forward their objections and being refuted.
But not merely is the view of the world which is now pre-
sented fundamentally a very different one, but there is also
manifestly far more weight assigned to the objections of the
atheists than to the refutations with which they are met, and
which are often very weak. Moreover, the tone is so frivolous,
cynical, and impure, that there can be no doubt about the true
opinion of the author. Matter, we read, is imperishable ; it
is incapable of increase or diminution, but it continually
assumes other forms. The world is eternal, and, at the same
time, it possesses in its own continual productivity the
principle of its preservation. The soul is the material
" Spiritus " or nerve spirit. Our condition depends upon our
food. All virtues or vices depend upon the good or bad
humours of the body. — In the discussion of the religion of
the heathen, the assertions of the ancient philosophers are
indeed contested, but they are hardly refuted. Such views are
brought forward as that Plato identified God and the world.
Other philosophers would have us truly honour God only in
the law of Nature. Nature herself is God, because she is the
principle of motion, and she has written this law in the heart
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NICOLAUS TAURKLLUS. 113
of the peoples. All other commands and doctrines are mere
inventions of princes and priests in order to keep the people
more easily in check by the hope of heavenly reward and the
fear of punishment in another world. Vanini proceeds to
refer miracles and signs to atmospheric phenomena and
phantasms of the imagination. The demoniacs were tortured
by the bad humours of the body; those who spoke with
tongues were seized by accesses of fever; purgatives and
cooling remedies put an end to these manifestations. Yanini
declines to speak of the immortality of the soul " until I have
become an old man, and am rich, and a German.'' In short, in
the Vanini of the later period we have before us a conspicuous
representative of that tendency which was estranged by
Humanism from all religion ; and, notwithstanding his well-
known saying that *' a straw compelled him to believe in God,**
the accusation of atheism was not raised against him without
some foundation.
IV.
NicoLAUS Taurellus.
Taurellus (1547-1606)* turned also against the authority
of Aristotle. He found the impulse and occasion for doing so
in the opposition to the theory of the " double truth," which
was frequently maintained even in the Protestant Church.
He does not wish to be regarded, however, as depreciating
Aristotle, only he would not have him regarded as the goal of
the course, beyond which no one can go. Philosophy ought
to recognise no other authority than the Scriptures, and it has
to recognise this authority so unconditionally that whatever
deviates from the written Word of Gk)d is to be rejected as
' F. Xaver Schmid of Schwarzenberg has the merit of having specially drawn
attention to the importance of Tatirellos, and particularly to his relations to
Leibniz in his *' Nicolaus Taurellus, der erste deutsche Philosoph," Erlangen
1864. Schmid gives details regarding the doctrines, circumstances, and writings
of Taurellus. Of these writings the most important are his Philosophise
Trinmphus, hoc est, Metaphysica Philosophandi Methodus, etc., 1573 ; Synopsis
Aristotelis Metaphysices ad normam Christian» Religionis explicate, emendate et
complete, Hanov. 1596; Alpes Ceese, 1597; De rerum »temitate, Marpurgi 1604«
VOL. h H - • T
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114 BEGINNINGS Of INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
error and untmth. In the preface to his Triumphtts Philo-
9ophicß, Taurellus expressly says it may cause surprise that he
has entitled his treatise the Triumph of Philosophy, while in
it he has attacked the philosophers with all his power. But
as nothing is true which stands in contradiction to Scripture,
it had pleased him to bring the matter to this issue, that after
the errors of philosophy were removed be might show that it
bad gained the victory, not because it had overcome theology,
but because, when conquered, it had subjected itself to the
service of theology. Apart from Scripture, philosophy can
have no other authority to follow than Reason alone.
But the question arises as to whether Beason is capable of
attaining knowledge of the truth. Are not our natural powers
so much corrupted by sin that we are completely incapable of
attaining to truth by means of them, not to speak of the
knowledge of God and divine things ? This question was
discussed in the age of the Eeformation. Taurellus answers
it in the first part of his Triumphtts Philosophice, in the
section de viribus humaruB mentis. He does not specially
enter upon an examination of our faculty of knowledge, but
he shows by a long explanation in detail that knowledge
belongs to the substance of our mind, that sin can only corrupt
its accidents, and hence that our natural faculty of knowledge
has not sufiTered by sin, but is still in the same state in which
it was before the fall of Adam. — By elucidating these two
points, namely, the rejection of all authority and the proof
that our natural faculty of knowledge is not corrupted by sin,
Taurellus paved the way for the establishment of his main thesis.
T/iere is no ** double" truth in such a sense that that
could be true in philosophy which is false in theology, or
conversely. "For as there is only one single principle of
things, and only one mind in man by which he is at once
philosopher and theologian, so there is likewise in one and the
same mind only one truth, to which there is nothing opposed
but falsehood." There is one mind which knows and believes,
and this is the human mind. Theologians have greatly con-
fused the subject by asserting that it is the divine mind which
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NICOLAÜS TAUBBLLÜS. 115
thinks and believes in ns. Knowledge, like faith, belongs to
the substance of the human mind« Our mind is not purely
passive even in the process of faith as the spontaneous appro-
priation of the merit of Christ ; it is not a mere dead block
presented as such for the operation of grace. It is true that
we need divine grace in relation to our thinking as well as to
our believing, in order that it may remove the obstacles which,
in consequence of sin, impede the active exercise of our reason.
Nevertheless it is not the mind of God, but the human mind,
which thinks and believes. The former is the ''causa
remotior," the latter the ** causa efiiciens/* There is therefore
one Season whose substance is constituted by thinking and
believing, and there is one Grace which supports us in both of
these operations. In like manner, there is only one principle
of all things, which is at the same time the ground of all know-
ledge, philosophical as well as theological Whence, then, could
there be a "double " truth ?
The complete subordination of Philosophy to Theology, in-
volving a merely negative relation of the former to the latter,
results from the principles of knowledge that come into
application in both sciences. Philosophy is the knowledge of
divine and human things, obtained through strict reasoning by
the faculty of knowledge implanted in us. Theology, on the
oth^ hand, rests upon immediate divine revelation. Both
Beason and Bevelalion point back to God as their ultimate
principle ; but while Eeason may err in many ways, Eevelation
is infallible. Hence Philosophy must subject itself uncon-
ditionally to Theology. If a contradiction arises between
them. Theology claims unconditional authority, and the
assertions of Philosophy must be tested and altered, if need
be, in accordance with the positions established by Theology.
But there is also a positive relation of Philosophy to Theology.
On this side, Philosophy appears as a positive presupposition
of Theology. Knowledge is thus regarded as the foundation
of faith. Here, likewise, a twofold relation comes into con-
sideration. Philosophical knowledge is not restricted to earthly
things, but ascending from effects to their cause, it also
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116 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
embraces the existence, essence, and working of God. In all
these points a true philosophy must harmonize with revela-
tion, and to establish, this harmony is the goal aimed at by
Tanrellus in his reform of Metaphysics. — One object, however,
belongs to the sphere of theology alone ; it is the divine Will
in the operations of grace. If Adam had not sinned, there
would have been no need of divine grace, nor would there
have been any theology, but only philosophy. When all men
have received grace, all knowing will receive its light from
this source ; and in this thii*d period there will be only theo-
logical knowledge and no philosophical knowledge. In the
middle period in which we now live, philosophy has the same
significance as the preaching of the law ; it has to drive us to
despair, and thus make us inclined to receive the Gospel and
divine grace. It is necessary to look at these two points
somewhat more closely.
Philosophy attains to the knowledge of God by means of
ontological as well as cosmological considerations. The prin-
ciples of things must correspond to those of knowledge,
because all knowing is innate in us. Hence the highest prin-
ciples of things are affirmation and negation. Simple affirma-
tion is God ; simple negation is puxe Nothing, or the first
matter of the physicists. The latter necessarily presupposes
the former as its cause. All finite things are compounded in
certain masses out of affirmation and negation. God is there-
fore the unlimited single substance in which there is no diver-
sity. Finite things are something in the sense that they are
not manifold; but God is all, and it cannot be said that He is
not anything. The principle of causality, when applied to
this position, gives as the result that God is the principle of
Himself, and at the same time the cause of all things. From
pure nothing, God created the second matter; and out of it,
by means of the forms created from nothing, He shaped indi-
vidual things. God, however, is not, as regaixls His substance,
the cause of the world, but He is so " per accidens," and only
by His free action. Examination of the world leads to the
same positions. Its limitedness proves that it is not etemaL
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KICOULÜS TAUBBLLUS. 117
The fundamental error of Aristotle lies in his holding the
eternity of the world. Bnt if God is not the internal or con-
stitutive cause of the world, but its external or efficient cause,
the essence of God is different from His causality. Viewed
as to His essence, God is substantial ; yet He is not an active
substance, but is activity and energy itselt This activity
does not consist in knowing, but in producing ; yet not in the
mere accidental producing of the world, but in eternal pro-
ducing of Himself. Hence God is the highest blessedness,
and therefore He is also triune.
The world is not an end in itself, but has been created for
man« Man finds his goal, which is happiness, in union with
God, and this results from the contemplation of God and the
righteousness connected therewith, as well as from the com-
mendation of God« The unity of men, as founded upon their
descent from one pair, is subservient to the attainment of this
goal The earth, however, is not to be viewed as a place of
happiness or misery, but only of propagation« As soon as the
determinate number of men is complete, this world will be
annihilated and men transported into another world to enjoy
blessedness or to suffer damnation. Since we sin and God is
just, eternal damnation awaits us. This knowledge is the
fruit of philosophy, and it leads us to despair. We are also
driven to the same despair by the divine law which speaks to
us in the conscience. This shows the agreement between
science and conscience. From this despair there is no other
escape than that which is furnished by the Christian religion.
Its two main positions are the acknowledgment of our own
misery and the promise of divine grace, or the Law and the
Gospel The Law, as expressed in the Ten Commandments,
is in accord with the will of God, which is engraven by Nature
in all men. As by corporeal relationship with one man we
all have become miserable, so shall we all become blessed by
spiritual relationship with one man. As by the sin of another
we came into a state of wretchedness, so by the merit of
another do we attain to a state of blessedness. For Christ,
who was begotten by God from the Virgin, and who is there-
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118 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
fore separated from the sin of Adam by the voluntary sur-
render of His wholly sinless life, has paid a ransom more than
sufficient for the sins of all mankind. It only remains, then, to
lay hold of the grace of God in faith ; for all who are saved,
are firmly convinced that Christ suffered death for them ; and
this is the substance of the Christian faith. — ^And so Taurellus,
on coming to the end of his treatise, De jEtemitate rerum^
asks : '' Quid igitur in hac nostra religione absurdi est ? Die
quseso, quisquis es, an ulla ratio nostrse salatis esse vel
excogitari, quae, veritati philosophical magis sit consentanea ?
Dlcam ingenue, quod sentiam : si hiec non sit, nulla erit alia."
The fate of Taurellus is significant of the character of his
age. He was certainly not without scholars and enthusiastic
admirers of his genius. But his opponents greatly prepon-
derated in numbers ; and it is remarkable enough that the
theologians were even more violent against him than the
peripatetic philosophers. Scherbius, his colleague at Altdorf,
showed himself a fanatical Aristotelian in his Dissertdtio pro
philosophia Peripatetica adv, Bamidas (Altdorf 1590). It
was asserted that Taurellus believed nothing, and was worse
than a Turk He was also branded as a Pelagian. Quenstedt
and Lampe number him among the Arminians. Löscher
reckons him among the naturalistic thinkers, who, as related
to the deists and Spinozists, were suspected of being atheista
The Heidelbeig Theologians designate him as "Athens medicus;''
and from that time he appears in almost all the lists of atheists.
Only Boyle and Leibniz mention him with laudatory recog-^
nition. He was otherwise either passed over in dead silence,
or violently consigned to oblivion by the destruction of his
wiiting&
Peter Bamus.
Petrus Bamus (1515-72) ^ was the grandson of a charcoal
burner, and the son of a poor peasant. After years of bitter
^ Of the numerous writdugs of Bamus, the following deserve to be particularly
noted: Institutionum dialecticarum, L. iii.. Par. 1552. Commentarii de
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PETEK BAMtJS. 11Ö
I>overty lie found, as the servant of a student in the college of
Navarre, the opportunity of satisfying his burning desire of
learning. But after he had studied the Aristotelian logic for
three and a half years, he recognised the emptiness and use?-
lessness of this hollow verbal wisdom. The i^eading of Plato
brought him to the Socratic ttiode of seaixjhing after wisdom ;
and in 1536, still a youth of twenty-one years, on his being
promoted to the Master's degree, he maintained the bold and
hitherto unheard-of thesis, "qusecunque ab Aristotele dicta
essent, oommentitia esse/* He maintained that all that
Aristotle had taught was mere fable ; for, in the first place,
the writings attributed to him were spurious, and, in the
second place, these writings contained nothing but errors.
This attack was unprecedented in that age, and especially in
the University of Paris, where Aristotle was honoured as a
saint, and regarded as infallible. Supported by Omer Talon,
Professor of Ehetoric, and Bartholomais Alexandre, Professor
of Greek, Eamus carried out the union of rhetoric with logic,
and introduced Greek into the public instruction. The ad-
herents of Aristotle induced Francis I. to interdict him from
all teaching and writing on philosophical subjects. This pro-
hibition was, however, i-ecalled by Henri II. in 1547 ; but the
conflict still went on. The whole life of Ramus is filled with
these wretched conflicts, and it was more as the founder of a
new philosophy than as a Protestant that he felt himself
insecure during the civil war in Paris. It is certainly estab-
lished that a passionate opponent, Jacques Oharpentier, a
truculent Aristotelian, took advantage of the horrors of the
Bartholomew massacre to get him safely put out of the way.
If we now look at this new Philosophy somewhat more
closely, we cannot but wonder how a philosophy which goes
much further than the genuine Aristotle in empty formalism,
and yields but little to the formalism of the Scholastics,
could have called forth such a movement Of the ancients,
Religtone Christiana, L. iv., Francof. 1577. Cf. Charles Waddington, Ramus,
sa vie, ses Merits, et sea opiuions, Paris 1855. P. Lobstein, Petrus Ramos als
Theologe, Strassburg 1878.
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120 BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
it is Socrates to whom Bamus loves most to refer, and he does
this from two points of view. His first object is to overthrow
the respect for authority. In philosophy, authority is to be
of no account, be it what it may. Instead of blindly following
an authority, we ought to take our stand upon reason and
upon free thinking. Further, science must be directed
towards practical utility. Science ought to be made to
minister to practical applications, although not to the mere
trivial utilities of daily life. This follows at once from the
three stages of capability which Bamus distinguishes in the
relations of every science, and which are designated Nature,
Art, and Practice. This principle applies to Nature, for we
have received from Nature our capacity for everything; it
holds of Art, which reduces to conscious and universal rules
what we are disposed to by Nature; and it fi^plies to
Practice, which is strengthened by repeated activity and habit
Bamus turns his attention chiefly to a reform of Dialectics ;
but even apart from his judgments about Aristotle, which
are often extremely unjust, what Bamus tries to put in his
place is not at all fit to be a substitute for the Logic of the
Stagirite. To put it shortly, he holds that Logic should be
closely connected with Bhetoric. Dialectic is ars beiie
disserendi, a guide to discoursing well; and as such it, in
fact, touches none of the deeper metaphysical questions
which Aristotle draws into the circle of his explanations,
and which he treats at times with skill Bamus really gives
nothing more than direction as to how to discourse well
about an object, to represent it on all its sides, and to main-
tain the reasons of it. Dialectic is divided into Invention
and Judgment (inventio et jiidicium). Invention treats of the
finding of proofs ; and proof is either artificial or inartificial,
according as by its nature it may or may not serve as
proof. The latter kind of proof applies to divine and human
testimony. The former kind of proof falls into a series of
classes, such as cause and effect, subject and predicate, and
so on. Under every kind, Bamus quotes a number of
examples from Latin and Greek writers, and gives a short
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FBTER BAMUS. 121
definition, although these are mostly only verbal, such as
** Subjectum est cui aliquid adjungitur," " Adjunctum est cui
aliquid subjicitur." The deeper question as to the grounds of
these proofs is not even raised. His doctrine of Judgment
only gives direction as to the mode of disposing judgments,
with rules as to the appropriate arrangement of the proofs
conducive to judgment At this point Bamus attaches him-
self in many respects to Aristotle, and does not advance
beyond laying down certain rules for the rhetorical apprecia-
tion of proof.
We come now to the question as to the position taken up
by Bamus towards Keligion. He was devoted from 1561 to
the Eeformed Church ; and a tour through Switzerland and
Germany from 1568 to 1570, brought him into personal
contact with the most distinguished theologians of his age and
communion. In the last years of his life he took a keen
interest in Synodical transactions connected with the arrange-
ments of the Eeformed Church in France. Had his life been
longer spared, his authority would perhaps have led to a
schism, for he represented the democratic constitution of the
CTiurch, and Zwingli's doctrine of the Lord's Supper as against
Beza. His Commentarii do not contain a scientific or
systematic discussion of theology, but only the reflections
of a highly - cultured layman on the chief points of the
Christian faith« Attaching his reflections to the Catechism,
and frequently giving an explanation of it word for word,
although occasionally diverging and softening in detail, his
Commentaries reproduce, on the whole, the doctrinal system
of the Beformed ChurcL
Bamus aimed likewise at purging theology of the subtle
questions of Scholasticism, and introducing a new method
into it This method consists in beginning with the defini-
tion of each doctrine, then quoting testimonies and examples
from the Scriptures of the Old and the New Testament, and
also giving quotations from distinguished poets, orators, and
historians taken from the whole of profane literature of
heathen as well as Christian origin. The object is certainly
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122 BEGINNINGS OF INDKPBNDENT SPECULATION.
not to dedace an authority or approbation for theology from
these sources, nor is it merely to procure an agreeable variety
for readers and hearers, bat it is to show that theology does
not lie far from man, and rather receives illumination from
the natural light that is found among all peoples. — In
opposition to the arbitrariness with whidi every individual
theologian adopts a separate way of his own, Bamus aims at
introducing a new arrangement by discoursing first of the
science and then of the disciplina. This is not the common
distinction between Dogmatics and Ethics, but the distinction
already mentioned between art and practice. The science
falls into the doctrine of the faith, and of its active manifesta-
tion in law, prayer, and sacraments. Although this armnge-
ment is simply borrowed from the Catechism, Bamus holds
that the institution of it is very significant *' Whoever first
brings this method into theology, kindles a peculiar light in
which all the parts of theology can be clearly and distinctly
surveyed."
Theology is defined as " doctrina bene vivendi," i.e. " Deo
bonorum omnium fonti congruentur et accommodate." Lately,
he says, in some inconceivable way, this bene 'viverc or living
well has been made Üie same as rede vivere or living justly,
whereas it is synonymous with beaie vivere or living blessedly.
Begarding the true meaning of the definition, wo obtain some
light from the circumstance that God is designated the source
of all good things ; and still more does its meaning become
clear when it is immediately afterwards said that the ethical
philosophy of the heathen deduced and determined the happy
life of man from the weak powers of his nature, as if man
had in himself what was sufficient for the blessed life.
Theology teaches, on the contrary, that man is not able to
attain the good and blessed life of himself, but realizes it
only when he listens to God, and thus receives the promise
of the eternal fruit of heavenly blessedness. And because
this blessedness is not completely obtained in the earthly
life, faith in immortality is the groundwork of the whole
Scriptures and of religion. Theology is therefore the doctrine
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PETER BAMUS. 123
of God which is communicated by God to men, and laid
down in the canonical Scriptures. Its substance is the
foi^veness of sins by Christ Tliis forgiveness is embodied
in both Testaments, which contain throughout the same
thing, and are only different in respect of the extent of their
announcement and the degree of their distinctness. Taken
together, the Old and New Testaments contain the divine
rules for a blessed life. Hence Faith is also defined as trust
in God in respect of His beneficence to His Church, for it is
only through the Church that we can obtain salvation. —
Works are inseparable from faith. As the fire cannot exist
without heat, nor the sun without light, neither can faith
exist without right action towards God. But being incapable
by nature of what is good, we only obtain by divine influence
the power required to perform it. The details of the theology
of Eamus need not be further reproduced for our purpose
herd ; and^ besides, they contain but little that is peculiarly
their own.
Bamism was the only philosophy that succeeded in breaking
down the supremacy of Aristotle. It succeeded for a time at
least, and it gave rise to a lasting movement through the
whole learned world.
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SECTION SECOND.
THE DOCTRINES OF THE REFORMERS.
AEEVOLUTION of the religious life — known as the
Protestant Reformation — took place at the same time
as the movement in the domain of Philosophy which we have
been describing, but it was entirely independent of that move-
ment, and was little influenced even by the free spirit of
Humanism. The Beformation separated into two movements,
but the foundation of both of them lay in the striving to
r obtain due independence for the individual in opposition to
the oppressive authority of the Boman ChurcL Some of the
representatives of this revolution gave up all that was objec*
tive in the previous position, and in consequence of this
exaggeration of the subjective principle they were unable to
found a lasting Church. Others, again, accepted the historical
fact of the redemption by the sacrificial death of Christ and
the immediate divine revelation in the Scriptures, and only
demanded the free access of the subject to both. The
representatives of this position have founded a Church
which still exists, but they also separated into two distinct
communities, forming the Lutheran and the Calvinistic Be*
formed Churches. The attempts to refer the separation of
the Lutheran and the Beformed Churches to merely external
causes now belong to the past. A religious difference
undoubtedly lay at the foundation of this ecclesiastical divi-
sion. Of the various formulae that have been proposed to define
it, it may be most correctly determined in the following terms.
God and man being viewed as the two members of the religious
relation, the consciousness of dependence on the all-determin-
ing power of God and the consciousness of personal sin and
unworthiness of the gifts of divine grace, may be regarded as
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M AKTIN LUTHER. 125
the two fundamental feelings of religion in relation to God
and man. The distinction between the two communities
appears in this, that the former consciousness comes into the
foreground among the Calvinists, whereas the latter comes into
the foreground among the Lutherans, this consciousness in
each case ruling everything else. The Eeformation, bls pro-
ceeding from the religious interest, has, on its own showing,
brought forth something quite different from mere philosophical
systems of religion. Hence there are only a few points in
connection with it that properly claim our attention here.
These are : — 1. The special character of the religious life as it
took form in the most important personalities of the Eeforma-
tion, and as it received objective representation in their
theology ; 2. The views adopted regarding the source of reli-
gious knowledge and the validity of reason in matters of
faith; and 3. The position taken up with reference to the
scholastic philosophy.*
I.
Martin Luther (1483-1546).
Martin Luther was bom at Eisleben, in Lower Saxony,
on the 10th November 1483. The strict training of his
father's house, the stern discipline he received at school, and
all the straitened circumstances of his outward life, had fostered
in Luther the spirit of the Law — of fear and timidity — and
80 the consciousness of sin came to form the centre of his
religious life.* Sin was thus realized by him, not so much as
a contradiction to his own moral determination, as rather in its
' The learned work by W. Gass on the History of Protestant Dogmatics
(OeschicJUe der protestantischen DogmcUik, 4 Bde. Berlin 1854-1867), has been
of special service in' connection with what follows in this section. A good deal
of information has also been obtained from the works of Frank and Tholuck.
(6. Frank, Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie, 8 Bde. Leipzig 1862-1875;
Tholnck, Geist der lutherischen Theologie Wittenbergs, 1852 ; Vorgeschichte
des Rationalismas, 4 Th. 1853-1862 ; Geschichte des Rationalismas, 1 Th. 1865.)
' Julias Köstlin, Die Theologie Luthers, 2 Bd. 1863 ; Luther's Leben und
Schriften, 2 Bd. 1876.
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126 THE DOCTKINES OF THE REFOKMERS.
antagonism to the divine law, and as having the divine dis-
pleasure and punishment as its consequence. It was this
consciousness of sin which drove Luther into a monastery,
and led him to seek his own justification in zealous penances
and prescribed works. And as the consciousness of grace
arose in him, not through works, but in faith, grace thus
constituted for him primarily liberation from the divine wrath
and divine punishment, and then only in consequence did it
become a source of strength for moral improvement. This
antagonism of Sin and Grace which Luther experienced in
himself in such violence as few other men have felt, forms the
centre of his whole Theology. For as the Word of God falls
into the Law and the Gospel, there are only two things
which it is necessary for the Christian to know. These are
knowledge of his own sin and damnation, and knowledge of
justification through Christ
Grace is appropriated by Faith ; and on this was founded
Luther's polemic against the Boman doctrine of Justification
by works and self-righteousness. Faith is trustful surrender
of the whole personality, and in this lies the mystical element
in Luther. But the object of this faith is the historical Christ
as the indispensable mediator of grace; and it is this that
distinguishes his doctrine from Mysticism. Through Christ
alone do we obtain grace; and hence in Him alone is the
right knowledge of God, as the Triune God and as infinite
Love, to be found.
Christ procured grace for us, and hence He is Grod and
man in one person. Even faith is divine grace, for we can
do nothing in consequence of sin, all our work being evil.
This operation of divine grace in us, which efiects the awaken-
ing of faith, is, however, bound to the external means of grace
in the Word and the Sacraments ; and this is in direct oppo-
sition to the views of fanatics. The fairest fruit of faith
is man becoming inwardly certain of faith, and becoming
comforted on the ground that God has forgiven him his sins.
The whole theology of Luther in its characteristic pecuL'arities
may thus be referred to this contrast between Sin and Grace,
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MAKTIN LXJTHEK. 127
and he has himself thus represented it ** We ought," he says,
" to comprehend the whole sum of the Christian understanding
in two parts, and to put them, as it were, into two sacks.
The sack of Faith has two pockets: in the one is put
this, that we are corrupted by Adam's sin; in the other
this, that we are all redeemed by Christ The sack of Love
has also two pockets : in the one is put this piece, that we
should do good to every one, as Christ has done to us ; and
in the other is this other bit, that we should gladly suffer all
kinds of eviL"
The grace presented to us in Christ, and to be appropriated
by us in faith, is the centre of the Christian Beligion. And
at the same time this grace is all that it properly contains ;
what does not stand in relation to it, no longer falls within the
sphere of religious knowledge. On this is based the separa-
tion that is carried through between the spiritual and the
secular, the heavenly and the earthly, the divine and the
human. In the former sphere, the immediate divine
revelation contained in the Scriptures is the valid source of
knowledge, and the divine grace is the power of action ; in
the latter, we follow reason and our own will. Before the
Fall, along with a morally pure will directed to the love of
God and his neighbour, man had also an unobscured know-
ledge of Grod. After the Fall it became otherwise. Our will
is now so corrupt that without the Holy Spirit we can do
nothing but sin. It is only in mere worldly things that we
are able to do anything, to build houses, to discharge civil
offices, and such like, and here we may even appropriate and
acquire a certain *' civil righteousness." In spiritual and
divine things, on the other hand, man is entirely without
freedom, and he can do anything that is good only by the
help of divine grace. The same division is carried out in
regard to knowledge. In secular things Eeason is recognised
throughout, and thus Luther was able so entirely and fully
to give his assent to the noble arts and sciences, but in regard
to spiritual and divine things Eeason is viewed by him as
smitten with blindness.
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128 THE DOCTRINES OF THE REFOBMERS.
He does not entirely reject a natural knowledge of God.
We are able to infer from the beautiful creations of the world
and its wonderful, well-ordered government, to a single, eternal,
divine Being, as well as from the innumerable benefits which
we receive, to the goodness and grace of God. Allusions to
the Trinity are impressed even on Nature. While Adam
could have known the omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness of
God even from the tiniest floweret, we can reach but a very
feeble kind of knowledge, as we comprehend God neither
as Triune nor as Love. Nay, this natural knowledge appears
to be so very insufficient that it is not knowledge at all, but
is complete darkness. All that Eeason knows does not hold
in it a droplet of the knowledge of grace and truth, of the
depth of the divine compassion, of the abyss of the divine
wisdom and wilL Eeason does not even know the Law rightly ;
for it does not understand that Love is the Law. And above
all, Eeason knows nothing of the fact that, or of the way by
which, we are to attain salvation according to Grod's will ; it
knows nothing, and will know nothing of all this. And as
to all that the heathen philosophers have said in their not
unskilful disputes about God, His providence, and His govern-
ment of the world, it amounts in truth to the greatest ignor-
ance of God and vain blasphemy. Hence he holds that " it
is not possible for us to comprehend even the least article of
faith by human reason, and that no man on earth, without
the Word of God, has ever been able to find or apprehend a
right thought or certain knowledge of God." Hence Luther
bows in all humility before the word of Scripture, and he even
describes Eeason " as Mrs. Hulda, the devil's whore," and as
that " vain^ quarrelsome termagant Eeason." He thus drives
Eeason entirely out of the sphere of religious knowledge with
the lash of his heavy scourge, while, at the same time, he lauds
it as the highest gift of God in the sphere of secular insight.
Eeligious knowledge rests solely upon the immediate
inspiration of God objectively contained in the Word of
Scripture. It is not impossible that revelations may yet
appear, but they must authenticate themselves by the Word
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MARTIN LUTHER. 129
of Scripture, and they are unnecessary after the concluding
revelation that is given in Christ. The question as to the
possibility of an immediate divine revelation and the mode of
its happening, is not explained any more than the trust-
worthiness of Scripture as the documentary record of this
revelation is proved. Both points are still regarded as
entirely certain in the universal consciousness of the time.
Christ, and the grace procured by Him, is the centre and the
essential substance of revelation. Hence Luther will not
merely judge of the value of the several parts of Scripture by
the d^ree in which they present Christ, but he also allows
himself the freest judgment regarding everything which does
not belong to this centre. He speaks, not merely of the
diligent studies of the Sacred Writers, of the dependence of
the one upon the other, of the peculiarities of their style and
such like, but he distinguishes different stages of inspiration,
and discriminates the object of religious faith from merely
external and historical statements. In respect of the former,
all the parts of Scripture agree with each other ; but in regard
to the latter, he admits, without hesitation, the presence of
contradictions, errors, or mistakes of the text The Scriptures
are only rightly interpreted when the inner illumination by
the Holy Spirit comes to our aid, and for this we can prepare
ourselves by oratio, Tneditatio, and tentcUio.
Further, the reception of the knowledge contained in reve-
lation takes place by means of reason. This, however, is only
possible in so far as, in the process of regeneration, the reason
of man likewise becomes other than it was. This is desig-
nated by Luther at one time as an extinguishing of the light
of reason, and at another time as a change of the natural light
But neither is this process, nor the obscuration of reason that
came in with the fall, described in detail Nor do we find
an exact demarcation of the spiritual and the secular spheres.
The distinction of these two spheres, however, gives the
deeper foundation of the proposition that something may be
true in theology which is untrue in philosophy, and con-
versely. This is the assertion of a " double truth." Against
VOL. L I r^ci]c>
uigitizea oy >^JV7VJV IV^
130 THE DOCTRINES OF THE REFORMERS.
the condemnation of the double truth by the Sorbonne, Luther
emphatically maintains that view. The proposition that the
Word was made flesh, is true in theology, whereas in philo-
sophy it is absolutely impossible and absurd. So, in like
manner, the inference that as the whole divine essence belongs
to the Father, and the whole divine essence belongs to the
Son, therefore the Son is the Father, is entirely correct in
philosophy, whereas in theology it is completely untrue. If,
then, a philosophical proposition comes too close to an expres-
sion of the Scriptures, it just means ** mulier taceat in ecclesia.'*
To assert only one truth is as much as to say that '' the truths
of faith are to be reduced under the yoke of human reason ;"
it is the same as '' wishing to enclose the heavens and the
earth in their own centre, or putting them into a pepper-
corn." In matters of faith we must therefore turn to another
dialectic and philosophy, which is the Word of God, and
we must regard the objections of a perverse philosophy
as no better than a " useless croaking of frogs." It need not
surprise us that different things are true in theology and
philosophy, since, in the secular sciences and arts, there is
not one form of truth merely. We don't measure a quart pot
in the same way as we do shoes, nor with ell-wands, nor do
we weigh a point with scales. It is impossible then that
everything in theology and philosophy can be true in the
same manner, because the subject-matters in question are far
more distinct from one another than in the case of human
arts and sciences.
Luther was not unacquainted with the Aristotelian
Scholastic philosophy of his time. He was not merely trained
in it, and had attached himself specially to the Nominalists,
but he had even lectured in Wittenberg on the Aristotelian
dialectics and physics. But he did not know the genuine
Aristotle, his knowledge being derived only from the Scholastic
commentators. The Aristotelian philosophy and the Scholastic
theology were thus connected so closely with each other in
his view, that his opposition to the theology necessarily turned
him also against the philosophy. It is only on this ground
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PHIUPP MELANCHTHON. 131
that his unbounded zeal against Aristotle is to be explained.
It appeared to him that it was only by the complete over-
throw of the authority of Aristotle that the Church could be
purified. It was wrong to honour Aristotle like Christ ; and
Luther, even in his own drastic way, can hardly say enough
in condemnation of him. Melanchthon's influence may have
afterwards somewhat softened this judgment, but Luther did
not advance so far as to transform the scholastic philosophy
and to bring it into such a positive relation to his theology
as that it might subserve the connected exposition of the
doctrines of faith.
IL
Philip? Melanchthon (1497-1560).
Melanchthon ^ brought the Humanistic element into the
German Beformation. This is accounted for by the fact that
before his acquaintance with Luther his life was devoted with
a purely scientific zeal to the restoration of the sciences and
tlie purification of the ancient philosophy of the schools. In
connection with Luther, Melanchthon came to recognise that
there is something higher than the restoration of the sciences,
and he then gave his rich gifts entirely to the service of the
Reformation. And yet he could say of himself with truth,
that he was almost drawn by force into the controversies of the
parties in the Church, and that he longed for the quiet, peace-
ful life of the student. His attitude towards secular science,
and especially towards the Aristotelian philosophy of the Schools,
was always a far more friendly one than that of Luther«
Having become intimately acquainted in Heidelberg with
the Aristotelian Scholasticism, Melanchthon turned decidedly
to Nominalism at Tübingen. His youthful enthusiasm was
at the same time given to the aspiring Humanism of the age,
and his desire to unite these two elements is the explanation
of his preference for the dialectics of Agricola. Still a youth,
* C. Schmidt, Melanchthon's Leben nnd Schriften, Elberf. 1861. Heirlinger,
Die Theologie Melaachthon's, Gotha 1879.
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132 THE DOCTKmSS OF THE BEFOEMEBS.
Melanchthon lectured at Tübingen on Virgil and Terence ; and
as a teacher of eloquence and history, he prelected on Cicero
and Livy. He even wrote a Greek grammar, and occupied
himself with the idea of giving a new edition of the writings
of Aristotle. Called to Wittenberg as Professor of Greek, it
was partly the reading of the New Testament and partly the
powerful personality of Luther that won him for the Reforma-
tion. The influence of the great Reformer even brought
Melanchthon for a time to reject Aristotle. He exhorted his
students to devote themselves to the philosophy of Paul
From him they will know the distinction between the true
Christian philosophy and the false philosophy of the Scholas-
tics, between what is necessary to salvation and what has
been devised by human wit, and which csmnot comfort men's
hearts. In his preface to Aristotle, he declares that the
wisest men have always despised philosophy, not only because
it is of no advantage to the administration of the State, but
because it weakens the mind, and so on.
This mood of aversion to Aristotle was, however, but
transitory. Melanchthon strongly emphasizes the necessity
of humanistic and philosophic culture for the servant of the
Church, and among all the philosophers no one stands higher
in his view than Aristotle. Without Aristotle, the right
mode of teaching and of learning cannot be attained. He
holds the prerogative over all the philosophers of antiquity.
The Stoics are to be rejected on account of their principle
of absolute necessity; the followers of the Academy, on account
of their doubts ; and the Epicureans, on account of their
immoral life. Plato has certainly some wise thoughts, but he
has not treated any part of science connectedly, and he is not
to be recommended because of his prejudicial influence upon
some of the Church Fathers, and especially upon the theolo-
gians. Melanchthon sought to promote the study of Aristotle
by lectures on the Aristotelian writings, by commentaries
upon them, and by discourses recommending them. But as
a genuine Humanist, he will also in the case of Aristotle go
back to the original sources; he rejects the Arabian corn-
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PHIUPP MELAKCHTHON. 133
mentators, and seeks independent explanations of the text.
Melanchthon was not disinclined to a certain eclecticism, as
when he holds that Aristotle is not to be regarded as in oppo-
sition to Plato, but rather to be viewed as his development.
Melanchthon was thus of great importance in regard to philo-
sophical instruction, and his text-books in Dialectics, Physics,
and Ethics laid the foundation for the supremacy of a somewhat
purified Aristotelian Scholasticism in the following age.
As Philosophy, according to Melanchthon, has a certain
practical value in qualifying us for any kind of work, it has
likewise a positive relation to Theology. In the first place,
it stands related to Theology as a formal organon. An
unscientific theology is a science full of confusion, in which
important subjects are not exactly explained, and in which
things that ought to be separated are mixed up among one
another, and those that ought to be connected are disjoined.
Dialectic and rhetoric are subservient to the purpose of formal
order. It is not correct to make Melanchthon identify these
in the manner of Bamus. Dialectic shows us how to teach
things correctly, orderly, and clearly, while rhetoric teaches us
how to discourse about things ; the former exhibits a subject
in naked words, whereas the latter treats of the adornment
of disconrsa Dialectic, as the science of method, treats of
definition, division, and proof. An exact definition may dear
up much confusion in theology and settle many a contro-
versy. Melanchthon therefore endeavours in his dogmatics
everywhere to lay down dear and exactly determined defini-
tions, and not a few of these have become the common
possession of the Protestant Church and its sdence. As
regards division and proof, Melanchthon already gives a
completely determined scheme, which is applied, not indeed
by himself, but by the dogmatic theologians of the following
scholastic period, to the treatment of the doctrines of theology.
Melanchthon himself, in the later editions of the " Loci," waa
ab^ady led by the purely methodical interest of the system to
incorporate several doctrines which he had previously passed
over. On account of this significance of philosophy as a
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134 THE DOCTRINES OF THE REFORMERS.
formal organon, Aristotle is to be preferred to all other
philosophers, for he alone has a strict method, and studiously
employs definite and exactly fixed modes of expression.
Again, philosophy performs certain preliminary material
services for theology. Psychology contributes many con-
ceptions which are indispensable in dogmatics, such as " will,"
" feeling," " desire," " freewill," etc. The immortality of
the soul likemse follows from philosophical principles. The
soul is not of an elementary nature because it has ideas, and
even universal ideas, such as those of incorporeal things.
What is not of the nature of the elements does not perish,
and therefore the soul does not perish on the death of
the body. — In view of the undeniable incongruity between
conduct and what befalls the individual in the present life, the
idea of Providence, as well as the voice of conscience, points
to a state of reward and punishment in the life to come.
Philosophical ethics likewise furnishes the most important
fundamental conceptions to theological ethics, such as "the
highest good," " virtue," " justice," " law," and others. At the
same time, the law of Nature appears, in the Loci, as a ray of
the divine wisdom in the human soul, although the full
revelation of the good is presented for the first time in the
Decalogue. This law of Nature already enjoins the worship
of the Deity, the observing, as sacred, of oaths, the customs of
the fathers, the supreme authority, the life of others, the family,
property, contracts, and promises. Upon the same foundation
rest also the first orders of natural right
From physics, which contains most of the metaphysical
elements that Melanchthon retains, theology receives not
merely the general view of the world, but also a whole series
of expressions taken from the sphere of the so-called natural
theology. To this department belong, above all, the argu-
ments for the existence of God, of which Melanchthon
enumerates no less than nine. These are — 1. The order,
regularity, and conformity to law of Nature ; 2. The existence
of reason, which cannot possibly arise out of irrational matter ;
3. The innate power of distinguishing good and evil ; 4. The
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PHILIPP MELANCHTHON. 135
agreement of all meu as regards the belief in God; 5. The
tortures of a bad conscience; 6. The origination and con-
tinuance of civil Society ; 7. The series of efficient causes, or,
as Aristotle puts it, of mover and moved, which, as a series
and order, cannot be infinite, but refers to a first cause or a
first mover ; 8. The complete couformity to design in Nature ;
9. The prophetic prediction of the future. — ^Further, physics
contains propositions not merely regarding the existence of
God, but also regarding His nature. He is one ; He is the
creator of tlie whole world and of the order prevailing in it ;
He is wise, just, compassionate, true, holy; He demands
obedience to His will and punishes transgressors. Of the
definitions of God which the philosophers have laid down,
Melanchthon adopts that of Plato, " Deus est mens setema,
causa boni in natura," that is, God is not body, but eternal
mind, of infinite power, wisdom, goodness, truth, justice, and
the creator of aU good. Five arguments are adduced for
divine Providence — 1. The useful changes of the seasons, 2.
the moral law that is prescribed to us, 3. the congruity
between conduct and its consequences, 4. the appearing of
heroes, 5. prophecies of the future. We also find traces of a
theodicy, as when certain grounds of consolation in misfortune
are adduced, such as the unavoidableness of misfortune, the
dignity of virtue in bearing it, a good conscience, the calm
endurance of others, the benefit to others of our suflfering, or
its conduciveness to the common wellbeing.
The positive value of Philosophy to Theology, 8is thus
regarded, must not, however, mislead us into attributing to
Melanchthon the fault of confusing or mixing up the two.
They are regarded by him as entirely different in respect of
their sources of knowledge. Philosophy draws its knowledge
from natural reason ; theology draws its knowledge from divine
revelation. Hence the certainty attainable in each of them is
likewise entirely different In theology, there is no room for
doubt, for the divine revelation is infallible. In philosophy,
cue opinion contradicts another, and error is heaped on error.
Beason is completely incapable of attaining the knowledge of
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136 THE DOCTRINES OF THE BEFORMEBS.
God, 80 that when any one tries, apart from God's Word, to
comprehend the divine nature by means of human thoughts,
he falls into fearful darkness. The darkening of the natural
light of reason belongs to the inborn results of the corruption
of sin. Hence whenever Melanchthon borrows any elements
from secular science for theology, whether from psychology,
or physics, or ethics, he points out that the true knowledge
and the complete certainty can only be obtained from
revelation. This antagonism is sometimes stretched, even in
Melanchthon, to an irreconcilable dualism. Thus he will not
give the literal sense of a passage of Scripture, because it
contradicts the judgment of reason. Nor will he allow the
rule that an individual cannot be compounded of two disparate
natures to be applied to the person of Jesus, nor is the
principle that nothing comes from nothing to be applied to
the creation of the world. Nevertheless, Melanchthon, even
in the case of such purely supernatural doctrines, always seeks
at least for analogies and for certain points of connection in
the domain of philosophy. It was only for a time that he
adopted Luther's external separation of philosophy and
theology, as expounded in his discussion "de discrimiue
Evangelii et Philosophise," and so he continually asserts that
there is only one truth. " Una est Veritas setema et immota
etiam in artibus." The two are indeed separated in so far as
philosophy considers everything which falls under our reason,
while theology considers the divine revelation. But the two
do not contradict one another, for, although theology is the
higher, both in its contents and as regards its source of
knowledge, yet philosophy is also a positive preparation for it,
a " psedagogia in Christum." They are related to each other
as the law and the gospel. Philosophy deals with universal
and rationally necessary truths, while theology gives particular
truths and the facts of the redemption through Christ.
This friendly attitude towards philosophy on the part of
Melanchthon is connected with his own view of the Christian
religion. Melanchthon is well aware that his theology is
a peculiar form of the Protestant doctrine. The briefest
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OSIANDEB, HXYKICUS, AND OKTHODOX LUTHERANISM. 137
expression for his point of view would be that the funda-
mental idea of the Christianity of Melanchthon is the idea of
free ethical personality. This appears most directly in his
rejection of absolute predestination and his assertion of human
freedom. We are, of course, referring now only to the later
form of Melanchthon's doctrine. The direct influence of this
idea is shown in his doctrine of the subjective appropriation of
salvation, which rests not merely upon the action of God, but
upon the active co-operation of man, as well as in the doctrines
of the new obedience of the justified, and of the Church as a
communion of saints. Even the more remote parts of the
system are specially determined by this fundament«! idea.
Grod appears pre-eminently as the spirit full of wisdom and the
freely creating personality ; and the trinitarian self-unfolding
of God is brought nearer to us by the illustrations presented
in thinking and willing. His Christology also strives to pass
beyond the Lutheran " communicatio idiomatum " to the real
ethical unity in the God-man, Christ. In sh,ort, if a single
principle is sought from which to explain the peculiar doctrinal
definitions of Melanchthon, it is to be found in the idea of the
free moral personality.
III.
OSIANDER, ILLYRICUS, AND ORTHODOX LUTHKRANISM.
The heroes are followed by the Epigons. The age of quick
religious life and of free reformatory creativeness, is followed
by the period of the Lutheran Scholasticism. The question is
raised as to whether this scholasticism sprang from Luther or
from Melanchthoa In our judgment it sprung neither from
Luther alone nor from Melanchthon alone. From Melanchthon
it learned to reduce the doctrines of faith to a fixed scheme of
logical formulfle and distinctions. From Luther it inherited
the respect for the external word and its main doctrinal con-
tents, and it added, of itself, what was most essential to the
system, the want of deep religious life and of free unprejudiced
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138 THE DOCTRINXS OF THE RE^OKMERS.
science. This period of Lutheran Scholasticism was introduced
by a series of ecclesiastical and dogmatic controversies, which
resulted partly in the suppression of the Melanchthonian
tendency, which was suspected of being Calvinistic, and it
partly subserved the dogmatic construction of certain points in
the doctrinal system. This latter function was necessary as
soon as the Protestant movement passed from the period of
conflict to enter upon that of calm self-reflection. But the
odious method of polemics as well as the often micrological
investigation of unimportant accessories, was as lamentable as
the narrow-mindedness which thought to secure the main-
tenance of pure doctrine only by suppression of the milder
tendency, and which thus strained the opposition of the con-
fessions beyond all measure. Of these controversies it is only
those connected with the names of Andreas Osiander and
Flacius lUyricm that are of any importance for us here.
1. The assertion of Osiander,^ that justification does not
consist in merely declaring the individual to be righteous, but
in making him essentially righteous, may appear at the first
glance as a relapse into Catholicism. The truth, however, is
that this view arose from the endeavour to show an objective
connection between justification and the sanctification result-
ing from regeneration ; and it stood in the closest connection
with the whole view of the relation of God to man, which, on
account of its mystical character, met with but little approba-
tion. Osiander asserts " a real indwelling of the triune God
in the religious subject, mediated objectively by the Word
become man and subjectively by the believing appropriation of
the Word ; and, according to this view, the subject is justified
or made righteous by this union with the absolute principle of
righteousness realized in faith, although the principle only
gradually abolishes sin in man " (Heberle). The real divine
life rests upon the knowledge of God, and this knowledge upon
the Word of God ; for the eternal Word of God, which is the
Son of God, is His own self-knowledge, or the totality of the
* Cf. Heberle in Studien und Kritiken, 1844. A. Ritschi in Jahrbücher für
deutsche TJieohgie, 1857.
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OSIANDER, ILLYRICÜS, AND ORTHODOX LUTHEBANISM. 139
ideas in which Grod perfectly knows Himselt This Word was
ideally eternal with Grod, and it received real existence in the
person of the 6od-man^ Christ This God-man is therefore
the perfect image of God. Adam was created after this human
nature of Christy and therein consisted his possession of the
image of Grod. At the same time, Adam possessed before the
Fall a perfect knowledge of God, and became participative of
the divine nature through this knowledge, and he was thus
raised to inward fellowship with God. By sin we have lost
this fellowship, and in order to save us God sent Christ as a
mediator. Christ has reconciled us to God by fulfilment of
the law and the endurance of punishment, and He brings us
the announcement of the forgiveness of sin and justification as
the making man righteous. The external word is the neces-
sary mode in which the eternal Word works. In receiving
the external word into us we also receive the eternal Word into
us. We enter thereby into the inward communion with God
that corresponds to our proper nature, or are justified. This
justification is therefore not a mere '' declaring righteous," but
a " making righteous," consummated by the indwelling of the
eternal Word in us, by which an inward union with God is
efiected. From this, sanctification or doing good actions
directly follows of necessity.^
2. The controversy of Flacius lUyricus regarding Original
Sin should naturally have led to the question as to whether,
and in what degree, our faculty of knowledge is affected by the
consequences of the Fall. But the controversy turned not
upon the doctrine, but upon the words in which it was
expressed, and it is a melancholy example of the empty
explanations to which obstinate theologians are driven by
their narrow adherence to mere logical distinctions. With
hardly a difference between them on reality, they fought with
unbounded vehemence over the question whether the word
" substance " or the word " accident '* W6W to be adopted. —
Flacius sometimes expressed views of general significance, as
that the innate knowledge of God is full of error and deception,
^ The aflänity of these views with those of Servetus may suggest itself.
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140 THE DOCTEINES OF THE REFORMERS.
that reason is the most obstinate enemy of God, and that it is
the source of all evils, without, however, drawing further con-
sequences from these positions.
3. The Formvla Comensm or " Form of Concord " brought
these controversies to a certain issue. With it properly com-
mences the Lutheran Scholasticism as the period of the
"ecclesiastical dogmatics/' In Joh. Gerhard (1582-1637)
we still find real living piety, and he has even composed
writings of an ascetic and edifying kind in the spirit of an
Arndt. Of the later theologians, Hutter, Calov, König,
Quenstedt, HoUaz, and others embody the spirit of their
theology in noteworthy contrast to its recognised definition.
Quenstedt defines theology in the same way as König, as the
practical habit of knowledge regarding the true religion by
which, after the Fall, man was to be brought to life by faith
in Christ, which proceeds from the Holy Spirit and the written
woixi. Accordingly, theology and religion still appear to be a
concern of life, but closer examination shows that it is only a
matter of knowledge. Dogmatic theology, while founded
upon the Scriptures, is ruled confessionally by the symbolical
books, and it is elaborated down to the most subordinate
doctrines. God is the absolute all-conditioning Being ; accord-
ing to the dogma of the ancient Church, He is three persons
in one substance. Man was created as the image of Grod in
innocence and with the joy of Paradise, in order that, by free
decision for the good, he might become an eternal participator
of the blessed life in communion with God. The fall brought
Adam and his descendants under the dominion of sin, and its
punishment is the wrath of God and eternal damnation.
Moved by ineflfable love, God determined to save sinful man.
God the Son became man in Jesus. He fulfilled the Law in
perfect obedience, expiated the guilt of men by His death, and
procured salvation for alL Awakened out of the grave, he
was raised to kingly dominion in heaven. In the Church the
Holy Spirit effects the conversion of the individual by the
word and sacraments in so far as he is but willing to yield
himself to its operation. In faith he then lays hold of the
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OSIANDEB,. ILLYRICÜS, AND ORTHODOX LÜTHERANISM. 141
merit of Christ; and, notwithstanding his sins, he is declared
by Grod out of His mere compassion to be held as righteous.
The culmination of the gradually advancing appropriation of
salvation is the mystical union with God. Faith is indeed
defined as a firm trust (assensus et fiducia) in the merit of
Christ, and sanctification is designated its fruit But in
reality the interest of these theologians was so exclusively
occupied with the purity of their doctrine, that faitH was com-
monly represented as merely assent to the doctrines of the
Church. This made no change on the distinction between the
Articuke fundamentales and the Articula non ßcndamentales.
It is only in respect of the latter that there is no danger to
our own salvation from not knowing or not accepting them.
The former are distinguished into doctrines which must neces-
sarily be known and accepted (primarii) and doctrines the
knowledge of which is not exactly necessary, but are such that
when once known they cannot be denied (secundarii). The
arrangement of the several doctrines under these categories,
however, is not fixed, but varies.
The question regarding the source of knowledge in theo-
logy is commonly discussed in the Prolegomena to the
dogmatic systema This source is always regarded as the
immediate divine revelation, and the contents of revelation
are laid down in the Holy Scriptures. The question regard-
ing the possibility of a revelation is still entirely foreign to
that age ; it only strives, by exactly determining the nature
of inspiration, to exclude any doubt as to even one word of
Scripture not being of divine origin. Inspiration is analyzed
with this view into a number of distinct factors, imptdsus ad
scribendum, suggestio rerum, suggestio verborum, directio animi.
Hence Calovius says, entirely in the spirit of the time : " Non
esset autem divinitus inspirata, si vel verbum in scripturis
occurreret, quod non sit suggestum et inspiratum divinitus."
Hence the immense excitement evoked in the whole Church
by the controversy between the younger Buxtorf and Capellus
regarding the integrity of the Masoretic text of the Old
Testament (c, 1680) ; and h^nce, too, the distrust with which
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142 TUE DOCTRINES OF THE REFORMERS.
the first critical investigations of the New Testament text
were long afterwards received Along with the revealed
knowledge of Grod, all the dogmatic theologians, however,
recognise also a natural knowledge of God, which is the
foundation of a iheologia naturalis, resting partly upon innate
ideas (innata), and partly upon rational examination of Kature
and History (acquisüa). In a natural way we can thus attain
a certain knowledge of God, but it is mostly restricted to
knowing that God is ; that He is one ; that He is good and
just ; and that He is the rewarder of the good and the bad.
How little the theologians were disposed to admit more than
this of the natural knowledge of Grod, is shown by the case of
the mathematician Erhard Weigel of Jena. In. 1679, at the
instance of the Theological Faculty, he was compelled formally
to retract anything he might have said, "as if I had unduly
presumed to give explanations of the Holy Scripture, or had
undertaken to demonstrate the Mysterium TrinitcUis from
arithmetical principles, or had recognised in my lectures on
Scripture what was considered heterodox and impious in the
judgment of the theologians." On the other hand, it is
interesting to notice how the section on the natural know-
ledge of God gradually grows in extent and importance
among the dogmatic theologians. In 1676, Baier, in his
Disputatio inatiguralis {heologica exhibens synopsin theologim
naturalis collatce cum iheologia revelcUa, gives a comparison of
Natural and Kevealed religion, in which they are represented
as running parallel to each other in all points, natural religion
having its goal in eternal life, and is the means of attaining
the knowledge and service of God. On this recognition of a
natural knowledge of God rests the well-known distinction
between Articuli puri and Articuii mixti ; the latter can be
known by the natural light of reason, but the former only
from divine revelation. This view is also supported by the
consideration that reason and revelation both come from God,
and therefore cannot contradict each other; and while it is
true that revelation contains much that reason does not
comprehend, it is not contrary to reason, but only above
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OSIANDEB, ILLYKICÜS, AND ORTHODOX LUTHERANISM. 143
reason. This relation, however, applies only to reason as
before the Fall and after Begeneration. The reason of the
nnregenerate does not always respect the limits set to it by
Nature, and it thus occasions the actually existing contra-
dictions between reason and revelation.
These statements already indicate the position assigned
within dogmatics to philosophy as the science of reason ; it
serves for the definition of conceptions, for the establishment
of lower truths, and for the refutation of the nonsensical.
Joh. Gerhard and Balthasar Meisner spoke the decisive word
on this question, and all the others followed them in essen-
tiala Gerhard, in his Methodus studii theologicB (Jenae 1620),
recognises a threefold use of philosophy within theology, as a
v>»us opyaptico^, tcaracicevatTTUco^, avaaxeviumKO^;. Philosophy
serves as an organon, in so far as it sharpens the human
mind and prepares it for all higher studies. The concrete
sciences of philosophy likewise serve for the explanation of
some conceptions (in quomndam temiiTiorum explicatione in-
serviufU). Certainly only " some " conceptions, for there are
conceptions in theology (mere theologi/yC) which can only be
derived from the Scriptures, such as " Christ," " election," and
others ; and their use is only to " serve," for theology may
apply such conceptions according to its own principle in quite
a different sense from that in which they are employed in
philosophy. Of the instrumental Sciences of philosophy.
Logic furnishes Theology with rules about definition, division,
method, and proof, while Bhetoric gives laws of eloquence.
The second use of philosophy, the furnishing of proofs,
applies only to the Artimli mixti, and even here, not in the
first line (primaria), but only in the second (secundaria),
nor yet as being necessary, but only as by way of super-
abundance (ix irepiovtria^). The Articuli puri cannot be
proved by principles of reason, but can only be elucidated
(Ulustrationis gratia) by analogies taken from Nature. And
even this must be done with such caution that the difference
of the two things shall at the same time be pointed out In
the third place, philosophy may be used for the refutation of
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1 44 THE DOCTEINES OF THE REFORMERS.
false opinions, yet only of those which we can judge of by
the natural reason, and even here only in a secondary way.
The meaning of the threefold misuse of philosophy, which
Gerhard opposes to its use, arises simply from its opposition to
theology.
Balthasar Meisner, in his Fhilosophia sobria (Giessen
1611), likewise finds the first use of philosophy in the fact
that it prepares our mind for the study of theology. This
preparation, however, refers only to knowledge {cogwitio) and
not to assent {assenevs), which is the work of the Holy Spirit
In relation to the object of theology, philosophy serves for
hiZa/TKoKla, iXeyxo^y ^f »77i;ö"t9, that is, for exposition, justifica-
tion, and biblical proof of the theological propositions. Only
the first of these needs any explanation. It finds its place in
referetice to simple notions, such as questions and conse-
quences. The former are either pure, as being biblical in
their expression, or ecclesiastical, as being formed from the
language of the Church according to the sense of the Bible.
It is only in connection with the latter that philosophy is to
be taken into account Inferences are either purely theo-
logical, or are only applied to theology, as for instance the
theologian must also know whether the powers of the soul
are really distinguished. Questions deal either with purely
theological conceptions, or partly with theological and partly
with philosophical conceptions; and hence the distinction
between qnestiones purw and questiones mixtce. The former
class are alone claimed by theology for itself. With regard
to the latter, philosophy is not merely useful for obtaining
insight into them {intelUgervtia), but is even necessary, as
philosophical conceptions can only be determined by philo-
sophy. Proof {confirmatio) is adduced in the first" line by
theology, and proofs from philosophy are admissible only as
an unnecessary supplement — ^The more glorious the use of a
thing is, so much the more dangerous is its misuse. Such a
misuse arises when it is asserted that philosophy is sufficient
to lead men to the knowledge of God and to religion, or to
prove the propositions of faith, and above all when a
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ULRICH ZWINGLL 145
supi'einacy over theology is assigned to philosophy by judging
of theological questions according to philosophical principles.
IV.
Ulrich Zwingu (1484-1531).
In the commencement of his treatise, De vera et falsa
Bdigione^ Zwingli puts before himself the objection that it is
too difficult a thing to undertake to give an exposition of the
Christian Religion. He answers this objection by saying :
Quid facilius quisque exponat, quam religionem quam de Deo
et ad Deum domi habet ? " What is easier to describe than
the religion which every one has within himself from God and
in relation to God ? " Zwingli therefore consciously sets
before himself the task of expounding what is present in his
own inner life as a fact. Nevertheless, he feels himself secure
against the reproach of thus exhibiting only what is a subject
of human curiosity and of individual liking. For what human
wisdom hatches from itself in a deceitful way is wrongly
called Beligion ; true Eeligion rests only upon the divine
word of Scripture. Hence two distinct questions arise : In
what does true Beligion consist ? and How does man attain
to it?
Beligion is a reciprocal relation ; and it therefore includes
two members, the one member of the relation being that
towards which the religion strives, and the other member
being the one that strives after the other through religion ;
the former is God, and the latter is man. In order to know
the essence of Beligion, we must take both these members
into account, for their right relation to each other, as corre-
sponding to the essential nature of both, is true religion,
whereas their wrong relation is false religion.
^ Of Zwingli's writings the most important in this connection are his De vera
etfaisa religUme Commeniariiu, and his Sermoim de Providentia Dei anamnema.
Compare also Sigwart, Ulrich Ztcijigli, Stuttg. 1856. Sigwart expressly refers
ta the dependence of Zwingli on Picus of Mlrandola.
VOL. I. K
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146 THE DOCTRINES OF THE REFOKMERS.
The essence of God consists, first of all, in infinite being.
God accordingly designates Himself as " I am that I am "
(Ex. iii. 13), that is, I am He who is of Himself, who is of
His own power, who is Being Itself. These words thus
indicate that God is the only, one to whom being belongs in
virtue of His own nature, while all other things derive their
being from Him. Hence God alone has being of Himself
and gives being to all things, in such a way that they
could not be in any way or for a moment if God were
not. And hence, too, God is necessarily one and infinite
and eternal ; and on this account He is also the highest
good. In Gren. i. 31, all existing thiugs are called good,
whereas according to Luke xviil 18, God alone is good.
These two expressions can only be united with each other on
the ground that all things are God, that is, that they are, in
so far as God is and constitutes their essence ; and so it is
said in Bom. xi. 36, that all things are of Him, and through
Him, and in Him. Again, God is the highest good, not in
the sense that He may be compared with other goods, and that
He surpasses them in worth, but in that He is solely and
perfectly good, whereas all things are only good in so far as
they are through God and participate in Him. (Jod is not
good as an inert, inactive mass, but all things have motion,
continuance, and life through and in Him. God is what
the philosophers are wont to call eVreXe^^em or ivifyyeui, the
perfect all-embracing always active Power which never ceases,
never takes end, and is never uncertain, but which always
60 guides, directs, and governs all things that there cannot
enter any want or error into the whole of things and
actions by which His power could be hindered or His decree
frustrated.
How much Zwingli is in earnest with this view of the
immanence and universal activity of God, is clear from the
fact that he shows by a detailed examination that the
being of finite things is not difierent from the infinite being
of God, and that secondary causes cannot be properly called
causes at all — All that is presented to our senses, including
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ULRICH ZWINGU. 147
the heavens and the earth, has its being, not of itself, but
from a higher being, that is, from God. " There is only one
infinite Being, so that all that is, is in Him, and that it is of
Him that anything is and exists. But it is not of Him as if
His being and existence were different from it ; and thus it is
established that what attains being and existence cannot be
anything that is not Grod, for He is the being of all things/*
In proof of this proposition, Zwingli, first of all, adduces an
example. The earth, a plant, an animal, man, in short, all
that is — is always, although every thinkable change may
occur upon it ; for what appears to us to be perishing and
ceasing to be is nothing but a change of the form, appearance,
or mode of action of that which never ceases, and which
always is and is in all things. As testimonies to this view^
there are then quoted along with the words of Scripture, the
relevant expressions of the heathen philosophers, and especially
of Seneca. — Because it stands thus with things, there is like-
wise only one single cause of all that happens. Secondary
causes can be called causes only in the sense in which the
delegate of a person in authority is that person himself, or as
a hammer and chisel are the cause of a brazen vesseL As all
things are, subsist, live, are moved, and operate from One and
in One, this One is also the only and real cause of all things ;
and what we otherwise invest with the name of cause, is not
properly termed a cause, but should rather be called the hand
or the organ with which the eternal Spirit works, and which
He uses as EUs instrument Secondary causes are thus
termed causes only by metonymy, or merely by transference»
Zwingli's combating of free-will was merely a consequence of
this view, and it is to be noted that his objections to that
doctrine are drawn from metaphysical and not from psycho-
logical considerations.
God is the highest ^ood. In Zwingli this is the standing
designation of God, and it is applied to Him because He is
the ground of the being and working of all things. God is
not this, however, as being the universal matter of all things,
but as the infinite principle of motion and life, and hence He
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148 THE DOCTRIKES 07 THE REF0BMEH3.
is also infinite intelligence and wilL '^ Ejus sapientia cuncta
agnoscuntur, etiam priusqnam sint, ejus scientia cuncta
intelliguntur, ejus prudentia cuncta disponuntur." God, in
fact, would not be the highest good, were He not, at the same
time, the highest wisdom and insight. It is true that this
goes beyond our finite capacity of knowledge, but we would
have to think of God as imperfect if we did not ascribe to
Him the highest wisdom. God, then, is not mere power
and activity, but He is also intelligence and wisdom, and
to these two attributes, goodness must also be added. These
three qualities, power, wisdom, and goodness, are inseparably
one in God. In this Zwingli sees an analogue of the Trinity,
which he receives into his system somewhat externally and
directly from the ecclesiastical doctrine. On the unity of
these three attributes, he also founds his view of Providence,
which controls the whole of his system.
Further, the goodness belonging to God is infinite.
Whereas men care only for themselves and have merely their
own interests in view, God, as the highest good, must neces-
sarily be beneficent. Kor is He so in the way in which
we are so, when expecting recompense or honour for our
goodness, but merely in order that His creatures may be
gladdened by His goodness. According to the testimony
of Scripture, it is the sole end of creation that the crea-
tures shall enjoy God, their Creator and their highest good.
Of the whole creation, however, man alone is capable of
enjoying God. Hence he appears as the head and flower of
the whole material creation, and what is most perfect in
him is his capacity for Religion. Zwingli's doctrine of Man
becomes somewhat obscure by his not clearly distinguishing
between the original state and the present condition of man.
Man is the most wonderful of all the creatures ; he is a
spirit in a visible body, an intermediate creation, between the
beings that are purely spiritual and those that are merely
sensible. In his union of spirit and body, man is, as it were,
an image of that union with the world into which God was
to enter through His Son. Man thus consists of two com-
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ULRICH ZWINGIX 149
pletely different and hostile substances, each of which follows
its own nature (ingenium suum servat). The spirit loves and
honours the Deity to whom it is related, and strives after
righteousness and innocence ; the flesh turns itself back to its
origin, the mire and all that is base. Zwingli describes this
opposition in vivid colours. He even appears sometimes to
forget that earthly matter also comes from God and is per-
meated by His powers, and therefore cannot absolutely resist
the Spirit. The question as to why God has created man in
such a state of unhappiness, and put him into this intolerable
discord with himself, is simply turned aside by a reference to
the infinite power of God. The question why the spirit is
punished when it is overcome by the flesh, although the flesh
is also a part of man and was given to him by his Creator as
well as his spirit, is touched upon, and it is answered that
man falls under judgment because God has given him a law.
The law corresponds to the inward striving and proper cha-
racter of the spirit, and if man follows the flesh, he becomes
subject to punishment Sin entered the world in consequence
of the selfishness which made Adam wish to be as God ; its
consequence was death and incapacity for good. For it
belongs to false religion to assert that man is only inclined
to evil ; this would amount in religion to " twisting a rope
out of sand or making an angel out of the deviL"
The definition of Beligion follows from these determinations
regarding God and man, between whom Beligion ad a reciprocal
relation exists. Its presupposition is sin, and the turning
away of man from God, which has arisen in consequence of
sin. Beligion has its origin in the fact that God recalls man
to Himself even when fleeing from before Him. When man
sees his guilt, he despairs of the grace of God; but as a
father who, even while hating the folly or arrogance of his
son, yet does not hate the son himself, so God has compassion
on the broken heart of man, and recalls him with gentle
voice to Himself. Beligion thus begins on the side of God.
Grod shows man that He knows well his disobedience,
treachery, and misery, and thus He brings man to despair.
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150 THE DOCTRINES OF THE REFORMERS.
But, at the same time, He shows him the fulness of His
goodness, so that man knows that God's grace is still greater
than his own guilt, and that it is impossible to tear himself
away from Him. He who is loved by God in this way,
regards Him as his Father, and thereupon considers how he
may please God. For religiousness is known from the
zealous striving to live according to the will of God. It
is a chief characteristic of Religion that man discovers
nothing in himself that makes him well - pleasing to God ;
whereas he finds in God a willingness to bestow upon him all
things. Religion is thus, when expressed in more modem
terms, the consciousness of being completely determined by
God or of being permeated by His Spirit
Religion accordingly rests upon knowledge, and particularly
upon the knowledge that God's grace and goodness are greater
than man's sin and guilt, so that we can be and live only in,
by, and with God. The second question. How does man
attain to Religion ? thus coincides with the question, How do
We come to the knowledge of God and man ?
Zwingli decidedly rejects the opinion that man can by his
own power, and through his natural faculty of knowledge,
attain insight into God, and thus reach true religion. The
knowledge of man is impossible to us, because man is adroit
in dissimulation, and no one shows himself as he is in truth.
The knowledge of God is impossible to us, because the
sublimity of God far transcends our weak power of com-
prehension. We can certainly know the existence of God ;
and although many wise men among the heathen, unable to
ascribe the fulness of perfection to one single being, assumed
the existence of many gods, there were others who advanced
to knowledge of the unity of God. The much discussed
passage in Rom. i. 19 says no more than that On the other
hand, we cannot know the essential nature of God of our-
selves, any more than an insect can know the essential nature
of man. For the eternal and infinite God is distinguished
from man even far more than man is from the insect ; and a
comparison of any two creatures with each other would be far
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ULRICH ZWINGLL 151
more in place than the comparison of any creature with the
Creator. Nay more, it argues the audacity of a Lucifer or of
a Prometiieus for any one to presume to know the essential
nature of God in any other way than by the power of the
divine Spirit. Hence what is taken by the theologians from
philosophy as statements regarding the essence of God, is but
mere illusion and false Eeligion ; and if we cannot know the
essential nature either of man or of (Jod in this way, far less
can we thus attain to knowledge of the true reciprocal relation
between them.
The right knowledge of God and man, and consequently
of the true religion, rests entirely upon divine revelation.
Zwingli, however, does not proceed to explain in detail the
nature of revelation and its relation to natural knowledge,
although the foregoing determination regarding the imman-
ence and the universal activity of God might well have led
him to do so. The divine revelation is primarily an immediate
internal illumination by the Holy Spirit of God. This illumi-
nation comes to man in accordance with his natui*e. Hence
Zwingli refers the law of Nature with such emphasis to divine
revelation. And hence this law of Nature — in such forms as
" what thou wilt not have done to thee, do not to any other "
— ^is held to be completely equivalent to the revelation in
Scripture. This purely internal revelation is bound to no
people nor to any specially elect persons; but as man is
related by Nature on the spiritual side of his being to God,
all men accordingly participate in this revelation. On this
natural illumination is founded the fact that Zwingli is able
to recognise Christians and believers, even among the heathen,
as participating in salvation ; and upon it also rest the several
elements of a true knowledge of God which are found like
scattered seeds among the heathen poets and philosophers.
And it is only on this ground that we understand the fact
that Zwingli cites the expressions of profane writers as
** testimonies '' along with passages of Scripture.
This internal revelation is not sufficient. The dulness,
forgetfulness, and sinfulness of men prevent them from
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152 THE DOCTRINES OF THE BEFOKMERS.
correctly apprehending and preserving it; and so this universal
revelation does not reach its goal because man sins. For an
explanation of sin, Zwingli refers less to the psychological
principle presented in the double nature of man than to
the fact that sin is not dissevered from the imiversal activity
of God, Even sin has to co-operate for the realization of the
ultimate purpose of the Creation, namely, that finite beings
shall know and enjoy God as the highest good. To the finite
understanding, knowledge is possible only through opposites.
Justice would not be known without injustice, nor good
without evil. In this lies the necessity of sin. God, how-
ever, would not stop with sin, but His will was to lead man,
through it, to full union with Himself. In a free decree of
His love, equally eternal with the plan of creation, God has
decreed to bring back man to communion with Himself. The
special external revelation subserves the carrying out of this
decree of redemption. Zwingli has not expressly explained
himself with regard to the mode of this special revelation,
but the sobriety of his critical exegesis proves that he did not
recognise any specific difference in the interpretation of sacred
and profane writings. Kbr does he designate the Scriptures
as holy from their being immediately inspired by God ; but
he does so designate those Scriptures that announce what the
holy, pure, eternal, and infallible Spirit means. Further, the
operation of the external word always presupposes the internal
Word. The internal revelation must first prepare the heart,
and only then can the external word find a good soil for
itself.
The special external revelation passes through two stages :
the revelation in the Law and the revelation in Christ.
When Zwingli speaks of the Law, he commonly refers not to
the natural law that rests upon universal internal revelation,
and was known also to the heathen, but to the Law of the
Old Testament. What was made known in heathendom by
God's grace only to some specially favoured men, was
communicated in the Jewish world to all by the institution
and arrangement of a Commonwealth. As regards the
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ULRICH ZWINGU. 153
Significance of the Old Testament Law, Zwingli contests the
view that it established an independent and essentially
valuable religion of legal obedience in such a way that man
could and should have attained to communion with God by
obeying the Law. The Law was given under the assumption
that man would not fulfil it. But it was not given merely as
a negative preparation for redemption in order to bring home to
man the knowledge of his sin or of his incapacity for good, or,
in a word, death. Instead of condemning and terrifying us,
the Law was to announce to us the will and inner nature of
Grod. Thus the commandment, " Love the Lord thy God with
all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind/'
teaches us that God Himself loves man and all His creatures,
and that we ought to love Him in return. Thus by His Law
God communicates to us a twofold knowledge, namely, that
we are bom to know Him, and that we are destined to enjoy
Him. But as God allows each of the two constituents of man
to work according to its proper internal nature, the spirit
lends its ear to divine things, while the flesh turns itself
away from them. If the flesh were completely to subject
itself, man would be an angel ; if the spirit were to degenerate
by combination with the flesh, man would be a beast. Now,
by the Law the spirit experiences a strengthening from above,
as even the body is, exists, and lives by the power of Grod,
The revelation in the Law is therefore in its essence quite
the same as the universal internal revelation ; and it is
likewise the same as the highest revelation of God in the
person of Christ
This highest revelation is distinguished from the former
only by greater distinctness and certainty. In order to bring
men actually to communion with God, a new life must be
implanted in them. And this has been done by the sending
of Christ For in the person of Christ God has become man,
and in Him the divine and human nature is united into the
unity of a personal life. As the soul and body in man, so
does the divine and human nature in Christ form an insepar-
able unity. Yet the two natures continue to be different in
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154 THE DOCTRINES OF THE REFORMERS.
their essence and their mode of action. Hence the divine
revelation culminates in Christ, because the fulness of the
divine Spirit has appeared in Him ; and hence Christ is the
commencement of the complete unity of man with God,
because in Him this unity was first realized. The work of
Christ consists in the restoration of humanity by a newly-
connected relation to God, and this work is described by
Zwingli by the aid of the previous ecclesiastical definitions.
We obtain an interest in this work of Christ by the com-
munication of the Holy Spirit, which proceeds from the
Father and brings the individual to the living communion
with God that has its foundation in Christ. God is called
the Holy Spirit in so far as He eflfects a holy, religious life.
This Spirit works inwardly and immediately in the heart of
the individual. He is the special and immediate principle
of the appropriation of salvation; all external institutions,
such as the Word, the Church, and the Sacraments, being
only means in His hand. Faith, as undivided surrender to
God and immediate union with God, is not at all a work of
man, but is the work of the divine Spirit alone. This is not
far from the view that lowers the historical Christ to a mere
visible representation of what is given by the immediate
operation of God, and can be produced by that operation
only. Zwingli, however, is far from holding this view ; but
it cannot be overlooked that two entirely different elements
of his system are here rather put externally side by side than
internally mediated with each other. In this connection a
distinction comes out even in Zwingli between the philosopher
and the ecclesiastical theologian. The former sees in Christ
only the historical embodiment and the personal representa-
tion of a universal process, while the latter strives to appre-
hend the person of Christ as of unique and peculiar significance
in universal history. It would lead us, however, beyond the
scope of our present exposition to consider these tendencies in
further detail
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JOHN CALVIN. 155
V.
John Calvin (1509-1564>
A peculiar character was impressed upon the Eeformation
by the influence of Calvin. It consisted mainly in the great
emphasis that was laid upon the verification of inward holi-
ness in the outward life. Calvin wished to establish at
Geneva a community of the holy God in which in all the
manifestations of private, public, domestic, and civil life
expression would be given to the fact that its members were
the elect of God and the redeemed by Christ. And notwith-
standing many great oppositions and difliculties, his poweri'ul
spirit succeeded, as far as such an undertaldDg can succeed,
in changing a great commonwealth of weak, sinful men into
a City of God.
It naturally fell to him as a later Eeformer rather to com-
plete the structure of the Church's Doctrine than to lay a
new foundation for it His far-reaching influence as a teacher
rests more upon the firmness of his inward conviction, the
clearness and conciseness of his representation, and the
rounded, systematic arrangement of his theology, than upon
any novelty or peculiarity in his mode of apprehension. We
do not find in Calvin, as we have found in Zwingli, anything like
a comprehensive system of philosophical and religious specula-
tion. His Institutio Bdigionis ChristiancB is indeed constructed
according to a special form. The two members of Religion
are God and man ; and hence the chief interest turns upon
the corresponding ' knowledge of God and man. The further
division of the Institutes into four parts — treating respectively
of God the Father, God the Son, (Jod the Holy Spirit, and the
Church — ^is borrowed from the Apostles' Creed. As these
two divisions cross each other, Calvin treats first of God as
the Creator, and of man as originally created good ; then of
God as Bedeemer, and of man as fallen ; next of God in so
far IU3 He acts subjectively in the appropriation of salvation
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156 THE DOCTEINBS OF THE BBFORMERS.
as the Holy Spirit, and of man as laying hold of this salva-
tion in faith ; and lastly, he treats of the Church as an insti-
tution for the mediation of salvation. The knowledge of God
is the ultimate goal of a blessed life. There is a certain
knowledge of God that is innate in us, and we are also able,
by examination of Nature as the work of God, to know Q^d.
But on account of our weakness, particularly in consequence
of sin, this natural knowledge of God does not suffice for
salvation, and we thus need the knowledge of God that is
immediately communicated to us in revelation. — Regarding
the relation of God to the world, Calvin shares the view that
was common to all the Eeformers, with the exception of
Melanchthon in his later period, namely, that everything in
the world is determined by the absolute power of God. We
do not find in Calvin any speculations about the essence of
God and His relation to the world as following therefrom ;
but, on the other hand, the view is emphatically and repeatedly
accentuated, that all that happens in the world is dependent
on the absolute decree of God, which as such is eternal and
unchangeable. Nor does Calvin shrink from the extremest
consequence of predestination in the rejection of the godless
and their eternal damnation.
The peculiar character of a doctrine becomes most certainly
and clearly known from the controversies which evolve what
was involved in it^
Calvin had already maintained the doctrine of predestina«
tion in all its sharpness against the view of Pighius (1542),
that grace depends upon foreknowledge, and that it therefore
supports the free co-operating will and is present to every one
who does not reject it, and against the view of Bolsec (1551),
which was essentially the same as that of Pighius. In like
manner, it was the question regarding the universality or par-
ticularity of divine grace and the question connected there-
with regarding the significance of the human will in reference
to the appropriation of salvation, that occasioned the great
^ Cf. Alexander Schweizer, Die Glaubenslehre der evang.-reformirtcn Kirche,
2 Bde. Zürich 1844-47. Die Protestantischen Centraldogmen, 2 Bde. 1854-56.
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JOHN CALVIN. 157
Arminian schism at the Synod of Dort (1618-19). Amyraut
(1596-1664) of Saumur tried to mitigate this same doctrine
of predestination, nor was he expelled from the Church on
accoont of his hypothetical üniversalism.
These internal controversies of the Eefonned Church show
that everything was referred by its theologians to the uni-
versal activity of God. This is also shown by the circum-
stance that the chief of all the objections that were raised
against the Calvinist system was, that it made God the author
of evil. Hence we may undoubtedly characterize the special
religious life embodied in the Calvinistic Churches by saying
that in them everything is referred to the universal activity of
God, or that the consciousness of dependence solely on God
lies at the basis of everything, whereas in the Lutheran Church
the consciousness of the personal forgiveness of sins is the
essential principle, and accordingly the doctrine of justification
by faith alone is the fundamental dogma. The dogmatic
theology of the Calvinistic Church has thus to seek its sole
controlling principle in theology proper as the doctrine of God,
and it finds it in the principle of the universal divine activity.
It is this conviction which determines the special Calvinistic
doctrines. The assertion of the particularity of the divine
decree of grace and the redemptive merit of Christ, of the
irresistibility and inalienability of grace, are but consequences
following from the doctrine of the universal divine activity.
In like manner, the distinctive Christology and Sacrament-
arianism of the Reformed Churches point back to the striving
to maintain the absolute dependence on God alone as their
ultimate source.
The dogmatic theology of the Reformed Church thoroughly
occupies the supranatural standpoint in the very same way
as is done by that of the Lutheran Church. Man has indeed
a natural knowledge of God, both innate by innate ideas and
acquired from examination of the works of God. But it does
not suffice to give a perfect knowledge of God, and still less
to make known His decree of redemption and its execution
through Christ. Hence the revelation of God must necessarily
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158 THE DOCTKINES OP THE KEFORMERS.
supervene. It alone gives the right certainty to the natural
knowledge of God, and completes it hj making known the
higher attributes, the Trinitarian nature, and the decree of
Bedemption ; and this alone suffices for salvation. On this
point we find in the Calvinistic and Lutheran dogmatics
similar definitions in almost the same terms, and yet a
noteworthy difiference appears in the two confessions, which
at least explains the objection of the Lutherans that the
Calvinistic theologians conceded too much to reason. The
following formula perhaps indicates this difference in the
briefest way. The Lutherans emphasize the negative relation
of the natural knowledge of God to the revealed knowledge
of God, whereas the Calvinistic theologians emphasize the
positive relation between them. The former prefer to give
prominence to the fact that the natural knowledge of God is
not sufficient; the latter bring out the view that it is a
preliminary stage and a positive preparation for salvation,
and that it is also a form of truth. This appears most
unmistakeably in the keenly discussed question whether it
may be said that natural reason or philosophy kindles the
light of the Holy Spirit (philosophiam seu rationem accendere
lumen Spiritus Sancti). The Calvinistic theologians generally,
and not merely the otherwise notorious Keckermann, are
wont to use this expression in order to bring out the positive
relation of the natural revelation to the supernatural revela-
tion, and of philosophy to theology, as well as to give
recognition to the pre-Christian religion and wisdom as a
certain divine revelation. It was so used perhaps with the
view of being able to vindicate the salvation of the noble
heathens, after the example of ZwinglL The Lutherans,
such as Gerhard, Meisner, Mentzer, and others, are just as
unanimous in their rejection of that proposition. They see
the peculiar character of the divine revelation endangered by
it, and too much conceded by it to the operation of the
natural corrupt reason.
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PROTESTANT CONTROVERSIES. VEDELIÜS AND MÜSiEUS. 159
VI.
Protestant Controversies. Vedelius and Musjäus.
The question as to how far philosophy is to be allowed to
influence theology, led to a controversy between the two
Confessions. This controversy/ which was always taken up
again, and is wearisome and unpleasing in its details, throws
an interesting light upon the " other spirit " which not merely
separated the representatives of the Eeformed and Lutheran
Churches on the memorable day at Marburg, but which has
operated up to the present time. Certainly it was only the
heat of the contest that could drive the combatants to such
extreme reproaches as that the Lutherans would give no
place to philosophy in matters of theology, that they only
asserted what stands on the Holy Scripture verbis expressis,
and that the Eeformed theologians assigned the supremacy
to philosophy even in theology. More closely considered,
the difference comes to far less than this, but its meaning
undoubtedly is what these very extravagances of expression
bring out, that in the Eeformed Church more was allowed to
the rational element than was admitted in the Lutheran
Church.
It is well known that the controversies between the
Lutherans and the representatives of the Eeformed Churches
took their beginning in Christology and the doctrine of the
Lord's Supper. This was not accidental; on the contrary,
these are just the doctrines of the Christian Faith in which
the characteristic tendency of religion to find a connecting
unity for the opposition of the divine and the human comes
most directly to expression. Luther, influenced by mysticism,
^ The following works which brought the literature of this controversy to a
closci and which are instnictiTe on account of their historical details, may be
referred to: Nicolaus Vedelius, Rationale theologicuin, sen de necessitate et
vero usu principiorum rationis ac philosophise in controversiis theologicis 1.
tres, Geneva 1628 ; Johannes Musseus, De usu principiorum rationis et
philosophise in controversiis theologicis 1. tres. Nicolai Vedelii, Kationali
theologico potissimum oppositi, Jen» 1644.
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160 THE DOCTRINES OF THE REFORMERS.
here at least desired an immediate oneness of the two opposites.
Zwingli, holding by the universal activity of God, in contrast
to which all middle causes lose their significance and in-
dependent activity, had no interest to go beyond the sober
intellectual view of the Sacraments as symbolical signs, and
of the person of Christ as a union of the divine and human
in the way in which every man unites soul and body in
himself. Thus do we now explain the difference, but at
that time the matter lay otherwise. The question then was
not to explain why the one asserted one thing and the other
another thing ; the point was to prove which view was the right
one. The common basis for this investigation was given in
the fact that the Scripture alone could give the decision in
questions of faitL The efiforts put forth with a view to the
interpretation of the Scripture in regard to the person of
Christ and the Lord's Supper, thus formed the starting-point
of those explanations which we are here concerned with.
It is known that Luther at the colloquy at Marburg
(Oct. 1529) wrote upon the table the words of the Scripture,
" this is my body," in order to be even outwardly reminded
of what he could not give up. And Luther's confession is
likewise known, that he would have but too gladly given up
the bodily presence of Christ in the Supper, but the word of
Scripture had been too powerful for him. In like manner,
the Lutherans afterwards commonly referred to the literal
word, and turned themselves in an unreserved polemic against
all attempts to interpret it in another sense. This was the
reason why the Eeformed theologians objected to the Lutherans,
that they wished to have all use of reason excluded from
the interpretation of Scripture, from whence it followed that
they could only teach what was verbally contained in the
Scriptures " quod totidem Uteris et syllabis aut verbis saltern
synonymis in scriptura sacra continetur." Occasion for this
assertion was given for instance by Chemnitius, who, in his
inquiry regarding the Lord's Supper, gives the exhortation
that we should not allow ourselves to be led away by the
devil, or be turned aside by profane disputations or remote
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PROTESTANT CONTROVERSIES. VEDEUUS AND MUSiEUa 161
questions from the word of Christ; and he adds that the
importance of keeping in view only the sacred words of our
Saviour is shown by the repugnance of opponents to the
" letter," as they say. The main concern is to keep in view
the spoken words of the Institution (to prijov verborum
institutionis) without giving heed to the principles of physics.
Lucas Osiander likewise desires to give the go-by to philosophy
as soon as we have to do with theological questions, and he
holds that in considering the mysteries of religion we need
give no regard to the axioms of Physics. — As against such
incriminating witnesses, it was easy for the Lutherans to
repudiate the assertion of the Beformed theologians as an
unfounded exaggeration. Their actual procedure, no less than
a series of express utterances of their most distinguished
theologians, from Luther downwards, proved that they admitted
the use of reason in the interpretation of Scriptm*e, both in
order to discover the correct meaning of Scripture in doubtful
cases, and in order to draw consequences from the transmitted
word.
This controversy was extremely opportune for the Catholics.
They took up the objection that was advanced against the
Lutherans from the side of the Calvinists, and on the ground of
it they threw out a challenge to all Protestants. The Catholics
certainly recognised the Scripture as the source of religious
knowledge, but they held that Tradition went along with it.
They further maintained that God had instituted a continuous
office of teaching, represented in the Councils or in the
infallible Pope, and that they had the right to promulgate
explanations of Scripture or continuations of doctrine with
binding authority. Protestants emphasized the sole authority
of Scripture without setting up any infallible guide to its
interpretation. Hence it was asserted that either the
individual has an entirely unlimited right of interpretation
for himself, or that the letter of Scripture is absolutely bind-
ing. At present, the former alternative is pressed against us
by the Catholics ; in that age the latter alternative evidently
came readier to hand. We find it first expressed in the
VOL. I. ^ n A
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162 THE DOCTRINICS OF THE BEFORMEBS.
'^ ßepliqae k la response da serenissime roy de la grand'
Bretagne" (3rd ed. Paris 1633) of the Cardinal Du Perron,
Archbishop of Sens. In the apologetic interest of his Church,
he argues that the majority of the Articles of Faith are
not contained with express words in Scripture, but are only
deduced from it by inferences. In order to reach these
Articles of Faith we need the instrument of reason, which
takes up as it were a middle place between the Scriptures
and inferences from them. Faith, however, thus becomes
uncertain and merely probable ; a certain faith only arises if
the Church comes as an external authority between us and
the Scriptures. — Vedelius mentions several Jesuits who urged
these considerations in combating the Protestants. Gonterius
takes up the controversy with the Protestants on the ground
of the authority of the Scriptures as recognised on both sides.
He argues that whoever draws consequences from the words
of Scripture, leaves this ground and applies the principles of
natural reason; and that the arguments of the Protestants
therefore only deserve consideration if they are found verbally
in the Scriptures. The Jesuit Arnold likewise proceeded in
a similar way. This theory was systematically developed and
applied in detail by the Jesuit Franciscus Veronius in his
Methodua VeroniaTia (Cologne 1628). According to his
view, the common principle of all the Confessions that had
fallen away from Eome, is that the Scriptures, as the canon
of all truth, contain all that is necessary for the worship of
God and our own salvation, and hence all the doctrines
relevant thereto must be measured by them as the highest rule.
The representatives of these Confessions are, therefore, bound
to form their faith out of the Scriptures in such a way that
it shall be verbally contained in Scripture without taking
from, adding to, or changing anything; and this is only
admissible by putting in place of the words of Scripture a
completely synonymous expression, whereas by the admissioa
of consequences too much would be allowed to natural reason.
Bartholdus Nihusius, who, it appears, went over to the
Catholic Church from somewhat questionable motives (1616),
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PROTESTANT CONTBOVERSIES. VEDBLIUS AND MüSiEUS. l6S
developes the same thought in his Ars nova (Hildesheim
1632), which was directed against G. Calixtus and C.
Hornejus. According to his own statement, he was led to
change his Church because the assertion made by the
Lutherans, that there were many dogmas contained in
Scripture that were contrary to the Roman doctrine, had
been found by him to be false. He urges the objection
against the Lutherans, and especially against Calixtus, that
he had derived many dogmas from the Scriptures which were
neither contained in express words in them, nor could be
derived by certain inference from them. In detailed exegetical
argumentation, Üue motive of which is thus indicated, he
seeks to show, with remarkable subtlety, that the Catholic
doctrines of the withdrawal of the cup, of divorce, of
celibacy, and of the mass cannot be refuted on grounds of
Scripture. Calixtus, in a thoroughgoing reply {TractaiuB
de Arte nova, etc., Frankf. 1652), gives consideration also
to the earlier representatives of his opponent's view, but
they appear to be known to him in part only from the
work of Vedeliua The other controversial writings that were
published on the subject are not of much importance.
The Lutherans therefore repudiated, as a groundless exag-
geration, the assertion of the Reformed theologians, that in
their interpretation of Scripture they admit no application
of reason and of philosophical principles, and that they fall
back merely upon the words of the text. In this the
Lutherans were undoubtedly right. The difTerence between
them only comes properly out when the question is put, Up
to what degree and in what way may the principles of
natural reason or of philosophy find application in theological
questions, and especially in the interpretation of Scripture ?
The explanations given regarding the mode of expression are
entirely unessential, and the principles of nature, of reason,
and of philosophy are held to be essentially synonymous. In
regard to the matter itself, it must be continually kept in
view that the Reformed Theologians prefer to make the differ-
ence as small as possible, whereas the Lutherans are disposed
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164 THE DOCTBINES OF THE BEFOBMEBS.
to increase it to the utmost Even Yedelius, the leading
champion upon the Calvinistic side, admits that the Holy
Scripture, the mysteries, and the Articles of Faith do not
require proof, and that the question of the application of
principles of reason is related to the theological controversies
only so ftur as concerns the establishment of the correct
meaning of Scripture with a view to their settlement.
Besides, the distinction of the questiones puree and the
questimes mixtce, of which the former completely transcend
the comprehension of human reason, is not rejected, and
emphasis is laid upon the position, that in every theological
question the Middle Term (medius terminus) must be taken
from Scripture. Further, the principles of reason are not to
be used as ptHncipia but as instrumenta of knowledge and
inference, and not primaria but only secundario, or merely as
auxiliaries to the Scripture proof. The Scholastic method of
resolving theological questions by reason and without the
word of God, is rejected as entirely inadmissible, on the
ground that philosophy does not rule or direct, but only serves
in theology. It is held, however, that to support theological
positions, not only on theological grounds but also on philo-
sophical principles, is permissible but not necessary; the
principles of reason have properly the position of being mere
auxiliaries of the proof from Scripture. In applying them,
the Middle Term must necessarily be taken from Scripture.
If this term is combined with the Minor, the connection is to
be established from Scripture, and only as it were ex ahunr-
danti from reason. If it is combined with the Major, the
connection is either expressly contained in Scripture, or
it must be got from it by interpretation and comparison of
passages. In the former case, the principles of reason are
not required ; in the latter, they are absolutely necessary.
This is designated by Vedelius as the subject of dispute in
the controversy.
Joh. Musfieus, the worthy representative of an orthodoxy
mitigated by genuine piety, follows the details of his opponent
step by step, and seeks to lay bare their defects. What he
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PBOTESTANT CONTROVEESIES. VEDELIUS AlO) MUS^US. 165
himself represents as truth (vera sententia) shows us a deeper
penetration into the question and a living grasp of it A
question does not become theological by the fact that its
conceptions are taken from Scripture, nor does a conception
become theological by the fact that its verbal expression is
taken from Scripture. The Scriptures contain many mere
natural truths, such as that the sun rises and sets; and it is not
possible that a proposition should be changed from being
philosophical into being theological merely on account of the
accidental circumstance that it has been received into the
Scriptures. In order that a proposition may be theological,
its contents must also be supernatural, and the middle term
of a theological inference must stand in a relation to the
major and minor that rests upon the peculiar divine contents
of Scripture and theology, and not upon the letter of the
Bible. In this sense all the inferences in theology must
have their theological character. Hence, if it is at all
admissible in theological inferences to take a premiss from the
principles of natural reason, and if the claim of the "Ars
nova " is to be decidedly rejected, the following law will hold
good : " When a universal theological premiss is connected
with a particular philosophical premiss, the inference follows
very simply by the subordination of the individual case under
the universal proposition." Thus all sin is forgiven on account
of the merit of Christ when appropriated in faith. Murder is
sin ; therefore murder is forgiven, eta But if the philosophical
premiss is universal and the theological premiss is particular,
then it must be carefully examined whether the philosophical
principle in question is necessarily and universally valid
(absolute et simpliciter necessaria), or applies only to a
particular sphere and conditionally (secundum quid et physice).
It is only in the former case that a correct inference is to be
got by the mere subordination of the particular under the
universal. In the latter case, this procedure leads to the
greatest errors, as is proved by the example of the Reformed
theologians, who infer thus : Every natural body is sensibly
perceived where it is really present; Christ's body is not
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166 , THE DOCTRINES OF THE KEFOEMERS.
sensibly perceived in the Lord's Supper; therefore it is not
really present
The difference between the Lutheran and Uie Calvinistic
theologians thus comes out more sharply in Musseus than in
the statements of Vedelius. It is evident that Musaeus touches
the distinction between them more correctly. This is only to
be exj^ined from the fact that the controversy, as soon as
it was conducted on fundamental «principles, culminated in
the question as to whether the principle of contradiction is
also Valid in theological questions, and whether reason or
philosophy has the right to adjudicate on alleged contradictions
in theology. This point was raised of necessity, seeing that
the Beformed theologians, in the controversy regarding
Christology and the doctrine of the Supper, fell back at once
upon universal principles, as when they argued that " the
peculiar essence (proprium) of one nature cannot be communi-
cated to another," that "every body is in a determinate place,"
" fiiiitum non est capax infiniti" The position of the parties
is quite correctly described by Vedelius, when he says that
the Lutherans assert there would only be a contradiction in
theological things if two expressions of the Word of God
contradicted each other, but not if the expressions of Scripture
were merely in contradiction with the rules of our natural
thinking. It is unquestionably possible for the divine
Omnipotence to make things which, according to our logic,
are contradictory to each other, be at the same time ; at all
events, our darkened reason may not presume to judge about
the mysteries of faith. To concede to Beason the right to judge
of contradictions in matters of faith would amount to making
her the mistress of theology. It would be an abuse of philosophy
and an absurd heresy in which Calvinists and Photinians
(Socinians) meet The Calvinistic theologians claim for reason
the right of deciding on the contradictions in any theological
questions, and not merely in those questions which can be
imderstood even by the natural reason, but also in matters
that are purely mystical All the reasons that are advanced
for this position may be reduced to this one, that error is
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PEOTESTANT CONTROVERSIES. VEDELIUS AND MÜS^ÜS. 167
contained in every contradiction, and therefore no truth of
faith can contain a contradiction. While the Calvinists
restrict themselves to this position, they emphatically repudiate
the accnsation of the Lutherans, that they elevate philosophy
to be the mistress and judge in matters of faith. Conrad
Homejus, in his De Progressv, Disputandi Liber (Frankf.
1624), tries to occupy a position intermediate between the
two parties. He argues that the question as to whether this
or that assertion contains a contradiction must be distinguished
from the other question as to which member of this contra-
diction is true and which false. Philosophy answers the
former question ; a special science and, in the case before us,
theology must answer the latter question. We have also to
distinguish between a formal contradiction that is clearly
presented in the words of a proposition, and a material
contradiction where the contradiction is hidden in the
attributed predicate. Philosophy again decides the former
case, while the particular science as theology decides the
latter. It is clear that the first distinction only carries out
what the Cal^dnists meant when they ascribed to reason only
the deeisio and not the diseretio of the contradiction, whereas
the latter distinction, when put in application, issues in the
opinion maintained by the Lutherana — The question " Utrum
contradictoria credi possint" was revived and discussed, without
any substantially new or important result, in the later
controversy between Christoph Matthias Pfaflf (1686-1760)
of Tübingen and Turretin of Geneva (1671-1737).
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SECTION THIED.
THE CULTIVATION OP PHILOSOPHY BEFORE DESCARTES.
I.
Aristotell^ism and Eamism.
THE judgment formed at any time regarding the signifi-
cance and value of philosophy, notwithstanding the
often repeated distinction between philosophy in itself and
the particular prevailing system, is never formed independently
of that system. Hence, we cannot avoid giving a brief re-
view of the condition of philosophy in the Schools during
the period that we have now been considering. In doing
so, we may take up the subject in connection with both the
Lutheran and the Reformed Churches together; for apart
from the fact that the Swiss Beformers, and especially Zwingli,
took a more friendly attitude towards philosophy, and that
Eamism strongly flourished for a period in the Eeformed
Church, the position of philosophy in both the Churches was
fundamentally the same. The aversion at the outset to all
secular science could not but cease as soon as the Church
found time to develop its own purified doctrine systematically,
and had occasion to defend itself from hostile attacks. The
attempts made at the commencement to create a new philo-
sophy passed almost all away without permanent influence, or
at least without the formation of a school. Hence there was
nothing else that could be done but to take up one of the
ancient systems; and only Plato and Aristotle could come
into consideration. But the history of the development before
the Eeformation has already shown that Plato obtained in-
fluence only over particular minds that had an inward afl^ity
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ABISTOTELIANISM AND RAMISM. 16.9
to him, and that he led them mostly to innovations and to
heretical divergences from the established doctrine of the
Church. On the other hand, we have seen that Aristotle
-worked scholastically and far more universally from the very
reason that many used his Logic without accepting the essen-
tial doctrines of his Metaphysics, and because he was pre-
eminently fitted to give systematic development and formal
completion to a doctrine that was already established and
r^arded as incontestable. With keen vision, Melanchthon
had already recognised this. Hence he urgently recommended
the study of Aristotle, and advanced it, according to his power,
by his text-books. It was thus the influence of Melanchthon
that helped on the Aristotelian philosophy till it flourished so
greatly in the Grerman universities of the sixteenth century.
For a time the designations Fhilippist and Aristotelian passed
as synonymous.^ Alongside of this movement, Eamism
was more widely spread at least for a time.* The tour of
Kamus through Germany and Switzerland (1568-70) already
divided the representatives of science, in all the places visited
by him, into two hostile camps. Some received him publicly
as the great reformer of philosophy; others combated him
as an audacious opponent of the infallible Stagirite. In
Heidelberg public tumults broke out among the students ;
and when Bamus, on the 15th December 1659, was beginning
to explain Cicero's oration pro Marcello, his opponents tore
away the steps leading up to the reading-desk, and a French
student supplied their place with his back. The wish of the
Elector to secure him as a professor of philosophy failed from
the opposition of the University. Beza again opposed his
intention of teaching philosophy in Geneva, on the ground
that it had been resolved at Geneva that logic and the other
philosophical sciences were only to be taught there by those
who did not diverge in the least (ne tantilliim quidem) from
* On this point reference maybe particularly made to Hermannns ab Elsvich,
De varia Aristotelis in scholis protestantium fortuna, Wittenb. 1720.
^ A detailed exposition of the movement called forth by the conflict between
Bamism and Aristotelism is unfortunately still a desideratum. The best is
that of Brucker, Hist. Grit. Phil, t It.
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170 CULTIVATION OF PHILOSOPHT BEFORE DESCARTES.
the opinions of Aristotle. In Strassburg, Basle, Zürich, and
other cities, his presence was celebrated in every possible way.
After the death of Bamus this division continued. Many
of his personal scholars spread his doctrines, such as Job.
Stnrm in Strassburg, Freigius in Freiburg, and afterwards in
Basle and Altdorf, Fabricius in Düsseldorf, and others. Beur*
husius of Dortmund, also one of his scholars, among other
works in explanation of the philosophy of Samus, wrote an
introduction to the system with a learned comparison of the
Dialectics of Bamus and Melanchthon. Scribonius of Corbach
wrote a Triumphus Logicm Hamice, Among the theologians,
the most distinguished Eamists were David Chythrseus of
Rostock, Caspar Pfaffrad of Helmstädt, and Piscator of
Herbom. Bamists taught in almost all the Universities,
even at Helmstädt and at Altdorf, the chief seats of Aristotel-
ianism. But Aristotelianism had also its valiant representa-
tives, of whom the most conspicuous were Caselius and Corn.
Martinii at Helmstädt, and Phil. Scherb at Altdorf, who, in
terms far from polite, refuses to allow any value to the
new logic, because it led men away from the truth, instead
of bringing them to it Further, Jakob Schegk in Tübingen,
who carried on a controversy with Bamus himself, Nicod.
Frischlin, Zacharius Ursinus in Heidelberg, Dasypodius in
Strassburg, and MatthsBus Dresser, may be mentioned as among
the leading Aristotelians. Numerous controversial writings
flew hither and thither, but they have only come down to us
in part, and they are generally quite unimportant. The
frequent academic disputations of the time specially formed a
wide field for the contests of the hostile parties. Along with
all this, reconciliations and mediations were also attempted by
the so-called Eamei mizH et syncretistc^ or Philippo-Bamists.
We may here mention only some of the most important, as P.
Frisius, Bud. Goclenius, Otto Casmann, Barth. Keckermann,
and J. H. Alstedt.
The conflict between the two schools ended with the
complete suppression of Eamism. In Helmstädt, a statute
of the year 1576 bound every teacher to teach the Aristotelian
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AKISTOTBLUNISM AND RAMISIL 171
philosophy as veram et antiqimm ; and, in 1597, the philo-
sophy of Eamus was expressly forbidden. In Wittenberg
also, where Bamism had been taught up till 1585 by some
private teachers in the University, it was thought necessary
to forbid it in 1603. In Leipsic, John Cramer, appointed as
public professor for expounding the Organon of Aristotle,
began to lecture prioatim on the logic of Bamus. It was
only after he had subscribed an assurance that he. would
avoid the ** novum ac insolens docendi genus Petri Eami,"
and that he would teach to the best of his power the '* vera
Sana receptaque doctrina Aristotelis," that the suspension
which had been passed upon him was set aside. Never-
theless in 1591, Cramer was deposed as a Kamist and
Calvinist ; and it was decreed that whoever qualified for
teaching in Leipsic must promise to teach nothing .against
Aristotle. In short, about the year 1625, the triumph of
Aristotelianism in Germany, and especially in the Lutheran
Universities, was complete. The attitude of the theologians
was of considerable influence upon this question. It was
decidedly for Aristotle. This was hardly due to the con-
fessional opposition to the Calvinists; for although at the
beginning Bamus stood in high authority in the Reformed
-Church, he afterwards shared the fate of Arminius, who, with
the support of End. Saell, but opposed by Justus Lipsius and
Scaliger, wished to naturalize Kamus in the Netherlands — a
8omewhat external combination which was prejudicial to both.
On the other hand, the theologians objected to the Baniists,
that they allowed to philosophy too great an influence upon
theology. ' That this objection was justified, was shown even
by the semi-Bamists Qoclenius and Casmann. Eudolph
Gk)clenius, the father (1547-1628), in his Problemata Zogica,
combats with all emphasis the extremely perverse opinion
that it was wrong to refer the propositions concerning God to
the rules of logic, and that logic was not an instrument for
theology, but only for philosophy ; for, he argued, we cannot
discourse about the former without the light of logic. Again,
in the JDialectiea Bami, Goclenius openly says that logic is as
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172 CÜLTIVAITON OF PHILOSOPHY BEFORE DESCABTES.
it were a light, not merely to teach philosophical things, but
also to lighten up the heavenly mysteries of the sacred
doctrine : " Nam conveniunt notiones et termini logici divinis
et fidei rebus vel proprise vel analogicae." Among the
orthodox theologians, Goclenius was opposed in the most
decided way by Daniel Hofmann in his "jDe urn et appli-
catione notionum logicarum ad res theologicas" (Frankfurt
1596). Hofmann accused Goclenius of equalizing God with
the creatures, and of being a Sacramentarian, an Arian, and
such like. In like manner. Otto Casmann in his Philosophic^
€t Christianen et verce, etc. (Frankfurt 1601), wishes the
mysteries of the Faith to be logically treated, and holds that
faith itself requires reason in order to attain to correct insight
into the objects of faith. Notwithstanding dl the subordina-
tion of philosophy under theology, he derives with unusual
emphasis the philosophy that is attained by the use of the
senses and of the reason likewise from God as the highest
wisdom ; and hence he holds that a contradiction of this
theology with philosophy is impossible, and that the know-
ledge of it is even indispensable to the theologian. — ^Nor
did Bamism fail to exercise a material influence upon the
theological system. We may find an example of this in
another semi-Ramist, Bartholomaeus Keckermann with his
Systema ss. theologioe (ed. 2, Hanovise 1607). We read here
not merely that " God designed to kindle in the human mind
the light of His Holy Spirit by the two manifestly divine
sciences (plane divinas) of Metaphysic and Logic ; " but that
the goal of religion is union with God (fruitio Dei tanquam
summi boni), and its fruit is practical activity in holiness,
appears more prominently in Keckermann than among the
orthodox theologians of that time, so that, notwithstanding
complete agreement in details, it cannot be doubted that the
spirit of the system is a different one. — It was also a fact of
some importance that the Catholic opponents made use of the
Aristotelian logic ; and the Protestants, as J. Gerhard expressly
says, could only encounter them with success when they
appeared in the same armour. But it was the relative worth
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AHISTOTELIANISM AND RAMISM. 173
of the systems which decided the struggle ; and in this respect
Aristotle was undoubtedly so much the stronger that the issue
of the conflict could not be doubtful. — Let us glance some-
what more closely, by way of illustrating this, at the work of
Alstedt which was then much used, and which has been highly
esteemed even by Leibnitz. It is entitled Cursus philosophici
EncydopcBdia, 1. xxvii. (Herbom 1631). Four preliminary
explanations '' prsecognita philosophical are prefixed to the
encyclopaedic survey, of which the first, entitled Archelogia,
promises to ßxplain the principles of being and knowing.
But of the principles of being we learn nothing further than
that they fall into internal and external ^pauses. The internal
causes are matter and form ; the external are efficient cause
and end. The former in the first line is God, and in the
second, man equipped with reason and the natural desire after
knowledge ; the latter is, at the highest, the glorification of
God and the perfection of man. The use of philosophy in
theology, jurisprudence, and medicine is a means of attaining
this end. Of the principles of knowledge we learn nothing
further than that they depend on the subject knowing, the
object to be known, and the particular medium of knowledge.
In like manner, the section entitled Hexiologia, in which he
treats " de habitibus intellectualibus," leads to nothing further
than the theological division of knowledge into supernatural
and naturali and the further division of natural knowledge
into innate and acquired. The Encyclopaedia then presents
the eleven theoretical sciences, which include metaphysics,
geography, optics, music, and architecture, next the five
practical sciences, including history along with ethics, and
finally the seven "poetical" sciences, including along with
logic, mnemonic, oratorio, and the lexical science. The treat-
ment of the details, like the general conception, is deficient in
depth. Such a mode of reasoning was not capable of over-
throwing the supremacy of Aristotle ; it could not but conduce
to shallowness and superficiality of judgment, and hence it
was opposed by all really earnest inquirers.
This period also shows an instance in which adherence to
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174 CULTIVATION OF PHILOSOPHY BB?ORB DESCARTES.
Plato led to heretical positions. Eilhard Lubinus (t 1621),
a professor at Bostock, ia his Fhosphorus, 8. de prima causa et
natura mali tractaius (Bostock 1596), teaches that there are
two eternal primordial principles, "Ens et Non-ens," Being
and Nothing. Being or God is the efficient principle of all
things ; nothing is their matter. From the former they have
their subsistence and the good ; from the latter they have all
their defects, evils, and badness. The first who raised his
voice against Lubinus was Albert Grauer in the dedication
of his treatise, Absurda absu/rdorum absurdim/aa (Magdeb.
1606); and he was followed by a whole series of famous
theologians. The whole incident shows, as in similar former
cases, that attachment to Plato is close to the danger of
material divergences from the doctrine of the Church, and
that, for the merely formal elaboration of the substance of the
already-established doctrine, no philosophy was more adapted
than the Aristotelian. This system was therefore zealously
cultivated. Melanchthon bad already done important service
in the way of freeing the study of the Aristotelian philosophy
frcm the bondage of the mediaeval commentators, and guiding
a return to its sources. But in 1596, Sal. Gesner still
complains that '' instead of the sources, any sort of text-books
and extracts are introduced, such as could be taught in
common schools or studied privately by any one," and that
thence arose great ignorance in physics, ethics, and meta-
physics. Soon, however, a deeper »iinderstctndiug of Aristotle
took its rise at Helmstädt Nevertheless, the expositions of
metaphysics which were used in that period continued to be
wholly limited to a superficial formalism which did not
penetrate to the profounder questions. The oldest of these
is the metaphysical treatise of the Spanish Jesuit Suarez,
entitled Di^utatiorus Metaphysical (1605). Metaphysics is
represented as the necessary basis of theology ; for only he
who controls all objective knowledge can receive the highest
knowledge into himself. Metaphysics is to be carefully
distinguished from the individual sciences, such as dialectics
and the practical branches of science; it treats of being as
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ARISTOTEUANISM AND BAMISM. 175
snch, and of things generally in their possible and actual
determinations, individuality, and differexicea Unity, good-
ness, and truth are represented as the universal properties of
all that exists. Then follow explanations in detail of the
relation of substance and accident, and that of cause and
effect. Concrete being is divided into the infinite and the
finite, and the latter is treated according to the scheme of
the Aristotelian Categories. — Jacob Martini of Wittenberg
proceeds in a similar way in his ExtraUcUvmes Metaphysicee
(1608). Metaphysics, he says, is the science of being as
such. This being, whose real existence out of thinking is
simply assumed, is either simple or conjunct, whence arise
the distinctions of the positive and privative, of the actual
and potential In detailed explanations and subtile sub-
divisions, the conception of causality is then analysed. In
this system, also, unity, truth, and goodness appear as the
simple properties of being. The One unfolds itself into the
universal and whole, differentiates itself into the individual,
divides itself still more into individuals, and sinks down to
mere numerical unity; and hence proceed the opposites of
limited and unlimited, and of perfect and imperfect Truth
lies at the basis of all thinking, and is presupposed through-
out as the agreement of things with the knowledge of them.
The good is the perfection that belongs to being in itself; and
it determines itself more closely according to the opposition of
the natural and the moral good. Into this scheme real things,
as got from empirical knowledge, are then introduced. — ^There
is not much difference in the method of ^he other meta-
physicians who were much used at that time, such as
Christian Scheibler of Marburg in his Opus metaphysicum
(1636), J. Scharff (f 1660), and others.
These men attached themselves to Aristotle, but it went
with them as with the Scholastics of the Middle Ages. They
did not penetrate into the profounder and really meta-
physical speculations of their great master, but even in their
so-called metaphysical investigations they confined themselves
to the formalism and schematism of logic. All philosophizing
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176 CULTIVATION OF PHILOSOPHY BEFORE DESCARTES.
was restricted to logic, and this logic did not trouble itself
about the questions regarding the theory of knowledge which
necessarily lead to metaphysics ; it only dealt with the
external form of the syllogism, with divisions carried out to the
utmost, and with the mechanical arrangement of things in the
formal outlines thus obtained. This is the very characteristic
of Scholasticism. Everything must be classified, schematized,
brought into the form of the syllogism, and proved according
to a definite form of drawing conclusions. B. Meisner having
raised the question in his PhUosophia Sobria " an semper in
forma syllogistica de rebus theologicis disputandum sit," and
having answered it in the negative, Cornelius Martini of
Helmstädt, in his Analysis Logica (1594), assails him in the
most violent way with odious suspicions, intentional dis-
tortions, and coarse invectives ; and Meisner finds it necessary
to defend himself in detail in a "brevis admonitio contra
C. Martini maledicentiam, iniquitatem, negligentiam " (1621).
He shows that although every sound reasoning must be of
such a kind that it can be reduced to the syllogistic form of
Major and Minor, yet it is not absolutely necessary to bring
it actually into this form. The representatives of the other
view, however, undertook to prove everything that is possible
by the aid of the syllogism, a method which was satirised
even at that time in the ironical treatise, " Mulieres Jiomines
non esse** (Paris 1693), which was often regarded as an
earnest production and zealously confuted. The author of
this satire undertook in the gravest manner to show that
" women are not men," by employing a syllogistic method
that was without a loophole and unassailable by the rules of
logia
Philosophy thus entered into the closest connection, not to
say intermixture, with theology. To this may be referred the
habit, in metaphysical works, of treating the section on God
and His attributes in disproportionate detail Thus J. Scharf
in his Pneumatica seu scterUia spirituum naturalis gives a
detailed "natural theology." Pneumatics is the doctrine of
spirits, and it accordingly treats in the first place of the
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AMSTOTELUNISM AND RAMISM. 177
infinite and independent Spirit, God. Although we can
obtain by the light of reason only an approximate knowledge
of God, yet Scharf gives prolix explanations regarding the
attributes of God, His relation to the world, our relation to
Him, and so on. This treatment of Natural Theology in
philosophy might seem like a feeble beginning of a Philosophy
of Religion, were it not that the treatment of the subject is so
utterly lacking in independence. Instead of philosophical
expositions regarding God, we find in this section of philo-
sophy only an outline of the corresponding parts of dogmatics,
at one time under a simple change of expression, and at
another even without this. It is still more characteristic of
the amalgamation of theology and philosophy in the Lutheran
Scholasticism, that most of the examples employed in logic
were borrowed from theology. Writers, like Beckmann in his
De modo solrendi saphismata (Jena 1667), were fond of
borrowing their examples of fallacies from the confessional
polemics, and examples of correct inference from their own
dogmatics. It is no wonder that, on their side, the theologians
likewise reduced all their explanations to the forms of the
correct syllogism. In particular, controversies were almost
always treated in this way, and this is another reason why
these writings have become so unpalatable to us now.
The results of this scholasticism may be here but briefly
indicated. Among the later theologians personal living
piety went on diminishing; and, in the place of faith,
came knowledge about faith and orthodoxy, which was the
means of leading to those petty controversies and hair-splitting
distinctions that characterize the dogmatic theology of that
period. Disputations were carried on regarding the language
of our first parents and the logic of the angels. Inquiries
were instituted " de partu Virginis" The question was dis-
cussed as to whether a single drop of Christ's blood would
have been enough for the redemption of the human race ; and
among other things it was disputed whether the blood shed in
Gethsemane remained united with the Deity, and whether
Christ, at the day of judgment, would show the scars of His
VOL. L M ,^ T
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178 CULTIVATION OF PHILOSOPHY BEFOBE DESCABTE8.
wounds or not It was the age of the most violent con-
fessional polemics, when, on the Lutheran side, the inquiry-
was put, with all earnestness, as to whether the Calvinists
should be called Christians, and it was openly declared that
there was more need to beware of the Calvinists than of the
Catholics. It was also the age in which the violent con-
troversy about the icpvy^v; and tchfotri^i in Christology led to
the most subtile distinctions.
IL
The Daniel Hofmann Controversy (1598-1601).
The University of Helmstädt was founded by Duke Julius
in the year 1576. By statute, the zealous cultivation of the
Aristotelian philosophy, as the *' philosophia vera et antiqua,"
was required, and the theological Faculty had at the outset
completely the preponderance. It was strictly devoted to the
Lutheran school, and Daniel Hofmann (1538-1611) ^ was the
ruling spirit in it. Belonging at first to the philosophical
Faculty, he had zealously lectured on the Aristotelian ethics
and dialectics, but at the same time had opposed Piscator and
Goclenius for their unjustified intermixing of philosophy with
the mysteries of faith. With the accession of Duke Henry
Julius to the government in 1589, an entirely different
character was impressed upon the University of Helmstädt,
and from that time humanistic and philosophical studies
became predominant J. Caselius (1533-1618), who was
greatly celebrated as a Humanist, was called from Rostock,
and he was followed by his colleague, Cornelius Martini
(1568-1621), who, with peculiar zeal and great success,
cultivated the Aristotelian philosophy of the schools, and
especially logic and metaphysics. Along with them there also
^ The füllest accounts of this Controversy are given by G. Thomasius (De
Controversia Hofinanniana, Erlang. 1844) and £. Schlee (Der Streit des Daniel
Hofmann über das Yerhältniss der Philosophie zur Theologie, Marburg
1862). Schlee gives the external history of the Controversy, with complete
references to the literature.
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THE DANIEL HOFMAKK OONTBOVERST. 179
laboured at Helmstädt the mathematiciau Duncan liddel,
and Owen Günther, a teacher of the Aristotelian physics and
a Humanist It is possible that these Humanists were not
entirely without a tendency towards the anti-theological arro-
gance of the Italian Humanists, but this is far more strongly
expressed in the reproaches of their theological opponents than
seems to be justified by their writings as we now have them«
It rather appears to be indubitable that Hofmann — to whom
Mylius applied the well-known expression, " his hand is against
every man, and every man's hand is against him " — ^had been
roused to the combat, not only from the fact that the human-
istic philosophical spirit had superseded the rigidly theological
spirit in the University, but also from his displeasure at
Caselius superseding himself in the leadership of the academic
body. Only thus can we explain how it was that
Hofmann, in the struggle against the humanistic Aristotelians,
could enter into an alliance with the representatives of
Bamism which had been prohibited at Helmstädt in 1592,
although they were far less in agreement with him on the
controversy in question as to the relation of Philosophy to
Theology than his opponents were.
After fermenting several years, the conflict broke out openly
in February 1598, when Caspar Pfaffrad, a Eamist, graduated
as Doctor of Theolc^ under Hofmann, then Dean of the
Faculty. The two set forth 101 theses,^ in which the errors
of the Scholastics and Arians, as well as of the Calvinists, in
r^ard to the doctrine of God, the Trinity, and the person of
Christ were derived from the intermixture of Philosophy with
Theology. The most important of these theses ran thus:
" Those who claim for Philosophy a right to the glorious grace
of God, detract from that grace, and commit the sin against
the Holy Ghost by not distinguishing between what is sacred
and what is profane. But we admit that he who divests
Philosophy of all approbation, in so far as it conducts itself in
^ Propofiitiones de Deo et Christi tum persona tum officiis, asserentes
pnriorem confessionem Dr. Lutheri, feces scholasticas expurgantis, oppositfe
FoQtificiis et omnibus cftaponantibus Terbum Dei, Helmstädt 1598.
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180 CULTIVATION OF PHILOSOPHY BEFORE DESCAKTES.
a right way and keeps within its own limits, and who simply
rejects the use of it, insidiously attacks an ornament of the
human race, a prerogative of human life and a beneficent gift of
the Creator and Preserver of the world." Again, " Philosophy,
which is worthy otherwise of all praise, is a robber in matters
of Eeligion, as is clearly proved by the opposition between the
elements of the world and the elements of Christ." It is
accordingly maintained that the assertion made by Luther against
the Sorbonne, that the same thing is not true in theology and
philosophy, is well founded both in religion and in science.
We should therefore leave dialectics and philosophy to their
own sphere, and in the kingdom of faith, which lies above
every sphere, we should learn to speak in new tongues,
otherwise we shall put the new wine into old bottles, so that
both will be spoiled. A whole series of examples is then
adduced to prove that the Scholastics were brought by their
philosophy to their errors regarding the knowledge of God, and
that we ought to be carefully on our guard against Philosophy
in matters of faith.
Hofmann wrote a preface to these Theses, for which he is
alone responsible. He asserts that if any one reviews the
history of the Church from the beginning till that time, he
will observe that, next to the devil, it has never had a moye
violent enemy than reason and carnal wisdom, and that they
claim supremacy in the doctrines of faith, so that their
violence even exceeds the inhumanity of carnal tyrants, since
they torture souls in the most violent manner, and draw them
away most forcibly from the true knowledge of God. The
more that human reason is cultivated by philosophical studies,
it marches forward the more completely armed ; and the more
it loves itself, so much the more violently does it assail
theology, and so much the more blinding are the errors which
it invents. Wherever we look in Christendom, a wretched con-
dition appears, because many theologians reduce the sublime
Articles of Faith to carnal wisdom, and accustom young men
to empty discussions. Hence Pfaffrad would bring the exces-
sive meddling {'n'o\vTrpayfioavvrf).o{ human reason in matters
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THE DANIEL HOFMANN* CONTROVERSY. 181
of faith to an end by refuting the Jesuits and Calvinists with
all their arts, while the Ubiquitists, who have drawn from the
same cistern of reason, are passed over in the meantime.
When Hofmann was called to account by the Consistory of
the University on the accusation of the Philosophical Faculty,
he expressly repudiated the explanation that he had not spoken
" de usu," but " de abusu philosophise," though he afterwards
went back to it. In a series of disputations and dissertations,
the controversy was carried on with unworthy invectives, and
it was confused, moreover, by the main conceptions — such as
faith, reason, and others — being used by the disputants in dif-
ferent senses. At the same time the controversy was diverted
from the main question regarding the right of philosophy in
theology to other related questions regarding the natural know-
ledge of God and the double truth. At last, Hofmann was
accused by the philosophers of having made philosophy con-
temptible and of having injured them personally, and, after a
long investigation, he was deposed from his ofl&ce in 1601, to
which, however, he was again recalled in 1604. Along with
Hofmann, there come forward only two literary representatives
of his view, not taking into account the unimportant elabora-
tions of it by soipe of his own pupils. One of these two
literary representatives was Joh. Olearius, Hofmann's son-in-
law and colleague, but afterwards Superintendent at Halle,
who, in 1599, addressed an Apology to the Duke accom-
panied with a JXsputatio theologica de phüosophice pio tim
mvltiplieique dbtisu ä sylagogia (Halle 1601). The other
was Gottfr. Schlüter, Superintendent at Göttingen, who, with
the addition of abundant material, gave an exposition of the
controversy favourable to Hofmann, in his Explicatio certaminis
quod de philosophiaB in regno et mysteriis fidei actione et usu
deque veritate duplici humana et spiritualia adjectatur (1601)-
On the side of Hofmann's opponents, besides those already
named, we may further mention Alber Grauer, General Super-
intendent in Weimar, who sought, in a Libellus de unica veritate
(1611), to defend philosophy against the objection of being
Socinian and Calvinistic.
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182 CULTIVATION OF PHILOSOPHY BEFOBE DESCARTES.
If we inquire into the impelling motives of this Controversy,
it might be at first naturally supposed that the philosophers had
claimed too much for themselves, and had thereby roused the
theologians to oppose them. This supposition, however, is
found to be erroneous, for the philosophers of Helmstädt do not
contest even the supra-rationality of theology, and they demand
for philosophy only the modest position of an organic and
materially preparative auxiliary. Owen Günther goes the
farthest. In a Programme of 11th March 1599, he puts forth
the following thoughts : (rod, as the highest good, wished to
communicate Himself by a rich outflow of His goodness to the
world. He put man into the middle of it as His own image in
order to dwell in him, and thereby to make him blessed. In
consequence of the fall, and as a punishment, our spirit has
been smitten with blindness and ignorance of the Creator and
His works. Our will has also been made subject to lusts
and to unrighteousness, yet God left us at least a trace of His
former glory. We know that there is a God who is the just
rewarder of the good and the bad. The will can also follow
reason and choose the good instead of the bad. The Scriptures
call the good the law of Nature, which is often overcome by the
law of the flesh to unrighteousness. Both the will and the
reason have become blunted and weak in the fulfilment of
their function, and in order to arouse them the Creator has
bestowed philosophy on man, which, being derived from the
treasury of the divine Spirit, expels our dark ignorance and
adjusts the obstinate conflict that is waged between good and
evil. The contemplation of the universe has this effect, as it
leads us necessarily to an indubitable conviction. From the
discharge of this task arises the dignity of philosophy and the
wrong of those who would exclude it from the Church, which
is a real atev0&v ßrjai^, not merely ignorance, but raving
madness. — He expresses himself much more modestly in his
treatise entitled Theologice et PhüosophUz mtUiui amicüia
ostensa (Magdeburg 1600). Philosophy and Theology, he
says, spring both from God ; the former rests entirely upon
innate principles of Nature, and is partly theoretical and partly
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THE DANIEL HOFMANN CONTROVERSY. 183
practicaL Theology is partly mystical and is entirely revealed ;
it transcends all the conceptions of men and angels, and it
is partly in agreement with reason« In this latter respect
Philosophy and Theology agree with one another, both as
theoretical and as practical knowledge. Philosophy gives
proo£3, whereas Theology demands a believing assent to its
assertions. Bat even in this relation Theology is always the
determining standard according to the words of the Psalm,
" Thy word is a light to my feet" If Philosophy turns aside
from this mle, she becomes a deceiver, and does not deserve
the hononrable name of Philosophy, as in doing so she is not
merely opposed to Theology, but to herselfl For the true
Philosophy recognises Theology as her queen and mistress,
and subordinates herself to Theology as a servant The
mystical Theology, however, goes beyond our reason, and
hence a Philosophy that is conscious of her proper limits will
never come into contradiction with it.
This is also the opinion of the other philosophers. They
all hold that Philosophy and Theology both spring from God,
and that the two are therefore in harmony with each other.
Patting a contradiction between them is the same as putting
a contradiction in God. This position is specially maintained
by LiddeL It follows that there is only one truth. Of the
objects of theology, there are some that we are able to know,
for the natural knowledge of God is also true (Rom. i. 19,
ii. 25). Other positions of theology — as the Trinity, the Incar-
nation, and such like — ^rest solely upon revelation, and cannot
be cognized by reason. The doctrines of the first rank can be
accepted merely from revelation, without the application of
rational principles ; in other words, they can only be believed.
Com. Martini uses for this distinction the expressions, "arti-
cnli pun aut mixti fidei, revelationis aut cognitionis," from
which was formed the later dogmatic expression, ''articuli
pun et mixtl" Philosophy has therefore a preparative relation
to theology, materialiter, and its logical laws are also applicable
to revealed theology, formaliter. For in theology two members
of a contradictory opposition cannot be true at the same time*
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184 CULTIVATION OF PHILOSOPHY BEFORE DESCARTES.
The existence of such an opposition is shown by logic, but it
does not decide which member is true and which is untrue.
Turning to the view of Hofmann, we find it particularly
stated in the Theses mentioned above, in the Notce to Gunther*s
Programme, and in the treatises entitled De duplid veritate and
Num Syllogismus rationis locum hahecU in regno ßdei. Hi«
view rests on the ecclesiastical doctrine of origincd sin. The
philosophers reckoned reason as an inalienable part of the
divine image, or at least they regarded its obscuration as of so
little importance that they held it could be counteracted by
philosophy. But Hofmann refers the corruption of the fallen
nature to the faculty of knowledge also, and in the manner of
Flacius he carries his view up to the assertion that we have
not retained a trace of our former glory, but our mind and
will now bear the image of the deviL Hence Hofmann is
led on in some places to assert that philosophy is, even in the
purely secular sphere, a work of the flesh, is hostile to God, is
full of error, and is decidedly to be rejected. These, however,
were exaggerations that were afterwards retracted. On calmer
consideration, Hofmann admits that there is a true philosophy
in the secular sphere.
This Philosophy assumes the most direct antagonism to
Theology; instead of being a positive preparation, it is a
decided enemy of the Christian Faith. " Because the reason
of man is the chief enemy of God, the more prudent it is iu
its natural kind, the more refractory a beast it is, and the
more does it set itself against the wisdom of God, which it
regards as folly." — Hence is explained Hofmann's attitude
towards the natural knowledge of God. He was inclined to
deny it entirely. The passage in Jas. ii. 19 is explained as
ironical, and even Eom. i 19 and ii. 15 are so rendered that
all true natural knowledge of God is called in question. But
Hofmann had expressed himself otherwise in the Theses " De
notitiis innatis" (1593), and he had finally to admit a natural
knowledge of God. But the objective truth of that knowledge
is always designated as only falsa Veritas, and it is asserted
that " what is true in philosophy is all false in theology," " that
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THE DANIEL HOFMANN CONTEOVERSr. 183
if phflosophy teaches there is a God, and that Ho is good, just,
etc., this is a lie in theology," and that " if the unregenerate
says there is a God, etc., he lies." This position becomes
clear from the difference in the views held regarding the rela-
tion of belief to knowledge. According to Martini, belief is
necessarily given along with knowledge; according to Hof-
mann, the heathen have a knowledge that there is a God, but
not a belief accompanying that knowledge. Now the philoso-
phers understand by truth the objective agreement of know-
ledge with the object known, wheteas Hof mann understands by
it the subjective certainty which rests, not upon knowledge,
but upon the belief effected by the Holy Spirit But this
difference does not come clearly into the consciousness of the
disputants, and so the controversy moves obscurely and con-
fusedly around the duplex Veritas. Although Hofmann does
not therefore deny the natural knowledge of God, he reckons
all the propositions of theology as belonging to the mysteries
of faith ; he therefore decidedly rejects the distinction between
the artictUi puri and articidi mixti, and speaks of truth only
where these are grasped in faith, and therefore by the power
of the Holy Spirit Olearius expresses himself in like manner.
He admits that the heathen may indeed know God from
nature, yet reason is so corrupt that it regards the surest and
truest doctrines concerning God's nature and will, the immor-
tality of the soul, and such like, as lies, and so designates
them.
This distinction of the subjective conviction, had it been
clearly presented to the philosophers, would as little have
been repudiated by them as the distinction of the source of
knowledge. Philosophy rests upon natural reason ; theology
upon supernatural revelation. Now, in so far as the latter
stands higher than the former, there are propositions, such as
that the Word became flesh, which are absurd in philosophy,
and yet are entirely true in theology. Philosophers may thus
also speak so far of a " double truth," and emphatically repu-
diate a philosophical criticism of the mysteries of faith.
Hofmann, on the supposition that a hostile invasion of the
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186 CULTIVATION OF PHILOSOPHY BEFOBE DESCARTES.
sphere of theology by philosophy was to be regarded as
inevitable, carries the unimportant opposition between them
farther than was necessary. The Aristotelian philosophy, on
the basis of its principle ex nihiio nihil fieriy teaches the
eternity of the world, but theology teaches the opposite ; and
therefore of the two contradictory opposites, the one is philo-
sophically true and the other is theologically true, giving a
duplex Veritas de una. Generally the philosophical axioms
lay claim to universal validity ; but in theology they are not
valid Olearius carries the thought farther. He holds that
such propositions as that " nothing comes from nothing," that
" Matter, Form, and Privation are the principles of all things,"
that " the whole is greater than the parts," that " the sun
cannot stand still," and others, are propositions which philo-
sophy sets up as universally valid, but which are not valid in
theology. He enters even closer into the main point when
he says that philosophy mixes up God, nature, the human
mind, and fate with one another, or even identifies them ;
that by its learning it excites doubts as to the divine truth,
explains away the doings of God for the salvation of men as
fables, and by the rules of dialectic and rhetoric perverts the
simple truth of the Scriptures ; that in the schools the heathen
authors are read instead of the Bible, and so on.
Further, according to the philosophers, revealed theology is
above reason, but not contrary to reason. By holding fast this
distinction, they also demanded the application of logic even
to the mysteries of faith, in so far at least as it might point
out any contradictions. Hofmann rejects this position also.
In the thesis of 1598, he had desiderated "novae linguae"
for theology, and he afterwards combated still more emphati-
cally the study of metaphysics as being favourable to the
Sacramentarians, and of no use in Science. He also rejected
the theological use of philosophical formulae. He says that
the Apostles on the day of Pentecost did not receive instruc-
tion in philosophy, that philosophical technicalities and
" termini Scholastici " have been, at all times, only causes
of theological controversies, and that to compel theology to
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THE DANIEL HOFMANN CONTEOVERSY. 187
male use of the language of the schools of philosophy was an
" intolerabile et impinm onus." These expressions, however,
were in part due only to the heat of the controversy, and
Hofmann has again at times expressed himself as entirely
agreeing with his opponents, that theology as a science cannot
dispense with syllogistic form. This holds particularly with
regard to the preaching of the divine word; for Hofmann
maintains, against the Enthusiasts, the view of the Formula
Consensus, that the external word is the means of conversion
by God's ordinance. But he does not mean thereby a rational
proving of the doctrines. As in the work of conversion,
human reason holds an entirely positive relation, the act of
conversion forms a transition from the Syllogismus rationis to
the Syllogismus fidei. The former is applicable only to those
contents of Scripture which are subjected to reason in an
external service of the letter and in the refutation of heretics ;
but applied to the sphere of faith it leads to Pelagianism and
Synergism. The " Syllogismus fidei " obtains its certainty
from the light of Christ, to which it is subordinated in obedi*
ence, but it is not more exactly described. The whole dis-
tinction, like the earlier one of the double truth of knowledge
and belief, is founded upon the obscure idea that the religious
certainty of faith, even when referring to the same object, is
of an entirely different kind from the intellectual certainty of
knowledge. This is a sort of intuitive apprehension which
vainly strives in Hofmann and his adherents to find clear
expression.
The controversy went on even after Hofmann's death,
although upon another stage and under a different character.
The adherents of Hofmann leave Helmstädt, but gather again
in Magdeburg. Wenceslaus Schilling (f 1637), private lec-
turer of the theological Faculty at Helmstädt, was excluded
from the University on account of "his hostile disposition
against the good arts (bonas artes) and philosophy." The
jurist and philosopher, Joh. Angelius von Werdenhagen
(1581-1652), who had been professor of the Aristotelian
Ethics at Helmstädt from 1616, was deposed from his office
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188 CULTIVATION OF PHILOSOPHY BKFORB DESCARTES.
in 1618 on account of his violent attacks upon the indif-
ferentiam of the Humanists and the empty formalism of the
theologiana Jacob Martini at Wittenberg wrote against them
his ** Mirror of Season (Vernunftspiegel), that is, a fundamental
and irresistible statement as to what reason along with its
perfection (called philosophy) is, how far it extends, and
especially of what use it is in matters of Religion " (Witten-
berg 1618). Paul Slevogt, a philosopher and poet, corrector
at Brunswick, may also be mentioned in this connection.
The peculiar character of this last phase of the controversy
comes out in the fact that the followers of Hofmann were
not, like himself, representatives of the great Lutheran ortho-
doxy, but turned to a peculiar mystical direction. In his
JEcclesias metaphysicce visüaiio, etc. (Magdeburg 1619), and his
De notüiis ncUuralibvs aucdncta conHdercUio (Magdebuig 1616),
Schilling goes beyond Hofmann, in so far as he rejects all
natural knowledge of God. He holds that God is much too
lofty to be known by the human understanding, that there is
no innate knowledge, and that the most that can be inferred
from Nature is that there is a God. The metaphysical defini-
tion of God as the Sns of whom it can only be said that it is
** negatio nihili," does not reach the full knowledge of God.
Nay more, the arguments for the existence of God, the phy-
sical and the moral as well as the metaphysical, are untenable
when submitted to criticism. Calvinism, Socinianism, and
Arianism are the consequences of undertaking to establish the
divine mysteries by metaphysical speculations. A special con-
troversy was carried on between Schilling and Jacob Martini
as to whether the immortality of the soul can be proved
on philosophical grounds, and it was the subject of a series
of somewhat uncourteous controversial treatises. In his
" Invincible Booklet of Principles " (UnUbenoindliches Grund-
hiichlein, Magdeburg 1617) he desiderates a simpler explana-
tion of Scripture, such as will leave aside " dialectical figures
and modes " as a roundabout babble of words, and will not
waste itself in mere logomachy.
Mysticism takes a still more decided form in Werden-
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THB DANIEL HOFMANN CONTROVERSY. 189
hagen. Eight of his Academic discourses, which he delivered
when a Professor at Helmstädt, are collected in his Vents
Christianismus fundamenta rdigionis continens (Magdeburg
1618). The scholastic theologians are opposed in the most
violent manner as " ratiocinistse." One is a genuine barbarian ;
another draws his termini from the midst of heathenism and
even from stony Arabia, and thus the Word of God is judged
contrary to His commandment, and the faith is desecrated.
Whoever applies Aristotle to theology, perverts the divine
irrefragable truth of the gospel by turning it into arbitrary
phantasies and empty conceits. At most, only the ancient
wisdom of the Egyptians may be applied to the mysteries of
the Scriptures. As the centre and the way of all truth in all
creatures is Christ, sacred things should only be spoken of in
the sacred words of Scripture.
Against these writers, Jacob Martini wrote his " Mirror of
Eeason" (Vemunftspieger) with great display of learning,
breadth of sentiment, and vigorous robustness. Its first part
treats of Reason, and the second part treats of Philosophy.
Natural Eeason, even after the Fall, exists in man, and is
capable of knowing not only natural things, but also that God
is, that He is one, eternal, and omnipotent, although it is
entirely incapable of understanding the mysteries of the
gospel of itself. Hence we ought, as htis been always the
case in the Church, to hold philosophy in high esteem as
the fairest gift of God next to His word, and to employ
its several sciences as much as possible in the service of
theology.
Paul Slevogt, in his Pervigilium de dissidio tkeologi et philo-
sophi in utriusque principiis fundato (1623), investigates, with
objective impartiality and the application of a cumbrous
philosophical formalism, the question as to whether the uni-
versally recognised Aristotelian philosophy and the only true
Lutheran theology agree with each other. He deals with the
subject in connection with four important questions. These
questions are: 1. Whether the immortality of Adam was
natural or supernatural ? 2. Whether faith is the sole cause
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190 CULTIVATION OF PHILOSOPHY BEFORE DESCARTES.
of justification? 3. Whether the individual can be certain
of his salvation ? 4. Whether God is in any way per acddens
the cause of sin ? His answers come to this, that in regard
to all these questions Philosophy must, by its very principles,
stand in contradiction with Theology.
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SECTION FOUETH.
THE OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PK0TE8TANTISM.
DUBING the age of the Beformation there arose certain
views and tendencies, represented by men who were
entirely at one with the Beformers in their decided aversion
to Bomanism, but who were not rec(>gnised as properly belong-
ing to their party or cause. After the two great Protestant
Churches of the Lutheran and the Beformed Confessions had
become consolidated, the separate movements referred to went
on, especially in the Lutheran Church. An opposition thus
took form within the circle of Protestantism, and this relation
points to its having a certain inner affinity with the Protes-
tant principle; but, on the other hand, the fact that it
appeared as an opposition, and was, in several instances, even
driven out of the Church, indicates a certain incompatibility
between its deviations and the historical development of the
Church. It is in this way that these movements have to be
understood. Those of them that belong to the age of the
Beformation itself have been stamped with the twofold
designation of the " Antitrinitarians and Anabaptists " and the
^Ultras of the Beformation." The former designation was
borrowed from a merely external mark, and is often inappli-
cable from the two terms being at times inseparable. Besides,
the ** Anabaptists " had carried on their irregularities for years
before they introduced the baptism of adults. The latter
designation is more applicable and usefuL If it be an
essential characteristic of Protestantism that, whereas Catholi-
cism subjected the individual in his need of salvation under
the external institutions of the Church, the Protestant
principle helped him to his rights by making him dependent
on God without the intervention of the Church, and thus
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192 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
founded salvation on faith alone, no one will doubt that
these movements were essentially Protestant. But the ecclesi-
astical Protestantism did not teach that the right of the indi-
vidual was unlimited. It retained as an inviolable reality
the historical fact of objective redemption by the death of
Christ once for all, the publication of this fact in the super-
natural revelation of God in Scripture, and the external
word and the sacraments, as the instituted means for the
subjective appropriation of salvation. The tendency to over-
throw these objective elements likewise, and to procure for the
individual unlimited right in belief and action for himself, is
what separates the movements of these " Ultras" from the Church.
Now, if everything in Eeligion is made to rest upon the
subjectivity of the individual, the question then arises as to
which side of it is to have special authority. Eeligion
may be put essentially on the same level with all manifesta-
tions of the spiritual life, and it will then be reduced to that
faculty which otherwise manifests itself as always the highest,
which is the natural faculty of knowledge or Reason. Or the
characteristic of Religion will be recognised in the fact that
the individual feels himself moved by a higher divine Power,
and sees Religion rooted in immediate divine Revelation.
Thus there arise two tendencies, which are at one in so far as
they are opposed to the objectivity recognised in the Church,
but they differ in that the one falls back upon Reason and
the other upon the immediate inspiration of the internal Word.
Besides these two, history shows us a third form of opposi-
tion, which arose from an exaggeration of the Protestant
principle in the Church itself. In opposition to the Catholic
Salvation by works, Protestantism emphasized the doctrine of
Justification by faith alone. The Lutheran orthodoxy some-
times carried this principle even to the assertion that good
works were prejudicial to salvation, and it thus evacuated the
essence of faith till it became a mere acceptance of the dogmas
of the Church. Against this tendency, the fresh pulsation of
the religious life set up a reaction ; it aimed not merely at
subduing the individual to the obedience of Christ, but at
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THE PXJBELY INTELLECTUAL OPPOSITION. SOCINIANISM. 193
obtaining satisfaction for the wants of the heart, and at seeing
in life the frnits of the inward transformation of the soul.
Thus there arose three different forms of opposition to the
Protestant Church. One was purely intellectual ; another
was mystical or spiritualistic and theosophical ; and the third
was religious and practical. The first culminated in Socinian-
ism ; the second in Jacob Böhme ; and the third in Pietism.
The Purely Intellectual Opposition. Socdoanism.
In the sixteenth century, Italy was the country in which
the most animated spiritual life prevailed. Humanistic studies
flourished there as nowhere else, and even led some to make
a sort of a cult of pagan antiquity ; and this caused a great
portion of the most educated circles to turn away with proud
contempt from the corrupt Christianity of the Catholic
Church. The first efforts of independent speculation set them-
selves up against all authority, and opened prospects to the
inquiring spirit undreamed of before. But it was just in this
the land of her secular dominion that the Church had long
been using her inviolable authority. It is no wonder, then,
that the earliest attempts at ecclesiastical reform appeared
in Italy, and that all the movements in the way of refor-
mation elsewhere were followed here with interest and in-
telligenca At Naples, Eome, Venice, and indeed almost
everywhere, smaller or larger societies were formed that
cultivated the new ideas in private and turned themselves
away from the ancient ChurcL Nor need we be surprised to
find that just here, where the intellectual culture had risen so
high and was stirred by so many impulses, the ideas of
religious reform also assumed a peculiar character. In
particular, the principle of Subjectivity was here more strongly
emphasized, and the right of intellectual criticism was desi-
derated in higher measure, than elsewhere. It is well known,
however, that the Eoman Church succeeded in suppressing
vol. l
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194 QtPPOSITIONAL MOVBMENTS WITHIN PBOTSSTANTISlt
the Befonnatioii in Italy by the terrors of the Inquisition,
till bot few traces of it remainecL Italy has thus taken part
in the history of Prc^iestantism. only through a succession
of men who had to leave their home on account of their Faith.
The number of these Italian refugees was very considerable.
In many parts of Switzerland, in Zürich, Geneva, and other
pUces, and even in Nürnberg and other Qerman cities, we
find independent Italian congregations. To these congrega-
tions came the men we have referred to, usually as their
preachers ; and they represent the purely intellectual opposi-
tion to the ecclesiastical doctrine of Protestantism. The
Canton of the Orisons, on account of its great political and
ecclesiastical liberty, as well as from its proximity, became
the principal refuge and resort of the Italians when they
were persecuted because of thdr faith. Here, along with
other quiet associates, worked Bartolomeo Maturo (tl547),
who was fond of plunging into thedogical subtilties and
of propoMug useless questions to the Synod. Among the
others was Camillo Benato, who taught that in the Sacra-
ments God does not op^ute anything in man, but that they
only represent what He has already worked in him. The
Lord's Supper is a mere commemoration of the death of
Christ, without any enjoyment of His body and blood ; and
Baptism is a testimony given by the individual of his faith,
and a mark distinguiahing the Christian from the non-Christian.
Bedemption does not rest on the vicariously atoning sufferings
of the death of Christ, but is realized within the individual
by the inworiking of the Holy Spirit, which is represented as a
sudden illumination by the higher light of reason, and as a
transformation of the whole nature. The r^nerate man is
free from the positive Law, and he alone will rise again. —
Pierpaolo Yergerio appears to have maintained a marked in-
differentism in dogmatic things, and he was at the same time
of a meddlesome disposition and of boundless scepticism.
Geneva had likewise an Italian congregation, in the midst
of which arose frequent doubts and discussions regarding the
Trinity, the deity of Christ, and other mysteries of faith. In
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THE PURELY IKTSLLEOTITAL OPPOBITION. SOCIKUKISM. 195
consequence, its membeis put the patience of Calvin to a
serere trial by their sceptical questions and their hoTetical
views. Matteo Gribaldo came to Greneva every year. He
had been a jurist in Padua. After his expulsion from that
city he bad, in 1555, become a Professor of theology at
Tübingen» and thereafter he settled on his estate at Fai^ges on
the Lake of Geneva. With regard to the Trinity, he admitted
that it was eontoaiy to aU ooneeivability that one couM be
three, and three one* He could only think of the subject in
this way : that the Jather and the Son were two substantial
things^ the one a generating Gh>d, the other a generated God ;
the one sending, the other sent ; the Father carporeus, the Son
oarporaltii ; the former bdng in Scripture mostly called God,
the latter mosüy called Lord. There were, therefore, two
Gods^ of whom the one proceeded from the other. But in so
£ar as Father and Son were the same Deity and a single
divine Essence, it could ako be said that they were both God
and both one. He explained the Christological doctrine in his
own way by teaching that as soul and body were united in
every man, so the divine and the human were united in
Christ Gior^o Blandrata (1515-1585), a native of Saluzzo,
afterwards employed as a physician in the courts of Poland
and Siebenbürgen, and then in Geneva, plied Calvin with his
sceptical quistions. He would ask whether the name of God,
when used without any further qualification, did not refer to
the Father alone ? Whether we invoke the true God when
we pray to the Father, as the Father is only a person whereas
the true Grod is the Trinity ? Whether the Father is invoked
in the name of the Son in so far as the latter is God or is
man ? What the expression " person " properly means, and
whether one cannot quietly believe in a God the Father, a
Lord Christ, and a Holy Spirit, without entering upon specula-
tions regarding essence and substance of which, indeed, the
Scripture says nothing? Gianpaolo Alciati of Piemont, in
1557, asserted that Christ was, even in his deity, less than the
Father ; that the whole Christ died ; and that the distinction
of two natures, or of a double Christ, was not founded on
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196 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PEOTESTANTISM.
Scripture, and was therefore to be rejected. Valentin Gentile
was also led to subtle opinions by attempting to comprehend
the mystery of the Trinity. If the Father were an
individuum in the substance, then we should have not a triad
but a tesserad. But the Father was rather the one substance»
and the Son the brightness of His glory ; both were true God,
yet not two Gods, but one and the same God.
Bernardino Occhino (1487-1564) was one of the most
distinguished Italian refugees. Bom at Siena, he was won
over to the new ideas through his intercourse with Jean
Valdez at Kaples. Having become General of the order of
the Capucines and a distinguished preacher, he aroused the
suspicion of the Inquisition by his insisting upon inward
simple biblical piety, until a summons to Bome to answer the
accusations against him drove him in flight to Geneva in
1542. After having spent a short time as a preacher in
Nürnberg and London, and then again in Geneva, he became
in 1554 preacher to the Italian congregation at Zürich.
He published Thirty Dialogues, of which the Twenty-first
treats of polygamy ; and, while it designates monogamy as the
only moral form of marriage, it yet shows that neither in the
Old or New Testament, nor in the decrees of the Fathers and
Councils of the Church, is there found an express prohibition
of polygamy, and therefore any one on whom God has not
bestowed the gift of continency may live in polygamy without
sin. This Dialogue excited such repugnance that, although
now an old man in his seventy-seventh year, he was driven
out of Zürich. Occhino in his Labyrinth raised certain
intellectual objections to the fundamental doctrine of the
Beformed Church as to the human will not being free.
Whoever asserts the freedom of the will, he says, comes upon
four insoluble difficulties; but he also who denies it gets
involved in a fourfold Labyrinth. The result is that human
freedom must be recognised as an indemonstrable postulate of
the practical reason, and its want of freedom as a postulate of
the religious consciousness. Occhino, renouncing the hope of
a satisfactory solution of the problem, gives the practical rule
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THE PÜBKLY INTELLECTUAL OPPOSITION. 80CINIANISM. 197
that we are to strive with all our power after the good as if
we were free ; and, on the other hand, that we are to give
honour alone to God as if we were not free. In his Dialogues
Occhino discusses the most important points of the Christian
doctrine, so that the doctrines of the Church are everywhere
defended against the objections of an opponent But these
objections are so dexterous and acute, and the refutation of
them is so feeble, that doubts may be honestly entertained as
-to the side on which the author's own inmost conviction
stands. The particularity of Grace is refuted ; Original Sin is
denied, because natural desire is not a sin ; the theory of
Satisfoction is assailed on the ground that Christ could not
give satisfaction to God either as man or as Grod, or as God-
man. To the question, how are our sins forgiven for Christ's
sake, the opponent answers : not in such a way that Christ
has changed God's eternal purpose to punish sin, for €rod is
unchangeable ; nor in such a way that He has brought them
into forgetf ulness with God, for God forgets nothing ; nor in
jBuch a way that He has appeased (Jod's wrath, for wrath
cannot move God ; and so on.
The last who may be mentioned in this series is Lelio
Sozini or Socinus (1525-1562). Bom at Siena of a noble
family, which was equally di^inguished by its ancient nobility
and for a succession of learned jurists who belonged to it,
Socinus was led by an innate speculative tendency to
theological studies. It seems to him that the whole subject
of jurisprudence would float without foundation in the air if
it did not rest upon a positive divine basis ; and this basis
could only be given in the Bible : hence his study of Scrip-
ture. A formally juridical conception of the religious relation
and an unlimited scepticism, are the two characteristics of the /
thoughts which Lelius Socinus gave rise to regarding almost all !
the parts of the ecclesiastical system of doctrine, and which"*
were to obtain such importance through the instrumentality of
his nephew Faustus. Lelius, who after 1547 resided mostly
in Geneva and latterly in Zürich, limited himself, probably
from a prudent cautiousness, to putting before Calvin, Bullinger,
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1 98 OPPOSmOKAL MOVEBOENTS WTTHIN PBOTESTAHTISM.
and Gualther ail kinds of snbtle questions r^ardmg the most
di£Eloiilt proUems of the faith. Thos he would ask whedier
the resuirection of the body can be prored on rational
groHnds ? He said that it rather appeared to be physically
impossible on acooant of the many transformations which
matter undergoes, and on account of the change of material to
which we are subjected ; further, that it was to no purpose, as
our salTation does not consist in corporeal tilings. Again, he
proposed such questions as the following: Whether a con-
fession of äie Messiahship of Jesus was necessary to salvation ?
What was the -nature and origin of repentance ? Whether it
was not a contradiction that our justification should be from
mere free graee and yet be purchased by Christ ? Wh^;faer
the sacraments weie not mere signs through which we confess
and thankfully remember that God has already bestowed upon
us salvation and life? On account of many accusations
raised against him, Lelius was compelled, in 1555, to
formulate a confession of his faith, and from that time he
regarded it as judicious to entrust his doubts only to his paper.
Thus it was that his literary remains became the chief means
of forming the views of his nephew Faustos.
In Switserland, men with such ideas did not find a
permanent location. Calvin y(as especially zealous in his
efforts to purge the Church of such errors ; nor did he shrink
from adopting forcible measures. Most of the fugitives, like
Qnbaldo, Gentile, Blandrata, and Stancaro, sought a refuge
in Poland. Here, in consequence of the peculicur political
relations, the greatest religious liberty prevailed. Hence it
was that all the oppositional elements of that period of
ferment gathered themselves together there. Already at the
Synod of Secemin in 1556, Conyza of Podlachium, who had
be^i educated in Wittenberg and in Switzerland, had openly
declared Üiat the Father alone was true God and greater than
the Son, and that the Trinity of persons, the consubstantiality,
and the communicatio idiomatum, were to be rejected as mere
inventions of the human understanding. In this chaos of
ideas the most diverse views met, and it was the natural soil
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THE PÖBELT INTELLECTUAL OPPOSITIOK. SOGINIANIStf. 199
for subtle assertions like that of Stancaro in 1654, that Christ
was our mediator only in His human nature. Statorius
asserted, in 1555, that the prayer "Yeni, Oeator Spiritus"
was idolatrous, because, in the whole of Scripture, no trace
was to be found of the divine personality of the Holy Spirit,
nor of His adoration and invocation. And finally, Davidis, in
1 5 78, declared that worship is not due to Christ as a mere man.
Faustus Socinus (1539-1604) was called into this chaos
in 1578, BXid his vigorous personality succeeded in bringing
some. clearness and order into the ferment of these confused
and unsettled conditions. He aeparated out all the fanatical
Anabaptists, and gathered the rest into a compact community ;
and upon this community Faustus Socinus impressed the
spirit which he himself had assimilated from the writings of
his unde.
The Sodndaai System of Doctrime^ is interesting in the
highest d^ree as an essentially con^stent representation of
Christianity on the basis of an externally juridical conception
of the religious relaticm, and of an unlimited application of
intellectual criticism, notwithstanding its external recognition
of supernatural revelation. The supranatural diaracter of
Socinianism is shown by the fact that it does not recognise a
universal or natural religion ; nor does it speak of a relation
between God and man as founded in the nature of both. The
older Socinianism even denies all natural knowledge of God.
There is no innate knowledge of God, otherwise there could be
no people found without some notion of God. Nor can we
derive the knowledge of Qod from nature, as even Aristotle
was not able to recognise the working of God in individual
things. It is true, indeed, that Joh. Crell (1590-1631)
' As Socinianism does not recognise authoritative Confessions, — even the
CtUeehittmue B<jicovt$ui$ enjoying no symbolical authority. — its doctrinal system
most be gathered from the numerous writingi of its chief representatives. The
most important of these writings have been collected in the BibliotJieca Fralrvm
PoUmormm^ Irenop. 1656, 8 vols. Reference may also be made to the following
works: — C. Ostorodt, Unterricht von den Hauptpunkten der Christlichen
Religion, Rakau 1604. Andreas Wissowatius, Religio rationalis s. de rationis
Judicio.in controversus, etc, Amsterd. 1685. Fock, Der Socinianismus, Kiel
1847
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200 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PKOTESTANTLSM.
afterwards brought forward another view, which sees in revela-
tion only a furthering and completing of what man can know
by his own powers. The contemplation of nature and of the
human world leads us necessarily, according to this view, to
accept a God; and we receive in our own conscience the
commandments the fulfilment of which is required by God.
But, on the other hand, Wissowatius expressly repudiates the
objection that the Socinians derived religion from reason and
made reason the judge of religion ; and he holds that from
natural principles and from human reason only the natural
theology and religion of the so-called Deists can be obtained,
but not the Christian religion. The genuine Socinianism
decidedly desiderates a divine revelation. This revelation is
not regarded as some sort of internal working of the divine
spirit upon man, but as a purely external communication of
truths of a practical and theoretical nature. Such com-
munication of revealed truth took place sporadically in the
first period of the religious development of the human race,
which was the time from Adam to Abraham ; in the second
period, which extended from Abraham to Christ, Moses was
the medium of revelation ; and in the third period, Christ was
the communicator of religious truth. But as Moses was only
qualified for the communication of divine revelation by the
intercourse that he had on Mount Sinai for forty days face to
. face with God, so Christ was qualified for this office by the
the so-called raptus in ccdum ; that is, shortly before the
beginning of his public activity Christ was raised in a
miraculous way to heaven in order to receive instruction from
God in His own petson in the truths of Christianity.
This revelation is contained in the sacred Scriptures, and
particularly in the New Testament. Schlichting even sets
forth the claim that " nos ipsi apostolicae et primaevse veritati
in omnibus insistere volumus ; " and the sacred writers were
held to have written " ab ipso divino Spiritu impulsi eoque
dictante." Hence it followed that the Scriptures were held
to be completely free from error, although this was strictly
maintained only in respect of the things that are essential to
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THE PüßELY INTELLECTUAL OPPOSITION. SOCINIANISM. 201
salvation. Ko criterion is set up for distinguishing between the
essential and the non-essentiaL Whereas the older Socinianism
made a very limited use of this distinction, the later Socinian-
ism adopted it in order to set aside many inconvenient testi-
monies in Scripture. As regards interpretation, Socinianism
sets up the principles of a grammatical and historical exegesis
which only obtained i*ecognition long afterwards ; but in its
own individual applications of them in detail it proceeded in
the most arbitrary way. The sacred Scripture, as divine
revelation, is therefore the supreme unquestionable rule in
matters of religion. Every law, however, requires interpreta-
tion and application to individual cases. The Catholics regard
the infallible office of the Church in teaching as the means of
doing this, and other Christians take other views. "The
Enthusiasts " find this means in the immediate inspiration of
the Holy Spirit in the inner word ; and others, who are called
by their opponents " Unitarians " or " Socinians," find it in the
sound reason (sana ratio). The epithet " sound " being here
applied to reason, in contrast to that reason which is darkened
by prejudice and error, and in distinction from any particular
philosophical system. Keason is therefore regarded as the
organ by which man receives, knows, comprehends, and judges
the divine revelation. For this use of the term Beason,
Wissowatius brings forward a series of arguments. He holds
that faith is assent (aasensus seu perstumo); and hence he
desiderates intelligence and rational insight. Again, he says
that the object of theology is truth, and it has therefore to be
known ; but without Eeason, to try to know the truth would
be the same as trying to see without eyes. Further, he alleges
that faith in the Scripture rests upon rational knowledge, or
upon the conviction that everything that God speaks is true,
that the Scripture itself demands this faith, and that any one
who rejects it always returns in practice to it again, etc.
With all this, however, Eeason is not allowed an uncondi-
tional right of criticism in respect of religious truths. On
the contrary, it is always emphatically maintained by the
Socinians that religion is above reason, because it is revealed
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202 OPl*OSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITUIN PROTESTANTISM.
by God. Certainly religion is not contrary to reason, for
reason cannot be overthrown by revelation. A distinction
between what is above reason and what is contrary to reason
is attempted, by holding that it is entirely different to say
that a thing cannot be conceived, and to conceive that a thing
cannot be. It is evident that this criterion is inadequate ; and
when miracles are characterized as above reason, whereas the
Trinity, the deity of Christ, and such doctrines are regarded
as oorUrary to reason, the principle of this division lies entirely
in something else. In the application of this principle, reason
is regarded as the supreme, indisputable judge of religious
doctrines ; and an unlimited, intellectual rationalism is thus
introduced« Certain universal axioms and common notions
(axianuUa wtiver$alia atque communes notiones) are set up by
reason, as being unconditionally true in relation to religious
doctrines. These are the simple principles of the sound human
understanding, but they are mostly directed against some
particular dogmatic conception. Such conceptions are referred
to, as that three times one are three and not one ; that the
whole is greater than its parts ; that a person who is from
another is not the supreme God ; and that a just one does not
punish a guiltless person in place of the guilty. In exegesis
the principle is also maintained that what is utterly contrary
to reason, cannot possibly stand in tJie Scriptures«
From this position Socinianism applied a criticism to the
profoundest Christian dogmas, and the formally logical acuteness
of it cannot be denied, however much its want of deeper
insight may repel us. Almost all that has been presented
with reference to Christianity in this connection, even to the
present day, may be found already contained in the writings
of Faustus Socinus. 1. The Trinity is contrary to Scripture.
Such an important dogma ought to have been quite clearly
and unambiguously expressed ia the Scriptures, instead of
which it is not found either directly or indirectly. This
doctrine is also contrary to reason. Three persons in one
substance are impossible ; there is either one substance, and
therefore one God, or three persons, and therefore three sub-
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THE PÜBELT INTELLECTUAL OPPOSITION. SOCINIANIBM. 203
stances and three Gods. Further, the conceptions of " beget-
ting" and "proceeding" are only applicable to finite things ;
and the wcp^x^p^^ is unthinkable. Nor is there any ground
assigned why there are not more than three persons proceeding
from God. 2. The deity of Christ is entirely contrary to reason.
It is impossible that two completely different substances — the
one of which possesses immortality, is without beginning, and
is unchangeable, while the other is the opposite of all these —
could belong to one person. Each of the two natures is
represented as a person, and the two natures must therefore
necessarily result in two persons. 3. The sharpest criticism
is directed against the doctrine of Satisfaction. This doctrine
of satisfaction is not grounded in the essential nature of God,
for compassion and justice are not attributes of God, but
determinations of His will Further, such satisfaction is not
given to His compassion, because the guilt is not forgiven, but
expiated ; nor to His justice, because it is not the guilty, but
a guiltless one that suffers. Satisfaction is impossible in the
abstract^ as well as in the concrete. It is impossible in
abstracto, because a satisfaction by dbedientia activa and a
satisfaction by dbedientia passiva mutually exclude each other.
If any one has performed everything he ought to do, he is free
from punishment ; and if he suffers punishment, he requires
to perform nothing. Again this holds, because both the pas-
sive obedience and the active obedience are impossible ; passive
obedience cannot be a satisfaction, because punishment as a
personal obligation is not transferable, and because one cannot
suffer death for many ; nor is active obedience a satisfaction,
because every one is already bound per se to fulfil the Law,
and because the obedience of one cannot take the place of that
of many, etc. In like manner, satisfaction is impossible in
coneräo^ and chiefly because we have brought upon us eternal
death, while Christ only underwent bodily death.
This formal and dispassionate intellectuality of the sana
ratio is also impressed on the special doctrines formulated by
Socinianism. It is regarded as vain speculation to examine
into the essential nature of God. We only require to know
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204 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
His will and the attributes that are related to it. The eternity
of God is expressly defined as an eternal duration in which
the natural distinctions of time into past, present, and future
are not annulled. Omnipotence consists in power to be able
to do all that God wills ; omniscience consists in God*s knowing
how to dispose His decrees and works most fittingly, and to
bring them to pass according to their proper end. The justice
of God is the only attribute that is apprehended in a pro-
founder way, as the perfect conformity of the divine action to
the rules that follow from His essential nature. Christ is
mere man ; but He is more than a common man, physically
on account of His birth from a virgin, ethically on account of
His perfect sinlessness, and oflTicially on account of the power
and glory bestowed upon Him after the resurrection as a reward
for His obedience. His office is that of a teacher, who com^
municates and corroborates the divine revelations. His death
also entirely subserves His function as a teacher. The human
will is free to accept or reject salvation by its own choice.
The Socinian conception of Beligion is an external and
juridical one. God is the absolute Lord over us; and on
account of His absolute power, He has the unlimited right to
do with us as His weak creatures what He will. He may
give us laws just as He likes, and put in prospect rewards
and punishments for their fulfilment or transgression. The
essence of BeL'gion lies in the laws and the promises by which
God will induce us to fulfil them. Koah received the moral
commandment that " whosoever sheddeth man's blood, by man
will his blood be shed," as well as ceremonial laws which
partly regulated sacrificial worship and partly forbade the
eating of blood. Abraham promised to keep God's covenant,
and he received the promise of the divine blessing. Moses
brought man a revelation of the divine will in moral, cere-
monial, and juridical laws that deal with details. The
fulfilment of these laws was not exactly impossible, but the
promises of the Jewish religion referred only to the present
life, and they were therefore incapable of sufficiently suppressing
the power of the flesh, so that a perfect fulfilment of the law
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THE PURELY INTELLECTUAL OPPOSITION. SOCINIANISM. 205
might be attained. Hence a new religion was necessary, and
Christianity is this new religion. The Christian religion has
in fact no peculiar character in distinction from Judaism;
Christianity, like every other religion, is a religion of law,
resting upon divine commandments and promises. The com-
mandments of the Christian religion are in part the Mosaic
commandments, with the additions and expansions given to
them by Christ There are certain moral laws which are
I)eculiarly Christian, such as self-derrial, the following of Christ,
trust in God, love to God and our neighbour. Such are also
the ceremonies of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, which have
merely declarative significance as external signs and testi-
monies of what has already inward existence. The special
promise of Christianity, which determines its high value, is
eternal life or endless duration. Man is, in fact, mortal by
nature on account of his creation from earthly matter. Be-
sides, by sin he has brought upon himself eternal death, which
is annihilation. Nevertheless man has a strong fear of death
and a keen longing after an endless duration. It is therefore
to be expected that the prospect of this glorious prize will
lead him to a perfect obedience. But as promises and com-
mands are not grounded essentially in the divine nor in the
human nature, but are given at will by the unlimited sove-
reignty of God, the Christian religion necessai'ily rests upon
revelation. And hence Socinianism declares that '' the Chris-
tian religion is the way revealed by God of attaining to
eternal life."
In Poland and Siebenbürgen, the Socinians formed a flourish-
ing community, and the school of Rakau enjoyed from 1600
a well-founded reputation. Of its important scientific
teachers we may here name only Christoph Ostorodt (t 1611),
JoL Völkel (tie 18), VaL Schmalz (1572-1622), Joh. Crell
(1590-^1631), Jonas Schlichting (1592-1661), Martin
Euarus (1589-1657), Ludwig Wolzogen (tl661), and
Andreas Wissowatius (tl678), the grandson of Faustus
Socinus. The most distinguished theologians of the Lutheran
and Calvinistic Churches wrote against the Socinians, such as
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206 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
Caloyios and Hoornbeck ; and so did some of the most
obscure of their disputants. It was the habit of the time
to undertake a confutation of the Socinian errors, which were
referred to all the possible heresies of the Ancient Church ;
it was at the same time regarded as a difiQcult task, and it
was prosecuted with the greatest bitterness. On this very
account the conflict but too frequently degenerated into un-
savoury wrangling, which became fatal to all scientific treat«
ment of profounder differences.
Socinianism existed for only a short time as a separate
ecclesiastical community. The political relations of Poland
hastened its decline. In 1638, the theological school at
Bakau was closed, and at the " Ck)lloquium charitativum " at
Thorn in 1645, the papal legate declared that be was sent
only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, that is, to the
Lutherans and the Calvinists; and the Socinians were
absolutely excluäed. In 1658, the Diet at Warsaw pro-
hibited the confession of Socinianism and any furtherance of
it, under the penalty of death. There remained no altona-
tive for the Socinians but to return into the bosom of the
Catholic Church, or to emigrate within three years. It was
only in some places that they could find a reception. Socinian
views had indeed been silently spread through wide circles, as
by John Biddle (t 16 62) in England, and by Soner of Altdorf
(tl612) in Germany. Yet the Socinians could only find a
safe refuge in Brandenburg. Here Sam. Crell (tl747) was
Minister of the congregation of Königswald near Frankfurt on
the Oder, and he was one of the last of the Socinian theo-
logians. When his daughters passed over to the Moravians^
the one remaining Socinian congregation at Andreaswald went
over also to the Protestant Church in the beginning of the
present century. — In Holland, the writings of the Socinians
were prohibited in 1599. Ostoixnit and Woidowski were
banished, but considerable numbers of their adherents con*
tinned to maintain their opinions in secret in that country.
They were favoured by the Arminians, not on the ground of
their being dogmatically related to each other, but as Grotius
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THE 8PIBITUALISTIC AND MYSTICAL OPPOSITION, 207
writes of himself, " he was not a man of that kind, that on
acconnt of a difference in opinion, which was not inconsistent
with piety, he would be the enemy of any one, or would reject
any one's friendship." In the end of the Seventeenth Century»
the Socinians in Holland also ceased to form independent
communities. Thehr existence as members of an independent
Church was accordingly but of short duration and of still
shorter prosperity, but so much the more widely did the
decomposing influence of their cold intellectual criticism
extend. And Socinianism thus became one of the most
essential preparations for the later enlightenment of the deisiic
rationalism.
II.-V.
The Spikitualistic and Mystical Opposition.
II.
The Anabaptists. David Joeis. Hans Niclas. Inde-
PENDENTISM« ThE QuAKEBS.
Wherever the £eformation appeared, there arose tendencies
and movements which, while having an internal afiSnity to it,
yet fell into bitter conflict with it. Luther applied to them
with all approj^dateness the words, " they have gone out firom
us, but they are not of us;" and Spalatin also characterizes
them by saying that ''wherever God builds a church, the
devil sets up a chapel beside it." They are usually designated
" Anabaptists ; " but as the movement went on for years, before
the baptism of adults was introduced in 1524, this is a purely
external designation. In opposition to the absolute authority
of the Church, Protestantism had bound the believer to Christ
and to the word of the Scriptures. In the general and
deep fermentation of the time, there was naturally no want
of those who felt they were too much bound by this limita-
tion. The representatives of such views maintained that the
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208 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PEOTESTANTISM.
Holy Spirit which is poured out upon all the people, and
the divine revelation which every individual receives, form
the only authority that is to be followed Along with this
principle it could not but happen that many heterogeneous
tendencies should appear, and that these should be but little
limited by the fact that the masses are fond of following a
conspicuous leader. BuUinger attempts to classify these
tendencies by saying that some of them demanded the ascetic
renunciation of the world, and that others depended more
upon millennial (chiliastic) hopes. Among the former, the
Separatist Spiritual Baptists would have nothing in common
with the world, and therefore laid down exact rules regarding
dress — as to what material it should be made of, what was
to be its shape, and so oa The Silent Baptists would have
no more preaching of the gospel, and came to no decision on
any question. The Praying Baptists, who left everything
to God, did nothing but pray. To the class of those who
cherished millenarian or chiliastic views, belonged the Apos-
tolic Baptists, who, appealing to the letter of the Scriptures,
roamed about the country without stafiT, or shoes, or purse, or
money, boasting of their heavenly commission to undertake
the office of a preacher, and discoursing to the people from the
roofs of the houses. This class also included the convulsive
Baptists, called also Enthusiasts and Exstatici, who boasted of
their ecstasies and the excellent heavenly revelations which
they received. The common Baptists formed the centre of
the whole movement ; they set themselves in opposition to
the excessive accentuation of the external word and the
ecclesiastical office of preaching, as well as to the dangerous
depreciation of good works. The Free Brethren, on the other
hand, abused the principle that the regenerate cannot sin,
as supplying a dispensation for the greatest moral excesses.
They extended the religious claim for liberty to the sphere
of the State and of social life, refused to pay interest or taxes,
wished to get rid of government, and demanded a com-
munity of goods and wives. They were mainly guilty of the
abominations of the Peasant War and of the Münster kingdom.
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THE SPIRITUALISTIC AND MYSTICAL OPPOSITION. 209
Such horrors excited a general repugnance to this party;
but although many of them were thrown into prison, expelled
the country, or slain, there arose everywhere new representa-
tives of their ideas, and only the strictest procedure could
finally extirpate them.
Taken as a whole, although they are greatly mixed up, we
may distinguish two principal directions in these movements.
We may designate them respectively as the Spiritualistic and
the Mystical tendency. They both emphasize the inner light,
and boast of immediate xmion with God. But the former
founds upon a communication of God that is transitory and
that manifests itself from time to time in visions, ecstasies,
and such like; whereas the latter asserts a continuous real
in working of God in the heart of man. The representatives
of the former tendency commonly lose themselves in external
particularities, and often in such as have but little to do
with religion. We will, however, briefly glance at the most
important of them.
Of Melchior Hofmann (t 1533) we know hardly more
than that he entertained millenarian hopes, as did also his
associate Stifel, who prophesied that the end of the world
would take place on the 3rd October 1533, at eight o'clock
in the morning. Joh. Denk (t 1527) saw the fundamental
principle of the Christian religion in the love of man to God,
and this love rests on the fact that we have within us the
living, powerful, eternal Word of God, which is God Himself.
This invisible Word can be rejected or accepted by us in
virtue of the freedom of our will, and we are accordingly bad
or good. The new life by which we are good does not come
in by the external word of Scripture, nor by preaching, but by
the immediate inworking of the Divine Spirit. It is a pro-
gressive communication of God to man himself. It is called
the inner word, in relation to knowledge ; and the power of
the Highest, in relation to action. For the regenerate man
the law of the external letter is abrogated, and only the love
that is planted in the heart holds good. Further, the sacra-
ments are mere external signs, and they are unimportant to
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210 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PBOTESTANTISM.
the believer. JoK Campanus (t 1578) believed that the
mystery of the Trinity could be made intelligible under the
figure of marriage, saying there was in God only two persons^
the Father and the Son, who were united with one another,
as husband and wife in matrimony. He also declared that
there was no sin in the regenerate.
Among the Anabaptists of Holland, David Joris and Hans
Niolas especially deserve to be mentioned. David Joris
(1501-1536), a glass painter at Delift, maintained that he
was led in early life, by revelations and visions, to look for
the speedy return of the Lord. After the fall of Münster he
became the leader of the Anabaptists. This position he won,
at the Convention of Bokholt in 1536, by his success in
bringing the different parties to an agreement They were
brought to one in many important points, only differing in
regard to marriage and the employment of force ; and soon
thereafter, basing his claim upon visions» he set up as a pro-
phet. The centre of his preaching was that the kingdom of
God had come, and that the second coming of the Lord was
nigh at hand. According to his view, the kingdom of God
was to be fulfilled and realized through the three periods of
the world. The first period was introduced by David, in
whom was the spirit and power of God ; the second period
Was introduced by Christ, in whom the whole deity was com-
pletely present ; and the third was introduced by David Joris,
upon whom the Spirit of God was to rest Sometimes he
calls the second of these three persons the greatest, as he had
made the first his pattern, and sent the last to follow him ;
at other times Messianic prophecies are immediately applied
to Joris himself. His adherents soon fell into two peurties ;
one of them, .notwithstanding its fanatical tinge, practised
honesty of life ; but the other, with David Joris himself at
their head, gave themselves to libertine excesses, especially in
the way of sexual indulgence. Joris was challenged to prove
his doctrines by the word of Scripture, but he repudiated the
challenge as human wisdom, philosophical curiosity, and
Jewish unbelief. As he asseited that his doctrine was
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• THE SPIKITÜALISTIC AND MYSTICAL OPPOSITION. 211
immediately revealed to him from heaven, he said it also
required scholars who would simply believe what the Spirit
taught.
Hans Niclas (1502-1577) received visions as early as his
ninth year. A great light of the glory and clearness of God
in the form of a mountain encompassed him, raised him from
his bed, shone through him in his whole being, and essentialized
itself wholly with his spirit and heart In his thirty-ninth
year he received a similar vision, in which God sank down
upon him and became entirely one substance with him. His
views were briefly as follow. In the beginning, when God
liad created all, there was only one God and one man, and
God was all that man was, and man was all that God was.
God gave man no other law than to live with joy in the naked
clearness of his God. By sin the man fell into blindness, and
estranged himself from God. In order to save him, God
created a new man, Christ. He entered into the science of
men, and found it fdlse and lying ; and in order to redeem
ünan from all foolish wisdom, He has introduced another
science. His disciples have proclaimed to all the world that
God has appointed a day of love in order that He may judge
the earth on that day by a man who was to present the faith
to every one. That day had now come. God would now
fulfil all His promises, and give to the good eternal life, and
to the bad eternal death. All the members of Christ were
now to be conjoined into a real body of Christ, or into a man
of God, in order that in the end, as in the beginning, there
should be one God and one man, and all in the one body of
Christ. Hence Hans Niclas also distinguished three periods.
In the first period, the law rules under sin ; in the second
period, the gospel of Christ rules ; and in the third period,'
there rules that love of which Hans Niclas was the proclaimer.
For although he was the least of all, and was entirely dead,
and was lying without life among the dead, God had wakened
him from the dead, had made him alive through Christ, had
humanized Himself with him, and deified him with Himself
into a living tabernacle, or a house of His dwelling, in order
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?12 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PBOTBSTANTISM.
that thereby all His wonderful works might be proclaimed to
all the world
Menno Simon (1496-1561) succeeded in forming a dis-
tinct Church out of these wildly fermenting elements, and it
has continued to exist till the present day. The Mennonites
retain the baptism of adults, but otherwise they reject almost
wholly the spirit of the communities from which they have
descended. In place of the spiritualistic appeal to immediate
revelation, they hold strictly to the word of Scripture, and
instead of unbridled libertinism, they seek their glory in a
quietly laborious and strictly moral life. In their case, there-
fore, we do not find any peculiar formation of Protestantism
in the sense under consideration.
In England, in opposition to the purely external reforma-
tion of the doctrine and hierarchy of the Church by Henry
VIII., the tendency towards a practical reformation of the
religious life likewise found expression in Puritanism. In
connection with it, Robert Browne (1550-1630) founded a
movement which represented the unconditional rights of the
individual This principle was at first applied only to the
external order of the constitution and worship of the Church,
and thus was formed JruUpendentism or Congregationalism.
It claimed that every separate community should form an
entirely independent congregation, whose members should all
possess the same rights, and decide on all matters by the
majority of votes. In the services of the public worship
every brother obtained the right to speak, and all pre-
scribed forms of prayer and the received festival days were
rejected. John Robinson spoke out the general thought of a,
progressive reformation in the words, "I cannot sufficiently
deplore the state of the Reformed Churches which have come
to a finality in religion, and will now not go beyond the
instruments of their reformation." The poet Milton (1608—
1674) represents the deep incisive principles in religion and
politics that were held by this party from 1644. Their
political principles were deeply significant; for the ruling
prince was represented as only a delegate of the people^ and
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THE SPIRITUALISTIC AND MYSTICAL OPPOSITION* 213
hence, under certain circumstances, regicide was justified.
Their religious principles were also distinctive, for the inner
word of the Holy Spirit is emphatically set above the external
word of the letter. As if the prediction of the prophet Joel,
iii 1, were fulfilled, every one appealed to the word of the
Lord which he had heard as to an immediate revelation which
he had received, or to the Spirit of God which spake in him.
Those who were the subjects of grace, therefore, called them-
selves no longer believers, but saints ; for even in the present
life man must become free from all sin« With this prophetism
there were joined millenarian hopes of an immediately
approaching completion of the Church, when a life would
begin in the full bright clearness of the divine light, and in
all the power and fulness of the Spirit, realizing the age of the
glorious freedom of the children of God. Along with this it
was declared, with all definiteness, that religion is an internal
power of life. Religion is not a name but a thing, not a form
but a power, not an idea but a divine reality ; religion is an
inner power of the soul by which it is united with God in
holiness and righteousness. Any one has just as much of
religion as he has of this power ; and where this power is not,
there is no religion. It was openly declared that even the
heathen, who have never heard anything of the earthly Christ,
have the gospel revealed to their hearts ; and it was asked
doubtingly whether Christ was a historical personality at all
Emphasis was kid upon the fact ** that it is not the head, but
the heart, that makes the Christian," and faith in the recon-
ciliation of man with God by the death of Christ was set up
as the sole criterion of being a Christian ; and hence they
demanded from the State the universal toleration of all
religious parties.
This enthusiastic party of reform fought under the banners
of Cromwell until they obtained the supremacy, and by the
** Short Parliament " they carried on the government of the
country. Cromwell's Protectorate (Dec. 1653) saved England
from the threatened dissolution of all social and political order.
He kept the revolutionary tendencies in check, yet held fast
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214 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
by the principle of toleration, so that with the exception of
Catholicism, all the denominations were recognised in England
which confessed the faith of Grod in Christ, although they
might differ from each other in doctrine^ worship, or dis*
cipline. With this period of external rest there emerged a
separation of the heterogeneous elements which hitherto co-
operated in Congregationalism. This first appeared in the
reparation of the political and religious tendencies. The
adherents of the former claimed unlimited freedom of con^
science as an inherent right of man, and they prepared for the
English Deism through the medium of the Levellers. Some
of the representatives of the religious movement laid aside
the former enthusiasm, and, led by Bichard Baxter, merged
themselves in Puritanism. Others of them, in hostile opposi-
tion to Cromwell, intensified the enthusiastic millenarian
element, and at last found a permanent form in the Quakerism
that was founded in 1654 by George Fox (1624-1691).
" No, it is not the Scripture, it is the spirit ! " With these
words Fox interrupted a sermon on the words of the text in
Second Peter, " We have a sure word of prophecy," eta, which
the preacher was applying quite correctly to the Scripture.
After long years of internal struggle, this was his first publio
appearance; and this thought was the centre of all the
sermons which he preached, under many perils but with
rich blessing, everywhere throughout the country. He who
lives in the words of the Scriptures is not a Christian, but
only he who lives the life of the Scripture. It is not the
external word that is the source of salvation, but the light of
Christ which is in us ; it is the seed of God in us ; it is God's
power, life, and presence in us. This light of Christ does not
appear, however, as a continuous calm possession, but as the
sudden direct seizure of us by a higher power, and this is
combined with convulsive movements of the body, from
whence arose the name "Quakers." In Fox, however, we
seek in vain for clear definitions regarding the nature of this
Light and its relation to the natural Beason.
When the Act of Toleration was passed by William III. in
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THE SPIKITÜALTSTIC AND MYSTICAL OPPOSITION. 215
1689, the Quakers obtained freedom to exercise their religion,
and they entered upon a calmer development. The chief
authority on the later position of the body is Bobert Barclay
(1648-^1690), and his Theologice vere christianoe Apologia,
published at Amsterdam in 1676, almost obtained the
authority of a creed among the Quakers. He begins his
exposition by saying that as the highest happiness consists in
the true knowledge of God, the most necessary of all things
is a correct insight into the ground and origin of this know-
ledge. But we must <»refully distinguish between spiritual
knowledge and literal knowledge, the former being the saving
knowledge of the heart, and the latter being the high-fiying,
empty knowledge of the head. This latter knowledge may
be obtained in various ways, but the former can only be got
by the internal direct revelation and illumination of the
Spirit of God. AU other knowledge of Christ and God is as
little tnie knowledge as the chatter of a parrot is the voice of
a man. This revelation of God by His Spirit has always been
the same, at the time of the creation of the world, and under
the Law, and now in Christianity. Hence the object of faith
is also everywhere the same, for it is God speaking in us.
Of this inner saving Light, it is further said that God has
given to every man, be he Jew or heathen, Turk or Scythian,
Indian or barbarian, a certain time of visitation in which it
is possible for him to be saved, and that for this end God has
bestowed on every man a certain measure of light or of the
Spirit. Whoever receives this Light obtains salvation, even
if he knows nothing of Christ's sufferings and death. This
Light may in fact be resisted, but no one is able to entirely
disregard it Moreover, this inner Light is emphatically
distinguished from natural Season. It is an error of the
Pelagians and Sodnians that has been caused by the devil,
to hold that man can follow the good in virtue of his natural
light, and direct his course heavenwarda The inner Light
is not a part of human nature, nor is it a survival of the good
which we have lost by Adam's fall, and it is to be carefully
distinguished from the natural light of reason. It is certainly
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216 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMEin^ WITHIK PKOTESTANTISM.
not God's proper essence and nature, but it is a spiritual,
heavenly, and invisible principle in which God as Father,
Son, and Spirit dwells ; it is an absolutely supernatural gift,
an inconceivable immediate indwelling of God in us. It is
this heavenly light by which all are called to salvation.
Both those who have heard the history of Christ and those
who have not heard it
On the other side, prominence is again given to the position
that the Spirit of God as the fountain of all truth cannot con-
tradict the Scriptures or sound reason. The Scriptures hav6
their revelations of the Spirit of God as the saints received
them. Hence the Scripture is certainly the most excellent
book in the world, yet it is always but an explanation of the
source itself. However important Scripture may be as a
credible attestation of the revelations of the Spirit, and as a
mirr(»: in which we can make ourselves certain of what we
inwardly experience, yet it is not to be regarded as the main
principle of all knowledge, nor as the highest standard of faith
and practice. It is the Spirit who leads us into all truth, and
it does not merely serve to open the Scripture to our under«
standing. The uncertainty of the text, the difficulty of
\mderstanding it, the indemonstrableness of the Canon, are
likewise adduced as grounds against the sole validity of
Scripture. In accordance with this merely historical view of
Scripture as a faithful narrative of the doings of the people
of God, as a collection of partly fulfilled and partly yet unful-
filled prophecies, and as a complete statement of the most
important principles of the doctrine of Christ, the historical
Christ is relatively put into the background. It is true that
Barclay speaks of the Person and Work of Christ entirely in
the expressions of the ecclesiastical dogmas, such as that
Christ has offered Himself a sacrifice for us, reconciling us by
the blood of His cross to God. But these forms of expression
are again in part naturalized. He holds that no substitution
took place, because God never regarded Christ as a sinner;
that if the redemption had been finally completed sixteen
hundred years ago, the whole gospel with its preaching of
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THE MTSnCS. SEBVETUS. ^ 1 1
repentance would have been useless ; and that it is only the
inward birth of Christ in our heart that is truly atoning.
Besides, the doctrine of the historical Christ is completely out
of connection with the system, as even one who has not heard
the history of Christ may be saved by the Spirit of God ;
and in this manner he becomes, as it were, a member of the
Christian Church, Again, justification is not a mere declara-
tion of righteousness on the ground of the imputed merit of
Christ, but is a real process of making righteous by the true
atonement which Christ works in us. This birth of Christ
in us takes place at a definite moment, so that every one must
be able to assign the day and the hour of its happening ; in
whomsoever it is completely produced, his heart is immediately
united with Christ, the body of death and of sin is got rid of,
so that he is free from actual sin and from transgression of
the law of Grod, and becomes perfect. The sacraments are of
no importance either as means of salvation or as symbols of
salvation, but they stand on the same level with the other
usages of the early Church. The baptism by water that was
administered by John, was only a prophecy of the baptism
by the Spirit, and with the coming of the latter the former
must cease. The Lord's Supper is a mere symbol of the
communion with the inner divine light, which alone is the
true spiritual body of Christ The same principle of the
internal light is also made to be valid in the doctrine of the
Church and in the order of worship.
III.
The Mystics. Servetus. Paracelsus. Carlstadt.
Münzer. Frank. Schwenkfeldt.
1. Mysticism had a close aflSnity to these spiritualistic move-
ments through their common polemic against too high an
estimate of the external letter, and their common inclination
to dive directly into the depths of the Deity. To the
mystical tendency we may most properly assign Michael
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218 opposihona;. MOVEmtyra within protbstantism.
Servetus (1508-1553), the famous physician, geographer, and
theologian of Arragon, well known for his denial of the Trinity,
and for having been burned at Geneva. He is altogether
peculiar in his personal characteristics, and he is extremely
interesting in his own way. He holds a somewhat isolated
position, from his rejecting the baptism of children as well as
the doctrine of the Trinity, and his appealing neither to
immediate revelation nor to the insight of natural reason.
He held that a reform of the Church was necessary ; for the
papacy and all connected with it is the work of the devil
himself, who intruded into the Church as early as the times
of the Apostles, and who became particularly powerful when
Constantino consigned the secular sword to Pope Sylvester,
and when the Council of Nicea established the tritheistic
dognia. But it was only a definite period of 1260 years
that had been assigned to this supremacy of Antichrist ; it
was to be broken down in the year 1585, and Servetus
believed that he was called by God to co-operate in bringing
it about This reformation of the Church was to be founded
upon the genuine doctrine of Christ as it is obtained by
correct interpretation of the Holy Scripture, and as it is
found in harmony with the utterances of the ante-Nioean
Fathers. But although Servetus emphatically blames the
exegesis of his opponents for their dependence upon the
Aristotelian philosophy and their ignorance of the Hebrew
language, and promises to interpret every word of Scripture
according to its proper meaning, his own expositions would
also be searched in vain for a really grammatical and
historical exegesis.
IiOoking at the spirit of the system of Servetus before
entering on its details, we find at once a remarkable mixture
of cold intellectual thinking and a profound mysticism that
drew its nourishment specially from Neo-Platonism. The
former element exhibits itself especially in criticism. With
unquestionable acuteness he points out the contradictions
which the mystery of the Trinity presses upon the thinking
of the understanding, such as that the Spirit is not a person;
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THE MYSTICS. SERVETUS, 219
that the Christele^ with the two natures in one person and
the essential equality of the Son and the Father is untenable ;
and that one substance and three persons is completely
untbinkabla The baptism of children is also opposed on
rational grounds. — A Mysticism, reminding us at many
points of Nicolaus of Cusa, shows itself in all parts of the
circle of thought in which Servetus moved; and drawing
from the depths of a truly religious soul, and equipped with
great wealth of knowledge, he has exhibited in his expositions
his inner life to others.
6od is described as being in Himself far above everything
that is finite and limited, as not limited by space and time, as
not light but higher than light, as not substance but above
snbstance, as not spirit but above spirit, and indeed as above
everjrthing which can be thought On the other hand, God
communicates Himself to all finite things, which without this
'would have no being or subsistence. This communication is
a gradual one. God communicates Himself to all things by
ideas, and to Christ, men, and angels in substance ; but to
Christ alone without measure, to men and angels in limited
measure by the Spirit-^as well by the inborn spirit as by the
Spirit that is supperadded by grace. Now, because God
communicates Himself to all things, Servetus can say that
the world is identical in essence with God ; God is all in all ;
God is everywhere full of the essence of aU things; God
Simself is the essence of all things, eta Yet this is not to
be understood as if God were corporeal and divisible, or as if
He were the one substance lying at the basis of all things,
and these were its diflFerent forms and parts. Qod is the
Spirit who contains all forms (mens omni/ormis), or who
includes in Himself from eternity the ideas, images, repre*
sentations, and substantial forms of individual things. These
ideas are not merely the divine thoughts and patterns
according to which things are created, but they are essential
substantial forms by means of which God enters into things
and bestows upon them their definite individual existence ;
for it is the divine idea or the Deity which makes this ^
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220 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PEOTESTANTISM.
stone, that gold, and a third thing iron. Matter is the onlj
thing that is created out of nothing. The four elements are
earth, water, fire, and air, of which the latter three as the
higher have an archetype in the heavenly matter in God.
The creation of individual things takes place by the intro-
duction of form into matter. It is mediated by created
light, which has a life-giving power derived from the
uncreated light, and it formatively introduces into matter the
substantial forms of things according to the eternal ideas. *
All eternal ideas are contained in the Word of Grod,
which was not separated in eternity from God, but assumed
independent existence at the time and for the purpose of
creation. In the Old Testament this Word appeared veiled
under manifold forms; in the person of Christ, it became
man. Because the Word was to become man in Christ in
order to reveal Grod wholly and fully to us men, and because
the idea of man is the most perfect of all ideas, the Word
bore in Itself even in eternity a prefiguration or adumbration
of the human personality. The man Christ is as such the
Son of God ; He is completely identical in essence with God
and of the one substance. As the Word He was from
eternity with God ; He was the mediator of the creation of
the world. As man He is of divine substance ; not merely
in the body in so far as Qod in His generation represented
the place of the bodily father, whence are the three higher
elements of the heavenly substance, but He is so also in the
soul, in so far as the Spirit of God is inbreathed into Him
without measure, as well as in the spirit which was bestowed
upon Him,
Man consists of Body, Soul, and Spirit. The body is
derived from matter. The soul is only in part identical
in substance with the body, from whose vital warmth in the
blood it takes its origin ; for, on the other side, it springs
directly from God as an emanation from the divine sub-
stance or as a breath of God. Hence it is that the soul can
receive the holy Spirit of God in itself, which is partly born
in us and partly communicated to us in baptism.
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THE MYSTICS. PABACELSUa 221
Even if Adam had not fallen, Christ would have appeared
as the perfect visible revelation of the invisible God, in order
to bring eternal life aud the true knowledge of God to man.
This was indeed the essential purpose of His mission, only
that under the present dispensation He had further to break
the power of the devil by His death and His descent into
helL By faith in Christ as the perfect revelation of God,
we obtain justification and the true knowledge of God. In
baptism, our soul is essentially transmuted by the heavenly
elements taking the place of the earthly elements, and
thereby there is established a substantial community of the
soul with God in Christ In the Lord's Supper our earthly
body is also transmuted into a heavenly body by Christ sub-
stantially communicating His body to us. When we are
thus transmuted in body and soul, the works of our external
conduct likewise become good and holy.
The essence of Beligion, according to Servetus, thus consists
in true knowledge of God and substantial union with Him.
From this conception he also obtains a certain historical
view of religion. The heathen know of God only what the
innate spirit and the careful observation of Nature teach
them. The Jews have divine revelations, yet they are veiled
because Christ bad not yet appeared in the flesh. The Chris*
tians have the perfect revelation.
Servetus belongs to the class of the solitary souls. His
opponents saw in him only the obstinate denier of the
Trinity, and it is uncertain whether his followers — who were
most numerous in Venice — really penetrated to the depths
of his thought. It is only in the present age that men are
beginning to rescue him from oblivion, and to appreciate
him justly.
2. Theophrastus Paracelsus Bombastes von Hohenheim was
bom at Einsiedeln in Switzerland in 1493, and he died at
Salzburgh in 1541. Attaching himself to the Cabbala^ he
founded a school that became widely spread, especially among
the physicians, and which fused in a peculiar way Alchemy
and Astrology with Theosophy. Paracelsus, as a physician,
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222 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PBOTESTANTISM.
set up the principle that diseases must be studied, not in the
books of Galen and Avicenna, but by observation of Nature,
and thus he became the reformer of medicine. This position
is not affected by his whimsical cures and cabbalistic phan-
tasies, his zealous searching for the philosopher's stone, and
his inquiries into the influence of the stars upon human life.
He at first taught German at Bale, and he also composed
some of his writings in the German language. But as, in
spite of all his striving, he could not free his thoughts from
the fantastic superstition of an age which was just beginning
to apply itself to the observation of Nature, his language
likewise struggles in vain after the right expression for new
thoughts, and he coined a multitude of peculiar words which
greatly increase the difficulty of understanding the German
Theosophist.
According to Paracelsus, theology is the basis of all know-
ledge, even of the knowledge of medicine. The natural
knowledge that flows from the light of Nature does not
i*each far. Man has all knowledge, all wisdom and art,
fram God, and we Christians from the new birth in the
gospel. For everything must be founded in the gospel that
we teach in history, jurisprudence, medicine, and philosophy,
and even the heathens, like Plato, Aristotle, and others, had
their wisdom from above, although not from faith in Christ,
" The book in which is the ground and the truth and the
knowledge of all things is God Himself. By this knowledge
all things are guided and ruled and brought to their perfec-
tion, for it is only in Him who has created all things that
there lies wisdom and the principle that is in all things."
Hence we must first seek the knowledge of God ; in this lies
the ground of all wisdom. God is the groimd of all things,
and they are all animated. God has " not created a single
coj*pu$ without a spiritus which it secretly carries in it, for
what would be the use of the corpus without the spiritus f
Nothing." All beginnings lie enclosed in the great chaos
from which they proceed by separation. Matter is formed
from salt, sulphur, and qiiicksilveri and its spiritus or spiritual
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THE ÄIYSTICS. PAJRACELSÜS. 223
essence is constituted by salt, sulphur, and mercury. This
means that, according as matter assumes the quality of i)eing
9olid, fiery, or fluid, it is formed by the elements of salt,
sulphur, and quicksilver. From the varied mixture of these
three elements, the different tilings arise ; and hence, not-
veithstanding the diversity of all things, there is a universal
harmony anK)ng them« This mixture depends oi^ ' the star^
spirit or cagaster indwelling in everything, which is the ground
of its predestination. These spirits have their body in the
constellations, and they proceed from God as the primal
source of all life.
Man as a microcosm has part in all the three worlds or
sphetes which go to form the macrocosm ; that is, he partici-
pates in God, in the stars, and in the elements. The body is
formed from the elements, and is supported by elemental
nourishment ; and hence it corrupts after death and dissolves
again into the elements. The body has its proper principle '
of life in the epirüus vitce. The soul is the sidereal spirit,
and it comes from the constellations. From it flow the orbs
and the natural sciences, in which we are dependent on the
influences of the stars. The spirit is, as it were, the soul's
soul, and it is breathed into man by God directly from the
substance of His nature. By the spirit man is capable of
receiving divine knowledge, and he receives the gifts which
God communicates to every one. By it he is also destined
for eternity.
Man is thus a being of a twofold kind. He is of an
animal nature, and can live to the animal spirit, and there-
fore be known as an animal Hence the Baptist calls the
Pharisees a " generation of vipers," and Clirist speaks of dogs,
swine, and wolves in sheep's clothing. But it was not in
accordance with the will of God that man should live as an
animal ; he was to live according to the higher nature of the
divine image, in order that he might fill up the place of the
devil and bis angels. Yet man turned to what was animal,
fell into sin, and came under the dominion of the devil
For our salvation, the Son of God, as the Word of the
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224 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PEOTESTANTISM.
Father, became man in Christ ; and by His bitter suffering
and death He paid for the guilt of our sins, freed the souls
of believers from eternal death/ and led them into Paradise.
Nevertheless, he who desires to live with Christ and to be
saved must also first suffer and die with Him ; and he must
be buried with Him and rise again in order to be glorified
with Him. An orthodox Christian must not only believe
that Christ was despised and mocked and buried for him or
for his sin, but he must believe that every one in his own
person must be despised, mocked, tortured, slain, and buried
with Christ Imputed righteousness helps no one without
this fellowship in the suffering of Christ.
In agreement with these views, Paracelsus depreciated all
that was external in religion and the Church. He praises
Luther for his bold attack upon the externalized ecclesias-
ticism of Bome, and yet he remained a Catholic himself. He
says that we cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven with
the fleshly, elemental body that perishes at death, and hence
we must obtain another flesh from above. We must be bom
anew of a virgin from faith, incarnated of the Holy Ghost,
the third person of the Godhead who cometh after Christ.
Baptism serves this end; by it we are incarnated of the
Spirit into that flesh in which we see Christ our Saviour,
and rise again from death and pass into the kingdom of
God. Now everything must live upon that from which it
has being ; and as the mortal body must be fed from the
natural elements, so the new birth must be fed from Christ.
His flesh and blood, which is begotten of the Holy Ghost from
the Virgin, and is therefore heavenly, is given for our enjojrment
in the Eucharist. In virtue of this non-mortal flesh of the
new birth, we will rise again at the last day with Christ Then
shall we no longer rot nor be consumed, but be clarified with
a divine clarification, so that we may enter with Christ into
the kingdom of the heavens. But the damned will be
darkened, and suffer the punishment which God will assign
to them in the judgment.
Th^ views of Paracelsus became very widely spread^ espe-
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THE MYSTICa CABLSTADT. FBANK, 225
cially among physicians. All the alchemists, the fantastic
astrologers, and naturalists of the age attached themselves to
him. This movement is of considerable importance in regard
to the history of the culture of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, but its details are of no value or interest for us here.
3. Carlstadt (t 1541) was of the men who stood near to
Luther, the one who gave himself up to Mysticism ; and he
was specially led thereby into paths which separated him from
the great reformer. He was a man of great erudition, and
his treatise on Eesignation or Self-abandonment (van der Oelas»
senheii) shows strong evidences of the influence of Tauler.
Self-surrender is the renunciation of all oreatureliness, and it
is inmiediately followed by the union of the soul with God.
The highest degree of renunciation consists in man sur*
rendering his own self or his personality to God, and keeping
himself from all godless and selfish impulses. Then does the
Spirit of Grod come into the soul and fill it completely ; for
faith consists in the union of the human heart with God, who
pours His power into it. Hence the Lord's Supper is not an
external enjoying of the flesh and blood of Christ, but the
act of internally becoming one with God. — Thomas Münzer
(1490-1537) also shows mystical thoughts, only they are
infected by an appeal to immediate divine revelation and by
his revolutionary ideas. Man must turn away from external
things, must go out of himself, and become a m^re nothing,
in order that God may come in with His light, and possess
the pure ground of the soul. When man has forgotten him-
self and every creature, then will God pour Himself into the
soul and work His work in it. The letter is good for nothing.
*' It would avail nothing even though one should have eaten
a hundred thousand Bibles ! '' And just as little does faith
alone avail without moral conduct
4. Sebastian Frank (c, 1495-1543) of Donauvörth is im-
portant as a historical writer of that time, although he estimates
the value of everything according as it is a means of education
and religious edification. He was also an excellent popular
writer, and Luther himself says of him that " he had taken
VOL. I. p ^ ,
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226 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
the right grip of things, and that he knew how historical
books are most willingly read, and are greatly liked." He
sided with the Beformation, inasmuch as he was a zealous
opponent to the papacy. He was the first to prove, and he
did so with great acuteness, that the twenty-five years' episco-
pate of Peter at Home was but a fable. He showed that the
Boman Faith had its origin from the popes and their institu-
tions, and was without the word and command of Gk>d. He
said the popes knew as little of the New Testament as a cow
knows about the game of draughts, or an ass does about
playing on the lute. Nevertheless, their over-estimate of the
value of the written word and their sectarian withdrawal
from the universal Catholic Church, separates hun from the
Beformers. Because the Scripture is divided in the letter and
is discordant, he held that the letter must give rise to heresy,
and that men can never be one, nor at one in it. The worst
thing that he dislikes in these and other sects is their partisan
separation. It is not the order to which we belong that makes
us pious, nor even our works, but the Spirit of Christ, as the
only true faith which regards aU things as depending on God,
and which makes the person agreeable to God, so that all that
the person does is done by God, God mirroring Himself in the
person, like the sun in still water. This Christian faith is a
free thing ; it is bound to nothing external, and hence there
is one Church scattered among aU the heathen, but gathered
together in the spirit. But do as we may, the world will have
a Pope, even though it should steal him or dig him out of the
earth.
All death in the Church comes, according to Frank, from
the literal understanding of the Scripture, while life rests only
upon the inner Word, which is the eternal Spirit of Grod. In
our relation to heaven there is something necessary that is
higher than a Bible, nor is it possible that the written word
can be God's word on account of the very change in its
languages and the uncertainty of its letter. The inner Word
is the divine Spirit, who is sent into the world, and especially
into every human souL Hence faith does not consist in
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THE MYSTICS. FRANK. 227
holding certain external things to he true, but in living and
experiencing inwardly the facts of faith. Faith is the inmost
fact of life, and with it man surrenders himself and sinks his
heart entirely in God, in order that God maj work in him
both to will and to do. — ^In accordance with this view the
historical Christ is made to retreat into the background, behind
the eternal Christ We ought to regard Christ not merely
from without according to the flesh, but we should know Him
in His best part as He is the word and the expressed will of
God. Christ in His true nature is eternal, and therefore He
did not come first into the world with the birth of the histo^r
ideal Chnst, nor even only among the Jewish people, but He
also influenced many an enlightened Iieathen who knew nothing
of the historical Christ It is not what is external and histo^
rical in the sufferings and death of Christ that saves, but He
must come into our heart, and must be united with our souL
Christ must be bom, live, die, rise, and ascend to heaven in
us. — ^With this corresponds the general relation of God to the
world and to man. God is different from the things which
vre can see, hear, touch, taste, or smell ; and He is knowabla
by us, but as men we only know Him in so far as He is in
ns. So far as it is possible to indicate afar off what Grod is»
He is an incorporeal soul diffused through all things in Kature,
and He essentially communicates reality and living feeling to
all things. The relation of God to Kature is represented by
the image of a juggler, who with his hand seizes a figure or
puppet, and moves it how and where he will, and as soon as
he withdraws his hand the things fall from their being again
into their own nothingness ; but God always remains in Nature.
As the air fills all and is nowhere, so is God in all things and
all are again in Him. The portion of life and soul which
God has merged in every one, is the form of God« In us God
first becomes determinate will All feelings and accidents
which we attribute to God — such as anxiety, suffering, dis-
pleasure, wrath, and such like — are not in God, but in us.
As we have spectacles on our nose, so does Qod thus appear
to us through our feelings.
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228 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
5. The congress of theologians at Scfamalkald in 1540 gave a
warning against the fanatical errors of Sebastian Frank and
Caspar Schwenkfeldt. Schwenkfeldt (1490-1562) was at
the b^inning a zealous adherent and promoter of the Beforma-
tion, but he was afterwards driven to join its opponents, and
he was universally assailed as a fanatic, for which Luther was
not without blame, as he attadsed him with undeserved violence.
He likewise objected to the over-estimation of the external
word in the Lutheran Church, as leading even to the assertion
that the preaching of a Judas Iscariot would have been just as
effective as that of the Apostle Paul According to Schwenk-
feldt, Seligion rests upon the inner experience of the divine
life. God needs no external thing or means for His inner
working of grace. Even Christ as in the flesh was a hindrance
of grace, and He was raised to heavenly being, that the Holy
Spirit might come to us. Whoever wishes to proceed from
external things to what is internal, does not understand the
course of grace. The sole means of grace is the omnipotent,
eternal Word, as it proceeds immediately from the mouth of
God, and not as coming by the Scriptures, sacraments, or
such like. The hearing of faith is an internal inblowing of
the spiritual wind of God ; it is as a drop from the fountain
of life ; it is a secret whispering of the mouth of Gk)d. It is
the acceptance of the living word of Grod in the soul, when
man, along with the sinful, carnal nature is transformed. Man
belongs by his body to the external world, and by his immortal
soul to the higher spiritual world, and hence what is external
can alone move the external man, whereas God *alone can
penetrate into what is internal. The first man was created of
the earth, earthy ; but his destination was to become perfect
through Christ, who alone is the image of the invisible God,
in order that God might wholly dwell and live in him. God
works in a twofold way in Nature ; after one manner in Crea-
tion, and after another in Begeneration. Creation brings
forth products which are alienated and far from the divine
Being ; Redemption is an activity of the divine nature, by
which it communicates itself in its undivided power. It may
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THE MYSTICS. 8CHWENKFELDT. 229
be said of the creation tUat all creatures are in God, in so far
as He has arranged, ruled, and known them all ; but in the
redemption there is realized in a still higher sense a union
with God. For faith is a state of the soul entirely identical
with its object ; in its object it becomes completely one with
God, and participates in the divine nature. True faith is
participation both in Nature and in the divine Being, accord-
ing to its measure ; it is a scintillation of the eternal sun ; a
sparkle of that burning fire which is God. Along with all this^
Schwenkfeldt insists emphatically upon the verification of the
inward life in the strict morality of outward conduct
In closest connection with all this stands Schwenkfeldt's
peculiar doctrine of the Deification of the flesh of Christ
This is founded upon the view that communion with the
exalted Christ on the side of His body is the source of the
new life. It is not the suffering and dying of Christ, nor
generally His earthly life in the state of humiliation, that
stands in the foreground with Schwenkfeldt, but it is the
Christ who is glorified in the heavens. We ought not to preach
a half Christ, that is, we ought not merely to proclaim His
redemption and satisfaction for us, but also our; regeneration
and sanctification, — ^not merely Christ on the cross, but also
the Christ who is exalted to glory. What the Christian
experiences within of the influences of grace i3 aU made up
of doings of the Christ who has entered into His glory, and
is personally ruling over His believers. , It is Christ who
inwardly communicates forgiveness of sins. It is Christ who
sheds abroad the Holy Spirit with the fulness of His gifts in
the hearts of His believers. It is Christ who Himself com*
municates Himself in the undivided unity of His personal life,
and gives Himself as food to the hungry souL The body of
Christ has also part in the heavenly glory, for His single per-
son may not be divided, as is done by the Lutheran doctrine
of the two natures and the communiccUio idiomatum. From
the outset the flesh of Christ was a flesh of a higher endow-
ment, furnished with powers of innocence and holiness ; and
afterwards, in the resurrection and ascension, there came in
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230 opposmoüTM. movements wtthik protestantism.
the complete deification of the flesh of Christ Its present
state is designated at one time as the g^oiy of the flesh ; at
another time it is described as sitting at the right hand of
God ; and again it is represented as anointment with a holy
Spirit This Spirit is nothing bat the totality of the opera*
tions of grace proceeding from the deified humanity of Christ,
for the Spirit proceeds from the body of the glorified Christ.
The Lord's Sapper is a real communication and appropriation
of the glorified Body of Christ ; but this spiritual enjoyment
is purely internal, and needs no external mediation.
With all vehemence the Beformers set themselves in oppo-
sition to these ** fanatics ; '' but when the Lutheran theology
stiffened into a rigid scholasticism, and continued to lose all
triJtö life and every regard to the interest of piety, the living
religiousness of the time led again to similar modes of oppo-
sition to the worship of the letter in the Church. Among
the less important representatives of this tendency were
A^dius Guthmann of Swabia (c. 1580), Paul Lautensack,
painter and organist at Nürnberg (1478-1552), and Bar-
tholomaeus Sclei of Poland (c 1596). The foUowiug are
some of their positions : — ** Hence it now follows incontro-
vertibly that the outward Christ, according to the flesh, is
of no use at all, with all His doing and suffering, if we have
not the inward Christ in us, who rightly encourages us in the
love of God, and makes us new and spiritual creatures."
"Whoever finds these the highest of all the mysteries of
God, has found noble pearls and the highest treasure, which
no man can find elsewhere than in himseH" ** For what is
outward in Nature and the Old Testament, we must perceive
in the New Testament in ourselves as it is fulfilled in the
spirit and in truth/' The culmination of this movement was
reached towards the end of the sixteenth century in Valentin
WeigeL
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YALENTIN WSIGBL. 231
IV.
Valentin Weigel (1533-1588).
Valentin Weigel was bom at Haim, near Dresden. He
was educated as an Electoral bursar in the Boyal School at
Meissen. From 1554 he studied at Leipsic, and from 1563
to 1567 at Wittenberg; and from that time to his death
lie laboured as a preacher at Zschopau. As his course of
training indicates, Weigel was well acquainted with all the
logical and philosophical science of his age. This is shown
also by his writings, for Weigel does not disdain to quote his
predecessors and masters, in spite of certain attacks upon the
scholastic learning of the time. Of the ancient philosophers,
Seneca, Plotinus, and Boethius were his favourites. Of the
Church Fathers, Origen and Augustine were most diligently
studied by him, while others are at least named. Weigel
was quite familiar with the German Mysticism as in Tauler,
" the German Theology," Thomas k Kempis, and Eckard.
Schwenkfeldt and Sebastian Frank are rarely quoted, nor have
we found any quotation from Carlstadt or Nicolaus of Cusa,'
notwithstanding undeniable points of contact with them. We
will endeavour to present the thought of Weigel according to
those writings that are recognised as undoubtedly genuine.^
His opposition to the Church of his time is expressed
most plainly in the original Dicdogus de Christianismo. A
"Hearer" or layman who is a fcdlower of Weigel's ideas
converses with a " Preacher " who is the representative of
the ecclesiastical orthodoxy. The Christ who has passed by
* The moet important of Weigere writings are the following : — Libellos de
▼ita beata, etc; Ein schön Gebetbüchlein, 1612; Der güldene Griff, etc.,
1617 ; Vom Ort der Welt, etc., 1618 ; Dialogue de Christianismo, 1614 ;
Phüosophia theologica ; T>S4t #icc/r«*, 1614 ; Principal und Haupt Tractat von
der Gelassenheit, 1618 ; Soli Deo gloria, 1618 ; Kurzer Bericht und Anleitung
zur Teutschen Theologej. Naturally these writings contain many repetitions,
but they everywhere bear evidence of a scientifically educated man who controls
his thought and expression. Reference may be made to Opel, Valentin Weigel,
1864.
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232 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
death into glory comes in in the character of "Death" as
umpire, and agrees decidedly. with the Hearer. In the last
chapters we are told how the Preacher peacefully dies after
confession and absolution; but as he had experienced no
penitence and expiation within, he enters into Hell, whereas
the Hearer, on account of his true inner life, goes to Heaven,
although he dies without the sacrament and lies buried in an
open field. The subject of the discussion is — (1) the internal
unction and illumination by the Holy Spirit in contrast to the
letter of Scripture as well as to confessions and teachers, and
(2) the inward essential indwelling of Christ after mortifica-
tion of the natural flesh, in opposition to the theory of
imputed righteousness. While the Hearer refers to the
Spiritual understanding of the Scriptures, the Preacher builds
upon the symbolical books, the current doctrines, the words of
wise teachers, and the science which he had learned in the
universities, and he indignantly asks the layman whence he,
an unlearned man, got his wisdom, which was not taught in
any pulpit whatever. The Hearer argues that we require to
slay our own Adam, and that Christ must be bom in us and
be essentially united with us ; whereas the Preacher refers
to the justitia imputativa, saying that Christ has given
satisfaction for us, and that " we carouse at His expense."
The main thesis of Weigel is that true knowledge does not
come (torn without, but from within ; it does not arise from
what is known, but from that which knows ; not from the
object, but, as he says, from "the eye" or the cognitive
subject. This proposition follows from his whole theory of
knowledge, which is carefully elaborated in detail The
external seeing, which belongs even to ^the cow grazing
before the gate," is to be carefully distinguished from that
internal seeing which is cognition. Three things belong to
mere external seeing, the Eye, the Object, and the Air;
whereas only two things belong to the inner seeing, the inner
Eye and the Object. The Object is twofold, according as it
is infinite when it is God, and according as it is finite, which
is the creature^ The creature again is twofold, as visible
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VALENTIN WBIGEL. 233
and as invisible. The inner Eye is threefold, being the five
Senses^ with their inner unity, the Imagination, and the
Beason with the understanding. The higher two of these
Eyes can work without the lower, but not conversely. Cor-
responding to them there is a threefold knowledge : sensual
knowledge (sensualis), directed to the external, visible appear-
ances of things ; rational knowledge (rationalis), including the
arts and sciences ; and intellectual knowledge (intellectualis),
relating to the knowledge of God.^ In like manner there is
a threefold school, namely, that of Man, that of Nature, and
that of God.
All this knowledge proceeds from the Eye, and not from
the Object. The continually recurring proof of this proposi-
tion is as follows: — If knowledge came from the Object,
then " a uniform undivided knowledge must come from any
one object into all the eyes which have this object presented
to them." In other words, the same thing would have to be
known in the same way by alL This, however, is not the
case. When several men look at the same colour, to one of
them it appears grey, to another blue, and to a third green.
If a hundred men read the same book, they have a hundred
different opinions about it, as is shown in the case of the
Bible, to which all appeal in support of their peculiar views.
Hence knowledge cannot come from the Object, but from the
Subject; not from the Thing presented, but from the Eye.
Further, the following grounds are also adduced in support of
the position. Without internal knowledge we could not
assent to the judgment of another nor recognise its correctness ;
nor could we form an estimate of writings; nor could we
learn anything by instruction from others or from books.
The same way from within to without is likewise prescribed
in Nature. The root, branches, fruits, and seed come from
the germ, and not from without, or from the earth and air.
In the creation the visible proceeded from the invisible, some-
* In a way that reminds ns of Nicolans of Cosa, Weigel refers many theo-
logical controTereies and accusations of heresy to the fact that many continue
in the sensihle or rational knowledge of God, while others rise to the intellectual
knowledge of God.
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234 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMKNTS WTTHIK PB0TBSTAKTI81C
thing from nothing; and not conversely. All diversity of
knowledge therefore lests, not upon the Object, but on the
diversity of Eyes; for all knowledge is contained within
ourselves. This is the natural knowledge by whidi we con-
duct ourselves " really," that is, actively.
This knowledge reaches to God» We are able to know the
Creator from the creatures, as they present a shadow or copy
of the eternal undivided being of God. As we infer from
a work to its maker, or from smoke to a fire, so do we infer
from the creature to God, partly by negation of all imperfec-
tion, and partly by afl&rmation in the ascending and descend-
ing series of things. This natural knowledge of God is,
however, insufficient for salvation. Sometimes this position
is established by the imperfection of that knowledge, *" for
we see Grod only from afar off, or from without, by the foot-
steps of the creature, which are as it were His shadow."
Nevertheless, when it is said again that " if Nature becomes
entirely silent and still, and comes to be forgotten," it may be
turned to a saving knowledge ; but the main groimd of this
assertion is another reason which is often repeated, namely,
that natural knowledge rests upon our own self-activity. If
it led to salvation, then salvation would rest upon our own
merit, which, however, would be Pelagianism« Faith and
salvation are not dependent on the creature, but entirely
belong to God, who is compassionate in Himself ; and hence
we must also accept a supernatural knowledge.
The natural knowledge rests upon the light of Nature;
the supernatural knowledge upon the light of faith and
grace. Hence the same thing appears quite different accord-
ing as it is viewed from the standpoint of God or of man.
These two points of view ought to be kept asunder and not
mixed or confused ; they are not hostile to one another, but
the natural knowledge or philosophy leads in an auxiliary way
to the supernatural knowledge or theology. In the super-
natural knowledge our relation is entirely passive; it is
produced in us by Grod Himself; God Himself is the Eye
and the light in man and through man ; and hence there
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VALENTIN WEIOHi. 235
IS no controversy or difference among religions men in regard
to the supernatural knowledge, but rather is there everywhere
harmony and unanimity. Any difference among them is
founded merely on the difiRsrent degree of thdr receptivity for
the divine illumination ; for man can here do nothing else
but stand still and keep Sabbath, or wait upon God in the
obedience of faith. Weigel describes this relation in his
** Tractate on Benunciation." It is only when man gives up
all things, renounces all that is his own, all his egoism, and
all the pleasure of the world as well as the delusion of
knowing anything, and when he has even abandoned this
abandonment so that he does not boast of it nor rely upon it,
— only then will Gk)d wed Himself to the soul in an inward
conjugal communion.
The entrance of this supernatural knowledge is Eegenera-
tion. Hence man has a twofold birth : a natural birth from
which all natural knowledge arises, and a supernatural birth
from the spirit of God which leads to supernatural knowledge.
Begeneration is effected by the Holy Spirit, not by means of
external ceremonies, but immediately, and it is only possible
by the fact that all supernatural goods, or in a word Christ,
lie previously concealed within us. Thus does all super-
natural knowledge flow from what is within, because God
Himself is within us as our light and eye. For the super-
natural knowledge, the same principle thus holds good as for
the natural knowledge, namely, that knowledge does not come
from the object or from without, but from within, or from the
Eye. The foundation and truth of things are never got from
books, they remain always an uncertainty unless the Eye
becomes shown to us much more distinctly than all teachers
and their booka But " this book in me and in all men, in
great and small, in young and old, in learned and unlearned,"
is the right book by which we are able to understand even
the Holy Scriptura ** It is the light of men which lightens
them in the darkness, and it is the Word of God. This word
is the wisdom of God in man ; it is the image of God in
man ; it is the spirit or finger of God in man ; it is the seed
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2 3 S OPPOSITIONAL MOVEBCKNTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
of Grod, the law of God, Christ, the kingdom of Grod ; it is the
wife of the life in us."
This inner word is the earlier. It is pnt externally before
the eyes and ears of man in three ways : in the law of the
tables, in the person of Christ, and in the preaching by the
office of the Spirit ; for were God's word not in ns, all that
falls below the whole historical Christ, and all the drawing of
the Father to the Son, would help and profit us nothing.
" He who has not confession and absolution in himself by faith
in Christ, is helped nothing at all by confession and absolution
in connection with the priest" But, on the other hand, the
external is not entirely in vain. As there is no knowledge
attained without an object, so preaching the Scriptures and
external instruction form a useful means of awakening and
stimulating, in order to excite and draw forth the word of God
that lies hidden within us, only the Scriptures are not to be
regarded as if they were a vehicle on which the knowledge is
brought into us from without.
These positions are put into their correct light by the views
that are expressed regarding the relation of God to finite
things in general and to man in particular.
There are necessarily two beings, the perfect and the
fragmentary or "part-work." The perfect is the eternal,
self-subsisting true Being, that includes all things in Himself
as well when they were in secret as now when they have come
to the light. The imperfect "part -work" is the creature
which arises from the true Being. God may be compared to
the number OTie ; for the eternity of God can just as little be
divided as we can divide the one in arithmetic. He is one
without any division or multiplicity, and so much so that two
expressions, which, applied to earthly things exclude one
another as contradictory opposites, may both be applied to
God. Hence God is likewise the highest good, and it is only
in the possession of Him that our longing for happiness can
be stilled, whereas all finite goods are naught, and the right
relation to them is to be entirely without desire of them.
The creature corresponds to the number two, because it is not
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VALENTIN WEIGEL. 237
sufficient for itself, but requires God for its preservation ; it is
only a likeness or shadow of God, a reflection or semblance of
the One and the Eternal
Finite things have been called by God out of nothing to
something. Accordingly, we distinguish a threefold Heaven ;
the highest Heaven is God ; the middle Heaven is the angels
or stars ; the bwest Heaven is the heavens and the earth, or
the visible world as formed of sulphur, salt, and mercury.
God dwells in a light to which no man has accesa As the
eternal Word, He comprehends all the angels, while the
angels have all the creatures in themselves spiritually. As
the nut is said to be the tree complicüe or infolded, and the
tree is an astrum explicitum or an unfolded nut, and as in the
number one the other numbers are involved, whereas two,
three, etc., are the number one evolved, so are all the angels in
God, and all things in the angels or constellations. All created
things do thus participate in God ; they have their very being
and their subsistence from Him ; for without Him they would
not be, nor would they be able to exist. Hence Grod is in all
things, and all things are essentially in Him. For ** God and
His Will or Word is not only in all creatures, but is also out
of them, as it comprehends and includes them, and therefore
even a fly could not live out of God, so that all must be in
God in substance although not in will" Yea, even Lucifer is
by his substance in God, because he would otherwise not be
at alL Along with Being, finite things have also nothing in
them, because they were called out of nothing to be some-
thing.
By his natural birth man is composed of three parts :
Body, Spirit, and SouL Body and Spirit constitute the mortal
part of man. The former is the tangible or sensitive part,
and it is taken from the earthly elements and returns to them
at death ; the latter, the intangible and insensitive part, is
taken from the stars, which therefore influence our whole life
in so far as that life depends on the Spirit By Ins body
man is a microcosm, that is, he comprehends all the lower
creatures ; yet the body is only the external bouse of the man.
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238 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
The seal comes from the spiraciUum vitce, that is, it is
immediately inbreathed into man by Grod ; and on account of
this divine origin it has to live with God as a wife with her
husband. Hence man has a double nature, Adam and Christ ;
and natural and supernatural are both in him.
Thus was man put into the middle between God and the
creature, that he might choose between good and eviL God
could indeed have settled him in the good vrithout giving
him choice, but then man would have been just like the
cattle. Man did not fall by some external seduction, but he
carries in himself the subtle serpent. The Angel in heaven
and Adam in Paradise both thought : I am an image of God,
the Almighty, and should be as God ; but God is His own
master, free, without commandment or law, and loves and
seeks Himself; therefore, I will also turn myself to myself,
love myself, and have delight in myself, and so shall I also be
free and blessed like God. By this self-love the Angel fell
as well as the man, turned himself from unity to hetereity,
from the one to the divided, from life to death, from heaven to
helL This turning from God to evil is, however, realized only
in the wilL Even the fallen one remains, as to his essence, in
God, and everything viewed in its essence as Being is good.
This distinction is indicated by the prepositions jttata and in ;
God is in those who are pious as He is one with them in
essence as well as in will ; he is along with or beside (juxta)
the Devil, who has turned himself away from Him as regards
his wUL The sinner, in his essence, must love God as his
origin and his true being, yet hate Him in his will ; and so he
finds himself in a constant conflict between love and hate, and
this is hell. For heaven and hell are not two separate places
somewhere in the universe, but we carry heaven and hell
within us. To live in heaven means the same as to live in
the will of God or to be one with God ; to live in hell means
to live after our own will, or to be turned away from God.
Although it thus depends only on our wiU whether we are
in heaven or in hell, yet after we have once sinned the new
life can only arise in us by the immediate operation of divine
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VALENTIN WEIGEL. 239
grace. It is preached from the pulpits that man becomes
just by faith, and imputation of the death of Christ ; but, in
truth, nothing external is of any avail, unless Christ is bom,
dies, and rises again within us. By the immediate inworking
of Grod, the Christ in us who was overcome by sin is thus
reanimated again ; and for this it is required above all that
we mortify the old Adam, or the carnal life, with all its
selfishness and its attachment to earthly things. If Adam is
dead, then will Christ live anew ; or in other words, we will
be really tmited with God. " Christ's death and merit are
not imputed to any one ; but if he has Christ's death in him-
self, and if he is then baptized by baptism to a like death, and
if his whole body is crucified with Christ, then is there
imputation." '' Faith is this, that Christ's life is ruling in us,
so that SUs spirit is in us. His flesh and blood are in us," etc.
'' As God the Father is in Christ the Son, and the Son is in
the Father, and these two are one ; so is God the Son in the
believer, and the believer is in the Son, and these two are
one." '' We must dwell in God and God in lis ; this is the
eternal marriage, the heavenly marriage by which we remain
united and connected with God."
From these positions there follow several consequences.
And first of all the regenerate man must give himself earnestly
and diligently to the work of holiness. So long as we con-
tinue to live in the flesh, we cannot indeed be entirely without
sin, but we can turn our will away from it ; and whereas we
formerly sinned joyfully with our will, after regeneration we
do so only with deep pain and against our will Again, the
Church is not a limited community enclosed in a particidar
place with exactly defined doctrines, but in all countries and
among all nations wherever pious men are found who have
died with Christ in their own hearts, and been renewed unto
a holy life, they form the true Church. Even here on earth,
after terrible conflicts, there will come a golden age, when all
the sects will cease and the universal Catholic Church will
everywhere prevail ; when Christ will really rule ; and when
love for the brethren will be the highest law among men.
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240 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
The historical Christ has, like the letter of the written word,
the significance of an external remembrance and testimony.
The Word was born man of the Virgin in order that God
might reconcile us through Christ with Himself, and might
show us a light, a way, a guide, a door, a pattern, or exemplar
as to how we should walk after Him. The depreciation of the
external means of grace is only in. a limited measure extended
to the sacraments. Baptism is not a nullity, but we have to
obtain by it a new flesh and blood from heaven. Confession
and the Lord's Supper are not indeed necessary, as the believer
bears the true High Priest in himself, but they minister to
greater assurance. — ^In opposition to the supremacy of the
priests, the universal priesthood is emphasized ; every believer
has the Christ in himself, who can forgive him his sins and
bestow absolution. — Prayer does not procure us anything from
God : it would be blasphemy to assert that God, who is
eternally unchangeable, would be determined or occasioned to
do anything by our prayers. The kingdom of God, for which
we pray, does not lie without, but within us, and therefore
prayer serves as an inward monitor, and to awaken us
within.
Weigel remained unimpeached tiU his death. Entirely
averse to the dogmatic wranglings of that age, he appears to
have devoted himself chiefly to the duties of his office of
preaching. He subscribed the Formvla Consensus without
hesitation, but says, " I have not sworn by the books of men,
but I have promised, by this subscription, to continue to hold
by the writings of the prophets and apostles, and never to
diverge from them ; and if I find anything in the writings of
the teachers or the Church that may be in conformity with the
apostolic doctrine, I will also accept it." From this point of
view he must also have exercised a wise silence with regard
to his opinions in the pulpit Of his writings there only
appeared before his death an unimportant funeral sermon«
They were for a time only circulated in manuscript within the
circle of his faithful adherents. It was not till 1604-1618
that his productions appeared in various places along with a
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VALENTIN WEIGEL. 24l
number of spurious writings, and it was only then that the
conflict about Weigelianism began.
The theological polemic carried on by J. Schellhammer,
Zacharias Theobald, George Eost, Lucas Osiander, and others,^
does not deserve to be dealt with here, and the less so
because they do not enter in detail upon WeigeVs doctrines.
To most of them, Weigel appears as a dangerous revolutionary,
who, like a Thomas Miinzer, aims at overthrowing the political
and social order. To others he is already objectionable because
lie opposes the literal sense of the doctrines and the dogmatic
positions fixed in the creeds. They all rail and declaim
against him in the rhodomontade style of the seventeenth
century.
Weigelianism became widely spread. The tractates of
Weigel were first printed at Halle. In the Archbishopric of
Magdeburg many of the nobility adhered to him. He gained
numerous followers in Anhalt; and in the gymnasium of
Marburg in 1619 two teachers, named H. P. Homagius and
G. Zimmermann, suddenly declared themselves Weigelians,
and were particularly zealous against the use of profane writers
in the schools. They had already gained a not unimportant
following in Hesse, and it was only by severe measures that
the Landgraf could check the movement. In Worms, Stephen
Grunius (1623) preached regarding the division of man into
body, spirit, and soul. In Frankf urt-on-the-Maine, some like-
wise declared themselves to be Weigelians. In Nürnberg,
William £o gathered a numerous congregation in 1622. In
the second and third decades of the seventeenth century,
an abundant literature appeared, which brought Weigelian
thoughts, without their philosophical basis and in a popular
form, to the knowledge of the publia This literature does
not contain anything new, and it mostly exaggerated, even to
caricature, the antagonisms of the system to learned culture, or
^ Johannes Schellhammer, Widerlegong des vermeynten Postill Valentini
Weigelii, Leipz. 1(^21. Zacharias Theohald, Widertaufferischer Geist, NQm-
het^ 1628. GeoTg Rost, Heldenbach vom Rosengarten, Rostock 1622. Lucas
Osiander, Theologisches Bedenken Vnd Treohertzige Erinnenmg. Tubing.
1624.
VOL. L Q
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242 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
to the letter, or its appeal to immediate revelation, or its
astrology, or the hope of a renovation of the political and social
relations. This also applies to Esajas Stifel (t 1627), an inn-
keeper at Langensalza and his nephew Ezechiel Meth (t 1640),
to whom the usual Weigelian errors are imputed, as also to
Paul Nagel (t 1621), a professor of mathematics at Leipsic,
who sees a universal corruption coming in from the worship
of the letter by tiie preachers who are not taught by the
Holy Spirit. By the aid of the stars, he tries to spell out
from the Apocalypse the signs of better times. Hans
Engelbrecht, a clothmaker at Brunswick (t 1642), moves
on the same lines, only that he lays more stress on the
verification of faith in active love, and he claims special
respect for his personal character.
A movement closely related to Weigelianism, although of
independent origin, is represented by the Hoeicrncians. In
the year 1614 there appeared the **Fama FratemitcUis Ä C,
or the Brotherhood of the famous order of the £. C. to the
heads, estates, and learned men of Europe," prefaced with
a plan of a universal and general reformation of the wide
world. In 1615 there followed the Confessio Fratemitatis
JR. C. In the "General Eeformation," carried out by the
arrangement of the Emperor Justinian, the seven wise men
of Greece, along with certain Eoman philosophers, are
represented as consulting about an improvement of the
world ; but they come to the view that their century could
not be helped. To vindicate their call they carry on
much talk about their trouble and labour, and give an
order regarding a new tax on vegetables, turnips, and parsley.
The Fama invites all the learned men of Europe to attach
themselves to the new Brotherhood for the improvement
of the corrupt world. Its philosophy is the head, origin,
and mistress of all other arts and sciences ; and it aims at
bringing thoroughly to light heaven and earth, and the
nature and being of the unique man. — It is a characteristic
sign of that age, and of the degeneracies to which a noble
mysticism may lead among the masses, that this mysterious
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JACX)B BÖHME. 243^
suramons called forth the Eosicrucian movement. Certainly
there was no lack of calm intellectual judges, who doubted
the existence of a society of Bosicrucians, and regarded these
writings as composed merely in order to ridicule or befool the
world. But incomparably greater was the number of those
who everywhere inquired after that society, and expected
from it the salvation of the world. They all gathered around
the mysterious name of Bosicrucian, and there were then not
a few who, from an obscure longing to penetrate into the
depths of nature and to grasp the supernatural directly, gave
themselves up to boundless fanaticism and astrology. The
truth, in fact, was tiiat a pious Würtemberg pastor, named
John Valentin Andre» (1586-1654), had in these writings
sought to ridicule the fanaticism and folly of bis time in
keen satire. And when, against all his expectation, the
satire was taken as earnest, and it became the very gathering
point of blind enthusiasts, he came forward himself against it
on several occasions, but in vain.
We turn now from these caricatures. Such morbid off-
shoots are not to be taken as our standards in judging of that
mysticism and theosophy which shot forth such splendid
blossoms in several individuals. In none, however, did it
appear with more magnificence and perfection than in Jacob
Böhme, to whom we now come.
V.
Jacob Böhme (1575-1624).^
Böhme was bom at Alt-Seidenberg in the Oberlausitz, near
the Bohemian frontier. He grew up amid rustic surround-
^ The worka of Böhme hare heen used in the collected edition published at
Amsterdam in 1682 (Des Gottseligen, Hoch - Erleuchteten Jacob Böhmens
Teutonic! Philosophi Alle Theosophischen 'V\''erken). Compare Hermann
Adolph Fechner, Jaccib Böhmes Leben und Schriften m the Neulausitz.
Magazin, zxzüL 4 and xxxir. 1, Görlitz 1857. The woik of Julius Hamberger
(Die Lehre des deutschen Philosophen Jakob Böhme in einem systematischen
Auszage aus dessen sämmtlichen Schriften, etc., München 1844) is only to be
used with cantioD.
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244 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
inga. On account of the weakness of his body, he obtained
a good school education, yet this went only so far as the
school of the place could cany it. In 1589 he became
a shoemaker's apprentice at Seidenberg, and in 1599 he
became a master of the craft at Görlitz. Böhme was
entirely self-taught from the time he left schooL He read
the writings of Paracelsus, Weigel, Schwenkfeldt, as well as
those of Stifel, Metb, and the Bosicrucians, along with the
Bible ; but he received no learned culture. As he represents
it himself, he knew neither the language nor the writings of
the ancients, and in philosophy he was entirely a homo rudis.
He says that all that he gives he dmws from the depths of
his own soul, or rather from the overpowering illumination of
the Holy Spirit ; for he speaks only from the impulse of this
divine Spirit and not from his own understanding. When the
Spirit comes upon him, he is laid hold of irresistibly ; and
when He has withdrawn, Böhme himself knows hardly how
to interpret what has been «poken through him. It is no
wonder that to us in these later times this interpretation much
more frequently fails. It is almost impossible to relish his
language. At one time he confuses us by the very affluence
of the sensuous images which are heaped up by his active
phantasy in order to enable us to conceive the inconceivable; for
they are not often happily chosen so as to be easily intelligible,
and still more rarely are they consistently carried out. At
another time he repels us by his efiforts to obtain the spiritual
meaning of a word of Scripture from the sound and tone of
its several syllables. And at other times it is almost
impossible for us to pick out the few grains of genuine gold
from the heaped-up rubbish of mere empty phantasies, or to
hold fast the thread of connection through the wearisome
labyrinth of prolix details which skip hiüi^ and thither with-
out order. We might read into his mysteries the wisdom of
all ages if we were to proceed with Bäime according to the
well-known saying of Socrates regarding Heraclitus, that
'* what I have understood of him is splendid and to the point,
and therefore I believe that the rest of him is likewise good
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JACOB BÖHMS» 245
and true." Bat it would be quite unjust, on the other hand,
to thrust aside all that is obscure and difficult as unintelligible.
As Socrates said of Heraclitus, Böhme in fact needs a " Delian
swimmer."
Since the time of Schelling and Hegel, it has become usual
to reckon Böhme among the philosophers, and to regard him as
a precursor of the modem speculation. Nor is this wrong ;
for in a mystico-theosophic way the cobbler of Görlitz alreeuly
beheld in sensible intuition what Hegel long afterwards sought
to embrace in the conception, namely, that the finite or Evil
proceeds from the infinite or Good by the process of self-
determination, and returns again from this estrangement into
the same ; and we have thus the dialectical process of Thesis,
Antithesis, and Synthesis, or of the " In-itself, For-itself, and
In-and-for-itself."
We must, however, beware of overstraining this affinity in
thought between Böhme and these later philosophers; and,
above all, it is not to be extended to the first of his greater
writings, which is the one most frequently used, the "Atirara,
or the Daum at us Rising^ that is, the root or mother of Philo-
sophy, Astrology, and Theology," eta, 1612.^ This treatise
falls into the three parts indicated in the title. Philosophy
treats of the divine power, of what God is, and how Nature,
the stars, and the elements are qualified in the Essence of
God, and whence everything has its origin. Astrology treats
of the powers of Nature, the stars, and the elements, showing
how all the elements arise therefrom, how they impel and
govern all things, and how good and evil are efiected by them.
Theology treats of the kingdom of Christ, how it is opposed
to the kingdom of hell and is in conflict with it, and how
men by faith and the spirit may overcome hell aqd obtain
blessedness.
Böhme starts from the view that on examination of Nature
we find everywhere two qualities, one good and one evil, and
that in this world they exist together in all powers and all
^ Aurora, oder Morgenrothe im Aufgang, das ist, Die Wurzel oder Mutter der
PhiloBophitt, Astrologie, und Theologite, etc., An. 1612.
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246 OPPOSITIONAL MOVSMEKTB WITHIN PB0TE8TANTISIC
creatures. Thus Heat, as Light, l»rings life to all things, and,
as Fierceness, it brings comiption. The good quality alone
rules in the angels only, and the evil quality alone rules in
the devils. TUs Opposition in the creatures is produced by
the stars, whose powers control the creation, and it is not
efifected immediately by God ; for God, although He permeates
the whole world as the sap does the tree, has not the opposi-
tion of the good and the evil in Himself, but is wholly good.
God the Father has in Himself all the powers which are in
Nature ; not, however, in such a way that each power exists
in Him in a particular place, but all the powers are united
together in the Father as one power. From this one power,
which is without beginning and without end, all creatures
have been produced. God the Son is not another God than
the Father, nor is He out of the Father, but He is the Heart
in the Father, the core in all powers ; He is a self-subsisting
person, and is eternally and always bom of the Father.
Should the Father cetise to bring forth, the Son would no
longer be anything; did the Son no longer shine in the
Father, the Father would become a dark abyss ; and if the
Father's power did not spring up from eternity to eternity,
neither could the divine Being exist God the Holy Spirit
is a still spiration of all the powers of the Father and Son ;
He is the spirit of life who forms and shapes all things.
The Trinity is brought near to us by its likeness in man. It
is shown fortJi by the Power which is in the whole heart, and
the Light which is in the whole soul, and the intellectual
spirit of both ; and again in all things, by the power out of
which a body is formed, the sap or the heart of things, and
the forth-streaming power in it or the spirit
The opposition of the two qualities arises through Lucifer.
In God there continually spring up and flow forth seven
Fountain-Spirits or qualities : the Sour, the Sweet, and the
Bitter, Heat, Love, Sound or Mercurius, and the last spirit,
which is called ScdUter. These mutually bring forth each other,
and all the seven united in one another are as one spirit
From the seventh Fountain-Spirit God created the angels by
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JACOB BOHMB. 247
a process of contraction. They formed three kingdoms, each
under a supreme head, — Michael, Lucifer, and Uriel,— created
respectively after the form of God the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Spirit, and formed oat of the midst of the kingdom
belonging to them. Lucifer was at first the most glorious
angel, with the most beautiful and most powerful body, and
with a light which was incorporated with the Heart or Son of
God ; but he set himself up to triumph over the divine heart.
Tnstead of obeying God, his Fountain-Spirits raised themselves
up and began to form a higher, prouder qualification than
God Himself possessed. The Fountain-Spirits then inflamed
themselves too strongly ; the sour quality drew the body too
hardly together ; the sweet water dried up, etc. Amid this
frantic foaming and tearing, a Son was born to Lucifer in his
heart, and the Spirit went out from his mouth. Lucifer, along
with his angels, was driven in a violent conflict from his
kingdom, which is the region of this world ; then men were
created as a compensation, and their king, born in the middle
of time from an angel, was to take up the place of Lucifer.
When, in the third birth in the region of Lucifer, Qod was
kindled into wrath, the light in that birth was extinguished ;
it all became darkness, and out of it was made the sensible
world. The first birth is that of the Son of God ; the second is
the proceeding forth of the seven Spirits ; the third is the con-
ceivability of Nature. Nature flows from a double fountain :
from the lovely, joyful Essence of God, and from the Wrath-
fire which was kindled in the fall of Lucifer ; and hence, in
all its parts, it is mixed of good and evil, of heaven and hell.
This world has accordingly a threefold birth. By its first or
inmost birth it is of one nature and will with the higher
heavens, that is, with the kingdoms of Michael and UrieL By
its second birth it is found in the present bipartite or dual
life. The third birth is the carrying of it back to the divine
unity, as the clear and holy heaven which inqualifies with the
heart of God beyond and above all the heavens. The second
birth is depicted by Böhme, under the guidance of the Mosaic
record of creation, in prolix and fantastic images, carried on
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248 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
till the fourth day, when the creation of the stars gives occasion
for unpalatable astrological reveries. Then the author suddenly
breaks oflf with the words : " For the devil thought of making
a festive evening therewith, because he saw that the day was
therein to dawn."
The thought that Evil has its ground in God Himself has
its first appearance in the writings of a later period. The
most important of these are entitled, Description of tJu Three
Principles of the Divine Nature (1618); Of the Incarnation of
Jesus Christ (1620), and High and deep grounds of the threefold
Life of Man (1620). The principles expounded in these
writings may be summarized as briefly as possible in the
following propositions. The first Principle is the wholly
universal indeterminate Will, which is therefore called the
Unground and Darkness ; but it bears in itself Fierceness, or
the longing and desiring after determinate willing. This first
Principle being mirrored in its Wisdom, brings forth out of
itself, or makes contract into itself, the second Principle, the
determinate separated will, the principle of Light The first
Principle then imaginates itself into the second Principle, thus
as it were fertilizing and differentiating itself by Light, and
then there proceed from it the good powers and effects. That
is, to God the Father and God the Son there supervenes the
accession of the Holy Spirit to complete the holy threefoldness
in the Trinity. The first Principle makes the Angels proceed
from itself. These, in like manner, should imaginate into the
second Principle, Light. Instead of this, Lucifer turns himself
round to the imgrounded principle, to darkness, in order to
persist there. Thereby Fire, or Fierceness, instead of being
mitigated by Light, is concentrated into itself, and there arises
the Satanic Nature, which is wholly eviL At the same time,
by the upflaming of Fire and the contracting of the fervid
fierceness, the lower earthly Elements arose from the heavenly
Elements, and the formation of this earthly World was com-
pleted. This is the third principle. Hence the three principles
and the three Persons of the Trinity do not now wholly
coincide.
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JACOB BüHME. 249
These short and comparatively clear propositions do not
yet, however, entirely express Böhme's view. We must
therefore follow him somewhat farther, keeping as close as
possible to his own words : — God is the Being of all beings,
and from EUm all things take their first beginning. It cannot
be properly said of God that in EUm there is fire or Sourness,
still lees that there is air, water, or earth, but that such have
arisen from Him. Nor can it be said that death, or hell-fire,
or sorrowfulness is in God, but that such have arisen from
Him. The devils also have arisen, and therefore we must
inquire after the source, or prima materia, of badness ; for, in
the primal principle, all is one thing and all is made out of
God, out of His Essence, according to the triad. In God,
indeed, there is neither beginning nor distinction, but because
the ultimate source of wrath and of love has to become dis-
closed, and because they are both from one primal principle
or mother, and are one thing, we must speak thereof in a
creaturely way, as if there was a beginning. All things are of
God, but God has created all, not from another matter, but
from His own being. Now God is a Spirit, but a spirit does
nothing else but rise, bubble up, move itself, and always bring
forth itselfl It has in its birth primarily three forms in itself,
as being bitter, sour, and hot ; of these no one is first or last,
but all three are only one, and they all bring forth each the
other two. Between bitter and sour, fire brings itself forth, and
thus there appear, in the fii'st principle, likewise the four forms
or qualities. Sour, Bitter, Fire, and Water. The primal principle
of all life and of all movement consists in fierceness or fervent-
ness, in accordance with which God calls Himself a fiery,
angry, jealous God. In man, when he is angered, his spirit
draws into itself ; he thrills with bitterness, and unless it is
soon resisted the fire of wrath becomes kindled so that he
bums in rage ; and so is it likewise in the primal principle
that is the ground of the production of Natura The first
Being is described as sour ; it contracts into itself and becomes
a hard, cold Power. On the other hand, bitterness resists and
pierces and rubs itself so hard that a flash of lightning flames
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250 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
forth in terrible fire. The fire-flash has now become primas^
and the matter, which in the primal principle was so hard and
terse, has become as if dead and powerless. When, then, the
Fire becomes mixed np with the sourness, there arises from
the ferventness a terror of great joy, and it flames np like a
kindled light. Thus springs up the fifth Fountain, graceful,
charming Love, and here there is vain caressing and love-
making, as when the bridegroom embraces his bride ; and
therefrom is brought forth the sixth form, which is Tone or
Mercurius. As with this gracious Love or gentle Fountain
the eternal light of Grod is bom, it is the only-begotten Son of
the Father. In this great joy, however, the birth can no longer
maintain itself, but obtains the seventh form in an unfathom-
able multiplication, which is the Paradise or kingdom of God.
Further, when the heart or light of God is bom in the Father,
there arises in the fifth form from the Water-fountain in the
light a most lovely, fragrant, savoury spirit, and this is the
procession of the Spirit from Father and Son. God now created
the Angels that He might rejoice in the creatures, and that the
creatures might rejoice with Him. Among the angels, Lucifer
was also created from the Eternal Nature ; he saw the birth of
the holy Deity, the heart of God and the confirmation of the
Spirit, and he was to continue an Angel. But because he saw
that he was a prince in the first Principle, he despised the
gentleness of the heart of God, and would not imaginate into
that gentleness, but would rather qualify into fire - power.
Hence everything vanished from him ; he was spued out from
his princely throne, and is now unable to raise his imagination
any longer to God, but remains fixed in the four Anxieties of
the primal Principle, and therefore God has enclosed him in
the third Principle, or this World.
Böhme has also expressed these thoughts in a less
physical garb in the following way: There is an eternal,
unfathomable divine Essence, and in its nature there are
three persons. The first person is the eternal Will. This
Will is ,not being itself, but the cause of all being. There
is nothing before it which constitutes it, but it constitutes
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JACOB BÖHME. 251
it8el£ A mere will, however» is thin like a nonentity.
This cansalises the will so that it becomes desireful, and
the process of desire is a mode of imagination, as the
will beholds itself in the mirror of wisdom. By this
Imagination of the will into the eternal wisdom, which
is identical with it, there arises the Will's Son, the other
person of the Deity, who is bom from eternity to eternity as
the heart of God, as His Word, as the Eevelation of the Being
of all beings, and the Power of the life of all lives. The third
person is the Spirit, which proceeds out of the power of speech,
from the grasp of the will by the imagination ; this is the
life of the Deity, a Person other than the Father and the Son.
The office of the Spirit is to disclose the wisdom of God. The
will of the heart of God laid hold of the sour fiat in the centre
of the Nature of the Father ; and as the figures of eternity
had been beheld in wisdom, they were now grasped by the fiat
in the Will-spirit of Gh>d, and were born and created, not from
alien matter, but frotn God's essence, or from tiie nature and
proprium of the Father. Their destination was to imaginate into
the nature and property of the Son, and eat of God's love and
Essentiality in the light of His Majesty; and they did this
with the exception of Lucifer, who turned himself away from
the light of love, and wished in the severe fire-nature to rule
over God's gentleness and lov& He was therefore driven into
the eternal Darkness. The expelled spirits then kindled by
their imagination the nature of the Essentiality, so that earth
and stones were produced from the heavenly Essence, and the
gentle spirit of water in the qualification of fire became the
burning Firmament. Thereupon ensued the creation of this
world as the third Principle, and the devil was shut up in
darkness between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of
this world.
The theory of the Principles took a somewhat diJBferent form
in certain later writings. The most readable of these are
entitled, High and deep grounding of Six points (1620); A
short explanation of the f Mowing Six points ; On the earthly and
heavenly Mystery (1620) ; On the Election of Grace ; and Theo^
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252 opposinoNAL movements within pkotestantism.
Sophie questiom (1624).^ There now appears before the three
Principles the wholly indeterminate XJnground, which embraces
all things and powers, yet on account of its undistinctiveness
it is an entirely unqualified unity. From this proceed the two
objective principles, the Evil and the Good : the former pro-
ceeding first as a consuming fire, as an angry and jealous God ;
and the latter second, as a lovable, compassionate God, who
neither wills evil nor can will it. The procession of this Love,
or its turning itself to the primal Ground, is the Holy Spirit
of the divine life. The third Principle lies in the creation of
the world ; its exemplar or eternal model is the idea of all
things, and it has its primal existence in wisdom as the
eternal mirrored form of the primary divine principle, or the
Mysterium magnum. Both principles co-operate in the creation,
and hence good is mixed with evil in all the things in the
world; that is, good and evil are not materially separated,
but everything is good or evil according to the centre in which
it has its subsistence.
There is no essence without will, but the will is the father
of all essence. And hence God as the ultimate ground of all
essences is a wilL This first will, however, is an eternal
nothing ; it is the unground, or the eternal unity apart from
all possibilities and properties. It is without origin in time,
and without place and position, yet at the same time it is
out of the world and in the world, and deeper than any
thought can plunge. This nothing is at the same time a
craving after something, and as there is nothing which can
give anything, accordingly the craving or the nothing itself
must give it, and so it makes something out of nothing. This
is the meaning of the Magia or Mysterium wjognvmi. What-
ever is something, however, or every particular thing, be it
divine or devilish, consists of Yes and No, of divine
power and light, and their object The eternal will of the
divine Unground emanates from itself; Unity becomes
^ Von sechs Punkten hohe und tiefe Gründung, Anno 1620. Eine kurze
Erklärung nachfolgender sechs Punkten. Vom irdischei^ und himmlischen
Mysterio, Anno 1620. Von der Gnadenwahl. Theosophische Fragen, Anno
1624.
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JACOB BÖHME. 253
plurality, and with plurality there arises also distinction
and opposition. The distinguished many are the No; for,
on account of the distinction, the emanated will is an
individual will which desires to be a thing of its own, and to
distinguish itself from identity or sameness, and which therefore
in Desire draws itself inward. The unity, on the other hand,
is an emanating Yes, which is insensient in itself and only
becomes manifest in the No as its object, and thus it obtains
something that it can will The Nothing wishes to pass
out of itself that it may become manifest, and the Something
wishes to be in itself that it may be sentient in the Nothing,
in order that the unity in it may become sentient The
emanated desiring individual will has several properties :
Sharpness, the movement of attraction, the feeling of anxiety,
and fire. Accordingly God is called an angry, jealous God,
and a consuming fire. Now, as the distinguishable will lays
hold of unity, there arises a fifth property in Love, which in
fire becomes mobile and desireful, and as a great love-fire it
forms the second principla We have thus along with the
XJnground two principles, or two centres in one principle, as
two kinds of fire. The Wrath-fire in the emanated will of
receivability is a principle of the eternal Nature ; the centre
of Love, or the Word of God, is the breathing of the unity of
God, the foundation of power. The former is the Father,
the latter the Son, and the emanation of the love-breathing
of the life of love is the Holy Spirit The angels were
formed out of the essence of both the eternal centres ; their
powers are the great emanating names of God, all having
sprung from the Yes and been led into the No. The angels
are the servants and instruments of God in the guidance of
the creatures. Their destiny was to sing in blessed jojrful-
ness and to play in the divine kingdom of joy. Lucifer fell
because, raising himself above his throne, he wished to exist
in his own receptivity, to make the No rule over the Yes,
and to persist in the Wrath-fire of the first Principle. The
will of the ungrounded being has shaped itself from eternity
into a form in wisdom as a thing images itself in a mirror,
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254 OPPOSITIONAL MOVPMBNTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
and there were thus in this idea the pattern forms of all Üüngs
which were ever to be created» only without distinction and
motion. With the object of giving a revelation of Himself,
God has created this external world as the objective repre-
sentation of what is inward ; and the spirit of the stars and
the elements thus constitutes the third Principle. Both
centres have been introduced into the form of the world, so
that darkness and light, evil and good, are mixed in all earthly
things.
The other views of Böhme were little affected by this
modification of his theory of the Principles. In what follows
of our exposition we accordingly found upon all his writings
except the Aimmu
He regards the opinion that God is outside of the world
in a particular place, as a widespread but utterly carnal
error. Heaven and Hell are not bounded spaces above or
below the earth, but every man is in heaven or hell according
as he lets the good or the evil, the joyous will of God or the
selfish, individual will, rule in himself God is and works in
and through us as in all things and through all things, only
everywhere by different powers and qualities. He also holds
that the opinion is erroneous that represents God, the three-
fold, as having first reflected as to how it was to be in and
with the world, and that He has in His decrees set up for
the creation immutable laws from without God works in
the world as the sap does in the tree. Our carnal reason is
indeed blind, and ineapable of exploring the mysteries of God
and of Nature ; but if we have experienced in ourselves the
new birth from Christ, the eyes of our spirit are opened, so
that in the contemplation of our Ego, of God, and the world,
men can know and understand what the divine Spirit has
been gracious enough to communicate to them through His
weak instrument, Jacob Böhme. — ^When Lucifer had fallen,
God created man in order to fill up the gap that arose. He
created him in His own image, so that he might participate in
the three Principles. The body was indeed formed out of
the earthly matter of this world, but God breathed into it the
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JACOB BÖHME. 255
true soul of all the three Principles in the temperament : the
true creaturelj Fire-soul, from which God is called a jealous
God and a consuming fire ; the Light-world, as the kingdom
of the power of God ; and the Air-soul as the ypirUus mundi.
Thus created, Adam was put into Paradise, that is^ into the
constitution of the divine world of light that was innate in
him ; and in this world he was to remain. And, as every
life must be nourished with the food that is related to it,
God made a number of trees of Paradise to grow of whose
fruit Adam was to eat, but only with his mouth as a spiritual
nourishment of the divine life of light Among them stood
a tree with earthly elemental fruit of which Adam was for-
bidden to eat Because all the three Principles were in him,
each of them wished to rule over him ; his soul stood there-
fore between the two opposite centres of fire and light ; and,
according to God's will, its destination was to direct its
imagination upon the light But man inclined himself to
the spirit of this world, and thereby he became bad. Hence
he fell into sleep, which was alien to him by his original
nature. During the sleep, the Tincture, or the living spiritual
form, — which is conceived as a medium between the merely
ideal being in the divine wisdom and the actual reality, and
which is called the Holy Virgin, — then gathered itself
together and vanished into the heavens. Man was thereby
changed, and in order that he might not be completely
destroyed by the enjoyment of elemental fruit, God created
Eve from the sleeping Adam, who till then had been andro-
gynous. Now for the first time did men eat of the for-
bidden fruit ; and thereby they fell completely under the
influence of the earthly, and were driven out of Paradise.
Yet they received even then the consoling prophecy of the
serpent " bruiser " Christ
God is not, as reason represents Him to us, an unmerciful
Being, who damns man to death on account of his dis-
obedience, but His will is that the sinner be converted and
live. For this end the Second Principle, the light-life or
the Heart and the Son of God, must become man in order to
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256 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
kindle again the nature that was shut up in death, with the
brightness of light Already in the ideal world Christ as
the future Eedeemer had on this account embodied Himself
in the form of eternity, and in Him God has elected the
human race. After the Fall, the word of the promise, that
the seed of the woman should bruise the head of the serpent,
was made good to the woman, thereby the holy voice went
out of God into the woman's deadened heavenly nature in
order to overpower the kindled wrath of God with the
highest divine love. By this voice the poor soul again
obtained divine life, and it was propagated as a covenant of
grace from man to man. In this way all men have part in
the word of promise and in the eternal light in Christ
Nevertheless, mankind divided soon into two kingdoms, the
one of which turned itself more to the light and the other
more to the darkness. From their founders they are called
the Church of Abel and the Church of Cain. Eve, entangled
in carnal desire, hoped for an earthly kingdom, and therefore
believed that' she had alreeuly brought forth the Bruiser of
the serpent in Cain ; but Cain sprang only from the selfhood
of the Adamic soul by carnal pleasure, whereas Abel sprang
from the divine desire that was produced by the inner Word
of God. That Abel was slain by Cain is a type of the fact
that Christ was to suffer death for men. Abel's place was
filled up by Seth, in whose race Christ was to reveal Him-
self in the flesh. Cain's race, on the other hand, turned
themselves to earthly arts. After the flood, the three
Principles appeared in the Sons of Noah. Shem being a
figure of the Light-world, Japhet a figure of the Fire-world,
and Ham a figure of the Outer-world. Similar representa-
tions of the opposition of light and darkness, of good and
evil, are found in Isaac and Ishmael as well as in Jacob and
EsaiL This opposition, however, is not so extreme as that
the Jews alone should have part in the divine light, and
that the heathen should walk wholly in darkness ; but as
Adam proceeded from the one God into his carnal ignorance,
so does grace also come out of the same one God and is
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JACOB BÖHME. 257
offered to all ignorant ones, to heathens as well as to Jews,
lu the covenant which God concluded with Abraham the
heathen do not indeed share, but thej certainly share in the
first covenant of the word uttered in grace. Paul can there-
fore say that God has called and chosen the heathen also in
the covenant of Christ ; for the purpose of grace which had
embodied itself in Paradise after the fall, the Promise lay in
them, and after this God calls them His love. The error of
the heathen is that they fell away from the only God to the
magic birth of Nature, and chose for themselves idol-gods
out of the powers of Nature, and that they honoured the
stars and the four elements because these govern all things.
Those heathen, however, who from the itch of corruption
passed out into the light of Nature because they did not
know God, yet have there lived in purity, have not merely
discovered great wonders of wisdom, but at the restoration of
all beings they will also dwell in the tents of Shem. — Even
in the Church of Abel, the kingdom of light, Christ could not
immediately appear in the flesh because of the universal
corruption. The saints of God, however, or the prophets,
prophesied out of the goal of the covenant, out of the
promised word which was again to move in the flesh. The
law of sacrifice is likewise nothing else than a type of the
humanity of Christ. "What Christ did as man, when with
His love He reconciled the divine wrath, was realized also
in the sacrifices with the blood of beasts. God's Imagination
looked upon the blood of beasts, with which Israel sacrificed
through the medium of the goal of His covenant. Not as if
the sacrifice produced salvation without faith, but man must
die to the false selfhood, and turn himself with his desire to
God. This is indicated by the sacrifice. The fire of the
divine wrath of God consumed the impure substance of the
animal flesh, and when the Jews ate the flesh of the sacrifice
they ate the flesh of Christ and drank His blood in pre-
figure or type.
The Son of God entered into humanity completely and
really in the person of Christ God was not thereby changed.
VOL. I. K _ ,
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258 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
" Certainly He has become what He was not before, but He
Himself has at the same time remained what and how He
was." The Word of God has a threefold formation : the first
being from eternity in the Father, a second person in the
Holy Trinity ; the second being assumed in the hour of the
salutation when Mary said to the angel. Be it to me according
to thy word ; and at the same moment there was assumed
the third form, even as if there were sown an earthly seed
from which a child grows. Christ is a true human creature,
and has also received a true human soul from Mary. Mary,
although in the outer flesh truly the daughter of Joachim and
Anna, was, by the will, the daughter of the covenant of pro-
mise, or the goal to which the covenant pointed, and in which
it was fulfilled. Hence the pure heavenly Virgin was
embodied in Mary ; the soul of Mary having laid hold of the
heavenly Virgin, and the heavenly Virgin having put on the
soul of Mary, as the heavenly pure vesture of the holy element
of a new regenerate maiL Thus did Mary become the blessed
among women ; in her did the true nature of humanity, which
had died in Adam and been shut up, become again alive.
Christ received the earthly essences from Mary in entirely the
same way as every child does from its mother. He has
therefore all the three Principles in Himself, but in the
divine order and not mixed through one another; and by
this is explained the fact that Christ remained completely free
from sin. The human essences have not, however, laid hold of
the eternal Godhead ; nay, even the Soul and the Word are not
one being, but they only permeate each other, as do the
quality of the iron and that of the fire in the glowing iron.
On the other side, the union of the divine and human in the
person of Christ is regarded as so close, that even the
corporeality of Christ was all present in it Christ has not
become man in the Virgin only, as if His deity sat cooped up
there, but Christ's corporeality is the whole fulness of the
heavens, which in the person is creaturely, yet lives outside of
the creature ; but both in one spirit and one power, and not
^a two.
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JACOB BÖHME. 239
The purpose of tlie Incarnation is to bring back man, who
owing to the Fall has let the spirit of this world rule in him-
self, to communion with God by a complete new creation
through the implanting of the Principle of Light. Böhme
expressly rejects as erroneous the view that this effect might
have been attained had God remained in heaven and only
looked upon mankind with love, as it were clothing every
individual with the heavenly Virgin or the pure nature of
man. The eternal word and heart of God must enter into
human flesh and into the death of the poor soul, in order to
take away from the flesh its power, to draw out the fierce
sting of hell, and to lead the soul up from death and hell.
The conquest of the devil and the power of death began with
the forty days' temptation of Christ in the wilderness. The
devil sought, but in vain, to excite in Christ the desire of
earthly bread, the spirit of pride, and the lust of universal
empire. The complete transmutation of the earthly being
into the heavenly was only possible by the Son being
obedient to the angry Father, even to the death on the cross.
The human Fire-life stands in blood, and therein does the
wrath of God rule ; there must therefore come another blood
bom out of God's nature of love into the angry human blood.
Both of these united with one another must enter into the
fierceness of death, and thus the fierce wrath of Grod must be
quenched in the divine blood. The outer humanity in Christ
must therefore die, in order that the egoism in mankind
should cease, that the Spirit of God may be all in all, and
that egoism may be only His instrument, all living in self-
renunciatioa The Form of love itself also gave itself up to
the horror of dying in order that out of Christ's dying and
death the eternal divine sun might arise in human quality.
When Christ died, He did not throw away the earthly body,
the quality of this world, and put on the incorruptible in
order that this body might live in divine power and not in
the Spirit of this world. Nor did the soul of Christ, when
released from the body, descend into hell in order to overcome
the devil ; but when Christ laid away the kingdom of this
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260 OPPOSITIONAL M0VBMENT8 WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
world from Himself, His soul penetrated into death and the
wrath of God, and thus wrath became reconciled in lova
Thus devils and all godless souls in wrath were taken captive
in themselves, and death was broken to pieces. Bat life
budded forth through death.
The question now obtrudes itself as to how we can become
participative of the new life in Christ. It is an error to hold
that God has from eternity destined some to blessedness and
others to damnation. Man is free, and can by the decision of
his own will choose life or death. When man has once
fallen he is not able to convert himself, yet he retains from
his origin out of the eternal scientia of the unground the
power to plunge into the Ground in which God brings forth
His word, and the soul may here be laid hold of by the grace
of God. This transformation is the work of the Holy Spirit
which works immediately in the heart, enlightening and
bringing it forth anew. As an external assistance, God has
given us His Word and the sacraments. In baptism, man
gives up his Adamic will to the death of Christ and desires
to die to his own will in the death of Christ, to rise again by
Christ's resurrection in a new will, and so to live and to will
with Christ. In the Lord's Supper the divine nature of the
Lord does not mingle with bread and wine, nor does Christ
unite Himself by His flesh and blood to the coarse carnal
flesh and blood of man, but by the Tincture or the heavenly
paradisaic power of bread and wine, Christ infuses His
heavenly flesh and blood into the life of man. The mere use
of these sacraments has as little value as the external word
alone has. It is not enough to go to sermon and to know the
lettered word. It does not make me a child of God to hold
it to be true that Christ died for me and rose from the dead ;
the devil, too, knows that, and it does not profit him. Hence
we ought not to wrangle and contend about mere external
knowledge of the word and the doctrines of religion, nor be
proud of that knowledge. For a Christian who cherishes an
ungodly will is just as much out of God as a heathen who
has no desire of God. And a heathen may be saved even
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JACOB BÖHME. 261
'Without the science of the kingdom of Christ if he turns to
the living Grod, and, in true confidence, gives himself up to
God's will. It is not on the external church of stone and
lime or on the word that we should depend, for learned science
and historical faith in the latter profit nothing. Further, the
forgiveness of sin is not to be thought of as taking place by
God putting Himself in motion on account of each individual,
and throwing awaj sin from him. Grod has put Himself in
motion from eternity only twice, — for the creation of the
'world and the incarnation of Christ, — ^and the Scriptures say
that our works do follow us. By forgiveness of sin nothing
is therefore taken from us, nor does God come down from
heaven to us, but our soul is gone out from Gkxl, out of the
holy will of His majesty, into wrath ; and as Christ has now
made a way through death and wrath to the majesty of Qod,
we must turn round and enter by the wrath into the majesty.
The atonement has indeed taken place once for all in Christ's
blood and death ; but that which took place once in Christ
must, by the shedding of Christ's bloo^, take place also in me.
Christ has truly broken down death for us and in us, and
made us a way unto Grod ; but what does it profit me that I
take comfort from it and learn to know it as such, yet
continue shut up in dark wrath, and am bound in the chains
of the devil. I must enter into this way and walk in this
path, as a pilgrim who marches out of death into life.
B^eneration is therefore realized in these two points»:
negatively, in the mortification of the flesh and of selfish-
ness ; and positively, in the reception of the divine life in
Christ The corrupt earthly will must die through real right
repentance, and enter into renunciation, into nothingness, by
giving up the will of the reason entirely unto death ; and it
must no longer will or know itself, but depend on the mercy
of God. For as God says, speaking through the prophet:
" My heart breaks, so that I must be merciful to him." In
this mercy of God the new man arises and grows up in the
kingdom of heaven and Paradise, although the earthly body
is in this world. Our walk and conversation, says the
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'262 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PBOTESTANTISM.
apostle, is in heaven, so that the new man walks in heaven,
but the old man in this world ; for the heaven in which God
dwells is in the new man. Then does the creature give up
its own selfwill, and sinks into the Nothing from which it
arose. The Something stands in torment if it has not its joy
in this, that the life of the Nothing may dwell in the work of
the Something. The means of regeneration is faith, but it is
not a thought or admission of history, it is a process of draw-
ing out of God's nature, it is the introducing of God's nature
by the imagination into the fire of one's soul, and putting on
God's nature as a body of the souL In the present life the
struggle between the good and bad principle continues to
ff) on even in the regenerate, and it is only under a continual
severe struggle that we can advance in holiness. In the
other world, the soul is either in light or in darkness. There
.is thus realized a complete separation of the good and the
bad ; the former enjoy a blessed union with God, the latter
are eternally damned.
In his lifetime Böhme found many adherents, especially
among the noble families of Silesia and Saxony, that were
attached to the views of Schwenkfeldt, as well as among
the physicians, who were acquainted with the doctrines of
Paracelsus. Dr. Balthasar Walther and Abraham von
JPrankenberg (f 1652) of Ludwigsdorf may be mentioned.
Of the writings of Böhme only two small treatises were
printed before his death, but his works were afterwards
published in Holland. They were reproduced in numerous
editions, and obtained a wide circulation. Böhme's views
thus penetrated into wide circles ; but as the fanatical element
gained ground, we find few who developed in any way the
profound and permanently valuable thoughts of their master.
— Johann Both intensified the dissatisfaction felt regarding the
corruption of the age ; he emphasized the demand that every
preacher must be bom again and have the Holy Spirit, and
even increased the millenarian hopes by demanding of his
adhierents that they should eradicate the godless by force, and
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JACOB BÖHME. 263
set up the kingdom of God upon earth. He was kept a
prisoner in Holland from 1676 to 1691, but found a place
of refage at Friederichstadt — Quirinus Kuhlmann, bom at
Breslau in 1651, and burned at Moscow in 1689 for his
perverse opinions, gave up his study of law because he was
prevented by the inner light that rose within him from
soiling himself with the antichristian degree of Doctor of
Law, and he worked thereafter for the spread of Böhme's
writings and views. — Friederich Breckling (1629-1711),
pastor at ZwoU, exercised considerable influence upon the
best-known follower of Böhme, Joh. Georg Gichtel (1638-
1710). The external work of the Scriptures falls, in his
view, completely below the knowledge that unfolded itself
within his own mind. ** The gifts and powers of God lie all
hidden in the soul, like the seed in a field, and all that is
required, is that we dig with earnest prayer after it and
awaken it" God is represented in the Scriptures at one
time as an angry God, and at another as love ; but in God
Himself the two principles are one, and God in Himself is
neither good nor bad. It was by the fall of Lucifer that
this harmony was first destroyed, and that the strife of the
two principles began. The whole of history is an uninterrupted
conflict between them ; man must die to his own will, and,
in rest resigned to God, he must enter into the divine will.
Christ, or the holy wisdom, is then bom in us, and gradually
drives out all darkness till the whole man is transformed in
body, soul, and spirit into a holy flame of love. In order not
to hinder this union, it is advisable to avoid the carnal
conjunction of marriage. The idea of a Melchisedekian
priesthood is specially adopted. Whoever has entered into
close communion with God continues to participate in the
work of redemption, as He oflTers up His life for the brethren
in order that God's wrath may be appeased in them. The
millenarian hopes again come strongly into the foreground in
Gichtel's views. After a changeful career, Gichtel lived from
1668 in Amsterdam in complete retirement He gathered
around him a community of adherents, called " Angel-brothers,"
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264 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PR0TESTANTIS3C
who afterwards spread widely, especially in the north of
Germany. — Ueberfeld (tl732) is to be regarded as their head.
— Christian Hoburg (1607-1675) likewise demanded inner
illumination by the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit,
instead of the external word of the Scripture and the worldly
learning of the Universities. Instead of the external imputa-
tion of the merit of Christ as a "gunnel and plaster over
all the stinking sin-sores of the unrepenting children of the
world," he desiderates the inward transformation and the
essential renovation of the man himself; in place of incessant
controversies about doctrine, he will have earnest striving
after the true Christ in . us. — ' Angelus Silesius or Joh.
Scheffler (1627-1677), who passed over to Catholicism, was
quickened by Böhme. He is well known as one of our best
hymn writers, and in his ''Spiritual Shepherd Songs"
{Geistliche Hirterdieder) he has fondly invested the thought of
becoming completely one with Christ in the image of Christ
as the bridegroom of the souL His mystical system has been
expounded in his "Cherubinic Wanderer" {Cherubinischer
Wdndersmann) in deeply moving language, and it diverges
from the kindred writings of the time by giving strong
expression to the thought that God first attains a distinctive
self-conscious existence in man«
'* I know that without me Ood cannot live for a moment,
And should I perish. He must needs give up the ghost."
In Eogland, Böhme's writings and views became also
disseminated ; and this was largely due to King Charles L,
who, after he had read in 1646 the "Forty Questions of the
Soul," exclaimed, " God be praised that there are still men
who are able, from experience, to give a living testimony to
God and to God's word!" Of Böhme's writings there
appeared three English translations, one after another.^ — John
Pordage (t 1698) and Joanna Leade (t 1704) were led to
attach themselves to him, and the celebrated Henry More
(t 1687), professor at Cambridge, in his Philosophice Teutonicce
' [By Sparrow, Edward Taylor, and William Law (1764), the last being con-
sidered the best— Tk.]
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8WEDENB0KGIANI8M AND IKVINGISM. 265
Censura, instead of the desired refutation of Böhme's views,
gave a comparatively undisguised recommendation of them.
Jean Leade became the centre of the followers of Böhme, and
in 1695 thej attempted, under the name of the Philadelphian
Society, to establish a union of all the really regenerate of all
the churches and sects.
This may be the most suitable place for referring, in a few
words, to Swederiborffianism ; not as if it were to be r^arded
as a product of Böhme's views, but on account of the affinity
of its fundamental characteristics with these views. The
dualism of Swedenborg (1689-1772) should not^ in my
opinion, be referred to the influence of Cartesianism. It
rather presents the fundamental character of Mysticism in
the mode in which it immediately plunges into the Divine,
which is clothed by a sensuous phantasy in the strong colours
of a tangible materiality. Swedenborg receives his wisdom
by visions. In 1740, on the first occasion, there appeared to
him by night a Form clothed in purple and gleaming in light,
and it spake, " I am God the Lord, the Creator and Sedeemer,
and I have chosen thee to explain to men the inner spiritual
meaning of the Scriptures, and I will declare to thee what
thou art to write." Thereby the eyes of his inner man were
opened, and while his body walked among men his spirit
dwelled in the upper world, conversed with the spirits in
heaven and hell, and received instructions from them. The
purpose of this revelation was to found a new Church.
There were in fSact four Churches : the first with immediate
revelation comes down to the flood ; the second with revelation
by "Correspondences" prevails in Asia and a part of Africa,
and is sunk in idolatry ; the third or Jewish receives revela-
tions by the Spoken Word ; the fourth or Christian by the
Written Word. This fourth Church again passes through four
periods, beginning respectively with its first institution ; with
the Council of Nicea, in which the errors of the Trinity and
of justification were established ; with the Beformation, when
the light broke in but did not spread universally; and vrith
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266 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PKOTESTANTISM.
Swedenborg, who was to pave the way for the establishment of
the new Jerusalem promised in the Apocalypse. The doctrines
of the Trinity and of satisfaction are the two grave errors of
the Church. The triad of divine persons leads necessarily to
three Gods, notwithstanding the oral confession that God is
one. There is indeed a certain triunity to be recognised in
the Deity, namely, the unity of the first, middle, and last
being, or of final end, cause, and effect, or of being, becoming,
and existence. This true triunity is a pearl of the greatest
price; by it alone do we obtain the true conception of
God. This triunity is first realized in the divine human
per8(Mi of Jesus Christ. As in man soul, body, and work-
ing are one, so in Him there are the Father as the primal
Divine, the Son as the Divine human, and the Holy Spirit as
the processional Divine. There are accordingly three mani-
festations of the Deity, as creating the world in the Father,
as redeeming in the Son, and as sanctifying in the Spirit.
The redemption has a universal cosmical significance. God,
as substance, has likewise a form, and it is the human form ;
He has thus a heavenly corporeality. God created the world
out of His wisdom and goodness, and He enters into all
things, especially into men, by His powers, according to the
measure of their knowledge and love. Man belongs by his
body to the natural world, and by his spirit to the spiritual
world. The universe is accordingly divided into the natural
and spiritual worlds. These two worlds stand towards each
other in an entirely exact relation of Correspondence, so that
there is nothing in the natural world which is not also in the
spiritual world. As the upper world is divided into heaven,
an intermediate kingdom, and hell, so in like manner the
lower world is divided according to the different degrees of
the good. Death is the transition from the one world to the
other ; for the spiritual world is only populated by the souls
of the departed, who enter there into exactly the same rela-
tions as they have left here, only somewhat spiritualized.
Hell had, in the course of time, widely extended its domain.
In order to repress it, God became man, a wider substantial
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ßWEDENBORGIANISM AND IBVINGISM. 267
communication of God to humanity. We come to participate
in this communication of GocJ by regeneration, a new creation
which is alone produced by God through the two means of
active love And faith. Faith takes its stand upon the word
of Scripture. This word has been dictated by God Himself ;
but, because it was adapted to the wants of men, it has been
written in the prefigurative form of the things of this worid.
The Scripture has therefore a double meaning, a natural
meaning and a spiritual meaning; and, by means of the
Con-espondences, the former is transposed into the latter, for
the word is written in pure Correspondences. After the
spiritual sense had been entirely lost, Swedenborg was raised in
ecstasy to heaven in order that, by instruction received there, he
might open up to men this true spiritual Sense. With the com-
pletion of his principal work, the Vera Bdigio Christiana, on the
19th June 1770, the New Church, called the New Jerusalem,
began, and it is represented as the crown of all the Churches.
The system that took its rise from Edward Irving, and
whioh has been known since about 1825 as Irvingism, may
also be mentioned here. Its fundamental principle is the
expectation of the early reappearance of Christ. The
apostolic gifts of speaking with tongues and of prophesying
were renewed in oi'der to separate a community from the
corruption of the Church, and this community is united in
absolute holiness with Christ, its holy and perfect head. The
oflBces of the apostolic age were also introduced again. In
doctrine, the only peculiar point in the system is that the
human nature of Christ is strongly emphasized. By His
being bom of a woman, Christ was subjected in all points
to the relations and conditions of fallen human nature. He
was also tempted internally and externally like us ; He was
internally assailed by impure thoughts and impulses, yet He
was without actual Sin. He also fell under the power of
death as a man, and it was not till the resurrection that He
received another flesh, and was exalted to be the perfect
Priest of God and the Head of His Church.
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268 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
VI.
The Practical Opposition. Pietism.
There are certain manifestations of Beligion which are
completely at one with Mysticism in emphasizing the internal
experience of Christianity instead of external acceptance of
the ecclesiastical doctrines, but which, at the same time, are
specifically distinguished from it by bringing into the fore-
ground the actual verification of the inner life in working
for the improvement of the individual and the perfection of
the world, instead of the idle revelling of feeling in the
inner vision of God. These forms of the religious life hold
fast by historical Christianity and the external word, but
they aim at completing the reformation of the sixteenth
century by adding a reform of the Christian life to its reform
of doctrine. We may designate it in this relation as the
" practical " Opposition, without overlooking the fact that its
ultimate roots are frequently found in views that are more
related to mysticism. The examination of this movement in
detail would not furnish much result for our special subject
of investigation, yet it cannot be passed over entirely.
It must be remarked, however, at the outset, that the
doctrine of the Eeformed Churches insisted strongly upon
sanctification as furnishing the assurance of election and
justification ; and where Calvin's influence was of authority,
the whole life of the Church was regulated in so strict a
spirit that the efforts we allude to did not arise in this sphere
as an Opposition. In England, where the Befoimation by
Henry VIIL was purely external, the tendency towards an
inward Christianity and a practical piety expressed itself in
Puritanism} Its share in the political revolutions of England
is well known. Its most distinguished scientific representa-
tives were William Perkins, professor at Cambridge (t 1602),
^ H. Heppe, Geschichte des Pietismus und der Mystik in der Reformirten
Kirche, namentiich der Niederlande, Leiden 1879.
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THE PRACTICAL OPPOSITION. PIETISM. 269
Thomas Hooker (1586-1647), and Thomas Goodwin
(1600-1679). The Puritans aimed at shaping the life of
the individual Christian according to God's Word. For the
true faith does not consist in holding the ecclesiastical doctrine
as true, or as that in which there is nothing needing to be
altered, but it is the inner certainty of peace with God and
union with Christ. The regenerate man is completely in-
capable of doing the works of the former life ; rather must he
strictly order his whole external life according to the demands
of Scripture ; and thus does the regenemte soul enter into a
union with Christ that is closer than the union of the body
and the souL
The Netherlands, in consequence of their political relations
in the age of the Beformation, became the country in which
all anti-Catholic movements found toleration. Here Cornhert
(1522-1590), secretary of the city of Haarlem, an adherent
of " the true religion which is Christian love," declared it to
be his motto " that Christianity does not consist in the lip,
but in the life ; it is in the walk, not in the talk." ^ He also
designated the persecution of heretics as a crime in the king-
dom of God, for God enjoins us not only to understand the
good, but to do it, and the end of Christ's suflFeriug and dying
is that we may become divine in Him by His active obedi-
ence in us. The controversy between the Arminians and the
Gomarists regarding predestination, with which were connected
the questions as to the relation of the Church to the power
of the State, and the authority of the written creeds, has also
a bearing upon our subject. For the representatives of pre-
destination always zealously repudiated the position that this
doctrine is dangerous to the striving after holiness ; and at
the same time their opponents, and especially Arminius him-
self (1560-1609), maintained the universality of divine grace
in connection with the requirement of an active verification of
Christianity. Arminianism is, however, not to be regarded
as an opposition to an already existing formation in the
' ** Dat het Christendom niet en bestaat in den mondt roar in den grondt, in
de daadt, niet in de praat"
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270 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PEOTESTANTISM.
Church of the Netherlands, rather might the victory of the
Gromarists at the Synod of Dort (1618-1619) be regarded as
the introduction of a more rigid form of Calvinism than had
hitherto prevailed. At the time when the bitterest hate
divided the Gomarists and Arminians, and the interest in pure
doctrine absorbed everything else, there arose among the
Gomarists in William Tellinck (1579-1629), a preacher at
Middleburg, a powerful expounder of the inner Christianity
and of the maintenance of godliness in active life. Holding
decidedly by the doctrine of the Beformed Church, and em-
phasizing the sole authority of the external word in opposition
to all enthusiasm, he, however, does not regard faith as the
mere holding of a thii^ to be true. Love is connected with
it in the closest way; it leads to inward fellowship with
Christ, and makes itself active in the mortification of the
natural man and progressive holiness of life. Among the
adherents of this movement we may here name Gisbert
Voetius (1585-1676), Professor and Preacher at Utrecht,
'' who was the most conspicuous of the teachers of the power
of godliness." On his entering upon his office as an academic
teacher, he deUvered a discourse, entitled Dt PietcUe cum
Scientia Conjungenda (1634). He says that the only one who
really studies theology is he who does so with piety, and
therefore the students should begin and end every day with
God ; they should exercise themselves daily in the study of the
holy Scripture, in prayer, and other exercises of devotion, and
they should also daily turn themselves in earnest repentance
to God. Voet likewise delivered lectures on Ascetic Theology,
which led to his book, entitled rh ^AaKffriicd s. exercUia
pieicUis (1664), a collection of the utterances of Catholic as
well as Protestant theologians regarding " the practice of faitL"
— Coccejus (1603-1669), Professor at Leyden, who excited so
violent a storm in the Beformed Church of the Netherlands,
reminds us of Pietism by his assertion that it is only the
believer who is a true theologian. But Pietism cannot be
regarded as peculiarly his own view any more than the Federal
Theology he expounded, which had been long anticipated.. lu
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THB PRACTICAL OPPOSITION. PIETISM. 271
opposition to the ecclesiastical scholasticism which asserted
the supreme authority of the Scriptures in words, yet lowered
it by an interpretation regulated according to the ecclesiastical
doctrine, Coccejus aimed at developing the doctrine of the
Church by an unbiassed and profound assimilation of the spirit
of the äcripturea Among the Coccejans there soon arose an
opposition, dividing them into the "Free,** who specially
emphasized the knowledge of the Christian doctrine, and the
" Earnest," who demanded a practical and living Christianity.
At the head of the latter class stood Friederich Adolph Lampe
(1683-1729). The Eeformed Church in Switzerland was
also afiTected by these movements when the representatives df
the German Pietism extended their efforts to that coxmtry.
But on the whole the Lutheran Church of Germany was the
natural sou of what is properly called " Pietism."
Among its representatives Theobald Thamer (t 1669) stands
nearest in time to the Beformation.^ When an Army Chap-
lain, during the Schmalkald War, he learned by sad experience
that the new doctrine had not improved the morals of the
time. His views were met by the assertion that man was
wholly incapable of good, and that he could be justified by
faith alone. This gave occasion for the formation of Thamer's
peculiar doctrina He held that man is justified by faith, but
not without works of love ; and that original sin only consists
in the want of understanding and weakness of the body. The
historical Christ has only value as doctrine and example,
whereas the true Son of God is virtue. This virtue is also
our reconciler ; for it is only by virtue that we can be recon-
ciled with God, and the doctrine of satisfaction by the death
of Christ is to be rejected. This virtue requires a certain
necessary power along with the knowledge of it, and we obtain
both by the indwelling power of God. The habit of holding
by the letter of Scripture and of the symbolical books is irre-
ligious. *' The Jews have the Talmud, the Turks the Koran,
the Papists the Jus Canonicum, the Lutherans the Augsburg
' Neander, Theobald Thamer, Berlin 1872. Hochmnth, Zeitschrift für histo-
rische Theologie, 1861.
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272 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
Confession, — ^where then is the Gospel?" There are three
witnesses of the truth: Conscience, Nature, and Scripture.
The most important is the Conscience, which is the Deity
Himself, and Christ dwelling in the heart and understanding,
and judging what is good and bad. From the contemplation
of Nature we can also draw the knowledge of God. Out of
the abundance of His goodness God has also given, as a third
witness, the Scripture, which, however, on the whole only
brings to remembrance and refers to these two witnesses.
The Lutherans, on the other hand, depend on a carnal notion
of inspiration. Thej think of the matter not otherwise than
as if God were sitting at hand with a grey beard, such as the
painters paint Him on the wall, and as if He laid hold of a
word with His hand, and laid it upon the tongue of a prophet.
Instead of this, it is to be maintained, not that a thing is true
because it stands in the Scriptures, but that it stands in the
Scriptures because it is true.
Johann Arndt (1555—1621), Court Preacher and General
Superintendent of the Church at Celle, obtained the most
important influence among the Pietists, especially by his
" Books of the True Christianity " {Bücher des vxxhren Christen'
thums). In the godless and unrepentant life of those who
make a boast of Christ and His word with a full mouth, and
yet lead an entirely unchristian life, Arndt sees a great and
shameful abuse of the gospel. Therefore will he show to the
simple in soul that '* the true Christianity consists in the
evincing of true, living, active faith by upright godliness and
the fruits of righteousness. So then we are to be named by
the name of Christ, in order that we may not only have faith
in Christ, but also live in Christ and Christ in us. So must
true repentance arise from the inmost principle of the heart ;
and the heart, the mind, and the soul must be changed, so
that we shall become conformed to Christ and His holy gospel"
His own living piety urges him to impress practical Chris-
tianity on his readers in this incisive popular language. His
work appeared in many editions, and was eagerly read, but
among the theologians it foxmd almost nothing but opposition,
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THE PKACnCAL OPPOSITION. PIETISM. 273
J. Gerhardt is the only one who praises it A preacher of
Danzic declared that '' he did not wish, after his death, to
come to where Arndt had gone;" and Lukas Osiander of
Tübingen, in 1624, called it a "book of hell," which was
affected by no less than eight grave heresies.
Among Arndt*s contemporaries and followers who shared
his views, mention ought specially to be made of Johann
Valentin Andrese (1586—1654), a grandson of Jacob Andreae,
who was celebrated in connection with the composition of the
Formula Consensus, Dissatisfied with the scholastic theology
and the confessional feuds of his time, Valentin Andre»
devoted the energy of his life to the composition of a series
of spiritual writings, and in various oflSces of the Church of
his country, to preaching that Christ of whom his heart was
full, and whose love constrained him to verify the faith of his
heart in genuine morality and virtuous conduct, Joachim
Betkins (t 1663) laments that Christianity had become an
antichristianity, because the mode of life was entirely unchris-
tian. For this the many unconverted preachers were to blame,
for an unconverted preacher cannot possibly bring a sinner to
repentance and faith. The importance laid on justification
brought it about that holiness and the true imitation of Christ
were but too frequently forgotten. In the seventeenth cen-
tury the University of Eostock was the nursery of practical
piety, as distinguished from a cold orthodoxy dependent on
the letter of doctrine. Here from 1638 laboured Joachim
Lütkemann, a scholar of the pious John Schmid of Strasburg
(t 1658), and faithful to his motto, *'I will rather save one
soul than make a hundred scholars ; " and he became the
spiritual father of Scriver, H. Müller, and John Jakob Fabri-
cius. In 1649, Lütkemann was expelled as a heretic, because
he had taught that Christ, on account of the separation of His
soul from His body in consequence of death, had not been
truly man during the three days in the grave. After him,
however, the Quistorps, father and son, continued the work at
Eostock; and the latter, in his Pia Desideria (1659), repre-
hended the shortcomings prevalent in the Church, the school,
VOL. L ® r- T
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274 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
and the household. J. Meyfart, a professor at Erfurt from
1631, reproaches the theologians who were satisfied with being
able " to syllogize, declaim, and chatter pretty well," and he
desiderates a higher standard of morality and the increase of
devotion among the people by prayer-meetings, fast-days, and
ecclesiastical discipline. J. B. Schuppius (t 1661), who
became senior pastor at Hamburg in 1649, insisted with great
zeal on piety of heart and the fear of God, and repeatedly
declared that theology is almost more of an experience than a
science. All these representatives of Pietism and many others
were only precursors of its maturest formation in Philipp
Jakob Spener (1635-1705).^
Spener was of a deep religious character, full of inwardness
and warmth, and equipped with high endowments of mind,
and a rich treasury of learned knowledge. Strongly influenced
at Geneva by the earnest spirit of the discipline of the Reformed
Church, as well as by the profound mysticism of Labadie,
Spener began to work on wider circles after he was called to
the senior pastorate at Frankfurt-on-the-Maine in 1666. He
saw the evil of the Church in the fact that faith was preached
without sanctification, and justification without the right
fruits of godliness ; and he found the reason of this in the
suppression of the simple, living word of Scripture by theo-
logical subtleties and human dogmas. Hence it was that in
1670 Spener began the so-called Collegia Fietatis, assemblies
of limited numbers, held at first in the house, and then in the
church, at which rehgious subjects were explained by the aid
of edifying writings, but afterwards in connection with reading
of the New Testament in the unrestrained form of free con-
versation. With the view of working upon wider circles,
Spener wrote in 1675 his well-known Pia Desideria, He
held that in order to save the Church from its state of
corruption, and to carry on to completion the reformation
begun by Luther in the morals and the life of Christians,
it was necessary to penetrate more profoundly, and on all its
^ W. Hossbach, Philipp Jakob Spener und seine Zeit, 2 Aufl. Berlin 1853.
H. Schmid, Geschichte des Pietismus, 1863.
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THE PRACTICAL OPPOSITION. PIETISM. 275
sides, into the word of God, and to diffuse the knowledge
of it more universally. For this purpose private meetings
ought to be held, and " ecclesiolse in ecclesia " established,
not as separatistic conventicles, but in order to advance a
deeper understanding of Scripture. Men required also to be
reminded of the universal priesthood in order that pious
laymen may also cultivate religious life in the circle of their
house. Above all, however, it needed to be pointed out that
Christianity does not consist in doctrine, but in practice,
and hence that the main thing was to mortify one's own flesh,
to be zealous in good works, and to show Christian gentleness
towards unbelievers or false believers. Spener maintained
that one of the chief ^defects of the time lay in the training
of the preachers in the schools and universities, because,
instead of a theology being learned in the light of the Holy
Spirit, and received with the heart, a human philosophy of
divine things was impi'essed on the brain. He declared that
it was a strange judgment of God that men had taken the
heathen Aristotle in our schools almost as the standard of
truth. He held that worldly science may find an application
to theology only as the spoils of Egypt were applied for the
use of the sanctuary, whereas all care was to be given to the
inward piety and the godly walk of the students of theology.
Then would the pulpits no longer be abused, so as merely
to give displays of erudition in foreign languages, and
artificial elaborations in discourse, but the word of the Lord
would thus be preached simply, yet powerfully. — These
proposals and suggestions met with approval on many sides,
and house meetings were instituted in many places, in
accordance with Spener's model But there also soon
appeared, under less circumspect guidance, certain accom-
paniments of the movement which were emphatically opposed
by Spener ; such as arrogant separatism, self-righteous security,
unworthy hypocrisy, fanatical millenarianism, and even moral
aberrations. Hence numerous attacks and accusations against
the system were soon called forth. Spener published various
writings in defence, and of these his Universal Theology of all
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276 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
believing Christiana and upright Theologians (1680) deserves
especially to be mentioned, because of its presenting the always
recurring principle upon which he founds. The principle is,
that while there is a science and knowledge of divine things
acquired from Scripture by mere human industry, yet this is
not the true knowledge of God, and that the illumination of
the Holy Spirit is requisite for the attainment of the true
knowledge, but that no unregenerate man obtains this illumina-
tion ; and therefore, as put briefly, that it is only a regenerate
man who can possess the true knowledge of God, or become a
right theologian.
Spener was Court preacher in Dresden from 1686 to
1691, and there he worked in the same spirit, but limited
himself to preaching and the function of catechizing, which
he prosecuted with great zeal. Having fallen into disfavour
with the Court, his position became so unpleasant that a call to
Berlin came as a welcome release. Among the undertakings
which were then carried out in his spirit, the most import-
ant was the Collegia Philohiblica, at Leipsic, of August
Hermann Franke, Caspar Schade, and Paul Anton, in 1687.
Thereafter the newly-founded University of Halle (1691)
became the seat and the proper nursery of Pietism, and
from »Halle it continued to spread over the whole of
Germany.
Coming now to consider the inner essential nature of Pietism,
we must above all keep in view the fact that Spener, anxious
to maintain the reputation of his orthodoxy, has repeatedly
asserted and shown that he did not deviate in any point from
the normal doctrine of the Lutheran ChurcL The dogmatic
errors which opponents have charged him with were only
certain consequences of his peculiar view of religion. Starting
from the deep corruption of human nature, he sees the essence
of Christianity in a divine power which works a total
renovation of the inward man, and which in like manner is
the only source of the true knowledge of God, as well as of
the genuine moral life. The former position is the basis of
the demand for a reformation of theology, the latter for a
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THE PRACTICAL OPPOSITION, PIETISM. 277
reformation of the Church. It is only the regenerate who
can be right theologians. " An unregenerate man has no true
light in his soul; he may, however, have the literal truth
r^arding the things that are to be believed in his under-
standing, and he may present them without theoretical
mistakes in an ecclesiastical form/' The Christian religion
is a power from God, which, by internal illumination and
awakening, transforms and revivifies man in the centre of his
being ; and hence no one can proclaim the truth in divine
things but he who traces in himself this inner life from God,
who is himself moved by the power of the Holy Ghost,
and illuminated by His light. Above all, this holds true of
the theologian. It is therefore erroneous and reprehensible
to try to teach theology in the Schools and Universities after
the manner of common human knowledge, and with all
possible worldly sciences conjoined with it. Instead of this,
the main thing to do is to supplicate with zeal and prayer for
personal illumination, and to strive after inward personal
experience of the new birth and the divine life. The more
deeply sin is felt as a hereditary evil propagated by the body,
and as awful corruption that has left nothing good and pleasing
to God, so much the more emphatically is it declared that the
regenerate man must regulate his whole life according to
the demands of the divine will Perfect holiness is indeed
impossible; even in the best there still remain stirrings of
evil, and remindings of their own weakness. Nevertheless
the regenerate ought to labour with careful observation of
themselves, and with unremitting zeal, to mortify their old
Adam, with his carnal desires, and to become perfect in all
points. — Upon this requirement is founded the hope of a
glorious age of perfection, which the future of the Church will
bring when it has struggled out of its present corruption.
From this fundamental thought sprang all those deviations
from the ecclesiastical orthodoxy which were urged against
Spener as heresies. He held that faith appears to be more
important than purity of doctrine ; for faith is not merely
knowing the doctrine of the Church, and holding it to be true,
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278 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
nor is it merely the means of receiving the objective redemp-
tion that is through Christ, but it is the inward reception and
experience of the new-created divine power culminating in
the inward fellowship of the soul with the Saviour, so that
even Luther's expression, " I am Christ," is not entirely to be
rejected. It is true that faith cannot be without some purity
of doctrine, at least in those points which relate to the work
of salvation ; but the assertion is false, that he only has the
saving faith who possesses a complete knowledge of the pure
doctrine in all its Articles. For it is not from purity of
doctrine that our salvation immediately comes, nor is it error
in doctrine that condemns us in itself; rather does salvation
come from faith, and condemnation from the want of faith.
Thereby Spener put dogma into the background as relatively
unessential for faith and salvation, without materially attacking
it ; and he thus attained in dogmatic controversies, and in
relation to other confessions, a breadth which was entirely
foreign to that age. On the other hand, Spener's material
deviations from the Lutheran dogmas were unimportant ; such
as, that he makes regeneration proceed from the will instead
of the understanding ; that in the doctrine of Justification
he represents the beginnings of the righteousness anticipated
from the divine judgment as already actually present, yet
without attacking the theory of imputation ; that he extends
Sanctification to the whole conduct, and excludes all adiaphora;
and that for the individual as well as for the Church, he
holds that there is a time of relative perfection already in the
present life.
Such is in brief the spirit and the principal contents of the
Spener Pietism. It would be unjust to burden it with the
outgrowths which were afterwards connected with it, and
•which brought the whole movement unduly into disrepute.
It need hardly surprise us that the straining after earnest
holiness did lead to external or even hypocritical semblances
of salvation by works ; or that the assertion of regeneration
as the necessary condition of true knowledge led some to despise
all worldly science and the ofl&ce of preaching, as well as to
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THE PBACTICAL OPPOSITION. PtBTISM. 279
separate themselves from the Church with its external worship ;
or that the Self-examination so much recommended, led
occasionally to a self-suflBclent contemplativeness and carnal
security. Further, the millenarian and mystical elements in
Spener led, in the case of some who came after him, to
extravagances, Gottfried Arnold (tl7l4), known as the
author of the Impartial histoid of the Church and of heräics,
turned to a contemplative Mysticism, as an immediate in-
tuition of God that is raised above all sensuous knowledge,
and imparts to man always new power for a holy mode of
life. The millenarianism of the system was developed with
all exactness into a comprehensive whole by Petersen (1649-
1727). The most violent attacks upon the Protestant Church
were led by Johann Konrad Dippel (1673-1734). At first
an orthodox theologian and then a Pietist, he published from
1697 a series of violent satires under the name Christianus
Democritus. Along with considerable talent he possessed a
boundless ambition, for the satisfaction of which any means
appeared to him justifiable, and his restless and inconstant
life hunted him from place to place, and from employment to
employment, without any satisfactory result. His writings
correspond to his character and life, being full of the most
heterogeneous views in religion, philosophy, medicine, and
natural science ; they are at one time inspired by a fanatical
mysticism, and at another guided by sober and practical
acuteness. According to Dippel, man consists of body, a
lower sensible soul, and a higher spirit. The spirit has to be
united with God, and the feeling of this union is man's
greatest blessedness. Eeligion does not consist of opinions,
but of a bettered heart filled with love to God and His
creatures, and of a pious, upright mode of conduct. He who
has this becomes saved, be he Jew or Turk, heathen or
Christian ; for God works immediately in our spirit, and not
by the external means of the letter or empty ceremonies.
The ecclesiastical Orthodoxy waged a violent polemic against
Pietism. Several hundred writings were directed against it.
We need not enter here upon this controversy, in which there
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280 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
were for the most part only individual questions examined,
without regard to the universal character of the movement,
and, besides, this was done in a manner that was far from
agreeable or profitable. The general result of this conflict
was the gradual decomposition of the rigid orthodoxy by its
permeation with Pietistic elements, as was shown very soon
in the controversy between Joachim Lange (1670-1744)
and Valentin Ernest Löscher (1673-1747). This controversy
was distinguished, not merely by the fact that its polemical
tone was far more intellectual than the others, that attempts
to reach a mutual understanding accompanied the polemic,
and that the opposition between Pietism and Orthodoxy is
everywhere exhibited as not itself the highest opposition
of the time. Nay more, in spite of the decidedness with
which the particular points at issue were examined, Löscher,
as a really noble representative of the ecclesiastical doctrine,
shows such a living, deep, inward piety, so warm a heart and
so open a vision for the faults of the Church, that the in-
fluence of the spirit of Spener upon him is unmistakeable. —
We shall have to return to the later influence of Pietism
when we come to discuss the German Enlightenment of the
eighteenth century.
Count Nicolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf (1700-1760) was
decidedly influenced by Spener. He was a man of deep
inward piety; his fortunate intercourse with the Moravian
brothers preserved him from self-sufiicient Quietism, and he
impressed the character of his own personality upon the
community of the Hermhut Brotherhood. In Zinzendorf, even
more than with Spener, religion appears as the inmost concern
of the heart, as an immediately felt life in one's own soul.
It is not, indeed, loosed from the external word of Scripture as
the pure source of the divine revelation, but neither is it
restricted to any mediation by learned culture and science.
The opposition between sin and grace appears as the substance
of the inner religious life. It is a deep consciousness of one's
own weakness and guilt, which is hardly bearable were it not
accompanied with the equally powerful consciousness of
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ZINZENDOBF AJn> THE MOBAVIANa 281
redemption by the bloody sufferings and the sacrificial death of
Christ, intensified even to a mystical self-sinking in the suffer-
ings and death of Christ in order to participate in the joy of
blessedness. The following verses express this thought with
a heartfelt simplicity that is truly touching : —
" Fac, nt possim demonstrare, quam sit dulce, te amare !
Tecum pati, tecum flere, tecum semper cougaudere ! "
This special character of the Zinzendorf piety comes out on
its own showing in the objective representation of his doctrine.
Christ is the centre of his doctrine, but Christ is the suffering
and crucified one ; and the liberation of man from the misery
of sin by fellowship with the death of Christ, is its funda-
mental idea. All speculative questions regarding the Trinity,
the nature of the God-man, the meaning of the Lord's Supper,
the Last Things, and so on, retreat into the background. Out
of the whole range of the Christian doctrine, it is only the
Person of Christ, and more particularly His sufferings and
death, that is treated with essential interest and in detail.
But this point is dwelt upon with such emphasis that
Zinzendorf can say with right : " the point of suffering, the
blood-theology, is mine ; we are the crucified Church (cruciata) ;
others have the unbloody, we the bloody grace." Along with
this is the fact that this suffering of Christ is painted vividly
and in a sensuous way, and the sinking into it, even apart
from the period of " sifting," is described with the play of an
almost voluptuous sensuousness which repels more sober minds.
From the inward fellowship with the suffering Christ, which
is intensified in the case of the community to the so-called
" special covenant," there follows for the individual a rest and
a peace in the heart that has received the grace of God.
This is usuaDy designated " unction," and it expresses itself in
the outward life, both in the cheerfulness of the heart that has
entered into peace in Christ, a cheerfulness which is at once
equable and unmoved by the external accidents of prosperity
or misfortune, and in the earnest striving to come as near as
possible to perfection in the advancing sanctification of the
external life. This theology does not lay importance upon
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282 OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.
worldly science, nor upon the testimony of natural reason ;
for "the vain reason which does not understand what is
meant by the inbreaking of grace, or treading with the
feet and lying at the feet of the crucified Jesus, are com-
patibilia." Nor does it lay sti^ess upon sharply formulated and
dialectically defined dogmas. The Moravian Brethren have
even collected together adherents of the different confessions
although under distinct tropes. Their doctrinal system after-
wards lost still more of its peculiar character, and Spangenberg's
Idea Fidei Fratrum (Barby 1778) is a somewhat colourless
exposition of the Protestant system of doctrine. But as a
nursery of inward piety and of upright life maintained in
rigid discipline, the Moravian community has still its import-
ance in the present day.
The Methodists arose in England almost at the same time
as the Moravians {c, 1740), and not without some personal
relations between their respective founders. The melancholy
state of the English Church, in which its own stagnation and
the strongly encroaching Deism were equally damaging the
religious life, awakened the thought, not of a reform of doctrine,
but of a renovation of the inner religious life. Notwith-
standing its peculiar violent convulsiveness in the forms of
repentance and instantaneous regeneration, Methodism has
essential points of contact with Moravianism ; for it also rests
upon a deep feeling of the opposition of sin and grace. Man
is corrupt in every capacity of his soul ; he is corrupt wholly
and at all points. Every man has to expect eternal death as
the just reward of his inward and outward godlessness. The
pains of hell are painted by the Methodists in the most glaring
colours in order to call the sinner to repentance by the terrors
of the judgment For repentance is the first step to faith,
and it proceeds from the free resolve of man ; and faith is
worked immediately in our broken heart as the immovable
conviction that God was in Christ, and that He reconciled the
world with Himself ; yea, that Christ has loved me and has
even given Himself up to death for me. There is thus produced
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THE BIETHODISTS. 283
an entire new creation of the soul, which must necessarily
bring forth external fruits, and a gradual advancing sanctification
even to total redemption from all sin and to complete per-
fection.— The later and especially the present practice of the
Methodists has unfortunately brought into the foreground the
momentary convulsiveness of repentance, which is excited by
all the terrors of hell, and appears outwardly in convulsive
starts, but is not always inwardly felt. And so much is this
so, that the striving after an inwardly felt and practical
Christianity, which was what is most justifiable in the move-
ment, hai'dly now finds a place within it^
^ [The translator cannot pass this concluding paragraph throngh his hands
without adding that he cannot regard it as either an adequate account of the
principle of Methodisin, or a fair representation of its present working and
methods. The ahnormal and extreme phases of the Methodistic revivalism are
sufficiently familiar to all, hut the Author has heen misled by them to an
erroneous idea of the contemporary striving and spirit of Methodism generally,
which is still very imperfectly represented in Germany. It has, however, been
thought better to reproduce the author's sketch as it is, than to modify or
omit it. — Tr. j
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SECTION FIFTH.
THE ENGLISH DEISM.
THE period that followed the Beformation has this ia
common with the preceding period, that theology and
religion entirely occupy the foreground of interest both in
science and life. And this was natural ; for where the revolu-
tion encountered the most powerful forces, the conflict could
not be otherwise than extremely bitter and very protracted.
Moreover, there arose, especially in the Lutheran Church of
Germany, a Protestant scholasticism which resembled in
many points the Catholic scholasticism of the Middle Ages.
Thus a new revolution became requisite in order that the
mind might obtain its complete freedom. This revolution
began in England with that movement which we are accus-
tomed to designate Deism. Its roots lay in the sober,
practical, common-sense character of the English people, and
its beginnings took their rise in the characteristic movement
of the English Eeformation. We have already had repeated
occasion to allude to this movement. Alongside of the some-
what external reformation of the Anglican Church, we find a
double current flowing through the time. The Puritans laid
peculiar stress on the practical verification of the inner
religious life in external sanctification and in the moral order
of the whole conduct, and it is manifest that this tendency is
not far from that which sees the essential nature of religion
only in the universally recognised requisites of morality,
because their conditions are inborn in every one. Again, the
Enthusiasts and their last offshoots the Quakers, with their
mystical character and their accentuation of the inner imme-
diate life of piety, appear to be far removed from the sober
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THE LEVELLERS. LORD BACON. 285
practical conception of Deism. Yet they also prepared the
^v'ay for it. By their view of the inner Light, the external
word of Scripture and the binding dogmas of the Church were
stripped of their authority. Experience, not to speak of the
arbitrary preference of the individual, was put into the place
of the objective authority, and when the religious life gi'ew
cold, it resulted, as a matter of course, that the Natural Eeason
was regarded as the inner light.
In politics and in philosophy Deism also found the way
prepared for it : in politics, by the doctrines of the Levellers ;
and in philosophy, by Francis Bacon.
The Levellers^ took their rise from the party of the
Independents by a separation of the political and the religious
elements. With the Independents the democratic doctrine,
according to which the renovation of the State was to be
effected in accordance with the principle of the Sovereignty of
the people, formed, indeed, a criterion for judging of religion
and its relation to the State ; but to the Levellers, Eeligion
appeared as a matter of personal fi'eedom, and as entirely sub-
ordinate to the wellbeing of the State. The supreme prin-
ciple of the Levellers was that the will of the people is the
highest law of a country, and that all authorities obtain their
rights only through the consent of the people. On the basis
of this principle they wished a purely democratic constitution
in the State ; and they were the first to demand an absolute
separation of Church and State on the ground that all union
between them leads to intolerable constraint of conscience and
to endless civil misery. Every religious confession, and even
atheism itself, should find toleration ; and every ecclesiastical
community should regulate its own affairs in entire indepen-
dence. No binding authority belonged to dogmas, whether
they were founded on the divine origin of Scripture or upon
the constraining authority of the Church. The ultimate
criterion of faith was held to be the inner voice of the heart
and conscience of the individual; and although certain
fundamental, conceptions, such as the existence of God and
^ Weingarten, Die Revolutionskirchen Englands, Leipzig 1868.
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286 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
the immortality of tbe soul, were decidedly maintained, yet
it was only the conditions of practical morality that appeared
to be essential in religion.
In philosophy, Francis Bacon (1561-1626),^ the founder
of empiricism, brought about a radical reform, of tbe full
significance of which he was himself well aware. Hitherto
theology and philosophy had appeared mixed up with one
another so as to be even undistinguishable. Bacon sees in
this condition the false union of an ill-assorted pair, whose
offspring was a heretical religion and a fantastic philosophy.
Hitherto God had been the essential object of speculation.
Bacon now gives Nature this position. Hitherto philosophy
had been a theoretical and purely contemplative mode of
knowing ; Bacon will now make her subservient to the pur-
pose of man's dominion over Nature, and he would therefore
make her practical. Hitherto the syllogism and general
principles had been regarded as the inexhaustible source of
knowledge ; Bacon will now found everything upon experience.
Hence he does not regard it as his function to set up a com-
pleted system which should lay claim to perpetuity, yet might
be overthrown by the next comer ; he finds his mission in
founding a new method by which future generations would be
always able to enlarge the boundaries of our knowledge. He
therefore directs his attack primarily against the prejudices
of the school as well as those of life, against the personal
peculiarities as well as the universal human weaknesses which
plunge us into a thousand errors. On the ground thus cleared,
he then sets up his new method of experience, of experi-
mental observation, and of induction. Such was the founda-
tion laid by Bacon of the Empirical Philosophy, which was
further developed by Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and the French
Materialists, and which was to find its culmination for a time
in the Scepticism of Hume.
As the whole of this philosophy assumed a regulative
position in the development of Deism, so did BacorCs special
* His roost im|)ortant writings are the Novum Organum^ and the Dt Dignitatt
€l Augmentis Scientiarum.
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LOBD BACON. 287
attitude towards religion work by way of preparation for it.
In his view, all knowledge is divided into knowledge of the
facts and knowledge of the causes in Nature, and between
them stands poetry. For poetical invention gives an image
of the world just as the description of nature and philo-
sophy do, only with this difference, that its image of the
world is sketched by the phantasy, and therefore does not
correspond to the actual, but to the wished-for state of the
world. This view furnishes Bacon with a criterion for judg-
ing of the religious myths of heathenism. He sees in these
myths only allegorical investments of philosophical truths,
and strives to explain them as such. The knowledge of
causes has a threefold object: Nature, Man, God. This
knowledge accordingly falls into three parts : the Philosophy
of Nature, Anthropology, and Natural Theology. Along with
this Natural Theology, Bacon further recognises Supernatural
or Revealed Theology, but it lies beyond the sphere of pliilo-
sophical knowledge.
Natural Theology arises from the contemplation of the
natural order of things, and it attains to the knowledge of the
existence of God as an Intelligence creative and regulative
of the world This conclusion is so certain that Bacon says
(in his Essay on Atheism) : " I had rather believe all the
fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran,
than that this universal frame is without a mind ; and
therefore God never wrought miracles to convince Atheism,
because His ordinary works convince it It is true
that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to Atheism,
but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to
religion."
Natural Theology, however, does not reach farther than
this. Of God's purposes with regard to man, of His decree of
salvation and such like, it knows nothing. There exists no
relation at all between Natural and Supernatural Theology ;
the former can neither establish nor justify the latter,' but if
we would pass from the one to the other, we must step out
of the boat of human reason and enter into the ship of the
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288 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
Church, which alone is enabled to keep upon the right way
by the Divine Compass. Theology and Philosophy are com-
pletely separated ; mixing them together only leads to
unbelief and fantastic ideas. Religion does not rest upon
the light of Nature, either in the external knowledge of
the senses or in the internal knowledge of the conscience, but
upon immediate Divine revelation. This holds true of the
reason no less than of the will, and hence we ought to
believe not merely what corresponds to reason ; but the
more contrary anything is to reason, so much the more does
it correspond to the honour of God and to our duty of
obedience to believe it How far the rules of reason may
find application in the connection and systematic arrange-
ment of the divine revelation, should be determined by a
" Divine Logic," the working out of which Bacon says is
still awanting.
There is no reason to doubt of the sincerity of Bacon in
his recognition of Revealed Religion. It was but natural,
however, that the interest of science should turn mainly to
Natural Religion, and that it should obtain the chief attention.
This was shown among others by Newton and Boyle. Newton
(1642-1727), by his discovery of the law of gravitation,
opened up new paths for natural inquiry in the sense of
Bacon. At the same time he held firmly by the position
that motion could only be communicated to matter by an
extra-mundane being, and he sought to found a Natural
Theology upon it. Boyle (t 1691), the founder of the
Royal Society, invested a sum that was to yield fifty
pounds for each of eight sermons that were to be delivered
every year in a London church, and their object was to
defend the Christian religion against unbelievers on the basis
only of the rational principles of Natural Religion.
Such were the most important currents in the spiritual life
of England about the close of the sixteenth and the beginning
of the seventeenth century ; and such was the soil upon which
Deism grew up. Deism itself is not a philosophical system ;
it represents a special conception of life which ruled the
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GENEBAL CHABACTER OF DEISM. 289
spiritual interest of England for almost two centuries. If we
inquire into its essential nature, it seems at the first glance
as if it first really brought forward that conception which we
are now in the habit of designating as " Deism " in the current
philosophical and religious terminology. The term is now
conynonly applied to that view of the relation of God to the
world which, in opposition to Atheism, affirms the existence
of God, and in opposition to Pantheism, affirms the personal,
independent, extra-mundane existence of God, but which at
the same time, in opposition to Theism strictly so called,
denies the continuous, ever-present action of God upon the
world and His activity in it. According to this deistic view,
God called the world once for all into Existence by His omni-
potent creative word, but then left it to itself as the workman
does with liis finished work ; and thus the world is supposed
to proceed upon its course according to the laws of the caibsas
secuTidcB that are immanent in it, without any interference
on the part of the cavsa prima. But such an identification
of the older English Deism with the current conception of
Deism is erroneous. On the contrary, several of the most
conspicuous English Deists express themselves most emphatic-
ally against this view, and repudiate it as atheistical and even
as irrational. Thus the example of the watch, which is
usually adduced as an illustration, is applied by Herbert in an
entirely diflferent sense from that of the later representations.
He says that the Epicureans ascribe everything to chance, and
yet no one can coijceive how under such a condition difierent
species or a fitting series of things could arise. Now, if even
a half intelligent man understands that a watch which shows
the hours night and day is constructed with intention and
great art, then any one must be completely mad who would
not refer this world-machine, which holds on its course not for
twenty-four hours only, but for many centuries, to a supremely
wise and powerful origin. — And Hobbes expressly says that
it is an unworthy view of God that assigns to Him complete
idleness, and withdraws from Him the government of the world
and of the human race ; God is thus, indeed, recognised as
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!2dO THE ENGLISH DEISM.
omnipotent, but if He does not concern Himself about what
is below, then the common saying applies, What is above us
does not concern us. But if there is no reason why we should
love Him or fear Him, it would be just the same as if there
were no God. In like manner, Charles Blount, in the preface
to his treatise. De anima Mundi, declares that the view
referred to amounts to Atheism : " It were Atheism to say
there is no God, and so it were (though less directly) to deny
His Providence, or restrain it to some particulars and exclude
it in reference to others." The second article of his Short
Sketch of the Deistic Religion accordingly expressly declares
that "God governs the world by Providence." The same
view is expressed by Morgan in the most decided way. He
designates himself a Christian deist, and distinguishes himself
as such on the one hand from the Christian Jew or Jewish
Christian, and on the other from the Atheist. But he
designates as Atheists, not merely those who deny the exist-
ence of God, but all who assert that the natural or moral
world, after it had been once created, put into its proper order
and provided with certain powers, qualities, and universal
laws of motion, continues to exist, to move, and to develop
itself without any influence of the First Cause. On the
contrary, Morgan as a Deist teaches that God governs the
natural and the moral world by His continuous uninterrupted
presence, power, and incessant action upon both. As a chief
objection to his opponents, he proposes the question. If the
natural and essential forces of the world can maintain and
govern the world without God and without the continued
operation of the First Cause, why then could they not also
originally create the world ? For if the corporeal world, by
means of its own internal laws and essential powers, and
without God's indwelling and working, can continue to exist
but a single moment, it may be as well conceived as going on
a longer time, and even to all eternity.
These references may suflBce to show that we would form an
entirely erroneous notion of the historical Deism if we were
to confound it with the recent conception of dogmatic Deism,
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THE HISTOJRICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DEISM. 291
It would also be incorrect to impute to the whole Deistic
movement a hostility to religion such as we encounter, in-
deed, in some of its offshoots, and as we find most sharply
reflected in such works as Swift's Tale of a Tub and Butler's
Hudibras, On the whole. Deism bears an earnestly religious
character ; it certainly does not show an uninterrupted belief
in positive religion, but it does manifest an incessant searching
for something fixed and certain behind the positive forms of
religion that are recognised as untenable. All the representa-
tives of Deism are convinced that it is not a body of particular
dogmas, but at most a few general principles, not a sacrifice of
the understanding, but a morally regulated life, or the inner
power of the heart, that constitutes the essence of Eeligion.
All the various religions participate, although in different
ways, in this one religious truth, and hence the question is
raised as to how these religions have arisen. It is only here
and there that we find the beginnings of a rational solution of
this question, for most of the Deists go no farther than the
view that the religions have arisen from priestly fraud and
the calculation of rulers. In like manner, they attack the
basis of the positive religions, but not the conception of
immediate revelations. But as enthusiasm for the written
word requires a proof and guarantee in the inner word of the
enlightened heart. Deism sets up certain intellectual criteria
by which the true revelation is to be distinguished from the
merely pretended revelationa We might characterize the
English Deism as a general movement in the way of intellec-
tual inquiry and investigation regarding religion, with the
tendency to derive all positive religions from one " natural "
Religion. It does not admit of a more precise characteristic,
for the answers which are given to the question which it
puts and investigates are as various as their starting-points.
Taking it as a whole, however, three phases may be dis-
tinguished in it. 1. Its Beginnings, as represented by Lord
Herbert of Cherbury, Sir Thomas Browne, Thomas Hobbes, and
Charles Blount ; 2. Its period of full development, as repre-
sented by Locke, Toland, Collins, Shaftesbury, Tindal, Chubb,
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292 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
and Morgan ; and 3. Its le^t representation in Dodwell and
Hume/
I.
The Beginnings of English Deism.
Lord Herbert of Cherbury.
Edward Herbert de Cherbuiy (1581-1648)* in his
principal work, De Veritate, gives the results of his theoretical
investigations into the nature of knowledge. These investiga-
tions were occasioned by the variety of the opinions then
existing, which caused the author to waver undecidedly
between one view and another. The study of the various
writers could not save him from this unfortunate position, for
they also represented various positions as the truth of philo-
sophy and religion, but gave no satisfactory explanation of
Truth itself. Hence Herbert resolved to start from a critical
examination of his own process of cognition " objectis libris
veritates nostras in ordinem digessimus." Now all true know-
ledge rests on the fact that objects are given under certain
circumstances to our faculties. The question regarding the
*• For the whole of this Section the following works are referred to : — T^echler,
Geschichte des Englischen Deismns, 1841, a work of rare objectivity and
reliability ; Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth
Century, 1876 ; Noack, Die Freidenker in der Religion, 8 Th. Bern 1853.
[Reference may also still be made to Leland's View of the principal Deistical
Writers, etc., 1754, etc.]
' Edward Herbert of Cherbury was an offshoot of the noble family of the Earls
of Pembroke. He was equally distinguished by his chivalrous character, his
insatiable thirst for knowledge, and his strict love of truth. He gave up the
quiet life on his estates and made several long journeys through the Netherlands,
France, Grermany, and Italy to satisfy his thirst for knowledge or to indulge his
longing for adventures and knightly deeds in famous military service of foreign
princes. In the midst of this changeful life Herbert found time to compose a
series of writings which show that he was a man of rich knowledge and an acute
thinker. The most important of his productions — and his own favourite work —
is hi3 ** De Veritate prout distinguitur a revelatione, a verismili, a possibili et a
falso " (Paris 1624). A further application of the thoughts of this theoretical
investigation relating to Religion is contained in his ** Do religione Qentilium,
errorumque apud eos causis" (Lpndon 1645). His other writings may be left
«out of account here.
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BEGINNINGS OF DEISM. HERBERT OF CHERBÜRY. 293:
nature of knowledge thus falls into a threefold inquiry — (1)
regarding our Faculties, (2) regarding the Objects that are to
be known, and (3) r^arding the Laws of the agreement
between these objects and faculties All our faculties are
divided into four classes, namely, instinctu» naturalis, senms
extemvs, sensus internus, and diseursus. The object of the
Internal Sense is the good (bonum) ; and hence the conscience,
as a reliable, universally - heard and universally - recognised
judgment regarding good and evil, is also called the sensvs
communis of the internal sense. Eternal blessedness is the
highest good. The object of the External Sense is the true
(verum). It is common to regard the five senses as all that
belongs to the External Sense, but this is false ; for to every
separate objective quality or difierentia of external things
there corresponds a special faculty for receiving it in our
External Sense. The intellectus is described as something
divine, and it realizes its own truths without requiring the
influence of external things. These truths are represented as
certain notitice communes, which exist in every sane man, with
which our mind is as it were filled from heaven, and by which
it judges of the objects of this world. There is no observation
nor experience without these common notions ; but they are
silent and concealed when no external things are presented
to them. The proper object of the Intellectus is eternal
blessedness, and so much is this highest goal set before all men
that it is quite impossible for us to pursue what is not happi-
ness. We are free only with regard to the means that may be
adopted for the attainment of this end. Side by side with
this dbjectum proprium of the Intellect, stands also the
dbjectum commune, or the common notions that are obtained
by reflection (quodcunque ex reliquis facultatibus seu noeticis
sen corporeis conformari potest). These intellectual notions
are distinguished by a series of marks from the immediate
common notions, but they have both the same certainty and
truth. — ^The application of these common notions to all the par-
ticular questions of whose solution our faculties are capable,
is the function of the fourth faculty, called Discursus (munus
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294 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
est ut quae circa utramqne analogiam sciri possant ia suain
infimam latitudinem ope notitiarum communium deduceTet).
How Herbert conceived of the agreement of objects with
these our faculties is shown most clearly by his distinc-
tion of a fourfold truth, 1. The Veritas ret consists in the
agreement of the thing with itself, which at the same time
involves the fact that nothing can be contained in it to which
our faculties could not be related. 2. The Veritas apparentuB
consists in the agreement of the appearance of a thing with
the thing itself ; it therefore desiderates that the object shall
be presented to us a suflBcient length of time and in proper
distance and position. 3. The Veritas conceptus is founded
partly upon the healthiness of the percipient sense, and partly
on the fact that the faculty corresponding to the object that is
to be known is applied to it ; thus the infinite is apprehended
by us only in a finite manner, and the eternal only in time.
4. The Veritas iivtellectus is the ** conformitas debita inter
conformitates praedictas," and it is the product and the highest
result of the previous truths from the combination of which it
springs. The true cognition is therefore founded upon the
intellect and its common notions (notiti» communes), and
these are discovered by means of the consenstts universalis, or
the congruent judgment of all. This "consensus" is the
highest rule of truth even in morals and religion. For
Eeligion is also a notitia communis or common notion, as there
is no nation and no century without religion ; and religion is
enjoined neither by philosophy nor by priests or governments,
but by the conscience.
Herbert puts Eeligion very high. It is the chief dis-
tinguishing and differentiating mark of man (tanquam ultima
hominis differentia ; solse et ultimas hominis differentiae religio
et fides). Hence there are really at bottom no Atheists.
The so-called Atheists only object to the false and inap-
propriate attributes that are assigned to God, and all they
mean is that they will rather have no God than such a one as
these attributes indicate. Nevertheless, if there be irreligious
men and Atheists, let it only be considered how insane and
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BEGINNINGS OF DEISM. HERBERT OF CHERBURT. 293
irrational those are among them who make reason the dis-
tinguishing mark of man.
By the rule of the " consensus universalis," the universally
recognised and therefore essential truths of all religions
are ascertained, and they are comprised in five propositions.
1. There exists a supreme Deity or God (esse supremum
aliquid numen). This is not, however, the mere abstract
conception of a Supreme Being, but Herbert enumerates no
less than eleven attributes belonging to God. He is blessed,
the end, ground, and means of things, eternal, good, just, wise,
infinite, omnipotent, free. 2. Worship is due to this Supreme
Being (supremum istud numen debere coli). This worship is
founded upon the faith that God regulates all things, including
the destiny of individual men, and that He is moved by
prayers. 3. Virtue and piety form the most important part of
divine worship (virtutem cum pietate conjunctam prsecipuam
partem cultus divini habitam esse et semper fuisse). From
this point of view there then opens up through various inter-
mediate stages a prospect leading to eternal blessedness as the
lost goal of things (ex conscientia notitiis communibus instructa
virtutem cum pietate conjunctam ex ea veram spem, ex vera
8pe tidem, ex vera fide amorem, ex vero amore gaudium, ex
vero gaudio beatitudinem insurgere docetur). 4. Sins must
be repented of and expiated (horrorem scelerum hominum
animis semper incedisse, adeoque illos non latuisse vitia et
sceleta quajcunque expiari debere ex poenitentia). Hence
every religion recognises sacrifice and expiation as practices
which God, in His goodness, has instituted as expiations for
the violation of His justice by sin. 6. After this life we
receive reward or punishment (esse praemium vel pcenam post
hanc vitam). — As universal elements of religion, although
differing in form, there are also enumerated: faith in the
Supreme God ; fixed hope in Him ; love which unites man
with God ; and virtue as the best worship. At another time,
he mentions only God and virtue ; or again, common concord
along with natural virtue. These universal truths are found
in all religions; and hence Herbert can say that there is
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296 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
no religion or philosophy so false that it has not its truth,
and that in every religion there are found means sufficient to
be agreeable to God.
In contemplating the historical Religions, the problem is
thus raised as to how the manifold additions which they
contain besides these truths are to be explained. In this
connection Herbert, with fine intelligence, enters upon a
physico-psychological explanation of natural religion, but
then suddenly breaks off from his inquiry, and takes refuge in
the assumption of the imposture of priests and the prudent
calculation of statesmen, which really explain nothing.
God reveals Himself to men in two ways : inwardly, as He
who is eternal life and blessedness, in the desire implanted
in all men after an eternal life and a happier state; and
externally, in the wonderful creation of this world. Now
the ancients sought in the world for something that was
eternal; they found this sublunary world subject to change
and decay, but in the heaven under the stars they found
a relatively eternal and blessed state. Further, they attributed
to the stars an influence upon visible things, and therefore
they did them reverence, yet not as the Supreme Deity, but
as His servants. In short, led by the voice of their own
conscience and from reverence and love to God, men attained
to the hope of a better life, and they then gave honour in the
stars to the greatest works of the Supreme God; but it
was God Himself whom they honoured in His works. In
ancient times this was the only form of religion, and it was
the same gods who were honoured under various names, as in
particular the sun was the Osiris of the Egyptians, the Baal
or Adonis of the Phoenicians, the Moloch of the Ammonites,
the Bel of the Assyrians, etc. Along with the sun came the
moon, the five planets, the fixed stars, and the heaven itself,
which was regarded as a corporeal substance; but "in
corporea coeli natura animam ejus, in anima coeli Deum ipsum
venerabantur." The diversity in the names of Grod had an
external reason, in the fact that every one assigned a name to
God in his own language and as it pleased him; and an
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BEGINNINGS OT DEISM. HERBERT OF CHERBtJEY. 297
internal reason, in the fact that God received a special name
for every eflFect or every benefit that flowed from Him.
Afterwards, the gods that were honoured in all countries and
among all nations were contrasted as dei consentes or dei
majorum gentium with the particular gods as the dd minoivim
gentium ; yet all assumed a Supreme God as the head over
the others, assigned to Him the. highest attributes, and rever-
enced Him as "Optimus et Maximus/' Hitherto man had
reverenced God in his own heart only according to the noiitico
communes, but now came in \hQ fahifieation of the true Religion,
— This falsification of Keligion is at one time attributed
to priests, philosophers, and poets, and at other times to
the priests alone. Its occasion lay in the consideration that
as every power, such as that of the king, had an external
reverence paid to it by practices and ceremonies, should there
not also be an entirely special worship rendered to God from
whom everything springs ? Nay, is there not a corresponding
honour due even to His ministers and priests ? Hence arose
the worship of images in temples, groves, and upon hills ; the
priests regulated this worship, and promised from it all happi-
ness and all furtherance. Then impostors arose and asserted
that a star, or a sphere, or an angel had spoken with them,
and commanded them how the rites of worship were to be
performed, and how life was to be led ; but, in truth, they had
only spent the night in the temple, and received there any
such revelation in dreams. These illusions could only be
imposed upon the people by the priests through employing
prophecies regarding the future which easily found credence.
For if, instead of the good that was promised, some misfortune
occurred, it was imputed to the sin of the sufferer ; and if,
instead of prophesied evil, some good resulted, it was declared
to be a consequence of ther prayer of the priest. Such super-
stition first arose among the Egyptians, and from them it
spread among all peoples. Besides, the priests added to
the Supreme God a whole series of other subordinate gods,
divided into three ranks or classes, the superccelestes, codestes,
and aubcodestes. For each of these they arranged a distinct
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298 THE ENQLISH DEISBC
cultus ; and from such fables did the priests form the religious
which have suppressed the chief articles of the one universal
Religion.
The heathen thus honour the same Supreme (Jod as we do,
only in another way. But the One True Religion has not
become completely lost ; to the heathen also virtus, fides, spes,
amorque were undoubtedly the higher rules of divine worship,
and sacrifice was a symbol of repentance. For the more
intelligent at least, who have a deeper insight into them,
the heathen religions are likewise found to contain those
five fundamental Articles, but they are hidden by a mass
of false accessories. Herbert does not express himself
distinctly about Christianity, yet he indicates that it has also
undergone a similar process of falsification.
A revdation of Ood is spoken of by Herbert both in
the narrower and in the wider sense. In the toider sense,
revelation is "quodcunque ex gratia divina demandatur;" it
is therefore the aid which is sent down from heaven to
the unfortunate in response to his prayer; it is the inner
experience of the activity of God in the process of faith, good
works, repentance, remorse, prayer, etc. Revelation, however,
is commonly regarded in the narrower sense, as something that
goes beyond general providence, as a communication of pro-
positions or commandments in addition to those five Articles.
Herbert expresses himself with great caution regarding
the question whether a special revelation is requisite to salva-
tion, or whether the five Articles suffice, saying that every one
will admit that these five Articles are good, and are universally
accepted. Some, however, affirm that these Articles are not
sufficient for the attainment of salvation. Whoever speaks
thus, he declares, alleges in his opinion something bold, not to
say dreadful and rash, as the judgments of God are completely
known by no one. Therefore, he says, I should not like
straightway to assert that these Articles are sufficient, yet it
appears to me that the view of those who judge piously and
mildly of the judgments of God is more probable, if only man
performs what he can. For it is not in the power of every one
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BEGINNINGS OF DEISM. HEBBEBT OF CHEBBUBT. 299
to make faith and tradition come to him, nor can any dogma
be added to the five Articles from right and universal reason,
so that man would thereby become more honest and pious, or
the public peace and concord would thereby be furthered.
Herbert does not examine more closely the possibility of
an immediate revelation of God ; his skepsis is only exhibited
in his making an effort to determine those conditions under
which we are alone justified in receiving a professed revelation
to be such, and he lays it down as implied conditions that the
Supreme Grod is wont to give oracles or to speak with articu-
late voice ; that the receiver of the oracle knows certainly
that it comes from the Supreme God and not from any good
or evil angel, and that he himself at the moment of receiving
it was not demented, drunk, or half asleep ; that the oracle is
handed down complete and inviolate by oral tradition or
writing to the after world ; and that the doctrine derived from
the oracle shall also so appeal to the later generations that it
will necessarily become an article of faith. Herbert elsewhere
also desiderates caution as necessary in accepting a statement
given out as a revelation. Our knowledge has its foundation
in our faculties, and revealed truth is based on the authority
of the revealer. Hence we can only give credence to a
revelation under the condition that prayer, vows, faith, in short,
all that Providence demands, has preceded it, and that the
revelation becomes by participation our own; for what is
accepted from others as revealed, is no more revelation, but
tradition or history, which for us can only be probable as the
ground of its reference lies outside of us. Further, it is
required that it teach us something that is entirely good or
true, because it is only by this that a rational revelation is
distinguished from irrational and godless temptation ; and
that we can trace the breathing of the divine Spirit, because
it is only by this that the inner efforts of our faculty in the
pursuit of truth are distinguished from external revelation.
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300 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
Sir Thomas Browne.
The Bdigio Medici of Sir Thomas Browne (ICO 5-1 6 81) ^
already contains the most important thoughts of the Englishr
Deism ; but along with a penetrating scepticism, it likewise
gives expression to a fantastic credulity, so that the different
judgments that have been pronounced on the book and its
author need cause us no surprise. Browne uses the pre-
caution to explain that his purpose was not at all to lay down
a rule for others, or to give definite canons of religion, but that
he only wrote his book with the object of exercising himself,
and that its contents might not be forgotten. He also boasts
that he had smitten down all the objections which Satan him-
self or his rebellious reason had opposed to him by that say-
ing of TertuUian, " certum est quia impossibile est" To hold
as true what one knows to be such is a matter of conviction,
and not of faith ; and hence he who does not live in the age
of miracles is to be congratulated, for it is only in the case of
such a one that there is any merit in believing, because it is
only in his case that faith is difficult But although the
author will rather shatter his own arm to pieces than dese-
crate a sanctuary or overthrow the monument of a martyr,
he nevertheless only confesses the faith which Christ Himself
taught, which the apostles propagated, and which the fathers
and martyrs confirmed. His faith may thus be assumed to
be the simple primitive Christianity of Christ, from which the
Christianity of the Church is carefully to be distinguished, as
it has been adulterated by the violences of Emperors, the
ambition and rapacity of Bishops, and the con'uption of later
ages. He speaks much and in competent style of the conflict
between reason and faith. Sentiment, faith, and reason are at
strife with each other, and are as hostile to peace as was the
second triumvirate of the Eoman Republic. But as there
^ Browne was born in London on the 19th October 1605. He studied at
the Universities of Oxford and Leyden, and settled as a physician at Norwich in
1636. Here he wrote his chief work, the Religio Medici (1642). He was
knighted by Charles II. in 1671^ and died on the 19th October 1681.
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BEGINNINGS OF DEISM. THOMAS BROWNE. 301
is no holy of holies for philosophy, neither does the original
religion of Christ know any mysteries. Browne begins to
speak of " the two books " out of which theology draws,
the one writton by God and the other by nature. The
relation between the two is, however, not closely explained ;
but as the original religion contains nothing in the way of
metaphysical speculations, but realizes the knowledge of God
from the rational contemplation of nature, so it is only the
uneducated crowd who behold miracles in Nature, whereas the
wise man perceives in it a high divine conformity to law.
And although Browne in his view of miracles stops at an
untenable half-way position, yet he not merely emphasizes
the fact that the providence of God is more clearly seen in
the regular course of nature than in miracles, but he openly
declares that the burning of Sodom and Gomorrah, the falling
of the manna, and such events, took place quite naturally.
As he excludes from religion all metaphysical speculations,
he teaches regarding God not much more than His existence,
to any doubt of which he had never been carried away, and he
even aflBrms that there have never really been Atheists ; and
he regards eternity and providence as the most important
attributes of God. The knowledge of the divine nature
or essence is reserved for God alone. All positive dogmas
appear as arbitrary, subjective opinions an^ errors. In theology,
he declares for keeping by the traditional way, and he will not
dispute about the Trinity, the incarnation, and similar subjects.
But as in all adiapJiora, he will have liberty to follow his
personal genius, he exhibits such indifference towards the
differences of the various Churches, that everything positive
is regarded by him as very insignificant. — Sir Thomas Browne
shows throughout a want of systematic completeness in his
thoughts, but his widely-spread writings served to communi-
cate the deistic method of thinking to the widest circles.
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S02 THE KNQUSH DEISM.
Thomas Hobbbs.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)* appears as a decided
adherent of philosophical empiricism. He defines philosophy
as a knowledge of effects from their known causes, and as
knowledge of possible causes obtained from known effects by
means of correct reasonings (effectuum ex conceptis eomm
causis seu generationibus, et ruisus generationum qu8B esse
possunt ex cognitis effectibus per rectam ratiocinationem
acquisita). Beckoning or calculation is represented as the
method of philosophizing, for rational thinking is just a pro-
cess of adding or subtracting, and all syllogistic inference
consists of these two operations. All our knowledge is derived
from sensible perception. This sensible perception is described
as a process of sensation in a strongly materialistic way. Its
basis is an external body, which presses either immediately or
mediately upon the corresponding oi^n, and propagates this
impression by means of the nerves to the brain or to the heart.
Thence arises a counter-pressure in order to be freed by
an outward-going motion from the external pressure. This
motion, however, appears as an external thing, and is called a
sensation. Its different qualities are nothing but differences
of the motion in us produced by the differences in the motions
of external matter. The imagination is nothing but the con-
tinuance of the motion according to the universal law of
persistence. Words are mere counters, that is, arbitrarily
chosen designations for particular sensations. Reason has no
' The principal writiogs of Hobbes were called forth by the contemporary
circumstances of hb country. He says himself that the third part of his
De Give (London 1642) was published by him because, some years before
the outbreak of the Civil War, his country had been violently excited by expla-
nations regarding the rights of the rulers and the due obedience of the citizens.
He hopes by it to show that it would be better to bear some inconvenience
in private life than to bring the State into confusion, and that the justice of an
undertaking should not be measured by the speeches and advice of individual
citizens, but by the laws of the State. His other important work is his
Leviathan ; or the matter, forme and power of a Commonwealth, ecclcsiasticall
and civill, London 1651. He also indicates its purpose to be to show that there
is no pretext by which infringement of the laws can be excused.
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BEGINKINGS OF DEISM. HOBBES. 803
other function than to add or to subtract generic names. By
the addition of two names there arises a judgment, bj the
addition of two judgments an inference, and by the addition of
inferences a proof. From the sum-total, again, one quantity
is found by the subtraction of others, because all thinking
consists in the simple processes of adding and subtracting.
Mathematical method is the only philosophical method, and
arithmetic is the model of all science. Because all thinking
rests upon sensation, there is no thinking and knowing but of
corporeal and finite things. There are only two kinds of body,
the natural and the aitificial, the latter being those that are
made by the will of man. Therefore philosophy is divided
into the Science of Nature and the Science of the State, to
which Logic has to be added as the theory of method.
The same naturalism controls the views of Hobbes in the
ethical sphere. Here, however, it is necessary to distinguish
between the condition of life prior to the existence of State
and the life in the State. In respect of the former pre-
political condition, it does not sound in accordance with
naturalism when we read that he who is not bound by a civil
law sins when he acts against his conscience, for, except his
reason, he has then no rule for his conduct. — But the notion
of conscience does not go far. If two or more are cognisant
of the same thing, they are called canscii; and as they are
mutually the most fitting witnesses of their deeds, it has
been held in all times as the greatest crime to give evidence
contrary to conscience. The word conscience (conscientia) is
also often used of the secret knowledge of one's own acts or
thoughts. — Eeason which, as we have already seen, is only
a faculty of reckoning, does not lead to any higher conception
of the good. It is expressly declared that there is no
universal rule of the good, the bad, and the indifferent,
derived from the nature of objects themselves. These con-
ceptions are entirely relative, and are significant only in
reference to that person who may use them. What is the
object of any man's desire, he calls good ; what is the object
of his aversion, he calls bad; and what he despises, is
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'304 THE.ENQUSH DEI8H.
indifferent Desire and aversion (appetitus, aversio) are real
motions in man which rest upon the motion of the senses.
The goal of appetite or desire is naturally the happiness of
life. If there were only a universally recognised criterioa
for the determination of what constitutes and what does not
constitute our happiness in life, an objective determination of
the good would be thus attained. But in the present life
there is no ultimate goal of our desire and no highest good
If any one were to attain the goal of his wishes» he could
just as little live as if he had lost all sense and memory.
Happiness is rather the continual advance from one pleasure
to another ; and it is so for this yery reason, that we do not
merely strive after a momentary gain, but the future calm
enjoyment of the object of our wish. Hence it cannot
surprise us when it is said to be " right " to preserve the body
from death and pains, to protect the limbs, and to keep oneself
in health. But as every individual forms his own judgment
about what is good, the wishes ^nd strivings of one man
are diametrically opposed to those of another. And because
in the state of nature all men have an unlimited right to all
things, there results as a consequence the war of all against
all. This universal state of war is, however, contrary to the
requirement of reason, in so far as it demands the preservation
of the life of the individual and of the race. Hence reason
demands that an end be put to this state of universal war ;
and thus the establishment of the State, as proceeding from
fear and brought about by a compact, is at the same time a
command of natural reason. While reason thus desiderates
the preservation of life and the members of the body, it
commands the individual to seek peace, and therefore not to
hold by his right to all things, but in consent with others to
tmnsfer his right to one will. Along with this supreme and
fundamental law, Hobbes enunciates nineteen other more
special laws, such as those relating to the keeping of com-
pacts, the pardon of the repentant, against ingratitude»
pride, immodesty, injustice, drunkenness, etc. AU these
laws are derived from natural reason, and they should
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BEGINI^IKGS OF DEI8M. H0B6ES. 305
lead in the interest of tJie individual to the founding of
a State.
The State is a civil person, which arises from all the
citizens subjecting their will to the will of one man or of
one assembly. It is all the same whether it is a natural or
a political State, that is, whether a ruler has acquired power
over the citizens, or the citizens themselves have transferred
the supreme power to one man ; in either case the holder of
the supreme power in the State has an unlimited authority.
He holds the sword of justice and of war, jurisdiction, legis*
lation, the nomination of officials, and the examination of
doctrine. And he is not at all bound to the laws of the
State. As soon as a State is founded, he becomes the person
by reference to whom conceptions are defined as good and
bad. As in fact the supreme law of natural reason involves
the founding and maintenance of a State as a necessary
condition for the maintenance of peace, so in correspondence
with the natural reason all that furthers the subsistence of
the State is good, and all that is prejudicial to it is bad«
This view of the State is not without an influence upon
Hobbes's Dodrine of Religion. While the State is formed by
the free compact of men, there exists before it by nature
another kingdom to which man belongs, and this is the
kingdom of God. The right of God to govern follows from
His omnipotence ; the duty of man to obey follows from his
weakness. There are, however, two kinds of natural obliga-
tion: in the one case, liberty is cancelled by corporeal
restrictions, and in this sense God rules over all men ; and in
the second case, liberty is annulled by hope and fear, and in
this sense God rules over those who recognise His existence.
His providence, the commandments given by Him to men,
and the punishments attached to their transgression. For
this a Word or proclamation of God is necessary. And
there is a threefold Word of God — ^reason, revelation, and
the utterances of the prophets; and hence we might
distinguish a threefold kingdom of GcoA. But as revelation
is now supplanted by Scripture, Hobbes speaks only of a
VOL. I. u ^ ,
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306 THE INGUSH DEISlf.
twofold klDgdom of God, a natural kiDgdom and a prophetic
kingdom. The natural kingdom of God, however, undergoes
a great revolution in consequence of the foundation of States.
Hence there arises a tripartite division into (1) natural
Beligion in the narrower sense, (2) natural political Beligion,
and (3) prophetic Beligion. The first two of these may be
taken together as Natural Religion in the wider sense, in
contrast to the last as Prophetic Beligion ; and, again, the last
two may be taken as positive religions (formed religion), in
contrast to the first as natural religion in the narrower sense.
Natural Beligion, in this narrower sense, is explained by
Hobbes on natural principles. It is proper to human nature
to inquire into the grounds of events, and especially into the
grounds of the happiness or unhappiness of oneselfl When
men see a thing begin, they immediately infer a cause by
which the thing is made to begin just at this time and not at
another ; and if they do not know the real causes of it, they
assume certain causes. Hence arises fear; for as men
certainly know that all things have their ground, they cannot
escape a constant care for the future ; but, looking ahead, they
are incessantly tortured by the fear of death, or poverty, or
misfortune, or similar things. This constant fear, arising from
ignorance of causes, has necessarily an object, and as men do
not see any other cause of their fate, they refer it to ''some
power " or an " invisible agent." Hence an ancient poet says
that the gods have been made by fear. "Primum in orbe
Decs fecit timer." And this is correct as regards the many
gods of the heathen. The recognition of the one eternal,
infinite, omnipotent God can be derived more easily from the
investigation of the causes of natural things ; for if any one
infers from any effect which he sees to its proximate cause,
and then advances to the cause of this cause, and thus goes
deeper into the series of causes, he will at last, with the best
of the ancient philosophers, come to a single first Mover, that
is, to a single and eternal cause of all things whom all call
God. And this result will be reached without any thought of
one's own happiness, such as awakens fear, diverts the soul
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BEGINKIKGS OF DEISM. HOBBES. 307
from the investigation of natural causes, and gives occasion to
as many gods as tbere are men who form them. — Although
by the natural light we can know that there is a God,
every one does not apprehend the existence of God, because
there are some men who direct their sense only to sensible
pleasure, or to the acquisition of honour and riches; there
are others who do not draw the correct inferences in this
connection, because they either cannot or will not do it ; and
there are still others who are too weak to do this,
Hobbes likewise gives a natural explanation of some
important points in detaiL We think of the substance of
God, he says, as the substance of the human soul, and after
the fashion of a man or of another body that appears in a
dream or in a mirror. Hence the soul is called "spirit,"
meaning a very fine body. Yet, because the spiiit is still
corporeal, those who have attained to the knowledge of the
one infinite, almighty, and eternal God rather designate Him
as inconceivable than describe Him as an incorporeal spirit.
— How these invisible agencies produce their effects, most
men do not know, yet, without any insight into what is meant
by ''being a cause," they often, according to some unreal analogy,
connect things that are um*elated. Others, again, ascribe such
invisible power to certain words and invocations, as for instance
to change bread into a man, etc. — Worship can be offered to
these invisible powers only by signs of honour and respect,
such as presents, supplications, thanksgiving, invocation, etc.
— ^As to the way in which such powers indicate to men what
is past and future, or favourable and the contrary, nature tells
nothing. — Here, however, we have the fourfold natural germ
of religion : the fear of spirits ; ignorance of second causes ;
worship of what is feared ; and expectation of what is con-
tingent according to prognostications.
In the state of nature, God makes Himself known only
through the natural law of reason. Tliis law relates, in the
first place, to the duties of men towards each other ; and, in
the second place, to natural worship. Honour consists in the
opinion which is held of any one's power and goodness.
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308 THE SNGUSH DUSlf •
Worship is a name for those signs by which this sentiment is
exhibited to others. Honour involves three states of mind :
Love, which relates to good sentiment ; and Hope and Fear«
which are related to the power of others. From these states
of mind there proceed external actions as natural signs of the
honour by which the powerful are wont to be conciliated and
to become kindly disposed. The end of honour in the case
of men is that as many as possible may obey them from love
and fear : in the case of God, its only end is that He may do
good to us. like all other signs of the. soul, so does the
honour or woi:8hip of God consist in words and in actions.
It consists in words, in so far as we assign properties and
names to God. The existence of God implies that He is
the cause of the world, and excludes the view that the world
is God, or God the soul of the world as well as the eternity of
the world. Further, it is unworthy of God to attribute to Him
complete inaction, and to withdraw Him from the government
of the world and of the human race. Neither are we entitled
to attribute to Him anything finite, such as a form, or to say
that we can grasp or conceive God with the imagination or
any other mental power, or that God has parts, or that He is
in a place, or moves, or rests. It is true that the word
" infinite " indicates an idea of our soul ; but when we say
that something is infinite, this does not express any determina-
tion of the thing itself, but only the impotence of our mind.
Above all, it is unworthy of God to assign to Him those
epithets that indicate a pain, such as revenge, anger, pity ; or
those that express a want, such as desire, hope, longing ; or
that love which is called fondness, or passive states. Even
when we ascribe to God a will, or knowledge, or insight,
nothing similar to what is in us should be understood thereby.
If we would assign to God only attributes which correspond
to reason, we must either use negatives, such as " infinite,"
** unending," " inconceivable ; " or the highest degrees, as " the
best," " the greatest," " the strongest ; " or such indefinite words
as "the good," "the righteous," "the creator," "the king," and
so on ; and always in the sense that it is not the attributes
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BEGINNINGS OF DEIS^ H0BBE3. 309^
themselves that are thus designated, but only our admiration
and obedience. Beason admits, in fact, only one word as a
designation of the nature of God, and that is His Mtistence, or
simply that He is, in which it is implied that He is the King
as well as our Lord and Father. — As actions by which God is
honoured, reason recognises prayer, thanksgiving, gifts» and
sacrifice as the expressions of gratitude; swearing by God
alone, and speaking of Him with reflection. In the highest
degree, however, attention is to be given to the observance of
the natural laws ; for all depreciation of the dominion of God
is the highest offence, and obedience is more agreeable than
all sacrifice.
Along with this natural worship, which devotes words and
deeds to the honour of God, and which is honourable in the
case of any one, Hobbes also speaks of an arbitrary worship
which takes its acts and designations from the sphere of
things that are indifferent in themselves. Thus, as r^ards
the divine attributes, there is nothing that is fixed in itself,
because in every language the use of words and names rests
upon convention, and therefore it may be also altered by
convention. The appointment of words and actions, that are
indifferent in themselves, to be used in the worship of God
necessarily demands an authority ; in the state of nature every
individual may appoint these, but it is otherwise in the public
State. In the State the holder of power is an unlimited ruler,
and he has therefore the right to arrange what words and
names for God shall be regarded as honourable, and what
others shall not be so regarded ; that is, he has the right to
arrange what doctrine is to be maintained and to be publicly
confessed regarding the nature and activity of God. On
the other hand, there are certain actions which are always
signs of contempt, and' there are others that are always
signs of honour, and the State can make no alteration upon
these. At the same time, however, there are innumerable
things which are indifferent in themselves in regard to honour
or contempt The State can make these into signs of honour,
and then they actually become honourable. With the forma-
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310 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
tlon of the State, the individual has to transfer to the State
the right to regulate worship. Otherwise, amidst the diversity
of worshippers, one would regard the worship of another
as unsuitable and godless, whereas worship can only then
serve as a sign of inward reverence when all recognise it as
honourable At the same time, Hobbes expressly declares
that the State can only prescribe the external worship and
never the internal faith, and that it is not necessary to obey,
should the State demand the dishonouring of Gkxl, or prevent
His being honoured.
Along with the natural word of God, Hobbes also takes
notice of a prophetic word, but he does not examine the
question of the possibility of an immediate revelation; he
merely sets up a series of rules which ought to be observed in
testing any professed revelation. Only that is wholly a word
of God which God ha^ spoken by the assurance of a true
prophet Hence we must know above all who is a true
prophet. The people believed in Moses on account of his
miracles and on account of his doctrine. The later prophets
likewise found faith on account of their prophesying coming
things, and on account of the faith in the God of Abraham.
But it is the function of natural reason to investigate whether
these two things were actually founded on fact. — ^When we
examine the supernatural revelation of the prophetic word,
we should not set aside sense, experience, and right reason ;
for the word of God, while it contains much that is above
reason, as what can neither be proved nor refuted by natural
reason, yet contains nothing contrary to reason. As often
then as we may stumble upon a passage that we cannot
comprehend, we must subject our intellect to the words ; for
the mysteries are like the pills which physicians prescribe
for the sick — swallowed whole they are healing, but when
chewed they are mostly spat out again ! This subjection of
the intellect is, however, not to be so understood as if we
were held bound to assent to divergent views of Scripture.
This is not in our power ; only we are not to contradict those
whose task it is to establish doctrines. God speaks to us
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BEGINNINGS OF DEISM. HOBBES. 311
either immediately or by means of other men. How He
speaks immediately to a man may be recognised by those to
whom He so speaks. Bat while it is not just impossible, it
is very difficult for another to know it. For if any one says
to me that Gk)d has immediately spoken to him, I do not see
how he will make it probable to me. If some one says it to
whom I owe obedience, then I am bound neither by word nor
by deed to make known my dissemus ; but, on the other hand,
he cannot constrain my belief. If some one says it who has
no authority, then there is no reason to believe him or to obey.
If some one says that God has spoken to him in a dream, then
he says that he has dreamed that God spake to him ; but no
one wiU hold the dreams of others to be God's word, at least
no one will do so if they can be naturally explained from the
pride and arrogance of the dreamer. When any one asserts
that God has supematurally inspired him with a new doctrine,
intelligent men will recognise of him that he is transported
by the over-estimate of his own mind. Although God can
speak to a man in a dream or vision by a voice and inspiration,
yet no one is bound to believe one who asserts that God has so
spoken to him ; he may in fact err, and, what is still worse,
he may lie. The Scriptures give two signs as marks of a true
prophet : the annunciation of the religion which is already
received, and the performance of miracles ; yet not the one
without the other, but both of them together.
Hobbes speaks about miracles in some detail That man
wonders at an event is conditioned by two things : first, that
he has seldom or never seen anything similar happening;
and, secondly, by the fact that he cannot understand that it
happens from natural causes, and not by the immediate
operation of God. Thus it is a miracle when a horse or an
ass speaks, but not when a man or a beast produce their like ;
the first rainbow was a miracle, but the present rainbows are
not so. In this way ignorant men regard many a thing as
a wonderful miracle about which educated men do not
wonder, such as eclipses of the sun and moon. Again, the
purpose of a miracle is always to accredit the prophets and
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S12 tHE ENGLISH DEISM.
ambassadors of God, and hence creation is not a miracle.
Farther» neither the devil, nor an angel, nor a spirit can
perform miracles, nor any one but God alone.
It is assumed as a historical fact without closer investiga-
tion that God has revealed Himself immediately to the
prophets, but Hobbes alludes to a double meaning of the
expression *' Word of Gtod." It signifies, in the first place,
the discourse of God, and in so far the Word of God is con-
tained in the Scripture. Again it means the doctrine of God,
and so far the Scripture is God's Word. Hobbes also lays
the foundation of important beginnings in the criticism of the
Old Testament canon ; he brings forward in particular certain
weighty grounds against the Mosaic composition of the Pen-
tateuch.— By this immediate revelation, the prophetic kingdom
of God is founded. Although natural reason can bring man
to a certain knowledge and reverence of God, there is always
a danger of his falling into atheism and superstition. The
former arises from the opinions of a rationedism which is
without fear; the latter arises from the fear which has
separated itself from right reason. Now, while the greatest
part of men sank into idolatry, God called Abraham to lead
men to the true worship. God immediately revealed Himself
to Abraham, and entered into a covenant with him and his
seed, to the intent that Abraham should recognise God as
his God, so as to subject himself to Him as ruler, and that
God, on the other hand, would give him the land of Canaan.
Circumcision was to serve as a sign of the covenant; but
besides this we find no laws that go beyond the demands of
natural reason. This compact was renewed with Isaac and
Jacob, and afterwards with the whole people at Mount Sinai,
and it then obtained the name of the '' Kingdom." The laws
of this Kingdom are in part, as relating to morals, of natural
obligation ; in part they are derived from Abraham, as in the
case of the prohibition of idolatry and the law of the Sabbath ;
and in part they were given by God as the special King of
the Jews, as is the case with the political, judicial, and
ceremonial laws. Moses united in his person the supreme
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BEGINZ^IKGS OF DEISM. HOBBES. 313
power of the State and the right to interpret the divine
Word. Afterwards both powers were united as of right in
the hand of the High Priest, but were really exercised by the
prophets. After the choice of a king, he exercised the two
powers, as the kingdom of Grod had been abrogated with His
consent.
This Kingdom of God was restored by Christ. Christ's
office is threefold : that of a Eedeemer, of a Teacher, and of
a King. The kingly office is undoubtedly the most important.
Christ was sent by Grod in order to conclude the covenant
between Him and the people. The kingdom of God,
established by Christ, does not begin till His second coming
at the day of Judgment. His first appearance upon the
earth did not yet constitute the kingdom itself, but only the
calling of those who will be received into the future kingdom.
For although His kingdom is only to come in the future, its
members must conduct themselves in such a manner here,
that they will persevere in the obedience promised by the
covenant. For the Christian Seligion is also a covenant or
compact, God promising forgiveness of sins and introduction
into the kingdom of heaven, and men promising obedience
and faith. These are, in fact, the two conditions of entrance
into the kingdom of God. Obedience alone would suffice, if
it were perfect ; but as we are subject to punishment, both
for Adam's sake and on account of our own sin, we need, as
the condition of obedience for the future, also forgiveness of
past sina Faith is a free gift of God. The only article of
faith that is necessary to salvation, is that Jesus is the
Christ ; and this article includes that God is omnipotent and
the Creator of the world, that Jesus Christ has risen from the
dead, and that He will raise up all men at the last day. It
is also evident that the Christian Church is completely sub-
ordinated to or rather incorporated in the State as the supreme
authbrity. The community of citizens constitutes the State ;
the community of Christians constitutes the Church. "A
Church and a Commonwealth of Christian People are the
same thing."
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314 THE ENGLISH DEISlf.
Chablbs Blount.
The writings of Charles Blount (1654-1693) contain
little that is peculiar or noteworthy. He gives a short sketch
of the Deistic Religion, and is the first to use this expression.
He holds that there is one supreme perfect Being, that God
is not honoured by images and sacrifices, for it is not external
rites, but only repentance and future obedience that can
reconcile God. He further holds that a mediator is un-
necessary on the ground that God must determine Himself,
and that such mediation would derogate as much from His
infinite goodness as an image would derogate from His
spirituality and infinity. There is nothing required but only
the observation of all the things that are just by nature, such
as the imitation of God or the practice of virtue. In another
place Blount enumerates seven principal points as belonging
to Natural Religion, which consists in the belief in an eternal,
intelligent Being, and the duty that is due to Him, and which
is ^communicated to us by our reason without revelation and
positive law. These seven points, however, differ e^entially
from the five points of Herbert He argues for the advan-
tage of natural religion over positive religion on the well-
known ground expressed in the following syllogism. The
precepts that are necessary to eternal salvation must be made
known to every one ; the precepts of revealed religion cannot
be known everywhere; therefore it is not positive religion,
but only natural religion, that is necessary for our salvation.
Blount can refer to nothing as explaining the positive religions
but the imposture of selfish priests, who deformed the primi-
tive religion of mere rectitude by the introduction of all sorts
of gods and images, oracles and sacrifices, in order to guide
the people in leading-strings for their own advantage.
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THE FÜLL DEVELOPMENT OF DEISM. LOCKE, 815
IL
The Full Development of Deism.
John Locke.
The philosophical theory of Locke (1632-1704)^ may be
designated Empiricism by reference to the result it attained^
and it may also be called Criticism by reference to the
method it pursued. The object and purpose of his principal
work was an Inquiry into the origin, the certainty, and the
extent of human knowledge, as well as the grounds and
degrees of belief, opinion, and assent. The result of this
examination of our faculty of knowledge is primarily nega-
tiva There are no ''innate ideas" either of a theoretical or of a
practical kind. On the contrary, the soul is originally a tabula
rasa, like a blank sheet of paper without any lines written or
engraved upon it ; but it is capable of receiving all sorts of
impressions. All our ideas arise from Sensation, that is, from
external experience by means of the senses, and from Beflec-
tion, that is, internal experience by means of consciousness.
The former process takes place in so far as the external
objects furnish the soul with ideas of sensible qualities ; and
the latter, in so far as the soul gives the understanding ideas
of its own operations. We obtain ideas of the Qualities of
bodies by impulse ; and there are various kinds of quedities
^ Locke became dissatisfied with the Scholastic Philosophy at the University
of Oxford, and felt himself drawn more towards Descartes. In the course of
his study of Medicine and the Natural Sciences he passed through an appro-
priate training for his later empirical inquiries. Locke formed an intimate
friendship with Lord Ashley Cooper, afterwards Earl of Shaftesbury, grand-
father of the philosopher of the same name, was appointed by him to important
political offices, and eyen accompanied him into exile when he retired to
Amsterdam. The last years of his life he spent partly in the discharge of
pnblic offices as Commissioner of Commerce and of the Colonies, and partly in
learned leisure. His Essay concerning Human Understanding , London 1690,
is the most important of his works, and it has secured him a permanent place
in the History of Philosophy. Here we have chiefly to consider his treatise,
entitled The Beasonableness of Christianity, as delivered in the Scriptures,
1695, and his Letters on Toleration, London 1689^92.
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316 . THE ENGLISH DEISM.
in bodies. The Primary Qualities are Solidity, Extension,
Figure, Number, Position, Motion, and they are inseparable
from bodies in any of their states. Ideas of these Qualities
arise in us as copies of the objects themselves, as when certain
minute imperceptible particles come into our eyes and
propagate thence a certain motion to the brain. The
Secondary Qualities have nothing corresponding to them in
the things themselves, but are only certain powers they have
of producing sensible ideas in us ; and this happens in like
manner by the action of imperceptible particles upon the
souL These ideas, however, have no similarity to the bodies.
Hence the soul can neither produce nor annihilate Simple
Ideas, but is purely passive in receiving them. On the other
hand, it has the power to retain the ideas that have once been
received, and to deal with them freely and actively. By com-
bination of Simple Ideas the soul forms Complex ideas; it
conjoins several ideas, and thus forms notions of Belations ;
and it further separates one idea from the others along with
which it appears in existing things, and by this abstraction
it produces General Ideas. But in these operations the
soul is also so far restricted that it cannot go beyond the
material furnished by Sensation and Reflection. Words
serve as signs of Ideas, and their meaning rests merely upon
the free, arbitrary convention of men, and it has nothing to
do with the actual existence of things. Most errors and
disputes rest upon a misunderstanding of words. By words
becoming sanctioned, an error is often propagated and con-
firmed. Doctrines may even grow into the dignity of prin-
ciples in religion or morals by length of time and the agree-
ment of neighbours, although they have no better source
than the superstition of a nurse or the authority of an old
woman.
Corresponding to this Empiricism in the theory of know-
ledge, Locke, in treating of Ethics, makes the sensations of
pleasure and pain the criterion of what is good and bad. We
call good whatever awakens in ns pleasure or diminishes pain,
and the opposite is bad. It is thus that our passions are put
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JOHN LOCKE. 3 17
in motion, for the wish for happiness determines our desire,
and in such a manner that on account of the different ideas of
happiness, different things appear as good or bad, and so that
a present pain determines us more strongly than a pleasure
that is hoped for in the future. When we are capable of
performing actions according to the ideas which our soul
forms of things in their bearing upon our happiness,, we are
free. It is not the will that is properly free, but the being
who acts. Further, what is morally good and bad is not
objectively or in itself good and bad ; but it is the agreement
or the opposite of our free act with a particular law by which,
in accordance with the will and power of the lawgiver,
what is agreeable and disagreeable is connected with our
state. Of such moral rules there are three : the Divine law,
the civil law, and the law of public opinion. The Divine law
alone is the true test of moral rectitude, and it is communi-
cated to us either by the light of nature or by the voice of
revelation.
What then does Locke make of Eeligion in connection with
such views? In the first place, his universal rejection of
innate ideas also applies to the idea of God. It is admitted
that it is one of the greatest practical truths that God is to be
worshipped, but neither the idea of worship nor the idea of
God is innate. There are peoples who do not possess this idea,
and besides, there are found in the creation such visible traces
of the wisdom and power of God that men can come to the
knowledge of God without having the idea innate in them. If
the innateness of this idea is inferred from the goodness of
God, which, in such an important matter, could not leave man
a prey to doubt and uncertainty, the reply is, that to infer
from what appears good to us to what God ought to have
done, is rash and presumptuous. Besides, there prevails the
greatest diversity of opinion regarding the idea of God ; and
the fact that the wise men of all nations have found out the
truth, at least regarding the unity and infinity of God, rather
proves that correct ideas are the fruit of reflection. Locke thus
designates the notion of God as a very natural discovery of
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818 THE ENGUSH DEISM.
human reason. The notion of God is formed in the same way
as the notion of immaterial spirits ; they are both complex
ideas made up of simple ideas of reflection. When we enlarge
those ideas that appear to us excellent, such as existence and
duration, knowledge and power, pleasure and happiness, by
the idea of infinity we obtain that idea which is most con-
formable to the loftiest being. The notion of God is thus
formed by enlarging the ideas which we have obtained through
reflection on the activities of our mind and through the senses
from external things, to the degree that it includes infinity in
it. We cannot know God's essence ; in His essence God is
possibly simple, but for us, in this relation, there is no other
idea possible but a complex one. Yet here we must not hold
to the idea of a body, but to that of a mind.
Locke also expresses himself regarding the ground upon
which the idea of God is formed. God has not left us without
witnesses of His existence. The truth of His existence presses
itself upon all, and its evidence comes up to mathematical
certainty, although it requires reflection and attention. Every
one has a clear consciousness of his own existence ; every one
is also certain that nothing cannot possibly produce a being ;
and therefore something real must have existed from eternity.
A thing which is produced from something else has in this the
source of all its powers ; and hence the eternal source of all
beings must necessarily also be the source of all powers, and
therefore must be supremely powerful. Of the two kinds of
beings, those that think and those that do not think, it is not
possible that those that do not think can have brought forth
those that think ; and further, as man finds in himself con-
sciousness and knowledge, these powers must therefore also
belong to the original Being, and even in the highest degree.
Hence there exists an eternal and most powerful Being who
possesses the highest knowledge. It is a matter of indifference
as to whether we call this Being God, but from this idea may
be derived all the attributes which we. are wont to assign to
the Supreme and Eternal Being. — Locke considers that the
ontological argument is not properly fitted to prove this truth.
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JOHN LOCKE. 319
Along with this natural knowledge of God, Locke speaks
also of Bevelation ; but instead of investigating its possibility,
he only sets up certain caveats to warn and guard us against
the too easy acceptance of pretended revelations. After
having spoken of the doubtful value, and the necessity of
making an examination of, all historical knowledge, he proceeds
to show that there are propositions which are supported upon
mere testimony, and yet lay claim to the highest degree of
trustworthiness, because their testimony comes from Him who
can neither deceive nor be deceived, that is, from God Himself.
This is Bevelation. Its trustworthiness is dependent on the
certainty, first, that a certain thing actually is a Divine revela-
tion ; and secondly, that we rightly understand the meaning of
the expressions. In both respects great caution is required.
The relation between Beason and Faith is explained at
considerable length. A distinction is made between (1)
rational propositions, the truth of which we can discover by
an examination of natural ideas ; (2) supra-rational proposi*
tions, or propositions above Beason, the truth of which we
cannot derive from those sources ; and (3) irrational pro-
positions, which are inconsistent with themselves, or are
incompatible with clear and distinct ideas. Thus it is accord-
ing to reason that there is one God ; it is contrary to reason
that there are many Gods ; and it is above reason that there
is a resurrection. When reason and faith are opposed to each
other, by reason is understood the accepting as true of pro-
positions to which the mind comes by the exercise of its
natural powers, and by faith is meant the acceptance as true
of a proposition that has not arisen from rational thinking,
but is adopted merely on the ground of the authority of one
who proclaims it as a divine ambassador. In this connection
there are three things to be observed. In the first place, an
external revelation can never communicate to us a new Simple
Idea which we have not previously received from sensation
or reflection. The conmiunication is made, in fact, through
language, but this is always connected with the impressions
given by experience. In the second place, revelation may
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'S 20 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
communicate to us tniths which reason can attain by natural
means, such as the truth of a proposition in Euclid ; yet revela-
tion never establishes the same certainty as deduction from the
natural powers of reason does. Hence no revelation can have
validity as against the dear evidence of reason, otherwise the
divine revelation would contradict what flows from the faculty
of knowledge that is likewise given by Gbd. As reason decides
in the case of a communicated revelation as to whether it is
really divine, the belief in it thus rests always upon reason.
In the third place, things that are above reason form the proper
objects of faith. They are therefore such things as we have
no ideas or only imperfect ideas of, or of whose past, present,
or future state we can have no knowledge, such as the rebellion
of a part of the angels and the resurrection of the dead. In
these things revelation must be of more authority than the
probable conjectures of reason ; but even here reason judges
as to whether a certain thing is a revelation as well as the
expressions in which it is communicated. In short, *' whatever
Grod hath revealed is certainly true ; but whether it be a
divine revelation or no, reason must judge."
Christianity is represented as entirely conformable to reason,
for nothing is requisite for a man to become a Christian but
repentance and faith. Locke rejects as erroneous the view that
all men were condemned to eternal and infinite punishment by
Adam's fall, and the opinion that Christ was only a teacher of
natural religion, from a special redemption being unneceesaiy.
Christ has delivered us from the power of death, and thereby
acquired for us again what we had lost by the fall of Adam,
namely, righteousness, happiness, and immortality. Every
righteous man has now again received a title to eternal life,
whereas the sinner is excluded from Paradise. As a substitute
for that obedience, which no one perfectly performs, Grod
requires along with repentance the faith or belief that Jesus
is the Messiaa The rule of obedience is the moral law as
purified by Christ, and Christ has enabled us more easily to
fulfil it by pointing to inexpressible rewards and punishments
in another world.
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JOHN TOLAND. 321
Locke expressed himself emphatically in favour of the
universal toleration of other religious communities, and he
supported this claim by a detailed theory regarding the relation
of the State to the Church.
John Toland.
John Toland (1670-1722)^ was the author of Christianity
not Mysterious, which was published in 1696. It was only the
first part of a proposed larger work, which, as planned, was to
consist of three parts. The object of the first part was to
prove that the chief qualities of true Eeligion are clearness
and conformity to reason, and that Christianity possesses these
qualities. The second part was to give a rational interpreta-
tion of the supposed Mysteries of Christianity, and to show
that they were grounded in human reason. And the third
part was to defend the necessity and design of divine Eevela-
tion against all the enemies of revealed Eeligion. Only the
first part appeared, and it falls into three sections. The first
section speaks of reason generally, and breathes throughout the
spirit of Locke's empiricism ; the second proceeds to show that
the doctrines of the Gospel are not contrary to reason ; and the
third goes on to explain that there is no Mystery or anything
above Eeason in the Gospel.
Eeason is not the soul viewed abstractly, but it is the soul
^ Toland was bom in Ireland. He was the son of Catholic parents, but in his
sixteenth year he passed over to Protestantism, and as he had not learned '* to
subject his understanding any more than his senses to any man or society,*' he
became the chief representative and the best known writer of the Deistic school.
His principal work is his " Christianity not Mysterious: or a treatise showing
that there is nothing in the Gospel contrary to reason, nor above it, and that
no Christian doctrine can be properly called a Mystery," London 1696. Toland
had to withdraw himself by flight from the violent attacks which this work pro-
voked. Two phases are to be distinguished in Toland's development. In his
Christianity not Mysteruma, which is to be regarded as the standard work of the
English Deism, Toland still represented a certain supematuraUsm, as he does
not contest an immediate Divine Eevelation, but openly acknowledges it, and
only demands that it should be in harmony with reason. In his later period,
as represented in his Letters to Serena (London 1704), his Pantheisticon {Cos-
mopoU, 1720), and his Adeisidamion (Hague 1709), Toland turns from his
earlier poedtion to a decided Naturalism.
VOL. L X
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322 THE ENGLISH DEISBl
as active in a particular way. Neither is it the soul as it
receives ideas into itself through the senses. The simple ideas
which we obtain by Sensation and Keflection rather form the
material upon which the activity of our Beason is exercised.
Knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or non-
agreement of our ideas. It is either immediate or mediate ;
the former constitutes intuitive knowledge, or self-evidence,
the latter demonstrative knowledge or demonstration. It is
only in connection with the latter that reason is active as the
faculty of the soul which discovers the certainty of doubtful
and obscure things by comparing them with those that are
completely known. What evidently contradicts our common
notions, or our clear and distinct ideas, is contrary to reason.
The ground of all right conviction is evidence, which consists
in the exact agreement or conformity of our ideas with their
objects. From this ground of conviction the means of infor-
mation must be carefully distinguished, and as such there are
experience and authority. Experience is divided into internal
or reflection, and external or sensation; and authority is
divided into human and divine. The divine revelation is not
a ground of conviction, or a motive of assent, but a means of
instruction. Revelation is indeed the way upon which we
actually come to the knowledge of truths, but it is not the
ground on which we believe them. Hence it follows that
in Christianity as a divine revelation there can neither be
anjrthing against reason nor anything above reason.
The assertion that things occur in revelation that are
contrary to reason is the ground of all absurdities, as of the
doctrines of Transubstantiation, of the Trinity, and so on. A
doctrine contrary to reason should be entirely unintelligible
to us, because we would have no idea of it. Further, whoever
says that he can accept what is a tangible error and contrary
to reason, if it is contained in the Scriptures, justifies all
absurdities ; he sets the one light in opposition to the other ;
and since both come from God, he makes God the author of
all uncertainty. Hence all the doctrines and precepts of the
New Testament must agree with natural reason and with our
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JOHN TOLAND. Ä23
own common ideas. And this rationality and comprehensi*
bility of the Christian religion is ako supported by the order
and method, as well as by the easy and simple style, which
prevails in the New Testament.
In order to prove that the Gospel contains no mystery, or
nothing supra-rational, it must first be settled what a mystery
is. By a mystery is meant, in the first place, a thing which
is conceivable in itself, but which for the time is veiled in
figurative words, or types, or images; and it also comes to
signify a thing that is inconceivable by its own nature. It is
erroneous to call anjrthing a mysterivm as soon as we have no
adequate idea of all its qualities or its essential nature. As,
in fact, we do not know the inner essence of things, but know
them only in so far as their qualities stand in relation to us
as useful or prejudicial, in this sense everything would be
irrational It would be as little correct to designate a
doctrine of the Christian religion as a mystery, merely
because we have no complete and adequate idea of it, as it
would be to do this with any ordinary part of nature. What
is revealed in religion being extremely useful and necessary
for us, is easily conceived, and it completely agrees with our
ordinary ideas. With proper examination, such doctrines
may be just as well conceived as natural and common things.
Thus with regard to God, we certainly do not know the
nature of His eternal essence, but we do know quite correctly
His attributes ; and every act of our religion is guided by the
contemplation of one of His attributes. The same limitation
of our knowledge to attributes is found in regard to all things.
In the heathen religions, Mysterium (MvaTqpiov) designates a
thing that is conceivable in itself, but which is so much
concealed from other men that it cannot be known without
special revelation of it, that is, without initiation into it by
those who know. In the New Testament, Mysterium never
designates a thing that is inconceivable in itself ; it indicates
a thing that is conceivable by its nature, but which is either
veiled by figurative words and practices, or is kept solely in
God's knowledge, so that it cannot be known without a special
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824 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
revelation. Mysterium therefore at one time signifies the
gospel; at another, the Christian religion; at another, the
doctrines revealed by the apostles ; and again, something that
is veiled in parables and similes. This view of the nature of
mysteries is also held by the Church Fathers.
Against this assertion, however, reference is made to the
nature of Faith or Belief as something that transcends
knowledge, and to Miracles as events that are essentially
inconceivable. With regard to Faith, Toland maintains that
the true faith is a firm conviction which rests upon previous
knowledge, and therefore upon the exercise of reason. God
does not, in fact, speak to us immediately, but we must rely
upon the words and writings of those to whom He may have
spoken. It thus becomes necessary to examine whether such
writings have actually proceeded from their alleged authors,
and whether these persons and their works are worthy of God
or not. Only if Faith is a conviction, founded upon previous
knowledge and understanding, can there be various stages and
degrees of faith, and only on that condition are we able " to
give to others a reason for the hope that is in us." That all
are commanded to believe under the threat of damnation,
necessarily presupposes that the object of faith is intelligible
to all. — Toland does not deny Miracles as events which
exceed all human power, and which the laws of nature are
not able to bring about by their ordinary modes of operation.
But as what is contrary to reason is nothing at all, and is
therefore impossible, miracles must happen according to the
laws of nature, although it may be by supernatural assistance.
"Miracles are produced according to the Law of nature,
though above its ordinary operations, which are therefore
supematurally assisted." Further, God allows Himself this
alteration of the natural course of things ; but this seldom
occurs, and always for a purpose that is important, rational,
and worthy of the divine wisdom and majesty.
If Christianity, then, is essentially without mysteries, the
only question remaining is, how did mysteries come into it ?
Jesus preached the purest morality, but when the Jews and the
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JOHN TOLAND. 825
heathen passed over in such great numbers to Christianity, the
former wished to retain their Levitical ceremonies and festivals,
and the latter wished to maintain their mysteries. When the
philosophers also became Christian, Christianity became from
day to day more mysterious, and it was soon intelligible
only to the learned. When, still later, the imperial power
protected Christianity, the Christian mysteries were made
completely like those of the heathen in the preparations and
the stages of the process of initiation, and they were carried
above the sphere of all sense and all reason.
An essentially different mode of thought is expressed in the
later writings of Toland. The most harmless of them rela-
tively are the Letters to Serena (London^ 1704), and especially
the first three Letters. Serena was the intellectual Sophie
Charlotte, Queen of Prussia. Starting with the complaint
made by the recipient of the Letters, that she was greatly
preoccupied by prejudices, the author shows in the first Letter
that it is impossible to keep oneself in youth free from errors,
aud that it is difficult to free oneself afterwards from them.
Even before birth a foundation is laid for them in inherited
propensity, and with birth there begins deception on all sides :
superstitious ceremonies on the part of the midwife, magic
words and symbols on the part of the priest, fear of ghosts on
the part of the nurse, stories of spectres and miracles at school,
eta The most fruitful nursery of prejudices is the University.
The priests are driven to abstain from undeceiving the rest of
the people, and rather to keep them in their errors. Every
class and profession has its own peculiar prejudices. It is not
openly expressed, yet it is sufficiently indicated, that the whole
of religion rests upon this rotten foundation of groundless
prejudices. The second and third Letters discuss the origin
of the belief in Immortality and Idolatry. Both of these
beliefs arose among the Egyptians, and spread from them to
all peoples. The Egyptians came to believe in Immortality
merely from their treatment of dead bodies, and by the piety
with which they preserved the memory of deserving persons.
The honouring of the dead then became the chief source of
'^o
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326 THB ENGLISH DEISM.
Idolatry* All the heathen religions aie distortions of the
natural truth of reason, and they are founded on the selfish
deoepüons practised by priests and politicians.
Toland applies the same scanty resources to giving an
explanation of Beligion in his work entitled AdetsicUemon
(Ebgue 1709)^ The first part proceeds to show that livy
was able to give excellent psychological explanations of the
pofiefUa, prodigia, etc., narrated by him, and that he regarded
worship as an invention of priests, and religion as a bugbear
prudently invented by politicians to terrify the people. The
second part makes the Jews Egyptians, and Moses an ^yptian
priest and monarch, who has expressed in the ten command-
ments only the pure law of nature. All the other doctrines
and practices were later idolatrous additions falsely attributed
to the great lawgiver himselfl
Of special interest for Toknd's later philosophical views are
the last two of the Letters, which explain the philosophy of
Spinoza, and his FantJieUticon (Cosmopoli 1720). The criti-
cism of the philosophy of Spinoza contained in these letters
well deserves to be considered in the history of philosophy.
With no little acuteness, Toland seeks to show that the whole
system of Spinoza is not merely false, but unsafe, and without
any solid foundation. The philosopher's greatest weakness
was a boundless passion to become the head of a sect, to have
disciples, and to adorn a new system of philosophy with his
name. Toland hits quite correctly upon the weakest point
in Spinoza's system, when he shows that it teaches only one
substance with many attributes, among which extension and
thought are the most important ; yet it tells nowhere how
matter attains to motion, nor, like the systems of Descartes
and Newton, does it make God the first mover, or motion an
attribute of substance. Hence it is entirely impossible for
Spinoza to derive the diversity of the many individual bodies
from the unity of his substance, and to combine them with it
A sure proof, he says, that even men of acute judgment are
led in many things by mere prejudice.
Toland, on the other hand, asserts that motion is as essential
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JOHN TOLAND* 32T
to matter as extension and solidity, and that it is not at all
possible to think of matter without motion, so that motion
necessarily belongs to the definition of matter. There is no
absolute rest in the whole world. The apparent rest of indi-
vidual bodies only arises from the fietct that opposite acting
forces of motion neutralise each other. If motion belongs
essentially to matter, it cannot possibly be outside of things.
In like manner, it is impossiUe to speak of an absolute space
in which the world moves as if it were contained in it, or of
an absolute time outside of things. Motion, however, and
particularly motion as essential to matter, is not merely the
change of place which one ol^ect assumes in relation to
another, it is likewise the change of the material arrangement
within individual things. Hence motion is the so-called
principivm individucUionü, that is, it depends upon motion
that the innumerable different individual things proceed out
of the one all-embracing matter. Upon motion, rest, form
and colour, heat and cold, light and sound, for all things are
nothing but a restless moving up and down, an eternal
change of matter, a universal becoming and peiishing; in
short, all change in things is nothing but the movement of
matter. Toland confesses that he is not able to explain what
motion is, for such simple ideas as motion, extension, colour,
and sound are clear in themselves, and are not capable of
definition. Notwithstanding this materialistic principle^ that
motion or force is essential to matter, Toland shrinks from the
last consequences, which were afterwards drawn by the French
Encyclopaedists. He designates it as an extremely thoughtless
and inconsiderate inference that would regard a guiding Intel*
ligence as unnecessary as soon as we have apprehended force
as essential to matter. For, entirely apart from the fact that
God could create matter as well with motion as with exten*
sion, he holds that the mechanical motion of matter alone can
as little produce the artistically formed plants and animals,
as shaking letters together could form an jEneid or an
IliacL
The same view is contained in the work called Pantheisticon.
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32S THE ENGLISH DEISM.
Here Toland imagines a nomerous sect of Pantheists, for whose
assemblies, modelled after the Greek symposia, he constructs
liturgical forms as a substitute for the ecclesiastical worship.
" Swearing by the words of no one, led neither by education ,
nor custom, not hindered by inherited religions and laws, they
discuss without prejudice, and in the freest and calmest way,
all things sacred and secular. They are called Pantheists
because their judgment regarding the relation of God to the
world is the same as that of Linus: Ex toto quidem sunt
omnia, et ex omnibus est totum." " The universe is infinite in
extent and power ; it is one by the connection of the whole
and the collision of its parts. As a whole it is immoveable,
because there is no place or space outside of it. In respect
of its parts, it is moveable, imperishable, and necessary. It
is eternal in existence and duration ; it knows with the highest
reason, which, however, can only be called by the same name
as our faculty of knowledge, from a slight resemblance to it,
for its parts are always the same, and as parts are always in
motion." Everything is produced out of matter, and consists
of matter, which separates into four fundamental elements.
From the motion of these elements, and the varied mixtures
of matter thus arising, the different individual things are pro-
duced, every one of which includes both form and matter.
Thought is also a kind of motion ; it is a peculiar motion of
the brain resting upon the ethereal fire, for the ether is the
e£Bcient cause of all perception, imagination, memory, and
elaboration of ideas. God is the " vis et energia totius, crea-
trix omnium et moderatrix ac ad optimum finem semper ten-
dens.*' He may be called the Spirit or Soul of the universe,
but He is not to be separated from the universe itself other-
wise than in thought. — ^The Liturgy of the Pantheists is a
worship of genius, and it is mostly borrowed from heathen
writers. We may only mention here, in particular, how all
that is positive in religion is expressly repudiated, in accord-
ance with the view of Cicero in his De repuhlica, lib. iii. : " Est
quidem vero lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes,
constans sempiterna, quas vocet ad ofiBcium jubendo, vitando
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ANTHONY COLLINS. 829
a fraude deterreat, qusB tarnen neque probes frustra jubet aut
vetat nee improbos jubendo aut vitando mo vet," etc.
Anthony Collins.
Anthony Collins (1676-1729) worked for the wider dif-
fusion of deistic thoughts. His principal work, entitled A
Discourse of Freethinking, occasioned hy the rise and growth of a
Sect called Freethinkers (London 1715), falls into three parts.
It shows, in the first place, the right to Freethinking generally ;
in the second, the right to Freethinking in religion ; and in
the third, it vindicates this right against a number of objec-
tions raised against it. The definition which Collins gives of
freethinking is by no means precise, and this defect shows
itself in the whole detail of his discussion. He defines it as
" the use of the understanding in the effort to find out the
meaning of a proposition by weighing the nature of the evi-
dence for or against it, and judging of it according to the
evident weakness or strength of this evidence."
The geneml right to freedom of thinking is based mainly
upon the consideration that any limitation of it would be
absurd in itself ; for if I were to restrain my thinking from
the free treatment of a subject, I must have a reason for this,
and this reason I can only assign to myself by freethinking.
Moreover, we have the right to seek the knowledge of every
truth ; for the knowledge of some truths is enjoined npon us
by God, the knowledge of others is required for the good
of the State, and no knowledge is forbidden to us. But
the only means by which we can attain to a knowledge of
the truth is Freethinking, without which science cannot
possibly be perfect, as without it we could not but fall into
the greatest errors, both in theory and in practice.
In matters of religion especially, we have the right to
think freely, both in regard to the nature and attributes of
God, and the truth and meaning of the books of the Bible.
And even the enemies of freethinking assert that a correct
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330 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
opinion in these things is absolutely necessaiy for the attain-
ment of salvation. But the best and surest means of coming
to truth is freethinking, and in view of the multitude and
variety of the professed revelations and divine command-
ments^ it is only in this way that the one truth is to be
found. Freethinking is also the safest means that can be
used against the pernicious evil of superstition. ÄU mis-
sionary activity among the heathen is based upon free-
thinking, because it is only thus that the heathen can be
moved to receive Christianity. The Bible likewise demands
freethinking ; it is only the priests who condemn it, and
they do so in part from dishonest motives. — Of the objections
urged against freethinking, Collins deals at greatest length
with the objection that all freethinkers have been, in the
highest degree, dishonest, profligate, and foolish. In opposi-
tion to this yiew, he brings forward a succession of extremely
virtuous freethinkers, from the time of the Greek philosophers
down to his own contemporaries.
Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury
(1671-1713).
Shaftesbury (1671-1713)^ is usually regarded as the
representative of " the autonomy of the moral element," that
is, of the independence of morality both of the institutions
of the State and of divine revelation. He is thus put in
opposition to Hobbes, who does not recognise an individual
morality, but sees the moral only in relation to the State ;
and also to Locke, who indeed admits an individual morality,
but finds it in relation to an alien and entirely external law.
' This the third Earl of Shaftesbury was a grandson of the first Earl of
Shaftesbury, who has been referred to above as the patron of Locke. He was
also a statesman, and as a member of the House of Lords he was a zealous
defender of civil liberty, but he did not enter into any political office in order
that he might be able to devote himself undisturbed to his learned studies.
His writings were collected under the title Characteristicks o/Men, Matmers,
Opinions, Times, 8 vols. 1711. They are mostly prolix, but elegant in style,
and on account of the variety of the subjects and their being treated without
connection, it is difficult to bring his thoughts into any systematic order.
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ANTHONY ASHLBY COOPER, EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. 331
We would prefer, however, to adopt a different characteristic,
which appears to us to be more comprehensive and more
correct, as being founded upon the fact that, in Shaftesbury,
the idea of Beauty comes everywhere into the foreground.
Beauty and harmonious order form the basis of his theism ;
upon the beauty, which pleases every one and everywhere as
agreeable, rests moral goodness or " Enthusiasm." In other
words, the human presentation of the divine truth, goodness,
and beauty is here regarded as the common psychological
root of art, religion, and morals, and indeed of everything
great that man realizes in the business of daily life or in
noble enjoyment
We may begin by looking at Shaftesbury's principle oif
Enthusiasm, and it will disclose to us the subjective origin
assigned to Beligion. Enthusiasm is a fundamental impulse
of human nature from which none of us are free. Its object
is the good and beautiful, to KoXbp koI aryaOop, which are
inseparable from one another. A sort of definition of
enthusiasm is set forth in the statement that number,
harmony, proportion, and beauty of every kind possess a
power which naturally chains the heart and raises the
imagination to an opinion or idea of something majestic
or divine. Whatever this object may be, the thought of
it enraptures us so much, that without it our life would lose
all charm and value, and no other interest would remain for
us but how to satisfy our coarsest desires as cheaply as
possible. This Enthusiasm has a very wide range; even
the play of atheism is often not free from it; and it is
difficult to distinguish it from divine inspiration. This was
the spirit which Plato regarded as the gift of heroes, states-
men, orators, musicians, and even philosophers ; and every-
thing great that is brought forth by these men is to be all
ascribed to a noble Enthusiasm. This passion is the most
natural, and its object is the most excellent and appropriate
in the world. Virtue is a noble enthusiasm which is directed
to the most appropriate end, and it is formed according to
the highest pattern which is to be found in the nature of
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332 THE ENGLISH DEIäM.
things; and religion, as the main object of this noble
enthusiasm, is the basis and support of it alL Hence that
cold philosophy \irhich denies the order and harmony in
things and rejects the admiration of the beautiful, also
regards religion as included among those evils which it is
incumbent upon us to exterminate. — Subjectively, then,
religion is founded on Enthusiasm, as a passion for
all that is beautiful and sublime, implanted in our
nature. But it would be ill for this passion were there
nothing corresponding to it in the objective relations of the
world. If the object itself does not exist in nature, neither
the idea nor the passion founded upon it can properly be
natural, and all admiration and enthusiasm cease ; but if, on
the other hand, there is such a passion by nature, Heligion
is manifestly also of this kind, and hence it is natural to
man.
Shaftesbury therefore refers, again and again, with
emphasis and enthusiasm, to the harmony and order that
prevail in the universe, to the wise purposes which we
encounter everywhere, and to the established unity to which
the various systems and circles within nature belong. Full
of enthusiasm, the author pours himself forth in poetical
descriptions of nature, and of the harmony, order, and unity
that appear everywhere in it. From this point of view he
also reaches his theodicy. If we were to call a being wholly
and really evil, it must be evil in relation to the whole. On
the other hand, if the evil of any particular system is a good
for other systems, and if it is conducive to the well-being of
the general system, then the evil of this particular system is
not in itself really an evil, as little as the pain in the process
of teething is to be regarded as an evil in a body which has
been so constituted, that, without this cause of pain, it would
be defective, and so it would be worse without it. We cannot
say of any being that it is wholly and entirely bad, unless
we are able to prove that it is not good in reference to any
order or economy in any other system. Now those things
which stand related to one another are infinite in number,
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ANTHONY ASHLEY COOPER, EABL OF SHAFTESBUEY. 83 S
and our mind is not capable of looking through infinity ; and
hence vre cannot see anything completely. But we very
often regard what is actually perfect of itself as imperfect
Notwithstanding the manifold evil which we encounter in
individual things, we must therefore admit it to be possible
that all things work together for the common well-being of
the great whole, and are thus truly good. If it may be so,
it follows that it must be so ; for all that is possible in the
whole will be made real for the well-being of the whole by
nature, or by the spirit of the whole.
From this point of view a Theodicy can only be com-
pleted by the aid of the conception of God. By God we
designate a being who is elevated to any degree above us
and the world, and who rules with intelligence and under-
standing in nature. He who does not believe in a higher
Being working with purpose and understanding, and who
believes in no other cause of things than chance, is an
Atheist He who believes that everything is governed,
ordered, and directed for the best by a first cause working
with design, or by an intelligent Being who is necessarily
good and unchangeable, is a Theist He who accepts several
higher beings working with purpose and understanding, is a
Polytheist He who accepts one or more higher beings who
are not necessary in themselves and who do not choose the
best, but act in accordance with mere arbitrariness and
phantasy, is a Dsemonist. It is manifest that it is only the
Theist who can adopt the inference that " as all things may
be good in relation to the great whole, they are also really
good ; " and hence Shaftesbury regards it as incumbent upon
himself to establish this theism.
Shaftesbury does not adduce either the cosmological
argument or the ontological argument as proofs of the
existence of God. Neither does he bring in the conception
of a first cause, nor of an unmoved mover ; but, faithful to
the ruling character of his system, he proceeds, in this con-
nection also, from what exists now and here, and proves from
the unity and harmony of the structure of the universe that
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334 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
it is animated and governed by One Spirit The unity of
the great universe necessarily points to a universal Spirit,
for what hangs thus together in itself as a world, one part
conditioning and presupposing another, necessarily requires
an all-comprehending Spirit. Further, the beauty of nature
comes into consideration. The beautiful, the attractive, the
amiable, never lie in matter, but always in art and design ;
never in the body itself, but in the form or formative power.
We cannot sufficiently admire this beauty in nature, and
accordingly a formative power must also reside in the world.
On account of the harmony of the whole, this power is one
only ; and on account of the beauty and harmony that appear
everywhere, it is a power that works with design. Hence the
aesthetic contemplation of nature necessarily leads to theism,
and theism to the faith that there is no evil in the whole of
the world. — Beligion is thus surely and sufficiently established,
both subjectively and objectively. Subjectively, in the passion
of enthusiasm implanted in us by nature ; and objectively, in
the unity and order, beauty and harmony of the Universe,
which on account of these qualities must be guided by one
higher Being working with purpose and intelligence.
Enthusiasm is the subjective source of religion ; and all
enthusiastic admiration is united with a sort of religious
reverence. As reverence is related to fear, some have made
fear the basis of religion. But enthusiasm is essentiaUy of
another kind ; it unites in itself love and fear. A wise limi-
tation and moderation of enthusiasm is, however, absolutely
necessary, as the inclination to indulge in wonder and con-
templative rapture but too easily degenerates into high-flying
fanaticism or into servile superstition. What is usually called
religious zeal is seldom without a mixture of these two excesses.
The ecstatic emotions of love and admiration are almost always
conjoined with the awe and the consternation of a lower kind
of devotion. The heathen religions, especially in their later
periods, consisted almost wholly of external pomp, and they
were especially maintained by that sort of enthusiasm which
is excited by external objects that are grand, majestic, and
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AKTHON Y ASHLEY COOPER, EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. 335
imposing. The Syrian and Egyptian religions tended more
towards a contemptible and abject form of superstition,
especially after the priests increased in number and power,
so that they threatened even to swallow up the State, and
from natural causes they inclined to superstition. ''The
quantity of superstition will, in proportion, nearly answer the
number of Priests, Diviners, Soothsayers, Prophets, or such
who gain their livelihood or receive advantages by officiating
in religious affairs." In fact, these systems regarding the deity
were enlarged even by mystical genealogies, consecrations,
and canonizations. The Jewish religion was also strongly
influenced by the Egyptian religion, Abraham having received
from it circumcision and other practices, Joseph having
been raised to the rank of an Egyptian High Priest, and
Moses having been initiated into all the wisdom of the
Egyptians. In short, although he begins so i*ationally,
Shaftesbury also has recourse at last to the inadequate
theory of the fraud of selfish priests ; and he thus explains
the extravagances of the heathen religions and their super-
stition and mysticism by their one-sided exaggeration of fear
or of love.
Christianity is not dealt with in detail. Theism, however,
is not apprehended in such a way as to lead to the rejection
of revelation and Christianity, but all rests upon theism, and
" No one can be a well-grounded Christian without first being
a good theist." For the belief in divine Providence which is
attained by contemplation of the order of things is the basis
of the Christian faith. Shaftesbury does not express himself
regarding the specifically Christian doctrines of redemption
and atonement, or the historical character of Christianity, or
the person of Christ Towards revelation he takes up an
entirely sceptical attitude. He believes in revelation in so
far as this is possible for a man who has never himself
experienced a divine communication, or been an eye-witness
of it. He looks with contempt upon the later miracles and
inspirations as a mass of devised fraud and deception. With
r^ard to those earlier times, he subjects his judgment
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336 THE ENGUSH DEISM.
completely to those in authority, and to the opinions that are
prescribed by the Law. The bftst Christian is a sceptical
Christian. When he relies merely upon history and tradition
for his faith in revelation and miracles, he has only a historical
faith, which is exposed to many speculations and to critical
investigations regarding language, literature, etc. Freedom of
thought is therefore emphatically demanded. A Christian who
supposes he cannot believe enough, may, by virtue of a
slight natural inclination, so far extend his faith, that, along
with all the miracles of Scripture and tradition, he may also
take up a complete system of old wives' fables. This would
be to play the sycophant in religion and the parasite in
devotion, in the manner of crafty beggars who address every
one as " your honour," or " your lordship," and the practice is
founded on the idea " that were there nothing ultimately in
the affair, such a deception would do no harm." At the
same time he holds that the authority in the State must adopt
a religion; and that the people must stand, in matters of
religion, under a certain public guidance. As there are public
walks side by side with private gardens, and public libraries
are provided along with private instruction by domestic tutors,
so in like manner a public authoritative religion is in place.
But it is irrational to prescribe limits to phantasy and
speculation, or to throw religious opinion into fetters.
Universal love appears as the main point, and it is the
peculiar characteristic of Christianity. The purpose of
religion generally is to awaken in us all moral inclinations
and sentiments, and to make us more perfect and accom-
plished in the practice of all duties ; yet this is not to be done
by a reference to reward and punishment, but by the inner
relationship between religion and virtue. The Christian
religion realizes this purpose in the highest degree by
implanting an all-embracing love. This position leads us to
the view taken of virtue and its relation to religion.
In his Inquiry concerning Virtue, Shaftesbury discusses at
length the question as to what rightness in conduct or virtue
in itself is, and as to the influence which Eeligion has upon
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ANTHONY ASHLEY COOPEE, EAKL OF SHAFTESBÜEY. 337
it He is far from identifying the good and the bad with
pleasure and pain, or from referring them only to the State
and its wants. Virtue is likewise founded subjectively in
enthusiasm, and objectively in the unity and harmony of the
world. He regards virtue itself as nothing but a noble
enthusiasm which is directed to its proper end, and is formed
in accordance with that high pattern or exemplar which he
.thinks he finds in the nature of things. There are certain
moral forms which work so strongly upon us, that they only
need to show themselves to cast down all opposite opinions
or ideas, all resisting passions, sensations, or mere corporeal
inclinations. Whether a creature is good or bad depends on the
inclinations and impulses by which it is guided. Inclinations
relate either to ourselves or to the whole to which we belong,
or there arise inclinations which neither further the general
well-being nor the private good. These latter are from the
outset vicious, and of the first two classes the selfish stand
more on the side of vice, and the benevolent more on the side
of virtue; but they are not unconditionally so. Virtue is
rather the right condition of our inclinations, not merely in
reference to ourselves, but to society and to the whole, so
that none of them may be awanting. Their relation is to be
regulated according to the relation of the harmonious unity
which obtains objectively between the whole and its parts.
Hence the admiration and love of order naturally improves
the disposition, and powerfully furthers virtue. But at the
same time virtue also brings happiness along with it, and vice
unhappiness, which is partly proved from the inward relation
of the individual to the whole, but above all from the reaction
of our own acts upon the states of the soul.
Hence Virtue and Eeligion are fundamentally one. Virtue
makes us put the selfish and the unselfish impulses into
that relation to each other which corresponds to the objective
co-ordination of the individual in the whole ; religion makes
us view the world as a harmoniously ordered unity, regulated
and guided for the good of the whole by the wise and
beneficent God. Hence the right knowledge of God is
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'S 3 8 THE ENGHSH DEISM.
conditioned by morality ; for we only see anger and wrath,
revenge and terror, in the Deity when we are full of unrest
and terror in ourselves. It is religion that makes virtue
perfect. '' The highest perfection of virtue rests upon faith
in God, for without it there can never be found so. much
benevolence, stedfastness, and immoveable perseverance in
goodness, nor so much order and harmony of inclinations
or uniformity of sentiments and principles."
Matthew Tindal.
Tindal (1656-1753)^ takes the position of an adherent
of Locke in his philosophical views, and especially in regard
to the theoretical principles of knowledge. Beason is the
faculty of apprehension, judgment, and inference. The object
of these operations is not things themselves, but only our
ideas of them ; and these ideas come either from sensation
or reflection. Hence our knowledge, as consisting in the
agreement or disagreement of our ideas with things, is
either intuitive or demonstrative. Certainty in religion
is also founded upon the agreement of its truths with
essentially clear ideas. Tindal approaches Shaftesbury in
the moral and practical view which he takes of religion.
He makes the true religion consist in the constant inclination
of the heart to do as much good as we are able, in order
thereby to promote the glory of God and our own well-being.
Tindal's diffuseness, and the want of order and definiteness
in his style, make it difficult to reproduce his thoughts
clearly and briefly. The main points expounded by him are
the following : — True religion is always necessarily the same.
It consists in the observance of what the nature of God and
man and their relation makes incumbent upon us as duty, and
it is conducive to our happiness. This same goal is always
attained by the same means. Hence revealed and natural
• His chief work is entitled Christianity as Old as the Creation; or, Üie
Gospel a Repuhlicatimi of the Religion qf Nature^ London 1730.
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MATTHEW TINDAL. 339
religion, if they are both true, cannot differ in regard to the
means that are conducive to this end, but being like two
pieces of wood that dovetail into one another, they are only
distinguished by their mode of publication. If there be then
a true natural religion, revealed religion and Christianity
must also agree with it. What is contained in positive
religion, in addition to the rules of natural religion, is but
superstition.
Natural religion consists in the belief that there is a God,
and in the practice of those duties which arise from our
rational knowledge of God and His perfection, of ourselves
and our imperfection, as well as of the connection in which
ive stand with God and our fellow-men. On account of this
purely juristic conception of religion, the expression " Law of
Nature" is frequently used by Tindal instead of Natural
Religion. The substance of this law, or what it contains, is
the honour of Gk>d and the well-being of men. God imposes
these duties upon us, not for His own sake, but for our sakes ;
yet prayer is a duty, not because any persuasion of God or an
alteration of His eternal providence could be attained by it,
but because, by ita leading us to contemplate the divine
attributes and to know His constant goodness, it incites us to
the imitation of the divine perfection and to mutual love. It
is likewise clear that God receives nothing by our actions,
either agreeable or disagreeable, but that everything happens
for our good. Duties must also coincide with happiness;
because the happiness of a thing consists in the perfection of
its nature, and the perfection of a rational being consists
in the agreement of all his actions with the rules of right
reason. " Beligion is thus a moral mode of conduct resting
upon the reason of things, or upon the objective relation of
things to each other, having the good of man as its final end,
and arising from free inclination, while the moral duties are
regarded as commandments of God " (Lechler). This natural
religion has actually existed ; it has existed even from the
beginning of things. Prom the beginning of the world God
has given men a law, by the observance of which they
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340 THE ENGLISH DEI8H.
could make themselves agreeable to Him, and with the law
He at the same time has given sufficient means to attain to
the knowledge of it This natural religion is perfect^ univer-
sal, and eternal. The essence of God, the nature of man, and
our relation to God and to other men are immutable, and so
likewise are the duties that arise out of these relations; God
would proceed arbitrarily and tyrannically, were there any
other rule regulating the actions required by Him than that
which is given by the connections between things and the
iitoess arising therefrom. This original religion must also
be perfect, because it has an infinitely wise and beneficent
author, namely God. As perfect, it must likewise be immut-
able, like the wisdom and goodness of God. The perfection
of natural religion is further clear from the fact that God
implants it, even after the publication of Christianity, in tlie
hearts of men, and that the perfection of the Christian religion
is often proved from its conformity to natural religion. And
if the value of a law can be heightened by its supreme
internal excellence, its great distinctness and simplicity, its
uniformity, universality, high antiquity, and even its eternal
duration, all these qualities belong in a high degree to the
Law of Nature. Besides, the acceptance of an external
revelation presupposes a conviction of the existence of God,
a conviction which springs alone from the internal light,
by the aid of which alone we are able to distinguish among
the professed religions the one that is true from those that
are false.
In these positions the judgment of Tindal regarding posi-
tive religion is already expressed. He still stands so far
upon supernatural ground, that he does not at all examine
the possibility and truth of an external revelation, to say
nothing of his contesting it. Positive (instituted) or re-
vealed religion is true in so far as it agrees with natural
religion ; if it contains more it is tyrannical, because it im-
poses unnecessary things ; and if it contains less, it is defec-
tive. Thus even Christianity, however new be the name, is
yet as old as tJie Creation, and it has been implanted in us by
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MATTHEW TINDAL. 341
God Himself as an innate law of human nature from the
beginning. Identical in their contents, natural and positive
religion are distinguished merely by the mode in which they
are communicated. The former rests upon internal revela-
tion, and the latter upon external revelation, but both spnng
from Grod, and therefore they cannot possibly contradict each
other. The purpose of Christianity or of the mission of
Christ, was to teach men repentance, to deliver them from the
burden of superstition, to put the law of nature into the
proper light, and thus to restore natural religion and to
publish it again. — ^The adulteration of natural religion by
superstition is not satisfactorily explained Superstition is
represented as being mostly founded in the fact that man has
no proper and correct notions of God, but makes a god like
himself; but the question arises, on what is this founded ?
From superstition have sprung the mediating gods among the
heathen. Expiations and mortification have their origin in
the delusion that God takes delight in the pain of His crea-
tures. Sacrifices are also referred to the delight of a cruel
God in the slaughter of innocent creatures ; and here, more-
over, deceptive and selfish priests had their hands in the
game. The clergy promote superstition from a selfish interest,
partly by means of mysterious dogmas, and partly by pompous
ceremonies. Tindal does not enter in detail upon the Chris-
tian dogmas. He only says of the dogma of the Trinity : I
do not understand these orthodox paradoxes, nor yet do I
reject them.
Tindal designates his view as " Christian Deism," and
makes the difference between the Christians and the Christian
Deists lie in the fact that the former do not venture to
examine the truth of the scriptural doctrines, whereas the
latter, who do not believe in the doctrines because they are
contained in the Scriptures, but in the Scriptures on account
of the doctrines, have no such anxiety.
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342 THE ENGLIBH DEI81C
Thomas Chubb.
Thomas Chubb (1679-1747)^ holds religion to be the
ground of the divine favour. True religion is what really
procures us this divine favour as contrasted with that which
man merely imagines. This true Beligion is founded either
upon "the moral fitness of things," that is, the objective
nature of things and their relation to each other, or upon *' the
arbitrary will and pleasure of God." The former is real by
nature ; for it only corresponds to the character of God. It
appears from the whole order of nature that God should act
as a wise and good being. Only thus does God act justly
and rightly with His creatures ; only thus is man put by his
own nature into a position for discovering the true religion,
for distinguishing between divine revelation and deception,
and for recognising the true sense of a revelation in contrast
to false apprehensions of it ; and it is only thus that true
religion is a simple thing, everywhere the same, unchangeable
in time or place, and only subject to change along with the
nature, the relations, and circumstances of things.
These positions give at the same time a canon for the
estimation of Christianity. The end and aim of the appear-
ance of Christ was to save human souls, or to secure to men
the grace of God and future blessedness. In a less proper
sense. He wished also to promote the present well-being of
men, the happiness or unhappiness of this world being closely
connected with that of the next. This promotion of present
as well as future weU-being does not flow, however, as is often
otherwise the case, from the bestowal of temporal power over
others, but is dependent on the condition that every individual
is brought to a state of mind and to a mode of conduct which
^ Chubb was a common artisan, working as a glover and also in the
service of a tallow-chandler. He was self-taught, but in spite of his defective
education he composed some of the most important of the Deistic writings.
The most important of his works are: '*The Previous Question with regard
to Religion,*' 1725 ; *' A Discourse concerning Reason with regard to Religion,"
London 1730 ; and "The True Gospel of Jesus Christ asserted," London 1788.
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. THOMAS CHXmB. 343
make Him a blessing to himself and the community, and which
also at the same time make him happy. In order to prepare
this happiness for men, Christ addressed Himself to men as
free beings, and proposed to them certain doctrines which they
ought to obey on the basis of their own conviction. They
were thus to improve themselves and become worthy of the
grace of God and of future happiness. To believe means to
follow such doctrines on the ground of real conviction ; and
this belief is the bond which connects one Christian
with other Christians, so that they are to one another like
brethren.
Christ has laid three truths before men. First, He enjoins
us to submit our heart and life to the eternal and immutable
laws of action that are founded in the reason of things, as the
only ground of the grace of God and of eternal blessedness.
Christ thus enjoins upon us no new way to the grace of God
and to eternal life, but the good old way which has held for
all time, of keeping the commandments, or of loving God and
our neighbour. Secondly, if by violation of this law we have
drawn upon ourselves God's displeasure, repentance is the
only certain ground of the divine forgiveness. It was a
chief part of the work of Christ to preach this gospel of
forgiveness by repentance and improvement Thirdly,
Christ impresses upon us the fact that God will judge men
at the last day, and that according to their works, and not
from His mere pleasure He will reward some and punish
others.
Christianity thus consists objectively in the natural moral
law, and subjectively in a submission to it that is founded
upon conviction. Hence it does not consist in a historical
narrative of facts, such as that Christ died and rose again ;
for the gospel, in fact, was preached before all that happened.
Chubb takes such a sceptical attitude towards the history
of Jesus, that he declares it to be only "probable" that
there was a person like Jesus, and that He did and taught
in the main what is related of Him. This probability
rests upon the actual existence and the wide diffusion of
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844 THE ENGLISH DEISBC
Christianity. As for the rest, Christ was a man who was
bom, grew up, and died like all other men ; and that He
declared Himself to be the Son of God only means that He
was one to whom the word of God came. — ^Further, the
gospel does not consist in the private opinion of any of
the writers, as in John's doctrine of the Logos. Besides,
these private opinions are often abstruse and difficult to
understand, whereas the gospel is intelligible to the simplest
understanding.
As the gospel is founded upon reason and corresponds to
the nature of things, we might expect that it would be
universally received, and that it would have exercised every-
where its purif}'ing influence upon the moral life. But a
multitude of inherited prejudices and of political and hier-
archical interests have been opposed to its universal accept-
ance. Its blessed influence has also been hindered by the
rise of doctrines that represented moral eflbrt as unneces-
sary, such as that of the imputed righteousness of Christ,
and by the error that it is not moral conduct but orthodox
belief that makes men acceptable to God. But more than
all, the progress of Christianity hsis been impeded by the
intermixture of civil and Christian Societies.
Although Chubb describes Beason as entirely sufficient to
guide man in the afiairs of religion and to obtain for him the
favour of God and the hope of a future life, he does not reject
revelation. The purpose of Bevelation is to rouse men from
their indolence and security, to bring them to reflect and con-
sider, to assist them in their inquiries and fiacilitate the work
of inquiry, to awaken in men a right feeling of the pledge
which is entrusted to them and of the duties which they have
towards God and their neighbours, to call those who walk in
the ways of vice to repentance and conversion, and to show
them the consequences of a good and a bad life with respect
to the pleasure and displeasure of Gk>d. But at the same
time the position is emphatically asserted that revelation must
be conformable to reason, and that reason is the only external
criterion by which the true revelation is to be distinguished
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THOMAS MOBGAN. 845
from the merely pretended revelation. From this point
Chubb enters upon an incisive polemic against the Christian
dogma of satisfaction.
Thomas Mobgan.^
In Morgan (f 1743) we do not find much that is new as
regards general principles ; but he presents a good deal that
is new regarding the historical construction of religion y and,
in connection therewith, regarding the criticism of the Old
Testament and of important Christian dogmas. The general
principles of his point of view are summarized by Morgan as
foDows : — 1. The moral truth of actions is founded on the
natural and necessary relations of persons and things, which
relations are prior to every positive law, and therefore cannot
be changed by such a law. 2. The moral truth of things is
the only certain criterion by which we can determine whether
a doctrine comes from God and constitutes a part of the
true religion. 3. The extraordinary powers and gifts of the
Apostolic Age were not restricted to persons of moral
character, but were also shared in by false prophets and
teachers. 4. Infallibility and sinlessness belong to God
alone, and hence those extraordinary gifts could not make
man infallible or sinless, o. The doctrines and obligations of
moral truth may be communicated to us in various ways, as
by reason, by immediate revelation, and by authentic evidence
of such revelation. But religion is always the same, and its
certainty as constituted by the moral truth of its doctrines is
also always the same. — These principles explain how it was
that, against all attempts to prove the truth of a doctrine from
miracles, Morgan emphatically declares that any acceptance of
^ Morgan was the Pastor of a Dissenting Congregation, bat lost his office on
accoant of his going over to Arianism. He then devoted himself to Medicine,
and practised as a physician among the Quakers of Bristol ; and finally lived as
an author in London. His principal work is, ** The Moral Philosopher. In a
Dialogue between Philalethes, a Christian Deist, and Theophanes, a Christian
Jew'* (London, L 1737, u. 1739, iiL 1740).
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346 THE ENGLISH DEISK
immediate revelation rests only upon historical faith ; that it
is therefore subject to careful criticism ; and that in the last
resort it can only be justified by the moral truth of the
revealed doctrines. Hence he proceeds to show that natural
and revealed religion, being identical in their contents, are
only distinguished by the fact that the former rests upon the
eternal and immutable principles of moral truth, while the
latter rests upon tradition, history, and human authority.
Further, Christianity contains nothing that is essentially new,
but is only a complete renovation and restoration of natural
religion.
On account of these views Morgan designates himself a
Christian Deist, in distinction from the Atheist on the one
hand, and from the Christian Jew or Jetoish Christian on the
other. The Deist is distinguished from the Atheist in this,
that the Atheist completely separates God and the world, so
that after the creation the world is maintained and governed
without the influence of the first cause, and merely by the
forces and according to the laws of second causes ; whereas the
Deist asserts a constant and continual influence of God
upon the world. The Christian Deist and the Christian Jew
are distinguished by the view they take of Christianity. The
Deist sees in Christianity a renovation of natural religion
in which the various duties of moral truth are more clearly
exhibited, are confirmed by stronger grounds, and are made
easy by the promise of active assistance through Jesus Christ
Christianity is that form of Deism, or of Natural Beligion,
which was first pi'eached by Christ and His apostles, which
has come to us through human testimony, and which is con-
firmed by the natural truth and essential divinity of His
doctrines. And only because Christ has made the best
communication to us of this Natural Beligion does Moigan
call himself a disciple of Christ and not of Zoroaster or
Mahomet. Bevelation is therefore nothing else than the
renovation or reanimation of natural religion. Nevertheless
its importance is very great. By it we have been raised out
of the state of great ignorance and darkness which cover the
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THOMAS MOBGAK. 347
whole world to the true knowledge of God and of ourselves,
including the knowledge of our moral relations and obliga-
tions towards the Supreme Being and towards one another.
Bevelation has brought us from great uncertainty regarding
our future life and the divine providence in the government of
the world to clear knowledge regarding them, as well as from
the conceit of our own natural capacity to the humble
recognition of our natural weakness and of the necessity of
divine assistance which we are assured of as soon as we ask
for it. It would be veiy precipitate to infer that theee are
natural truths and moral obligations which are clear of
themselves to reason, and which therefore do not require a
revelation to communicate them. The books of Euclid and
Newton's Principia undoubtedly contain natural truths that
are foimded in the reason of things, but only . a fool or a
lunatic would say that he could have learned these things just
as well without those books, and that no thanks were due to
their authors. The Christian Jew, on the other hand, con-
nects Christianity closely with Judaism, sees in Christ only
the national Jewish Messias, and would have the whole law
retained.
The opposition thus indicated goes back, according to
Morgan, to the primitive Christianity as represented by the
names of Peter and PauL Morgan proceeds in detailed
explanations and with critical acuteness to give such an
exposition of the original Christian antagonism between
Jewish and Gentile Christians as makes him appear almost a
precursor of the recent critical school. On this point we
can only touch briefly here. The Jewish Christians are
represented as accepting nothing that was new in passing over
to Christianity except that Jesus was the Messias, and this
they accepted in the literal national sense. Hence they
demanded from all Jewish Christians rigid observance of the
whole Jewish law, and from all Gentiles the observance at
least of the laws of the proselytes. Paul rejected both
requirements, because he would not connect things that were
indifferent in themselves with necessary moral duties flowing
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348 THE EKGUSH DEISM.
from the eternal natural Law, and because he regarded the
Jewish ceremonial law as annulled. Paul was '' the great
freethinker of that age ; " he was " the bold and brave
defender of reason against authority " in opposition to those
who had set up a godless system of superstition, blindness, and
slavery against all sound reason, under the specious pretext of
a Divine revelation.
The eternal and immutable religion of nature consists in
childlike love and reverence towards God, in brotherly love to
men, in the fulfilment of all those moral duties of truth and
honesty which flow therefrom, in a trustful confidence in and
dependence upon God, and in the constant sense of His power
and presence in all our actions as the rewarder of the good
and the punisher of the bad. Whence then has (he corruption
of this pure, primitive religion sprung f Morgan answers this
question at some length. The falling away from the pure
religion began among the angels even before men existed.
God had equipped this highest class of intelligent beings with
various powers and capacities, and put them at various points
in the government of the world, yet in such a way that He
retained the one undivided supremacy. At the beginning
this order was maintained, but afterwards the lower orders of
the angels turned no longer to God Himself, but to Lucifer
or Satan. Thereupon the Archangels demanded that all
suppjLications should be brought solely through their mediation
before God. In a heavenly war, Satan was then overthrown
with his adherents and banished to the earth. Here they
sought to turn man away from God. At first they persuaded
man that, as ministers of Providence, they had great power,
that God had deputed to them dominion over the world, and
therefore that prayers should only be directed to God through
their mediation. Afterwards the demons were regarded as
independent, and all worship and obedience were withdrawn
from God; and ultimately there were other mediators and
intercessors, such as dead heroes and princes, interposed even
between these new Gods and men. The general diffusion of
this error is explained only by the influence of priestcraft, and
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THOMAS MOBGAN. 349
this influence is connected with the practice of sacrifice.
Sacrifice was at first a purely personal action, an act of
obedience, or of subordination and surrender to the will of
God on the side of the sacrificer. As such it was agreeable
to God, and it availed as a means of reconciling God and
winning His favour. Then, because liberality passed current
as a sign of love to God and to men, public festivals and rich
banquets received pre-eminently the name of " sacrifices.'* At
first the patriarch or prince himself, as the host or entertainer,
supervised tbe festival. Afterwards certain festive speakers
were appointed to announce the festival, to welcome the
guests, and to superintend the bakers, butchers, cooks, etc.
These were called priests ; and, like all royal servants, they
were paid from the public treasury. Once established in this
office, they were enabled to connect all religion with sacrifices
and festivals, and to allot all the merit that was connected
with the practice of these functions. From being masters
of ceremonies and supervisors of festivals, they were able
gradually to elevate themselves to the throne of God, and to
make princes and people dependent upon ^them by the bless-
ings which they supplicated from heaven.
The first priesthood that was independent of the crown
and equipped with great privileges, was founded by Joseph in
Egypt. Thereafter Egypt became the mother of superstition,
the patroness of new gods, the mistress of idolatry through
the whole world ; for every new god was a gain to the priests.
During their long residence in Egypt the Jews also adopted
much of this idolatry, and became completely Egyptianized.
Hence it was not possible for Moses to communicate to them
the true religion unveiled, and it became necessary for him to
accommodate himself to their errors. Moses and the prophets
spake in a double sense : in a literal sense, according to the
errors of the people; and in a secret sense, which disclosed the
true religion. The matter really lies thus: the ancient
authors, sacred as well as profane, did not write as pure
historians, but as orators, poets, and dramatists. By means
of this style they maintained the historical truth, and yet
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350 THE ENGLISH DEISIC.
by reference to the nearer surroundings of the action thej
took the liberty of decorating the history with sensuous
images and dramatic representations, such as were agreeable
to the views of the people and fitted to excite their interests.
Morgan compares the historical narrative of the Old Testa-
ment with Homer's description of the Trojan war, and with
the writings of .£sop, Ovid, Milton, and Shakespeare. Thus
he lays the foundation for an incisive criticism of almost the
whole of the Old Testament history, in which he is not
sparing with reference to the miraculous narratives or the
moral character of the heroes that come into view.
Among the Christian dogmas, the doctrine of satisfaction
specially appears to Morgan as a coarse result of Jewish
superstition. His criticism of it reminds us in many points
of Faustus Socinus« As a Deists Morgan indicates the
purpose of the death of Christ to have been (1) to manifest
His obedience to Qod, to attain the highest honour, and to
verify His religion ; (2) to show that there is no respect of
persons with God; (3) to exhibit God's absolute authority
and our absolute obligation to obey Him; and (4) to
strengthen our hope of a life hereafter. The origin of
the dogma of the Church is explained by a mistaken literal
transference of the Old Testament view of sacrifice to Christ.
Even in the Old Testament, sacrifice was originally only a
sign of repentance, and it was by priestly selfishness that it
was made into a means of expiation. This conception was
transferred by the Jewish Christians to Christ, and it was
necessary even for Paul to attach himself, at least in figura-
tive, ambiguous expressions, to this view in order that he
might accomplish anything. In truth, the death of Christ is
not the caicm meritoria, but the catcsa effectiva of our salvation,
as by His death He does not justify us, but leads and guides
us to the right way in which we are justified and reconciled
with God. We say that we are justified and saved by Christ,
because, by His righteousness and obedience even to death.
He has procured the grace of God so as to establish a kingdom
of peace and of righteousness in the world as the most rational
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SPECIAL CX)NTROVERSIES. IMMORTALITY. 351
means of bringing men to personal faith, repentance, and
upright obedience ; and this is absolutely necessary in order
to reconcile them with God, to make the Deity gracious to
them, and to win again the divine favour. By a natural
metaphor, we accordingly call Christ our reconciler and
redeemer, the founder of our salvation, and the author and
finisher of our faith.
IIL
Special Controversies and the Apologetic Works.
Before we turn to the last representatives of Deism, it still
remains for us to notice briefly a series of works which it
occasioned, and to mention at least the Apologies that were
written in opposition to it.
1. The Immortality of the Human Soul has been regarded
from of old as one of the most important religious truths.
Hence the strictly supranatural view of Beligion has found
it difficult to admit that we can obtain the knowledge of this
truth without the aid of Divine revelation« Sometimes a
further step has been taken, and not merely the knowledge
of immortality, but immortality itself, has been made to rest
upon special divine grace. In England this latter view was
also asserted, Henry Dodwell (1706) proceeded to show
from Scripture and the oldest Fathers that the soul is mortal
by nature, but is made immortal by God. He held that this
takes place by the Divine Spirit which is communicated in
baptism. And because since the time of the apostles only
bishops have the right to administer the sacraments, only the
members of the English Episcopalian Church are immortal
and all Dissenters are mortal — Against this high-flying claim
of the high Episcopal party, there arose a general opposition,
and a series of controversial writings represented the more
rational view that the human soul is essentially immortal
2. Prophecies and Miracles, from of old, have been held in
chief estimation as the means of proving Divine Eevelation.
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352 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
As Deism sought to carry back the contents of the ChrLstian
Keligion to the expressions of natural reason, altitiongh with-
out calling in question the principle of revelation, it was not
possible to pass over these means of proof in silence. The
Debate on Prophecies (1724-1728) was opened by William
Whiston (1667-1752). Having become embarrassed from
perceiving that many passages of the New Testament which
professed to be fulfilments of Old Testament prophecies do
not agree with the existing text, he asserted that the Jews
in the second Christian century had falsified their sacred
Scriptures in the original text as well as in the LXX., in
order that the testimonies drawn from them in the New
Testament might appear not to be valid. He also attempted
to restore the earlier text in order to prove that the prophecies
had been literally fulfilled. — This assertion was the occasion
of the publication by Anthony Collins of his work entitled
A Discourse of the Grounds and Seasons of the Christian
Religion (London 1724). Such a universal intentional falsi-
fication of the Old Testament he held to be completely
incredible ; and if it had taken place, it would be impossible
to restore the correct text. It is admitted that the truth of
Christianity can be proved only on the ground of Prophecies ;
for as every new revelation is attached to cm earlier one, so is
Christianity attached to the Old Testament This proof by
Prophecy is not, however, to be obtained by literal interpreta-
tion of the Old Testament passages, but only by typical and
allegorical interpretation of them. To assert that they prove
in their literal sense what they have to prove, would be to
give up the truth of Christianity ; for it can be easily proved
that in their literal acceptance they refer to entirely different
things. Christianity rests wholly upon types and allegories.
But as Collins gives no judgment as to the value of this
proof, it may appear doubtful whether he holds the proof of
Prophecy as binding, and the revealed character of Christianity
as proved or not. His personal conviction was probably this,
that Christianity may be proved as a revelation only on the
ground of fulfilled prophecies; that the fulfilment of Old
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SPECUL CONTROVERSIES. MIRACLES. 353
Testament prophecies in the New Testament can be proved
only on the ground of aUegorlcal interpretation; that this
method is uncertain and false, and hence that it cannot be
convincingly and certainly established that Christianity rests
upon revelation. That the argumentation of Collins was
understood in this sense, is shown by the immense number
of replies which appeared in opposition to him. Only a few
of the positions they took up may be here mentioned. —
Bullock combats the view that Christianity was founded
in a positive way upon the Old Testament, and that its
fundamental article was that Jesus was the promised Messiah.
He maintains that the references to the Old Testament had
merely the intention of setting aside Jewish prejudices, that
Christianity is a new Law proclaimed by Jesus, and that it
may be proved by rational grounds to be divine. — Others, and
especially Sykes, seek to show that the Old Testament
prophecies were literally fulfilled in the New Testament, but
they have recourse to the greatest arbitrariness in carrying
out this thought. Others again, and in particular Chandler
and Jeflfery, assert that the New Testament writers did not
themselves mean to narrate fulfilments of prophecies, but only
in a free way attached themselves to Old Testament phrases
and narratives. In JefiTery's Christianity the perfeäion of all
Bdigion, natural and revealed (London 1728), the view,
however, first breaks through here and there, that the truth
of Christianity is not lost even if the Apostles erred regarding
the Old Testament prophecies.
3. The Debate on Miracles was opened by Thomas Woolston
(1669-1731), who proceeded to apply the allegorical inter-
pretation, not only to all such historical facts as the entry of
Jesus into Jerusalem, but also to the miracles of Christ.
Even the history of the resurrection of Christ has no meaning
in its literal acceptation, but is a type of His spiritual death
and of His resurrection from the grave of the letter. Woolston
supported his recommendation of the allegorical mode of inter-
pretation by showing that a literal interpretation meets with
•the greatest difiBculties. The same method is pursued by Peter
VOL. I. z ^ T
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354 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
Annet (t 1768), who, in a series of writings, some of which
are composed in an extremely repulsive tone, endeavoured to
overthrow the credibility of the Gospel history by pointing out
contradictions and improbabilities in it. He likewise advances
from the criticism of the particular miraculous narratives to
the consideration of the conception of miracles. In his view
a miracle is not merely an unusual event within the regulated
course of nature, but it is a supernatural event contrary to
the laws of nature; and this contradicts the wisdom and
immutability of God. Nor are miracles capable of producing
belief; it is the imagination that shows us miracles.
4. The deistic movement called forth numerous Apologists,
but only a few of them occupy such a general point of view
as to come into consideration here. Henry More and Kalph
Cudworth brought Platonism into the field in opposition to
the dissolving effects of the thoughts of Hobbes. Theophilus
Gale (1628-1678) had already made an attempt to carry all
the science and philosophy of the heathen back to the Sacred
Scriptures as their ultimate source. Henry More (1614-
1678) turned away from the Aristotelian Scholasticism, and
found satisfaction in a Platonism alloyed with Pythagoreanism
and Kabbalistic elements. With the conviction of the irre-
fragable truth of the Biblical Eevelation, he combined the
assertion that Pythagoras, and Plato also through him, drew
their wisdom from Moses. Metaphysics is the rational in-
vestigation of immaterial substances ; or, it is a natural
theology. There are four kinds of spirits : the Germ-forms or
the material principle which lies at the basis of the formation
of plants, Animal Souls, Human Souls, and the Souls of the
Angels. Besides these there is also a universal soul of nature
or World -soul, which permeates and animates the whole
universe. The uncreated Spirit or God is essentially dis-
tinguished from these created souls. His existence indubitably
appears from the idea of a necessarily existent being which is
innate in us. The constitution of the world, with its mani-
festation of design in the whole as well as in its parts, also
points to the infinite reason and wisdom of its Author.
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THE APOLOGISTS. HENRY MOBE AND RALPH CUD WORTH. 355
Above all, however, the designed structure of our body and
the faculties of our mind, make us certain of the existence of
God.— Kalph Cud worth (1617-168 8),^ equipped with astonish-
ing learning and no little acuteness, undertook a refutation
of the whole philosophy of atheism, of which Hobbes
appears to him as a leading representative. The view
which is favoured by the despisers of God, that there is
nothing in the mind which has not beeü formerly in the
senses, is erroneous ; God in knowing Himself also knows all
things, and in these ideas and necessary truths we also parti-
cipate. Above all, the view is to be rejected which would
empty the notions of good and evil of all universal and
essential contents, and which would found them upon the
arbitrary institution of any will whatever. Morality is fixed
and natural, and it is founded in the nature of things ; for
no divine or human law can bind us to anything but what is
good in its own nature {<l>va€i). The atheists, who all assume
an insentient and unconscious matter as the principle of all
things, are systematically classified according as they think
of matter without life, or as involving a vegetative life. The
former assume either certain qualities or certain atoms, and
thus form the Anaximandrian and the Democritic Atheists ;
the latter hold either that the whole of matter is animated, or
that its several parts are animated, and they are accordingly
divided into the Stoical and the Stratonian Atheista The
most important of these systems are the Democritic and the
Stratonian ; but neither the atomism of Democritus nor the
hylozoism of Strato, lead by inner necessity to the denial of
the Deity. By the aid of a great wealth of historical material,
Cudworth goes on to show that the idea of God, and, in par-
ticular, of a single Supreme Being, is found everywhere, even
among the most pronouncd heathens. To this idea we are
led by the investigation of causes as well as by the contem-
plation of the design in the world. The reality of God
' His principel work is, The True InUUectual System of the Univtr9e,
London 1678. It was translated into Latin by Mosheim with notes (Jera
1788). [Edited along with the Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality,
by Harrison, in 8 vols., London 1845.]
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356 THE ENGLISH DEISIC.
follows from His idea in us as well as from the existence
of eternal truths and innate ideas generally.
Most of the writings published to refute Deism appeared
as replies to Collins' Discourse of Freethinking, Richard
Bentley, the great Greek scholar (1662-1742), wrote against
him his Remarks upon a late Discourse of Freethinking, under
the pseudonym " Phileleutherus Lipsiensis." He puts himself
in so far upon the same ground with his opponent, as he also
demands freedom of thinking ; and, besides, this is so univer-
sally admitted that it is superfluous to vindicate it The
polemic is not always quite dignified or worthy, as when
Bentley asserts that the " freethinkers " had a personal interest
in denying hell, and when he advises them to put it down by
force. He shows, with great acuteness and superior knowledge
of the subject, that the definition given of " freethinking "
was extremely indefinite and defective, that freethinking
actually tends to become rash, bold, inconsiderate thinking,
that the diversity of opinion in religion is extremely natural,
and is no reason for rejecting it He also shows that the
" Freethinkers," instead of only following their reason without
adopting any hypothesis, were from the outset convinced that
the soul is material, that Christianity is a deception, that the
Scriptures are falsified, that heaven and hell are fables, and
that our life is without a Providence and without a Hereafter.
— Benjamin Ibbot, in his Boyle Lectures (1713-1714), like-
wise claims for reason the right to examine whether an
alleged revelation is really a revelation, and what is its mean-
ing. He only objects to Collins, that he does not love the
truth for its own sake, and that he does not proceed im-
partially. Even Edmund Gibson, Bishop of London, in his
Five Pastoral Letters to the People of his Diocese (London
1728 ff.), concedes to reason the right to examine whether
the grounds in favour of an alleged revelation are convincing,
although he also emphasizes the demand that reason since the
fall, must subject itself in matters of religion to the divine
revelation.
Of the treatises called forth by Tindal's Christianity as old
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JOHN CQNYBEARK. JOSEPH BUTLER. 357
as the Creation, it may be mentioned that some of their
authors, such as Campbell and Stebbing, attempted to explain
the origin and the partial truth of natural religion by deriving
it from revelation. John Conybeare, in his D^ence of Revealed
Rdigion (London 1732), takes the view that natural religion is
certainly independent of revelation and certainly true, but that
revealed religion is alone perfect and sufficient for salvation.
He gains a no small advantage over his opponent by showing
that Tindal plays in an extremely obscure way with con*
ceptions ; that he uses the phrase ** Law of Nature " as
synonymous with " Eeligion of Nature ; " and that he calls
religion natural at one time because it can be known by
natural reason, and at another time because it is founded in
the nature of things, and so on. Conybeare restricts the
expression natural religion to the former meaning. If we
assume at the outset that man has a sufficient insight by
nature, even in this case revelation would not be superfluous.
It would promote our insight as a means of instruction, by
exhibiting a comprehensive and orderly system of doctrine ;
and by its appeal to divine authority, it would claim our
attention and respect Further, even assuming the perfection
of reason, a distinction must be made between reason before
the fall and reason as it now is, and also between the reason
of the whole of mankind and that of the individual In truth,
however, natural religion is perfect only in the degree in
which natural reason is so ; but i^atural reason is imperfect,
and therefore natural religion is so too. It is wanting in
clearness ; it rests upon insufficient ^auctions ; it does not
embrace all that should properly pertain to it ; and it furnishes
no means for the support of virtue. Further, natural religion
is changeable like our reason, which is the means of know-
ing it, and like the relations of things. Hence we must
expect that a divine revelation, if there be such a revelation,
would contain certain positive determinations in addition to
those of natural religion ; and we actually find such in all
revealed religion. There are therefore sufficient grounds in
reason for accepting a special positive revelation and recognising
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358 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
it in ChristiaDity. For although we owe an uDliniited obedience
to revelation, yet reason has to examine any alleged revelation
as to whether its contents are consistent with certain and
known principles, and whether it is accompanied with
sufficient external evidence so that it can be received as a
revelation.
Joseph Bauer (1692-1752),* who died Bishop of Durham,
undoubtedly takes the most conspicuous place among the
Apologists of his time. The fundamental thought that he
has expressed is that Natural and Bevealed Religion are not
opposites that exclude each other, but that they stand in
" Analogy " to one another. Butler first considers Natural
Religion. The hypothesis of a Future Life cannot, he says,
be in any way strictly proved, but it may be made probable
by examination of natura Observation of the moral life
makes it probable to us that all things are guided by God
according to a wise Providence, and that they are governed
according to moral laws ; and hence the work of training the
human race, which is thereby begun, makes us expect that it
shall be continued in a future life. Christianity is represented
by Butler under a twofold point of view. In the first place,
it is a republication and external arrangement of Natural or
Essential Religion, adapted to the present circumstances of
men, and destined for the promotion of natural piety and
virtue. Natural religion teaches that the world is the work
of an infinitely perfect Being, and is governed by Him ; that
virtue is His law ; and that in the future life He will deal
with all men according to their works. This Natural Religion
is thus taught in its original simplicity, and free from all the
superstition by which it has been adulterated ; and as
Christianity, by its miracles and prophecies, has given Natural
Religion the support of external authority, it makes the
reception of it easier to all men. It is also thus accom-
modated to the particular wants of one people and one age,
in order that it may thereby be brought nearer to men. —
' His principal work is, The Analogy of Religion, natural and revealed, to
the Constitution and Course of Nature, London 1786.
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DAVID HUME. 359
But, in the second place, Christianity contains things which
cannot be discovered by Eeason, and in this connection
natural religion is its basis, but not its whole. What is
peculiar and characteristic of Christianity, consists shortly in
this, that it teaches us to know God, not merely as Father on
the side of His omnipotence, but also as the Son who is the
Mediator between God and man, and as the Holy Spirit by
whose assistance our corrupt nature is renewed. From these
new relations to God as the Son and the Spirit, there likewise
spring certain obligations or positive commandments, which
cannot be known by our natural reason, but can only be
ascertained on the ground of immediate Divine Bevelation. —
Butler then proceeds, although in a less original way, to
refute the objections which have been urged against a Eevela-
tion in general, and against Christianity in particular.
IV.
David Hume.
The general significance of Hume (1711-1776) may be
briefly summarized by saying that in him the whole movement
of Deism reached its close. In the development of philosophy,
Locke had hitherto been the chief authority in England.
Hence, apart from the sesthetic theory of Shaftesbury, the
discussions of the Deists rested on the basis of Locke's em-
piricism, and they contributed little to the promotion of
general philosophical speculation. Hume attaches himself
closely to Locke, in part correcting him and in part develop-
ing his doctrine. In the discussions relating to religion,
Hume likewise brings the movement to a close. Hitherto
Deism had maintained an essentially supranatural character ;
for although it demanded rationality in revelation, and assigned
to rational thinking the right to decide as to accepting or reject-
ing it, it nevertheless founds upon the position of an immediate
revelation. It takes this position, however, with a difference
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360 THE ENGLISH DEIS&L
worth noting, namely» that from the outset the function assigned
by it to Bevelation is to communicate to us actually new know-
ledge relating to those things of which we could not otherwise
be certain, or which we wou]d not so easily and quickly have
attained to, if left to ourselves, but which reason is capable of
accepting and recognising as true. Afterwards, however, the
only function assigned to Bevelation was to guide men again,
in opposition to the errors that had arisen, to the natural
truths of reason which had been formerly known. Hume, on
the other hand, knows nothing of Bevelation as standing in
harmony with Beason. He evidently returns to the judgment
of Bacon concerning the complete separation of faith and
reason ; but while Bacon earnestly maintained his faith along
with his knowledge, in Hume the element of faith is also
assailed and consumed by his philosophical scepticism. We
may well consider this point somewhat more closely.
In philosophy, as has been said, Hume attaches himself in
the closest way to Locke, and he proceeds to develop Locke's
principles. As Locke, in his theory of knowledge, had under-
taken a critical examination of the origin, certainty, and
extent of human knowledge, as well as of the grounds and
degrees of belief, opinion, and assent, Hume likewise proceeds
on the same lines in his Philosophical Inquiry cojiceming
Human Understanding (1748). He aims at giving a "mental
geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of
the mind," because be sees in this the only possibility of
freeing the sciences at once from transcendental investigations
and the way " to correct all that seeming disorder in which
they lie involved." Hume goes even farther than this,
designating philosophy briefly as the "science of human
nature ; " he also founds his inquiry regarding morals and
religion entirely upon it.
In theoretical philosophy, Hume accepts it as an established
position that the whole material of our mental operations
consists in " perceptions." In this connection Berkeley had
already saved him the trouble of having to repeat the
negative criticisms of Locke regarding innate ideas, and of
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DAVID HUME. 361
inquiring with him into the sources of our ideas. " We may
observe that 'tis universally allowed by philosophers, and is
besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really
present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and
ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by
those perceptions they occasion." Perceptions, according to
the higher or lower degree of their liveliness, are divided into
" Impressions " and " Ideas " ; the former designate the ideas
and sensations that are immediately produced by an external
impress, the latter indicate the reproductions of these in
memory and imagination.^ All Simple Ideas are mere copies
of simple impressions, for the understanding has no power to
create anything new. It is otherwise with Complex Ideas.
There are complex impressions to which no ideas exactly
correspond, and there are also complex ideas to which there
are no exactly corresponding impressions. The understanding
Las not only the capacity of recalling ideas before itself in
memory, but it can also combine and separate, midtiply and
divide these ideas, in the phantasy, although it is always
restricted to the mateiial which it has received from experi-
ence. There are certain general Principles which undeniably
regulate the combination of individual ideas into complex
ideas. The most important of them are Besemblance, Con-
tiguity in time or place, and Cause or EfTect.* Along with
these natural relations, Hume also distinguishes certain
artificial relations, which are infinite in number yet may all
be reduced under these seven general heads : Resemblance,
Identity, Space and Time, Quantity, Degrees of Quality,
Contrariety, Causes or Effects.* The three natural Relations
mainly occupy him. The relation of Identity rests on resem-
***AU the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two
distinct kinds, which I shall call impresmoM and ideai. The difference between
these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon
the mind, and make their way into onr thought or consciousness. Those per-
ceptions which enter with most force and violence, we name impressions ; and
under this name I comprehend aU our sensations, passions, and emotions as
they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas^ I mean the faint images
of these in thinking and reasoning." Treatise, Book I. Part I. Sec. 1.
' Inquiry, Sect. III.
. » Treatise of Human Nature, Bopk I. Part I. Of Relations.
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362 TUE ENGLISH DEISM.
blance. This relation arises when we view one and the same
objects at two di£ferent moments of time, and only attend to
its unchangeableness during the lapse of the time ; and the
identity of an object is thus equivalent to its unchangeableness
and uninterrupted duration during a received portion of
time. This relation of Identity has therefore a merely
subjective foundation, and its expression has no objective
significance, apart altogether from the fact that it is almost
always expressed where differences are present. The objective
validity of the conception of Substance, both as material and
immaterial, thereby also falls. We perceive certain qualities
in repeated combinations, or even in a certain constant union,
hence we regard their coexistence as a thing or as a simple
object At the same time, however, the qualities appear to us
to be different and separate ; and in order to combine these
two things with one another, we form for ourselves the idea
of the one substance with its many accidents. But this idea
is not presented in any perception, and we have no right to .
transfer this fiction of our imagination to the external objects
of perception. In other words, our conviction of the con-
tinued existence of the external world, as a world of external
bodies corresponding to our earlier and later perceptions, rests
merely upon our imagination, and is only attained by means
of that fiction. As in the case of the objectivity of the
external world, the immaterial substance of the soul, or the
personal identity of the Ego, is in like manner resolved into a
mere subjective fiction. There is neither an impression, nor
is there an idea of the self or Ego founded upon any impres-
sion. When I exactly examine myself, I find in fact various
individual perceptions, but not a separate " self," whether as
an independent perception along with others or in connection
with these. It is a purely subjective addition to the process,
when we connect the various independent perceptions in the
Ego into an imaginary unity.
The relation of connection in space and time, leads us to
examine its significance. The Ideas of Space and Time do not
arise from separate perceptions that exist along with other
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DAVID HUME, 363
perceptions, nor are they jprior to all perception, nor are they
afterwards separated from perception. The idea of Space
arises from the perception of visible and tangible points,
which are distributed in a certain order, and the idea of Time
is abstracted from the succession of different perceptions.
We can neither form an idea of empty space and empty time,
nor the idea that space and time can consist of infinitely small
parts.
The Eelation of Causality leads Hume to the inquiries by
which he became the precursor of Kant, and by which he
established his reputat»m in philosophy. It is Causality
which alone enables us to pass in our knowledge beyond the
immediate present perception ; that is, to infer from the
perceived existence of an object to the existence of an object
which is not perceived, as preceding or as following it Hence
the knowledge that proceeds according to the Eelation of
Causality is distinguished from other knowledge, in that the
former constitutes empirical knowledge or experience, and
the latter intuitive or demonstrative knowledge. Intuitive
knowledge arises when two presented objects are compared ;
and demonstrative knowledge arises when the relations of
quantity are examined in geometry and arithmetic. Intuition
and demonstration give certainty, whereas experience gives
mere probability. — ^What is essential to experience as aided
by the Eelation of Causality, consists in the fact that we
thereby obtain a knowledge of the existence of objects which
are not presented to our perception at the time. Hence the
great question is. How, on what ground, and with what right,
may we infer generally from the idea of one object to another
that is not included in it ? It is impossible to infer to the
connection of one object with another merely from the idea of
the first object, or ä priori by a mere operation of the under-
standing. In regard to rare and wholly new objects, this is
not doubted ; but with regard to the common occurrences of
daily life, such as, that heat melts wax, or that a ball in
motion communicates its motion to one at rest, we believe
that we are able to draw inferences ä priori This opinion,
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364 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
however, is only the result of a deceptive influence of custom.
The Relation of Causality thus rests in every case upon
experience. But what does experience actually show us in
two things which we regard as Cause and Effect ? It is not
any particular quality of these objects, for anything may as
well be a cause as an effect. What we are presented with, is
rather a mere contiguity, or at most a succession of these
objects in space and time. Even in those cases in which the
Relation of Causality meets us most directly, as in the con-
sciously-willed movements of the body, nothing further is
presented to our observation than this contiguity or succes-
sion in time and space. But a single observation of this
relation, does not sufi&ce to lead to the knowledge of cause
and effect. This knowledge requires that such observations
should be frequently repeated. If, in a series of cases, two
objects continually appear in the same relation of connection
in space and time, the two impressions of them become
combined so closely with one another in our experience that
our imagination is determined by custom, on the repetition of
the one impression, to add to it the idea of the other. This
subjective necessitation is the only ground on which we
assume an objective necessary connection of the two objects,
and because we accept this connection we also become
firmly convinced that quite another significance belongs to
this combination of the ideas than belongs to mere images of
the imagination ; in other words, we think that the objects
really correspond to this subjective combination of ideas.
This conviction is founded upon Belief. We distinguish, no
doubt, between objects of experience and the inventions of the
phantasy; but in neither case have we anything but ideas
before us. There must, however, be some distinction between
those ideas which we accept as true from their corresponding
to an external object, and those which we reject as untrue.
This distinction can only be relevant to the sensation or
feeling as not depending on choice, and as without refer-
ence to the will being connected with true ideas, but not
with those that are untrue. It is as impossible to explain
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DAVID HUMK 365
this feeling as it is to explain the sensation of cold, or the
emotion of anger, to a being who has no experience of them.
But every one knows this feeling, and is conscious of it in
himself. The correct expression for it is " Belief." " Belief
is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas
of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination."
" The sentiment of Belief is nothing but a conception more
intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the
imagination." This Belief is the guiding principle of our
whole human life. By it alone we make experiences useful
to us, in so far as we assume for the future the same course
of events which we have observed in the past ; by it alone
do we extend our knowledge backwards and forwards beyond
the sphere of the objects immediately perceived. We there-
fore come to a certain harmony between the course of nature
and the succession of our ideas, and it rests upon the habit
which regulates our whole knowledge and action. The
necessary causal connection which we attribute to things,
thus rests merely upon our being subjectively compelled to
represent two things, which we have often observed in a
certain particular mode of coexistence in space and time, as
always in that relation, and as thus connected with one
another. The greater or less probability of the empirical
inference, rests on the number of the cases in which this
coexistence is observed in proportion to those in which it
was not found. For such an inference from experience
always remains a probability, and it never becomes a certainty.
— ^A special kind of merely probable knowledge, is that which
is founded upon Analogy. As yet we have been considering
Experience only under the point of view that the very same
object that we have observed hitherto in constant combina-
tion with another object, meets us again. But it is commonly
the case that it is only a more or less similar object that is
afterwards presented to us. The main question then comes
to be, How to determine degrees of similarity from identity
on to contrast ? For the less resemblance there is, so much the
more improbable does such an inference from analogy become.
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366 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
It is this same spirit of subjective empiricism, that appears
in Hume's investigation of moral questions. With penetrating
self - observation and careful psychological analysis, Hume
gives at the outset a survey of the human '' Passions " as
forming the natural substratum of our actions. Grenerally,
he maintains and emphatically argues that the Science of
Ethics has no imperative or constructive character, but is
entirely descriptive. It has not to establish universal Laws
derived ä pinori from no one knows where; nor has it to
subordinate individual cases to such laws; it has rather
to examine with care the actual conduct of men, and to derive
from the observation of their individual actions the general
laws of action. The will is not a particular power, nor a
special faculty. " By the will I mean nothing but the irUemal
impression we feel, and are conscious of, whefii v)e krioicingly give
rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our
mindy It is only from the fact that there has been no
agreement regarding the notion of the will, that the endless
and still unsolved controversy regarding freedom and necessity
is explained. Were it not that the subject of the dispute is
treated in endlessly ambiguous expressions, a recognised result
would have been reached long since ; for as regards the matter
itself, the disputants are really at one. Kobody questions the
essential equality of all men, at all times, and in all places.
In like manner, nobody disputes the fact that, in human life,
all actions stand in constant connection with certain motives,
characters, and relations. The constant connection of two
objects is, however, the only objective relation which underlies
our conviction of the necessity of material events. Hence
there is no reason for not attributing the very same necessity
to human actions as to external things. In the practical
judgment of life and men, we are also wont consUmtly to
proceed on the assumption of necessity; and we are only
prevented from keeping strictly to it by our idea that we
might have acted otherwise, as well as by the opinion that
necessity properly implies something more than a coexistence
in space and time that is without exception. Now it is
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DAVID HUME. 367
asked, By what then is our will determined? Is it by
reason or by feeling ? It is not by reason ; for reason
has to do only with knowledge, that is, with observation
of the relations of certain ideas in intuition and demonstra-
tion, or with the establishment of facts in experience.
In none of these cases can reason be the ground of
an action. Just as little can it combat a passion, for the
passions belong to an entirely different side of our mental
life than that of knowledge and perception. Morality does
not therefore consist in certain relations that have to be dis-
covered by reason, nor in facts that have to be established by it.
Bather is it feeling that determines the will. Our feeling
moves in the opposition between the agreeable and the dis-
agreeable. Hence our moral judgment regarding a character
and an action, as well as the determination of our will to
action, must rest upon a feeling of the agreeable and of the
disagreeable. This, however, is not to be understood as if all
agreeable feelings excited in us the idea of what is morally
good, and all disagreeable feelings that of what is morally
bad ; but the feeling of the morally good and bad rests upon
a peculiar and wholly specific kind of pleasure and pain.
By this feeling virtue becomes happiness, and vice unhappi-
ness. The only question remaining relates to what it is in
the objective world that excites in us the feeling of moral
satisfaction or the moral feeling of pleasure. The reply to
this question is that it is what is useful for others. This is
reached as the result of an analysis of the universally
recognised social virtues. Benevolence, Philanthropy, Grati-
tude, and Friendship are universally esteemed on account of
the advantage or Utility which arises from them for the
common weal as well as for the individual This holds still
more of Justice, the rules of which have only arisen from the
advantage which society and its members derive from their
observance. Hence even suicide is quite permissible, as
Hume argues at length in his celebrated Es&ay on Suicide,
Suicide is not a violation of duty towards God, because it
would be blasphemy to assert that the individual could thus
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368 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
interfere so as to destroy the divine plan of things. Nor is
it a violation of duty towards society, because our obligation
to work for the well-being of society ceases if a dispropor-
tionate pain is thereby prepared for us, or if we would thus
become a mere burden to society. Nor is suicide a violation
of duty towards ourselves, as no one will throw away life so
long as it appears worth the living. The moral estimate of
actions thus rests upon the specific feeling of pleasure which
is excited by actions that promote the advantage of human
society. Hence the feeling of humanity or sympathy, is
determined more correctly as the ultimate moral principle.
It has the twofold significance of giving a rule for the moral
judgment of all actions and characters, as well as furnishing
the motive of all really good actions.
Hume's Moral Philosophy, like his theory of knowledge,
thus forms in its own sphere, the culmination and close of the
preceding development of English thought. His Philosophy
of Eeligion holds exactly the same position and significance.
It grew up wholly on the soil of the English Deism, and is
only to be understood in connection with it ; but at the same
time it goes in essential points beyond it Hence, as in his
theory of knowledge, Hume is here, too, not merely the con-
summation and close of the previous development, but he is at
the same time the precursor and beginner of an entirely new
movement, which was to be carried on and completed by the
labour of a later time and by the thinkers of another country.
His principal work relating to the Philosophy of Eeligion
is entitled Tlie Natural History of Religion. At the outset,
Hume distinguishes two principal questions which claim our
attention in any inquiry with regard to religion ; the first
question relates to "its foundation in Eeason," and the
second to " its origin in human nature." The main progress
made by Hume beyond Deism, lies in the fact that he
deals with the latter question independently, and that he
does not attempt to refer religion, after its untenableness
by reason has been proved, merely to priestly deception
which explains nothing. The first question appears to him
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DAVID HUME. 36Ö
to be the most important ; and " happily it admits of the
most obvious, at least the clearest solution. The whole frame
of nature bespeaks an Intelligent Author, and no rational
inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a
moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine
Theism and Eeligion." Notwithstanding this expression,
Hume has not regarded it as superfluous to subject this
question also to an incisive examination. Along with par-
ticular sections of the work entitled An Inquiry concemivg
the Human Understanding^ the Dialogue eoneeming Natural
Eeligion mainly deal with this subject. They were not
published till after Hume's death, which took place in the
year 1779 ; but they had been composed as early as 1751,
and after more than twenty years of preparation.
The literary form of this investigation presents it as a
report by Pamphilus to Hermippus regarding a discussion
concerning the existence and nature of God, carried on in
Dialogues between three friends, Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes.
Demea represents the belief in Eevelation ; but in the
philosophical i*elation he stands not upon scholastic, but upon
sceptical ground, — that is, he will not establish the truth
of Divine Revelation by the aid of human reason, but he
will corroborate the necessity of immediate revelation from
the fact of the insufficiency of human knowledge. Philo is
likewise a sceptic, but he holds fast by his philosophical
scepticism, and does not save himself on the sure ground of
revelation. Cleanthes again has good confidence in human
thinking. Instead of doubting of the reliability of know-
ledge, he will not merely criticize any alleged revelation by
its aid, but wiU also apply it so as to obtain a natural
knowledge of the existence and nature of God. He therefore
represents the so-called Natural Theology, or the Deism of the
time. These characteristics are manifested in the intro-
ductory Dialogue regarding the significance of scepticism,
which Cleanthes rejects as practically impossible and scien-
tifically impracticable, while Demea and Philo recommend it,
the former advocating it as a preparation to belief, and the
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(870 THE ENGUSH DEISM.
latter as the true scientific method of procedure. — ^The exist-
ence of Grod, as the most certain of all things, is not called in
question in the subsequent discussion. The only question
treated is as to whether the proofs of God's existence are
sufBcient, and what light falls from these proofs on the
knowledge of the being and nature of God. Of the traditional
Arguments, the Ontological Argument is not even mentioned.
This is quite natural, for a theory of knowledge like that of
Hume could recognise nothing at all in the assertion that the
existence of God follows from the idea of God. The Cosmo-
logical Argument is merely touched incidentally. Demea
believes that even if the arguments a posteriori were to prove
insufficient, yet the argument ä priori would lead to the goal
in view. It is expressed thus. All that is, must have a
cause or a ground of its existence, as a thing cannot pro-
duce itself. In rising from efiTect to cause, we must therefore
either assume an infinite succession, which would be absurd,
or we must have recourse to an ultimate cause, which
necessarily exists, and the non-existence of which cannot be
accepted without contradiction; in other words, we must
come to the existence of God. On the other hand, Cleanthes
objects that it is of itself an absurdity to try to demonstrate
facts, or to establish them by arguments ä priori. There is
nothing demonstrable but that of which the opposite involves
a contradiction. Anything may be thought as not existing,
and hence nothing can be demonstrated as existing. Further,
in case there were such a thing as *' necessary existence," why
may the material universe itself not be this necessarily exist-
ing being ?
The greatest part of the Dialogue turns upon the Teleological
Argument, or, more exactly, on the question as to whether the
inference of design and intelligence in the origin of the world
is founded upon facts of experience. The point then is not
to prove the existence of God, for this stands fast, but to know
more exactly the nature of this original, or the nature of God.
Cleanthes proceeds to show that the world is an artificial
machine quite analogous to the products of human art ; and as
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DAVID HUME, 371
the likeness of the effect enables us to infer a like author,
we must therefore accept the existence of an intelligent author
of the world. Demea protests immediately against every
inference by analogy from man and his actions to God.
Philo then proceeds to argue that an analogical inference
in this case, in which the resemblance is so small and the
dissimilitude is undeniable, is far from being an inference
from experience. It is neither legitimate to transfer the
contrivance or economy of a part, such as a house, to the
whole of the \mi verse, nor to apply the procedure of the
existing and regulated world to its mode of origin, ''Can
you pretend to show any such similarity between the fabric
of a house and the generation of a universe ? " If we were
to judge about the origin of the universe from experience,
and therefore with any certainty, it would be necessary that
we should have been present at its origin and have seen how
iu fact a world arises. — These preliminary objections cannot,
however, convince Cleanthes. In vivid and rhetorical Ian*
guag^, he refers again to the fact that everywhere in nature
we find design in its arrangements; and that the simplest
natural explanation which presses itself at once upon un*
prejudiced thinking, is the acceptance of a divine intelligence«
We ought to stop at this immediate impression, and not
labour to seek out sceptical objections to it. Demea brings
forward the view once more that God's nature is entirely
inconceivable, that it is presumption to wish to make God
accessible to our understanding, because we thereby degrade
God and make Him like man. On the other hand, Cleanthes
asserts that this mystical conception of God differs in little
from the view of the sceptics and atheists, and that, if it is
denied that God is knowable, there will not be much inquiry
after His existence, and the belief in God will then be but an
empty belief in a vague something.
And now PhUo begins to give a special and systematic
refutation of that inference from Analogy. 1 . Anthropomor-
phism, he says, infers that as a human work of art has its
ground in the plan of the artist, so does the world per ana^
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372 THE EKOUSH DEISM.
logiam point to an intelligent Creator and His preconceived
plan of the world, But it is asked what is gained by this
assumption ? We see ourselves always compelled to rise stdll
higher in order to find for any cause again another cause.
To carry back the universe of things to a universe of ideas in
God, is only the first step in a regressus in infinitum. " How,
therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of
that Being whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or
according to your system of Anthropomorphism, the ideal
world into which you trace the material ? Have we not the
same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal
world, or new intelligent principle ? But if we stop, and go
no farther ; why go so far ? Why not stop at the material
world ? " This infinite regression, however, cannot satisfy
us; the story of the Indian philosopher and his elephant
applies to it If we are to stop at the first ideal world, why
not at once at the present material world ? It would be
better not to look beyond it. " By supposing it to contain
the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to
be God ; and the sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so
much the better." As the Peripatetics found the cause of
an occurrence in an occult quality, so do the Anthropomor-
phists in like manner find the cause of order in the ideas of
the Supreme Being, or in a rational Power which constitutes
the nature of God. In the same manner the order of the
universe may be explained without going back to a Creator.
2. The Teleological Argument leads neither to the infinity,
nor to the perfection, nor to the unity of God. " Like eflTects
prove like causes." This is the ultimate principle upon which
all inferences from analogy rest, and therefore it is also the
principle of the teleological argument This principle is not
considered in itself, but it is taken and applied strictly and
precisely. Now the efiect in question, in so far as it comes
to our knowledge, is not infinite, and therefore we have no
ground in it for attributing infinity to the Divine Being.
Further, there are in nature, at least so far as our knowledge
reaches, . difficulties, defects, etc., and therefore we cannot
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DAVID HUMK. 373
assert that God is perfect or free from error, mistakes, or
inconsequences. Or, again, as a human work of tolerable
perfection often comes into shape after many mishaps and
failures in the attempts to produce it, may it not also be that
" many worlds have been botched and bungled throughout an
eternity ere this system was struck." And now as a great
number of men are combined in the building of a house or a
ship, it might also be that various deities had combined to
form a worid. That would merely constitute so much the
greater a resemblance of the world to human things. Nay, if
the position of the Anthropomorphist is to be taken, why then
is it not carried out at once more completely ? '* Why not
assert the deity or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a
nose, mouth, ears, etc. ? " 3. In experience the principle
holds good, that where certain circumstances are observed to
be similar, the unknown circumstances will in like manner be
similar. The world shows much similarity to an animal or
organic body. We may therefore infer that the world is an
animal, and the Deity is the soul of the world, moving it and
moved by it. If the objection is raised that thereby the
eternity of the world is asserted, but that this position is
refuted by the recent origin of intellectual and material
culture, an escape may be found by taking up the view that
endless periodic revolutions follow each other, and that they
are guided by an eternally immanent principle of order.
4. As the world is much more like an animal body or a
plant than a human work of art, the origin of the world
might be much rather explained by generation or growth
than by intentional creation. ''In like manner, as a tree
sheds its seed into the neighbouring fields, and produces other
trees; so the great vegetable, the world, or this planetary
system, produces within itself certain seeds, which, being
scattered into the surroundiug chaos, vegetate into new
worlds." This view certainly gives free scope to the imagina-
tion, but from it we see how incapable we are to determine
anything from experience regarding the origin of the world,
and how the principle of resemblance leads us astray.
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5. Once more, even the hypothesis of Epicurus might be
defended. If we take a finite quantity of matter that is
continually and everywhere moved, it must necessarily in the
course of time assume all possible formations. Most of these
would have no internal power of existence and would there-
fore perish, but at last there would come about one which
could maintain itself in being. Although accidentally arisen,
such an arrangement would present the appearance of an
adaptation of means and ends ; for were the parts not suited
for the preservation of the whole, the whole would in time
have perished. — Hence the result of this discussion is summed
up in the view, that as innumerable hypotheses may be
maintained with the same probability, we must exercise the
reserve of the sceptic, and confess our ignorance.
Cleanthes represents the deistic mode of thought of the
time. According to his view. Design prevails in the world,
and hence its origin must go back to an intelligent author.
In that age human happiness was regarded as the final
purpose of things. The Dialogues could not therefore con-
clude without looking at the question of human happiness,
or the problem of the Theodicy with reference to the
knowledge of the existence and nature of God. Demea
expresses this position thus : " I own that each man feels,
in a manner, the truth of religion in his own breast, and from
a consciousness of his imbecility and misery, rather than from
any reasoning, is led to seek protection from that Being on
whom he and all nature is dependent.'' Demea and Philo
describe alternately and with great eloquence, the misery of
life, the unhappiness of man, and the universal corruption of
human nature. But while Demea will merge this mystery in
the incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature, Philo borrows
weapons even from that position against the argument for
the existence of God advanced by Cleanthes, arguing that
the boundless misery on the earth compels us to think
either that God's omnipotence, or His wisdom, or His good-
ness is limited. For if God were of unlimited power, wisdom,
and goodness, the happiness of living beings would not be
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DAVID HUME. 37S
impaired by any unhappiness. And although it may be
admitted that a world even under that condition might be
compatible with the idea of a very powerful, wise, and bene-
volent Deity, yet it can never furnish us with an inference to
His existence that is without difficulty. All evil rests upoA
four circumstances : (1) Pain and pleasure serve to incite the
creatures to action, and to make them watchful in the matter
of self-preservation ; (2) The course of the world is governed
by genei'al. laws ; (3) All powers and capacities axe bestowed
with great parsimony upon individuals ; (4) The several prin-
ciples of the great machine of nature do not work with com-
plete exactness, but exert an influence beyond the bounds of
their utility. This is expressed as ** the inaccurate workman-
ship of all the springs and principles of the great machine of
nature." None of the four sources of evil appear to us to be
necessary, and hence one might be inclined to adopt the
Manichaean theory of a dualism in the origin of the world.
The universal connection of the order of the world is, how-
ever, hardly compatible with this view. Hence it comes as a
result to this, that as regards the origin of the world, the
happiness and unhappiness of the creatures does not appear
to have been taken into consideration. — At the close, Clean-
thes and Philo come to agree in thinking that their dispute
was really but a dispute about words. The one admits that
the original intelligence is far removed from human reason,
and the other confesses that the original principle of order
has some distant resemblance to reason. Why then should
they still dispute ?
The eleventh section of the Inquiry concerning the Human
understanding, entitled " Of a Particular Providence and of a
Future State," is connected by its contents with the subject of
the Dialogues. Hume here makes a friend take up the part
of Epicurus, who defends himself against the reproach of
godlessness in a speech delivered on the Areopagus before
the assembled Athenian people. The chief argument for the
existence of God is derived from the order of nature. In
every inference from effect to cause, the two must be pro-
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376 THE. ENGLI8H DEISM«
portional to one another, and qualities may never be assigned
to the cause that are not necessary for the explanation of
the effect, and no inference may be drawn again from the
discovered cause to other effects than those that have been
observed. If we therefore suppose that the gods are the
authors of the existence and order of the universe, we may
indeed ascribe to th^ the particular degree of power, under-
standing, and benevolence which is visible in their work, but
never more. Further, " we can never be allowed to mount
up from the universe, the effect, to Jupiter, the cause ; and
then descend downwards, to infer any new effect from that
cause, as if the present effects were not entirely worthy of
the glorious attributes which we ascribe to that deity." Only
because this is overlooked is the inference made to an all-
good, all-wise, and all-powerful Creator, and then the effort is
again made backwards to explain away evil and imperfection
from the world. — Epicurus is further represented as saying :
I deny a Providence, you say, and Supreme Governor of the
world, who guides the course of events, and punishes the
vicious and rewards the virtuous ; but I entirely acknowledge
that according to the present order of things, virtue is con-
nected with more tranquillity of soul, and finds a more
favourable reception in the world, than vice. Whether I
derive this perception from an experience, or refer this
arrangement to an intelligence acting with design, is all the
same as regards my conduct. The expectation of a special
reward of the good and punishment of the bad in addition to
and beyond the usual course of nature, " must of necessity be
a gross sophism, since it is impossible for you to know any-
thing of the cause but what you have antecedently not
inferred, but discovered to the full in the effect" It is quite
unreasonable to render this life only a passage to a future
life. " Are tliere then any marks of a distributive justice in
the world ? If you answer in the aflßrmative, I conclude
that since justice here exerts itself, it is satisfied. If you
reply in the negative, I conclude that you have then no
reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods."
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DAVID HUME. 877
If we abandon the sure path of experience, and infer by the
imagination to a distinct intellectual being, who produces and
maintains order in the universe, we maintain a principle
that is equally uncertain and impracticable, as such an in-
ference from the cause to the eflfect is not allowable. An
inference from effect to cause, and again from the cause to the
effect, is indeed allowable in reference to the works of human
invention and art As we learn to know man in his nature,
motives, and qualities, from experience, our knowledge of the
cause in this case is not founded upon the one present effect,
but upon a hundred other experiences and observations which
justify an inference to wider effects. It is otherwise with
reference to the Deity. We infer a Deity merely from the
world as an effect, and therefore inferences drawn from the
Deity cannot carry us beyond the world of experience. The
great source of our mistakes lies rather in the fact that we
put ourselves in the place of the Supreme Being, and assume
that He will observe the same rules as we would do in His
place. But the analogy between the Supreme Being and us,
does not at all justify this assumption.
The views of Hume regarding the Immortality of the Soul
and Miracles, are also of interest in connection with his
Philosophy of Eeligion, His views regarding Immortality are
expressed in his Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the
Soul, which were not published till after his death in 1783.
The contents of these Essays correspond exactly to the logical
consequences which result from his dissolution of the idea of
the substance of the souL The inference is drawn that,
" Nothing could set in a fuller light the infinite obligations
which mankind have to Divine revelation, since we find that
no other medium could ascertain this great and important
truth." This inference, however, is only meant to soften the
aversion of the reader to the repulsive contents of these
Essays, but it will not weaken their result Hume subjects
the metaphysical, moral, and physical arguments for the
Immortality of the Soul to a sharp criticism. " Metaphysical
topics suppose that the soul is immaterial, and that 'tis im.-
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378 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
possible for thought to belong to a material substance." The
notion of substance is entirely confused. We represent it as
an aggregate of individual qualities which inhere in an un-
known something. Matter and Spirit are therefore equally
unknown to us. We do not know what qualities belong to
them. At least it is only experience that can decide as to
whether matter may be the cause of thought. And if thought
is only attached to a spiritual substance which is dispersed^
like the ethereal fire of the Stoics, through the world, the
various thinking forms and existences are formed out of it as
from a sort of paste or clay. The same spiritual substance
therefore lies at the basis of the most various formations.
The individual form is dissolved in death ; and as we know
nothing of existence before our birth, in like manner the
existence after death does not affect us. — The moral argu-
ments assume that the justice of God has an interest in the
future punishment of the vicious and the reward of the
virtuous. These arguments are thus founded upon the
assumption that Grod has attributes besides those that are
expressed in the world, and that are alone known to us. And
yet, if there be any purpose that is distinct in nature, we may
assert that the whole purpose of the creation of man was
limited to the present life. Only on this ground can it be
explained that our interest is so completely limited to this
world. " On the theory of the soul's mortality, the inferiority
of women's capacity is easily accounted for," in view of the
less important tasks of women. The main objection lies in
the fact that " heaven and hell suppose two distinct species
of men," the one completely good and the other completely
bad. In truth, however, men oscillate between vice and
virtue. The physical arguments, which are the only philo-
sophical ones, speak distinctly for the mortality of the SouL
If two objects are so closely connected with one another that
all the changes of the one are accompanied by corresponding
changes of the other, by the rules of analogy we must infer,
that if the one is dissolved, the dissolution of the other
also follows. This, however, is the relation that subsists
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DAVID HUME. 379^
between the body and the soul. Everything is in a continual
flax or change, and shall the soul then alone be immortal and
indissoluble ? Further, " how to dispose of the infinite
number of posthumous existences, ought also to embarrass
the religious theory."
Hume expresses his views regarding Miracles in the tenth
section of his Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding.
In entire conformity with the subjective character of his
whole philosophizing, he does not discuss the objective
possibility of Miracles, this being passed over as unquestion-
able. What he examines is their subjective credibility. The
positions which he maintains here are the necessary con-
sequences of his assertions regarding the theory of knowledge.
He begins with a reference to Tillotson's argument against
the Beal Presence. " It is acknowledged on all hands, says
that learned prelate, that the authority, either of the Scripture
or of tradition, is founded merely in the testimony of the
Apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our
Saviour by which He proved his divine mission. Our
evidence, then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less
than the evidence for the truth of our senses." But the
weaker evidence must yield to the stronger. In the same
way Hume will meet the belief in Miracles. The external
occasion, at least for the last revision of these thoughts, was
undoubtedly the excitement caused by the miracles " lately
said to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of
Abb^ Paris, the famous Jansenist," and the recollection thus
reawakened of the Port Royal Miracles.
Even experience, Hume maintains, may lead us into error.
Here also there are all possible degrees of conviction from the
highest certainty to the lowest d^;ree of moral evidence or
probability. It is therefore important to bring one's faith
into proportion to the degree of evidence. If inferences are
founded upon an infallible experience» we may expect the
event with the highest degree of assurance ; in other cases,
we must weigh the opposite experiences against each other,
and incline to the side on which the greatest number of
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880 THE. ENGLISH DEISM.
experiences is found, yet always only with uncertainty. This
is the probability which assumes an opposition of observations,
and according to the relation of these cases it ^has a different
degree of certainty. This position holds also where we
accept statements upon the testimony of others. In this
case the incredibility of a fact may invalidate the testimony
of a witness for it, however credible. Now, let us suppose
" that the testimony, considered apart and in itself, amounts
to an entire proof, but that the fsict related is a miracle, in
that case there is proof against proof, of which the strongest
must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force in
proportion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a violation
of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable
experience has established these laws, the proof against a
miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any
argument from experience can possibly be imagined. The
plain consequence is, that no testimony is sufficient to
establish a miracle unless the testimony be of such a
kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than
the fact which it endeavours to establish." Hitherto it has
been supposed that the testimony upon which a miracle is
founded, may rise to a complete proof. This supposition,
however, never holds true in fact. In the whole of history
there is no miracle found which was attested by a sufficient
number of sufficiently credible men. And, moreover, as we
are disposed the rather to accept statements the more they
contradict our other experiences, it is also shown that
miracles excite wonder, and astonishment, and agreeable senti-
ments which lead men away to accept them. Supernatural
and miraculous narratives are specially suspicious, in tliat
they are found most numerously among ignorant and bar-
barous peoples. Lastly, we have no testimony for any
miracle which is not opposed by an infinite number of
counter testimonies. Hence not only does the miracle of
itself annihilate the credibility of the statements, but these
statements neutralize each other ; and in matters of religion
there is great diversity and controversy. Now, in so far as
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DAVID HUME. 381
any miracle supports a particular religion, all the other
religions will throw it overboard. The result then is, that
no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever risen to
probability, and still less to historical certainty. " And even
in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments," and
"there is no testimony that is not opposed by an infinite
number of witnesses." If we deduct the one from the other,
" this subtraction with regard to all popular religions amounts
to an annihilation ; and therefore we may establish it as a
maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as to
prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any
system of religion."
Notwithstanding this criticism, Hume admits that Miracles
and deviations from the usual course of niature are possible.
The same holds true of Prophecies, for all Prophecies are
really Miracles, and only as such are they proofs of a divine
revelation. " So that, upon the whole, we may conclude that
the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with
Miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any
reasonable being without one. Mere reason is insufficient to
convince us of its veracity ; and whoever is moved by Faith
to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own
person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding,
and gives him a determination to believe what is most
contrary to custom and experience." With these words
Hume concludes his discussion of Miraxjles. We must, how-
ever, beware of seeing in them a personal submission to
the Christian faith or its Miracles. The philosopher expresses
himself here with his wonted circumspection and reserve,
convinced that every one will draw the necessary conse-
quences from his argument, as they apply also to Christianity,
without his needing expressly to point them out.
The second question, which according to Hume's view is of
special importance in regard to all investigation of Eeligion, is
that which relates to its origin in human nature. Hume
devoted his work entitled the Natural History of Religion to
the solution of this question, and it is in connection with it
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S82 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
that we find the main advance then made beyond English
DeisuL
Deism consoled itself with the fiction that the pure faith
of reason, of which Christianity appeared as a restoiatioD,
actually existed at the beginning of the human race as a
Beligion. It was therefore necessary for Hume to examine
at the outset the question as to the original form of Religion.
This, he holds, was not Monotheism, but Polytheism. '' It is
a matter of fact incontestable, that about seventeen hundred
years ago all mankind were polytheists ; " and that the farther
we are carried back by history we find men sunk the deeper
in polytheism, and no marks nor symptom of any perfect
Beligion. It is certainly possible that in still earlier and
more ancient times men maintained the principles of pure
theism. But how improbable it is that as ignorant barbarians
they found the truth, and then sank into error as soon as
they became civilised ! On the contrary, our knowledge of
barbarous nations and savage races shows the improbability
that there should not have been in this very point a gradu-
ally ascending progress of mankind from lower to higher,
and this is confirmed by the impossibility of explaining
to ourselves how the purer knowledge of God had ever
become lost.
The original form of Religion, then, was Polytheism.
The question regarding the origin of Religion, is accordingly
determined more definitely as a question regarding the origin
of Polytheism. This origin is not to be found in thinking.
Had men been led by the examination of nature to the
acceptance of an invisible, intelligent Power, they could have
accepted nothing but a single being who bestowed upon
this magnificent machine its existence and order ; for although
not impossible, it is yet extremely improbable that the world,
which is arranged into a unity, should be referred to several
authors. Again, if we leave the works of nature out of
view, and follow " the footsteps of Invisible Power in the
various and contrary events of human life," we are necessarily
led to Polytheism, that is, to the recognition of several limited
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DAVID HUME. 383
and imperfect deities. For the course of events is so full of
change and uncertainty, that we cannot refer it to a single
intelligent Being otherwise than by assuming that there are
opposite purposes in Him, and a constant conflict of opposite
powers. The first religious ideas do not arise from ** a con-
templation of the works of nature, but from a concern with
regard to the events of life, and from the incessant hopes and
fears which actuate the human mind." It is therefore not
speculative curiosity, nor pure love for the truth, that leads
man to accept the existence of intelligent powers. It is
rather ''the anxious concern for happiness, the dread of
future miseiy, the terror of death, the thirst of revenge, the
appetite for food and other necessaries. Agitated by hopes
and fears of this nature, especially the latter, men scrutinize
with a trembling curiosity the course of future causes, and
examine the various and contrary events of human life. And
in this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and
astonished, they see the first obscure traces of divinity."
The fear and hope with which we contemplate the unknown
causes of our prosperity or adversity, and especially the
events of the future, are thus the deepest psychological roots
of Keligion. And there is another consideration which has
to be added to these. Men have the general tendency to
think all beings like themselves, and to transfer to eveiy
object those qualities of which they are conscious in them-
selves. Thus we find human faces in the moon, and armies
in the clouds, and thus do we ascribe to everything that
pleases or displeases us benevolence or ill-wilL Along with
this, it is explicable that these unknown powers from which
we expect the formation of our future with fear and hope,
likewise assume in the imagination the form of human beings.
Not merely are spiritual qualities, such as knowledge, and
will, and human affections and passions, but even the human
shape, is attributed to them. It is evident that these limited
beings can have only a narrow, limited sphere of action ; and
as such a being is assumed for every peculiar sphere of life,
there are very many of them.
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884 THB ENGLISH DEIS3I.
It may very well be doubted as to whether the name of
Beligion should be applied to such conceptions. We find in all
this nothing of what we now call Eeligion and regard as its
necessary constituents. These gods constitute no first principle
of being and thinking; they exercise no supreme universal
dominion ; and they pursue no divine plan or purpose in the
creation. Entirely unworthy representations are contained in
the older heathen religions ; the gods stood wholly within the
world as belonging to it. The question regarding the origin of
the world was not at all examined in these religions; and
even the philosophers who were associated with these religions
only began with Anaxagoras, and therefore very late, to refer
the world to an inteUigent Author. The further development
of these religious ideas proceeded with much arbitrariness.
Man is certainly inclined to accept an invisible inteUigent
power in nature, but his attention at the same time clings
strongly to visible things. In order to unite both inclinations,
the invisible power is connected with a visible object, and
thus all the remarkable products of Nature herself appear as
real deities, such as the sun, the moon, the stars, and the
fountains inhabited by nymphs, etc. The partition of different
domains to special deities becomes the foundation of allegory,
both physical and moral. The god of war is represented as
barbarous and cruel, and the god of poetry as elegant and
refined. As the common deities were but little elevated above
man, there were also certain men regarded specially as heroes
or public benefactors, and held to be worthy of reverence, who
were raised among the gods. By this apotheosis there arose
a great number of heathen deities. And when sculptors and
painters represented the gods, an exact distinction was seldom
made between the god who was represented and the statue or
painting that represented him.
These are the general features of all polytheistic religions ;
and now it is asked. How did Monotheism arise out of this
Polytheism ? At first it might be supposed that intellectual
thinking and the speculative interest in the comprehension of
the universe, led man from the acceptance of many gods to the
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DAVID HUMS. 385
belief in one God. This supposition, however, turns out to be
erroneous. In Europe, where Monotheism has already so long
and so 'universally prevailed, if we ask a common man even
now why he believes in an Almighty Creator of the world, he
will not refer us to final causes. He will not speak to us of
the artistic construction of his hand, of the wonderfcd articu-
lation and flexibility of his fingers, and so on, but will tell us
of the sudden death of a man, or of the great drought of the
summer, etc. In short, the common people found their faith
in a divine government of the world upon extraordinary
incidents and marvellous events, which appear to the thinker
rather as counter instances than proofs of it The wonderful
connection of the universe and the strict observance of its
established laws, which is to us one of the main arguments for
Monotheism, appears to the multitiide ratlier as an argument
against it. Hence the origin of Theism cannot be referred to
the theoretical want of the speculative thinking, but is only
explained from universal practical reasons, from its acceptable-
ness to the human mind, or from " irrational and superstitious
principles." Polytheism already makes one of its many gods
the object of special worship and adoration, whether it is sup-
posed that the particular nation is subject to this particular
god, or after the manner of human relations, that the one is
king or supreme lord over the rest. Now, if God is regarded
as a special patron, or as the universal King of the gods, men
seek to gain His favour by very special manifestations of
honour to Him, and thus there arises among men a sort of
rivalry for the favour of God, and a hunting after the highest
possible expressions to use in His praise and as signs of His
honour. And thus do they come to the idea of infinity, beyond
which there is no further progress. Hence men are satisfied
with the knowledge of a perfect being, the creator of the
world, and this knowledge coincides by accident with the
principles of reason and true philosophy ; but this position is
not attained by reason, but by flattery and fear, and a pro-
pensity towards the most common superstition. Both among
savage and civilised peoples, flattery of the ruler carried to the
VOL. I. 2 b ^oooIp
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386 THE ENGUSH DEISM.
highest degree leads to his being designated as a real deity,
and to his being brought before the people for worship, and it
is likewise quite natural that a limited deity should be finally
raised to the position of the universal Creator and Euler of the
universe. But on account of its origin the idea of this elevated
deity, contradictorily enough, still continues such that human
infirmities, passions, and partialities are ascribed to it.
It is only by reference to this origin of Monotheism that we
can find an explanation of the fact that there is generally a
peculiar flux and reflux in connection with it, or a striving to
rise from idolatry to Monotheism, and again a tendency to
relapse from Monotheism into idolatry. *' The unknown causes"
which control life always press in again upon the knowledge
of the one Supreme God ; and they are regarded as mediators
of a lower order, as subordinate beings between men and the
Supreme divinity. These half-gods or middle beings stand
nearer to us, and thus become the main objects of worship,
and thus there arises a gradual reintroduction of idolatry. The
religion then sinks always deeper into idolatry until a reaction
ensues, and it again attains to the full purity of Monotheism.
Thus do even Christiemity and Mohammedanism fluctuate
between this descending and ascending movement, passing
from an omnipotent and spiritual deity to a limited and cor-
poreal deity, or even to a visible representation, and conversely
passing from the material image to the invisible power, and
even to the infinite and perfect Deity, the Creator and Euler
of the universe.
To this historical review Hume adds a comparison of these
various religions. With respect to toleration this comparison
turns out very unfavourably to Monotheism. Polytheism by
its very nature has room for other religions, and this toleration
has been frequently shown by it in history. Monotheism must
be exclusive, and shows itself repellent and cruel towards
others of a difierent faith. Polytheism has yet another advan-
tage. If the Deity is conceived as infinitely elevated above
man, this view is fitted, when connected with superstitions, to
plunge the human soul into the deepest debasement and dejec-
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DAVID HUME. 387
tion, so that mortification, expiation, and passive suffering are
regarded as the only actions that are pleasing to God« On the
other hand, if the Deity is considered to be only a little higher
than man, there arises the spirit, courage, self-consciousness,
the love of liberty, and all the qualities \7hich make a people
great. Nor has Monotheism any superiority from the point of
view of reason. The whole mythological system of antiquity
appears natural and probable. Monotheism formed the funda«
mental principle of a national religion, and its basis so greatly
corresponds to sound reason, that philosophy can become
united with such a theological system. But as the other
dogmas are contained in a sacred book, the controversy against
reason only properly begins there, and then the irrefragable
principles of reason cannot be recognised in the theology.
Nay, even when we wonder at the impossible and fabulous
histories that are accepted by the confessors of the heathen
religions, we are deceiving ourselves from inherited prejudice ;
when examined in the light. Monotheism has even more
incredible positions. — The idea of God is everywhere found
to be of a twofold origin. In the first place, it originates
in fear, then in flattery ; the former makes God appear terrible
and evil, the latter represents Him as sublime and good.
Hence there arises an irreconcilable contradiction it'garding
the idea of God and conduct towards Him. The scanty
influence of religion upon morals is most lamentable. In
every religion the majority of those who confess it, however
sublime their verbal definitions of the Deity may sound, do
not seek to gain the favour of God by virtue and good morals,
but by petty observances, unmeasured zeal, and the acceptance
of mysterious and absurd opinions. Nay, even the greatest
crimes are commonly practised with superstitious piety.
Good and evil are everywhere mixed in the world, and this
applies also to religion. Certain advantages may be admitted
as belonging to its theistic form, but along with these it has
also its dark sides. " The propensity to believe in invisible
intelligent power, if not an original instinct, being yet a general
attendant of human nature, may be considered as a kind of
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388 THE ENGLISH DEISM.
mark or stamp which the Divine workman has set upon His
work/' ** but what caprice, absurdity, and immorality are
ascribed to Him ! " " The noble privilege of man to find God
in nature is replaced by sick men's dreams, or by what may be
]*eg{u*ded rather as the playsome whimsies of monkeys in human
shape, than the serious, positive, dogmatical asseverations of a
being who dignifies himself with the name of rational" " The
whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt,
uncertainty, suspense of judgment appear the only result of
our most accurate scrutiny concerning this subject But such
is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible conta-
gion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely
be upheld did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one
species of superstition to another, set them a-quarrelling, while
we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make
our escape into the calm, though obscure, regions of philo-
sophy." Thus does Hume close his Natural History of
Religion}
^ The best edition of Hume's Philosophical Works is that of T. H. Green and
T. H. Grose, 4 vols. London 1875.— Reference may also be made to Friedrich Jodl,
Leben und Philosophie David Hume's, Halle 1872, and Edmund Pfleiderer,
Empirismus und Skepsis in David Hume's Philosophie, etc., Berlin 1874.
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SECTION SIXTH.
DESCARTES AND SPINOZA.
I. Descartes.
DESCARTES (1596-1650) takes his place along with
Bacon as the founder of the Modern Philosophy ; and
he begins the speculative movement, as Bacon does the empi-
rical movement. They were both driven to their position by
a conviction of the uncertainty of all previous knowledge, and
their aim was to save the human mind from universal Doubt
by a new Method, as the only correct means of renovating
science. In this undertaking both of them continued to stand
upon the ground of dogmatism, and they did not advance to
a critical examination of our knowledge as such. Bacon finds
the certain knowledge that is beyond doubt in the observation'
of nature, or in right experience. Descartes finds it in our
own self - consciousness. Whatever I may doubt of, I am
always in any case doubting or thinking, and therefore I exist
Hence the proposition, Cogüo ergo mm, which is the Archi-
medean standpoint for all further investigation. I am, and,
in particular, I am as a thinking being ; and I am undoubtedly
certain of this, because I have a clear and distinct Idea of it.
Hence arises the criterion that what is clearly and distinctly
perceived is true; and only what I clearly and distinctly
perceive is true. Now, in our consciousness we have a mul-
titude of ideas which are partly innate, which have partly
been formed in us by ourselves, and which have partly been
produced in us from without. In so fcur as they are ideas and
are only in our consciousness, they are entirely true. We go
on in our judgment, however, to assert their agreement with
external things. Tiie question then arises as to whether we
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390 DESCARTES AND SPINOZA.
are justified in asserting this agreement In order to answer
this question we must have recourse to a principle of which
the truth is established to us as beyond doubt This is the
principle of Causality ; namely, that every efiect has a cause,
and this cause must contain as much or more reality than the
eflTect If we apply this principle to our Ideas, then it is
plain that the ideas of man, animal, and body may have their
foundation in ourselves. The idea of angels is compounded
out of the idea of God and that of man ; it is only the origin
of the idea of God that needs an explanation. We cannot
possibly be the originating cause of this idea, for we are far
more imperfect than it is. Hence the existence of the idea
of God in our self -consciousness can only be explained if God
really exists without us as its cause.
This is the Argument for the Existence of God that is
peculiar to Descartes. It is to be carefully distinguished from
the Ontological Argument of Anselm, but that argument is also
turned to account by him. He puts it in the following way.
Among the various ideas which we have, we observe the idea
of a supremely intelligent, supremely perfect, and supremely
powerful Being. l!his idea far transcends all other ideas, and
we know that it includes existence as not merely possible,
but as entirely necessary and eternal. Hence, merely from
the fact that we know that necessary and eternal existence is
contained in the idea of a being of the highest perfection, we
may infer that a most perfect being really exists. For the
custom which we have of separating eodstentia from essentia in
all other things ought not to lead us to a similar procedure
in contemplating the highest Being. ^ Existence can as little
be separated from the idea of God as we can separate from
the idea of a triangle the fact that the sum of its three angles
is equal to two right angles, or from the idea of a mountain
the idea of a valley ; so that it is as absurd to think of God,
the most perfect Being, without existence — that is, with
the want of a perfection — as it is to think of a mountain
without a valley.**
We further find the Anthropological Argument in Descartes
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THE DOCTRINES OP DESCARTES. 391
in the following form. Whoever knows anything more per-
fect than he himself is cannot exist of himself, for in that case
he would have given to himself all the perfections of which he
has any idea in himself. Again, we cannot have created our-
selves, because we do not possess the capacity of preserving
ourselves. Hence we must have our existence from a Being
without us, and in particular, from that Being who bears all
perfections in Himself, that is, from God. Hence God must
exist — In both its forms the argument is founded on the fact
that we exist as imperfect beings, yet carry in ourselves the
idea of the most perfect Being; and in the one connection
it is inferred that God only can be the cause of this effe<5t,
and in the other connection it is inferred that we cannot be
that cause. " If in one of my ideas a reality is represented
so great that I am certain that this reality cannot be contained
in myself either forTnaliter or eminenter, and that I cannot
myself be the author of this idea, it necessarily follows from
this that I am not alone in the world, but that there exists
another being who causes that idea." " The whole compelling
force of the argument lies in this, that I must recognise that
I myself, as I exist with the idea of God in me, could not
possibly exist unless God really existed ; and I mean just that
God whose idea is in me as one who has all the perfections
which I cannot conceive, but can only, as it were, touch from
afar with thought, and who is subject to no want at alL"
The conception of God set up by Descartes follows from tlie
arguments thus advanced for the existence of God. Be is the
most perfect Being and the cause of all existence« God is
designated as Substance, that is, as a being who exists .in such
a way that no other being is required for His existence. - Jn
this strict sense there is only one substance, namely, Gpd,
while corporeal and thinking substances may be comprehended
under the common notion that they are ^beings that only
require the co-operation of God for their existence. They
mutually exclude each other, and neither of tbem can exist
without the other. But we cannot apply the idea of substaece
univoce to God and to those other beings; for God is the
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392 DESCARTES AND SPINOZA.
infinite substance, whereas they are finite substances. Des-
cartes further seeks to determine the nature of Grod from the
idea existing in us ; and accordingly God is eternal, onmiscient,
omnipotent, the source of all goodness and truth, the Creator
of all things, and infinitely perfect God is not corporeal, and
He is without sensation, for all sensation is a state of passivity ;
but He has knowledge and will. In general, everything is
carefully separated from God that appears in ourselves as a
defect or imperfection ; and, on the other hand, we are em-
phatically warned against indulging in subtle investigations
regarding the infinite ; for as finite beings we are not capable
of comprehending or thinking the infinite.
The existence of God is of so great importance to Descartes,
because in his view our conviction of the existence of external
things rests upon it alone. The perceptions of our senses are
deceptive, because it is only what we clearly and distinctly
know and think that is true. There exists no relation or
reciprocal interaction between mind and body as relative
substances, and as beings completely independent of each
other. Hence we cannot explain nor conceive from the nature
of mind or body how ideas of corporeal things external to us
can arise in us. But we have these ideas, and are conscious
of the impossibility of not having them ; and hence we have
them from God. Now God may indeed deceive us, if He so
will ; but veracity belongs above all things to His perfection,
and therefore God will not deceive us. Hence on our con-
viction of the existence and veracity of God rests our certainty
that external things correspond to their ideas in us. This view,
however, appears to exclude all error, and thus the difficulty
emerges that errors do yet occur, although the truth of our
ideas of external things rests upon the veracity of God, and
this leads Descartes to a somewhat artificial theory. Our ideas
are true as ideas in ourselves; error only enters when the
judgment asserts the real existence of external things corre-
sponding to these ideas. The judgment is a matter of the
will ; the idea is a matter of the understanding. Error is
therefore founded on the will, and more precisely on the fact
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OPPONENTS AND ADHERENTS OF DESCARTES. 393
that the will reaches farther than the understanding, or that
we will to know more than we can know. If we only will,
that is, have the will always guided by rational insight, we
may keep ourselves from error.
The existence of external things is thus established. Their
essence is defined in sharpest contrast to the essence of mind ;
the essence of mind is thought, the essence of external things
is extension. AU the phenomena of minds are only forms or
modes of thought; all the phenomena of bodies are only
forms or modes of extension. And because bodies are merely
manifestations of extension or magnitudes in space, there are
no indivisible bodies or atoms, nor is there any limit or
interruption of the world ; that is, there is only one infinite
world. Because all occurrences in the corporeal world are
only modes of extension, all the changes of matter and all its
diflTerent forms are dependent upon motion. The ultimate
cause of motion is God, but the quantity of motion in nature
remains always constant, and it is communicated by impulse.
All the processes in the corporeal world proceed according to
mechanical laws; and these laws, in accordance with the
theory of vortices, explain the order of the universe.
There is only one fact which cannot be explained under the
rigid separation of mind and body ; it is the nature of the
human passions. They point with necessary force to the fact
that man is a unity made up of body and mind. In the
pineal gland as its special organ, the soul stands in connection
with the body.
IL
Opponents and Adherents of Descartes.
Descartes himself did not wish to advance with his philo-
sophical views too close to Revealed Religion. "We must
continually consider that Ood is the infinite ground of things,
and that we are only finite. If God then reveals anything
regarding Himself or others that transcends the natural powers
of our mind, such as the mysteries of the Incarnation and
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394 DESCABTES AND SPINOZA.
Trinity, we are not entitled to refuse to believe in them,
although we may not clearly understand theuL** This
expression, as well as his submission to the authority of the
Catholic Church, need not be r^arded as a mere confession of
the lips ; the Cartesian Philosophy shows on one side soch a
decidedly theological character that these expressions may be
taken as meant in real earnest. But, on the other side, it
shows such a decidedly naturalistic character, and betrays so
entirely new a spirit, that the antagonism of Theology to it
need not astonish us, especially in view of the fact that tlie
disciples often went farther than the masters. Home put the
writings of Descartes on the Index. In Holland, Synods and
Universities combined to combat this dangerous philosophical
innovation. In France and England, in Germany and
Switzerland, the armouries of the mind and of force were led
into the field against it It does not lie within the purpose
of our inquiry to follow the external course of this conflict in
its details. We limit ourselves to a brief summary of the
most important objections advanced by opponents, and will
then proceed to review the most important of the Cartesians.^
The objections of the Opponents of Cartesianism were
directed not less against the general principles of the new
Philosophy than against its individual doctrines. Universal
Doubt, which was the starting-point of the thinking of
Descartes, at once aroused opposition. Even when it was
not mistakenly regarded as Scepticism in principle, it was met
by the unquestionably certain axiom, that it is impossible that
a thing can at once be and not be. At all events it was held
that this Doubt could only be applied to the domain of
philosophy ; in theology, it would destroy all faith and would
1 G. Frank, Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie, Bd. iL 1876 (rieh
in interesting dettUs). F. Bonillier, Histoire de la Philosophie Cart^enne,
2 vols. Paris 185i (the fullest history of the subject).
Of the Opponents of Cartesianism and their works, the following are of most
interest for us here : — Jacob Bevius, Methodi Cartesian» consideratio theologica,
Logd. Bat 1648. Petrus van Mastricht, Novitatum Cartesianarum gangnena,
AmsteL 1677. Samuel Maresii, Tractatus de abusu Philosophic Cartesiause,
Groning. 1670. Joh. A. Oslander, Collegium considerationum in dogmata
theologica Cartesianorum, Stuttg. 1674. J. V. Alberti, AjfrXtv» »xww», quod
est Cartesianismus et Coccejanismus, Lipsi» 1678.
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OPPONENTS AND ADHEBENT8 OF DESCARTES. 395
take away all guilt from unbelief. The principle that what-
ever is clearly and distinctly known is true, and this only, is
far from clear, because clear and distinct knowledge is defined
most defectively, and it opens the door to all fantastic and
fanatical notions. The principle is also rejected on the ground
that any one who clearly and distinctly perceived the images
of his imagination would thus supersede all objective truth by
his mere subjective opinion, and this when applied to theology
assumes the peculiar character of an immediate divine revela-
tion. The assertion that Philosophy has the same certainty
as Theology, is already suspicious on account of its afiBnity to
Socinianism. It would lead to the view of a double word of
God, a twofold divine faith of equal authority and dignity ;
it would rank the philosophers with the prophets and apostles
of Grod, and promise complete freedom from error as the fruit
of philosophy. It is utterly intolerable that the modem
philosophy will no longer be the servant of theology. This
philosophy protests even against the name " Christian Philo-
sophy," under the pretext that philosophy has only to follow
natural reason without regard to a revelation or a positive
religion. Thus we should have an utterly heathen philosophy,
and a ceaseless conflict between it and Christian theology
would be unavoidable. As the assertion of this position rests
upon a complete denial of the obscuration of our reason in
consequence of sin, it will advance from the equalization of
philosophy and theology to the demand that philosophy shall
have the unlimited supremacy. This was already claimed
with r^ard to the interpretation of the Scriptures. And on
the ground of the assertion that the Scriptures, not only in
matters of natural science, but also in matters of morality and
faith, speak in attachment to the erroneous opinions of the
multitude, philosophy is proclaimed as the only infallible inter-
preter of Scripture ; and yet the Scriptures are entirely clear
in themselves, and require to be interpreted by themselves.*
^ The work of the Amsterdam Physician, L. Meyer, PhUosopJäa Scripturm
interpret (Eleatherop. 1666), is speciaUy attacked again and again, and in the
most yiolent manner.
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396 DESCABTES AND 8PIK0ZA.
Of the objections advanced against particular doctrines of
the Cartesians, we can only refer to the most important,
otherwise we would have to go through the whole of the Loci
of the ecclesiastical dogmatics. The argument for the exitience
of Ood, derived from the idea innate in us, was violentiy
contested, but generally without being correctly understood.
It was urged that the idea of God is not innate in all men,
for there are some men and even peoples without it Again,
it was held to be untenable to infer from the idea in us to
real existence without us, as we might in this way assert the
existence of a golden mountain. Further, it was held that
the assertion of Descartes led to many absurdities, such as
that, according to it, Jews, Turks, and Heathen worship the
same true God as the Christians ; that the ideas of God in us
would be vicars or images of God, or even lower gods ; and
that before Descartes found his ideas, the Church had no
certainty for the existence of God. — ^Again, the attempt to
give a definition of Ood was repudiated, as this would only
be possible if God were finite, compound, and imperfect — It
is false to make the essence of Ood consist only of thinking,
because the same substance is thereby attributed to God as to
the angels and men, whereas God is rather to be regarded as
Spirit and life. To say in a positive way that G<m1 exists
a se ipso, to apprehend His universal presence as mere universal
activity, or to assert that God can do what is contradictory,
and that He can deceive us whenever He will, was declared to
be completely absurd. — ^With regard to Creation, the Cartesians
excited offence by asserting that God only communicated
motion to matter, while chaos had produced everything out of
itself alone merely by natural forces ; that the creation took
place in the particular period of six days of twenty-four hours
each ; that everything was not created on account of man ; and
that creation and preservation were the same activity. Of the
physiccU doctrines of the Cartesians, the most contested were
the theories of the animatedness, the infinity, and the unity of
the world, as well as the conjectures that the moon was
inhabited and did not shine by its own light, and that the
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OPPONENTS AND ADHERENTS OF DESCARTES. 397
earth moved as a planet around the sun. The purely
mechanical explanation of all the processes in the natural
world appeared to the theologians as suspicious naturalism
and the nearest approach to atheism. — In ArUhropology, the
Cartesian assertion, that the pineal gland was the seat of the
soul, excited opposition ; and still more dangerous and, from
its disguised Pelagianism, utterly intolerable, seemed the
doctrine that error has its foundation in the will, and therefore
cannot be completely avoided by us. The mdlibitas of tJie
Angels, or the doctrine that they are not by their substance in
any particular place, because their essence consists of pure
thought, was also violently contested.
These objections, and the often passionate tone of the
extremely violent polemics in which they were urged,* show
at the same time that the scholastic theology of the Beformed
as well as the Lutheran Church did not fail to recognise the
strong antagonism of the new mode of thought to that which
had hitherto prevailed. Although this scholastic theology did
not intermit its attacks, although in many points, especially
in certain rash consequences drawn from Cartesianism, it
decidedly gained the advantage, and although the secular
power and the venerable authority of centuries were on its
side, yet it could not prevent the triumph of the new spiritual
force. In particular, two fundamental and general thoughts
of the new system unceasingly made way ; namely, that the
investigation of the world of nature must be separated from
theology and assigned to natural reason alone, and that know-
ledge out of clear and distinct principles is to be regarded
as the highest criterion of truth. The supremacy of an
intellectual rationalism in natural science and in theology
was the general result of the Cartesian Philosophy.
Among the oldest representatives of this philosophy, there
certainly still prevailed here and there a conservative character.
Christoph Wütich (1625-1688)* held without question the
^ In this way the pnlm is perhaps due to Lentulus from his Cartesius
triumphatas et uova sapientia ineptianim et blasphemi» convicts, 1658.
' Consensus Yeritatis in Scriptura diviua et infallibili revelats cnm ventate
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398 DESCARTES AND SPINOZA.
most important authority and influence among the theological
Cartesians. He declared himself decidedly against the
supremacy of theology over philosophy, and against employing
Scripture to obtain theories about the system of the world and
the simplest corporeal beings. He also teaches that clear and
distinct knowledge is the only universally valid criterion of
truth, and that the natural freedom of our will is unaffected
by sin. At the same time, he takes up an entirely friendly
attitude towards theology. He holds that belief is not to be
withheld from the revelations of the divine Word, even if our
limited intellect is incapable of comprehending them ; that
the philosophical doctrines regarding the soul, the angels, and
the idea of God in us, are extremely useful for theology ; and
even that the most mysterious doctrines of the Christiau
religion, such as the Trinity and the incarnation, may be
easily understood by the aid of the Cartesian philosophy. To
pass over others, it may be mentioned that the theologian
Heidanus (1597-1678) belonged also to those who sought to
connect the ecclesiastically established doctrine as much as
possible with the new philosophy. Some thinkers were
carried by the influence of Cartesianism to mystical views.
W. Deurhoff of Amsterdam (t 1717) * was one of these. He
held that as what was created by God is in its essence either
extension or thought, all men in their real being are the one
extension and the one mind which God originally created.
What comes into existence in the course of time is but -a
modification of the one humanity originally created at the
beginning. The individual human mind is likewise but a
particular manifestation of the one mind. With these
thoughts he combines an entirely mystical theory of salvation.
— ^The mystic Friederich Adolph Lampe and the Cartesian
Koell come into contact here, and they agree at least on some
points. These examples prove that the reproach of enthusiasm
urged against Cartesianism was not entirely unfounded.
philosophica a Renato Descartes detecta, Lagd. Bat 1659. Theol(>gia
pacifica, ed. ii 1675.
^ Compare H. Heppe, Geschichte des Pietismus und der Mystik in der
Reformirten Kirche, Leiden 1879.
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OPPONENTS AND ADHEKENTS OF DESCAKTES. 399
Far more general and more decided, however, was the
tendency of Cartesianism to a sober rationalism and to
intellectual criticism, a tendency which was attacked as
naturalism and atheism. The point at which its assault upon
the previous theology was most sensitively felt was the
demand which it raised for a philosophical interpretation of
Scripture. This demand was accompanied by inquiries which
aimed at the outset only at exposing and condemning the
superstition involved in all the heathen religions of the
ancient world. The violent and even passionate antagonism
aroused by these inquiries can only be explained from the too
well-grounded fear that such inquiry might also be directed
against Christianity and its holy things. — Antonius van Dale
(1638-1708) attempted, in his dissertation De origine ac
progressu idololatrice et mperstüianum (Amst 1696), to prove
by detailed historical inquiry that the belief in demons and
spirits was as old as the human race, and had been transmitted
from one people to another, but had been cultivated with
peculiar preference by the Egyptians. Most attention was
excited by the work of Balthasar Bekker (1634-1698),
entitled " The Enchanted World." ^ The general principles
here put forward regarding the relation of reason to Scripture
are moderate throughout in their tone. Beason and Scripture
are represented as the two sources of truth ; the one is not
subordinated to the other, but they are co-ordinate, for reason
speaks of things with regard to which Scripture is silent, and
Scripture teaches something that is not subject to our under-
standing. Beason stands before Scripture, because Scripture
must make manifest to it that it is from God ; and again,
Scripture stands before reason, because God has revealed to us
in it what human reason never comprehends. Nevertheless it
happens that the two meet and join hands, yet so that reason
as the inferior always gives reverence to the Scripture. In
natural things, reason alone is the ground and rule of know-
ledge; in matters of salvation, God's Word alone is the
* De Betoverde Weereld, zynde een Grondig Ondersoek van*t gt- meen gevoelen,
aangaande de Geesteu, etc., Amst 1691.
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400 DESCABTSS AND SPINOZA.
ground and rule of faith. If Scripture, then, does not speak
of natural things in a natural way, reason must teach us to
interpret it ; and if, on the other hand. Scripture speaks of
things of faith, reason must subject itself even although it
does not comprehend. The investigation of '' the Enchanted
World " is directed to the question of belief in subordinate
spirits and their activity. With an astonishing knowledge for
his time of the history of religion, the author first examines
the opinions which the heathen peoples entertained regarding
spirits, and he comes to the result that they agree in great
measure with one another, and that they were led everywhere
to the same arts of soothsaying and magic. The opinions of
the Jews and Mohammedans were entirely akin, and even
Christianity has received from the same source its belief in
demons and angels. This circumstance is of itself by no
means fitted to recommend that belief, and still less so is the
general observation that the belief becomes always weaker the
more men advance in civilisation. Reason, however, cannot
decide this question. It indeed teaches us that there is only
one God, and that the angels and demons cannot therefore be
demi-gods or subordinate gods; but, as there are immortal
spirits besides God, namely, human souls, reason cannot
decide whether there are still other spirits, and how they act.
Nor does the Scripture give us much information regarding
the origin and nature of the angels; and if it gives us
somewhat more information regarding demons, yet it is not
communicated in direct doctrinal form, but in occasional
and often extremely figurative narratives. According to the
Scriptures, the devil appears in a perfection which is equally
at variance with the loftiness of God and his own sin. The
angels that appear to Abraham and Lot behave themselves
like men. The temptation of the Lord is explained by the
thoughts of His own heart Neither Job nor Paul was
tormented bodily by the devil, nor did the lunatics need
either the devil or the moon, and the demoniacs were subject
to a peculiar disease. Christ Himself, in driving out spirits,
as also elsewhere, only accommodated Himself to the pre*
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OPPONENTS AND ApHERENTS OF DESCARTES. 401
judices of the multitude. Most of the passages of Scripture
which were applied to the devil are to be understood of bad
men, and it is entirely contrary to the truth of the Christian
faith and of true godliness to suppose that the devil goeth
about in the world, that he appears to men, and administers a
great kingdom with power and cunning. The author then
turns to the examination of the whole series of histories
drawn from the domain of witchcraft and magic, and they are
rejected altogether as mere superstition and the delusion of
timid hearts.
The attempts to sketch a complete system of Natural
Theology purely from philosophical principles, were historically
of no great influence, although in principle they had a wider
range of meaning. The most important representative of this
method was Hermann Alexander Röell (f 1718). In his
inaugural dissertation as Professor of Philosophy and Theology
at Franecker,^ Röell indicates it as the task of his life to show
that the only true philosophy is one which, in examining the
things of this world, teaches us not merely their nature and
causes, but the cause of causes, a philosophy therefore which
shows us not merely the use of the goods that belong to this
life, but the way to the highest good. He also aims at show-
ing that the only perfect theology is one which illuminates
the too corporeal light of reason by the clearer light of
revelation, and which restores their original clearness to the
truths that are knowable by nature and are impressed upon
our souls but are lamentably obscured, a theology which
thereby completes nature. In short, his principle is the unity
of nature and grace, of reason and revelation, of philosophy
and theology. Eevelation without reason is wanting in
authority, and reason without revelation is wanting in com-
pleteness. Philosophy examines the ground, the goal, and the
order of things. The goal of man is happiness, which consists
in the possession of the highest good, which is God. The sole
way to Grod is religion, and more particularly it is rational
' Dissertatio de Religione naturali, ed. 8, Franecker 1695 ; expanded in
}n$ Diasertatioxies philosophiere, etc, Fraukf. 1729.
VOL. I. 2 0 ^ J
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402 DESCABTES AND SPINOZA.
religion (religio rationalis) ; for it is only through the ideas
innate in us, and the inferences obtained from them by think-
ing, that we are able to attain the true knowledge of Gk>d and
the right religion. This natural knowledge and the natural
striving to apprehend the highest good and to avoid evil^ form
the basis of every rational religion. In detail, Böell here
develops the same thoughts as we already find in Descartes.
When he comes also to speak of revelation, its existence
is assumed without examination. Bevelation, like natural
religion, cannot be understood without the aid of ideas ; and
hence, if there are entirely new elements of knowledge com-
municated to tis in revelation, there must likewise, as at
creation, be completely new ideas inscribed in us. In this
case it only remains to us to bring the new ideas into con-
nection with the other ideas, and to make ourselves certain of
their divine origin. If revelation communicates to us truths
of which the simple ideas are already known to us, we can
and ought to examine whether these are to be recognised
as divine ; that is, whether there cannot be found another
explaining cause of the alleged divine Word than the omni-
science and omnipotence of the first Being. A true divine
I'evelation can contain nothing that is contrary to reason, for
reason also comes from God; yet it may very well com-
municate truths regarding God's nature and works which the
natural reason alone is incapable of ascertaining. We must
believe such Divine communications even if we are not able
to comprehend them, but even then we should seek to make
the meaning and the divine origin of Revelation clear to us
by means of rational principles.
The least satisfactory point in the system of the Cartesian
Philosophy, is undoubtedly the attempt it makes to bring the
unity of body and spirit as actually existing in man into
harmony with the extreme opposition to each other under
which they are represented. This problem gave rise to the
first attempts at a further development of the system. Arnold
Geulinx (1625-1669) can only explain the reciprocal action
of body and mind on each other by a miraculous interference
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OPPONENTS AND ADHEBENTS OF DESCABTES. 403
of Grod on every occasion. Geulinx divides Metaphysics
into Autology, Somatology, and Theology. Ät the outset
of his Autology appears the pix>position of Descartes, Cogüo
ergo mm. This is the strong citadel that has to be maintained
against all sceptics, for although I do not know whether
things are as I think them, I know at least that I do so think
them ; that I think and therefore am. Now I find in myself
many ideas or modes of thinking which do not arise firom
myself, for they do not appear when I will them, and they
come when I do not will them. These ideas must therefore
be excited in me by another, and in particular — and this is the
peculiar basis of the Occasionalism of Geulinx — this Other
must be conscious of the fact, for without knowing how a
thing happens, it is not possible to effect it. This Other
excites these ideas nee mediante tm ipso nee se ipso sed eorpare,
neither by me as a medium nor by himself as a medium,
because we are both simple beings, whereas the ideas are
manifold. They are excited by means of the body, and in
particular as the ideas are very diverse they arise not
from the body as at rest and continuing always the same, but
from its movements. The body, however, and its movements
are entirely without the capacity to excite thoughts, and hence
the body is neither the efficient nor the occasioning, but
merely the occasional cause of our thoughts. The body, on
whose occasion, " occasione cvjv^^' those ideas that are inde-
pendent of me arise in me, is my body. My union with this
body is not my work ; for birth and death take place without
my knowing and willing. It is the work of One who works
by means of the body and its motion upon me ; and on the
occasion of my willing, works in like manner upon body. The
Somatology of Geulinx with its explanation of body, of exten-
sion, of the three dimensions, of divisibility, etc., may be passed
over here. Nor do those points in his Theology interest us in
which he proceeds to show that God is the Creator of the
world and the powerful mover, and that He is eternal, free,
independent, and perfect. His essential position is that it is
God who has united us with our body, and He is thus Lord of
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404 DESCARTES AND SPINOZA.
life and of death, and in an inexpressible manner, He is our
Father. Further, on every occasion, in a miraculous manner.
He moves the body on occasion of our thoughts, and He
effects the corresponding thought in us on occasion of motion
in the body. The miraculous element in this process is not
at all denied or concealed by Geulinx. It is no less a miracle,
he says, that the tongue in my mouth vibrates when I utter
the word " earth," than if the earth itself vibrated. There is,
however, an expression found in Geulinx which belongs to an
entirely different oircle of thought In conformity with his
principle that when one does anything he must know about
it, God must know and will, because He works in us, and
therefore He must be a Mind. God alone is a true and real
Mind, mens simplicüer proprie et vere, whereas created minds
are only particular and limited minds, because they do not
simply think and will, non sunt mens sed mens eo usque, sed
cum certo limite. This is further explained as meaning that
they are to some extent mind, aliquid mentis, as also particular
bodies are not bodies, but are to some extent body, aliquid
corporis. These expressions cannot but remind us of Spinoza.
Again, it is said that '' ideas and eternal truths, such as that
two and three are five, are in the divine mind, and in ours only
when we see them in God, and consequently contemplate God
Himself." Such expressions remind us of Malebranche.
Nicole Malebranche (1638 -1715V as a priest of the
Oratorium or Oratoire, endeavours to combine the philosophy
of Descartes with the dogmas of the Catholic Church, and in
particular with the fundamental doctrines of Augustinianism.
With Malebranche the impelling thought is likewise the
question regarding the possibility of knowledge. With Des-
cartes he asserts the dualism of the thinking Substance and
the extended Substance ; and he maintains with Geulinx that
there is no immediate relation or direct interaction between
bodies and minds, but that the motion of bodies is only
* De la Recherche de la V^rit^, rarie 1675, ia his princiiml work. See
also his Entretiens sur la m^taphysique et la religion, Paris 1688. Cf. Kuno
Fischer, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, i. 2.
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OPPONENTS AND ADHERENTS OF DfiSCARTES. 405
an occasional cause of the activity of the mind, and that the
thinking of the mind is only an occasional cause of the
motion of bodies. Nevertheless there is actually presented in
knowledge an effect of bodies upon the mind. Things effect
nothing; in truth they are not causes, and are improperly
called causes. There is in general only one real cause, namely,
God. Nor can God and finite things be distinguished as
primary and secondary causes merely by the degree and mode
of their working. Things produce nothing, God alone pro-
duces all things. God creates bodies with rest in them at one
time and motion in them at another ; He creates minds with
sensation as well as knowledge in them, and He creates
the union of body and soul. The existence of the world
as well as its continual maintenance and existence rests upon
the creative activity of God; for even the preservation of the
world is continuous creation. At the same time, however,
Malebranche is opposed to all mixing up of God and the world.
" The universe is in God." With this formula he indicates
his own view, whereas the formula, " God is in the universe,"
is used by him to characterize the philosophy of Spinoza,
which he repudiates as atheistic.
Malebranche holds that by their own nature body and
mind, as independent substances, cannot act upon one another
He says even that " God can unite minds with bodies, but He
cannot subject minds to bodies." The constant and exact
correspondence of the modifications of bodies and minds is
regulated by the general laws which God has given to His
world. Nevertheless experience convinces us daily that
our mental activity is dependent upon corporeal states. God
can neither will nor produce this dependence ; it cannot
therefore be the original state established by God, but has
been brought about by our free action in the fall. Even the
continued existence of this dependence of the mind upon the
body cannot be willed by God, and hence His action now aims
only at procuring for us again that independence of the soul
from the body which has been lost, or in other words, to
redeem us through Christ. Eeligion and philosophy are there-
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406 DBSCABTBS AKD SPINOZA.
fore entirely one. Error, as arising from the senses and
the imagination, and therefore from the inconceivable depend-
ence of the mind upon the body, is a consequence of sin ; its
actual and universal existence in the present is the philoso-
phical proof of the Augustinian dogma of original sin. libera-
tion from error by being raised from obscure and indistinct
ideas to clear knowledge, and liberation from sin through the
redemption in Christ, are the same in effect The former
is the goal of philosophy, the latter is the goal of religion.
According to Malebranche, our knowledge cannot have its
foundation in ourselves. This follows at once from the general
proposition that finite things are not causes; but it also
follows from the other consideration, that the knowledge of
God does not spring from ourselves, because finite beings
cannot produce the idea of the infinite. Hence the presence
of the idea of God in us is the surest proof of the existence of
God. Knowledge of bodies is only possible through ideas.
These ideas cannot possibly be effected by bodies, and just as
little can they be produced by the soul, or be possessed in the
form of a natural capacity. Nor are ideas innate, because the
world of ideas is infinite while our soul is only finite. It
is likewise unthinkable that God communicates to us ideas
individually at the moment we require them« Knowledge is
therefore only possible in Grod. This position is apprehended
in the following way. We know bodies by ideas ; all bodies
are extended, and they are nothing but extension ; and hence
all ideas may be referred to the ideas of extension or to
intelligible extension. This intelligible extension, viewed as
the principle of the world of ideas, is the primordial idea (id^
primordiale), and viewed as the creative ground of finite things
it is the archetype of the corporeal world (archetype des
corps). This idea of extension is at the same time contained
in the universal reason ; for in spite of all the diversities, all
minds are identical in this, that they know or behold that idea.
There is in fact only One Season ; as only an infinite reason
can grasp the idea of the infinite, and as it is only under this
supposition that universal validity can belong to the cognitions
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THE VIEWS OF SPINOZA. 407
of the innumerable individual men« The Universal Keason
and the Intelligible Extension correspond to each other« God
is the Universal Season, and along with it He is the In-
telligible Extension ; and therefore He is the ground of all
individual things. Our clear and distinct knowledge, in con-
trast to the unclear and indistinct knowledge of sense, is
the knowledge which arises from universally valid thinking of
reason or from ideas. These ideas are in Gk)d, and therefore
we are also in Grod, in so far as we have ideas and know
by them ; or conversely, we can know things really only in
God. — This relation of the finite minds to God is certainly
left obscure in the System. Malebranche indicates it at one
time by saying that God is the place of minds, as space is the
place of bodies ; and at another time he says that as the
particular is a participation or limitation of the universal, all
creatures are nothing else but imperfect paHicipcUiom of the
divine Being. This is the fundamental thought of his re-
markable system, when we take it in its essentials apart from
his particular views regarding the universal activity of
God, and the nothingness of finite things, error being a conse-
quence of the subjection of the mind to the body arising from
sin, and true knowledge being a consequence of redemption
from sin or elevation to God.
III.
Baruch Spinoza.^
The Jew Spinoza may certainly be introduced into a
History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion without any
justification being required for doing so. For although the
direction of his thought was strongly influenced by the study
^ Besides the Ethiea, ordine geometrico demoMtrata^ etc., the principal
philosophical work of Spinoza, we have also specially to consider the Tractahm
theologicO'politicuSf Hamburg 1670, and the Tractatua de Deo et Nomine
ejusque fdiciiate, etc. The following works may be referred to : Theodor
Camerer, Die Lciire des Spinoza, 1877. Kuno Fischer, Geschichte, etc., nt
wprcL,
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408 DESCABTES AND SPINOZA.
of the Rabbinical philosophies, — as has been lately shown with
much acateness, — ^yet his exact knowledge and high apprecia-
tion of the New Testament as well as of the person of Christ,
taken along with his exclusion from the Synagogue, show that
his range of vision went far beyond the limits of Judaism.
And as Descartes was his precursor, so we find his successors
among the Christian philosophers. Yet even to-day Spinoza
is still spoken of in many circles as a godless destroyer of
Beligion, and still, as in earlier times, Spinoza is to some but
a name for the very head and front of all unbelief and all un-
godliness, so that a Spinozist is even regarded as synonymous
with a pantheist and an atheist But whoever reads his
writings must feel himself beneficially influenced by the breath ^
of the deep religious spirit that permeates all his inquiries.
Hence it is easy to understand how not only the kindred soul
of Schleiermacher should call upon us " to sacrifice reverently
a lock to the manes of the holy expelled Spinoza," but even
how his opponent Jakobi could exclaim : '* Be thou blessed of
me, thou great and even holy Benedictus ! However thou
mightest philosophize and err in woi*ds regarding the nature of
the Supreme Being, His truth was in thy soul, and His love
was thy life I "
The TractcUtos de intdlectus emendatione already shows this
religious character. In order to obtain the true and imperish-
able good, we must renounce the seemingly certain goods of
Ufe, including the pleasures of sense, riches, and honour.
This is necessary in order to be delivered by love to God from
all selfish desires, and to be purified from all love to ourselves
and to finite things. For he says : '' Love to an eternal and
infinite Being fills the soul with a pure joy that excludes from
it every kind of sorrow. Such a state is most fervently to be
wished, and to be striven after with all our power."
In proceeding to Spinoza's views regardiijg the Philosophy
of Religion, the Traäatus tJieologico-politicm first claims our
consideration. Avenarius refers the composition of it to
the years 1657-61, and therefore shortly after Spinoza's ex-
clusion from the synagogue in 1656. It is also probable, as
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THE VIBWS OF SPINOZA. 409
Bayle coDJectures, that this Tractate has in part embodied the
Apology in which, as we know, Spinoza protested against the
condemnation of the Sabbins, and contested the right of
the Jewish tribunal to deal with him. It is only thus
that we can explain how the Tractate, which did not appear
till 1670, frequently assumes an apologetic turn, and is
specially keen in its attacks upon Judaism. And in entire
accordance with this view is the assurance of the author, that
he had already reflected long and long ago upon what he
had written.
Spinoza himself indicates that the object of his Tractate
was to oppose the mixing up of Theology and Philosophy, and
to separate religion and science (fidem a philosophia separare
totius operis prsecipuum intentum fuit). The treatise is
therefore at the same time an oratio pro domo, with the
intention of showing " that faith allows every one the greatest
freedom in philosophizing.'' The author accordingly asks the
reader to give his attention above all to Chapters XIIL and
XIY., and to subject them to repeated reflection, persuaded
that he had not written in order to produce something new,
but in order to correct what was mistaken. Between theology
and philosophy there subsists no connection or relationship,
for the two differ Mo ccdo in their aim and foundation. The
aim of philosophy is truth; that of faith is obedience and
piety. The foundation of philosophy is to be taken from
nature alone, and it consists only in universal conceptions or
common notions (notiones communes), while the foundation of
faith is only to be found in history and the holy Scripture.
This is the Antithesis which Spinoza opposes to the Thesis
of his opponents, who hold that religion is knowledge like
philosophy, religion being knowledge derived from supernatural
principles; whereas philosophy is knowledge derived from
natural principles, and hence they regarded religion as the
highest irrefragable authority, even in questions of philosophy.
In this view, however, Spinoza holds that the highest aim,
the supreme practical end of religion, is not kept in sight.
Here, in fact, the two again coincide, for both found our
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410 DESCABTES AND SPINOZA«
highest happiness on love to God and communion with Him.
Hence the ultimate aim of both is the highest happiness iu
communion of love with 6od. But in religion, obedience, and
in philosophy, knowledge of truth, are intermediate ends;
and the starting-point for religion is in history and Scripture,
while that for philosophy is found in the nature of things.
If Beligion is knowledge, then the Scriptures, as the main
documentary source of Beligion, must also contain knowledge,
and their purpose must be to teach us knowledge. This view
of Scripture requires to be refuted at the outset Spinoza
proceeds to show that the ultimate purpose of the whole of
Scripture is to teach obedience. Hence both Testaments
demand nothing but that man shall obey 6od with all his
heart, and exemplify this obedience in love to his neighbour.
This command of obedience is the sole rule of faith ; it is
only by it that it is .possible to demand faith from all, and
not merely from those who have knowledge. Now it is
manifest that most of the expressions of a theoretical kind in
Scripture are referred to this faith. The aim of these
expressions, however, is only " to make such things understood
of God as being unknown would take away obedience towards
God, and which are necessarily accepted as soon as this
obedience exists" (de Deo sentire talia, quibus ignoratis
tollitur erga Deum obedientia, et hac obedientia posita
necessario ponuntur). Hence several consequences necessarily
follow. 1. It is not faith as such, or merely holding a thing
theoretically to be true, that works salvation, but only faith
on the basis of obedience, ratione ohedientice (Jas. iL ;
1 John iv. 2). Hence we ought also to judge of the faith of
a man according to his works. 2. The religious value of
dogmas is not determined by their theoretical truth, but
according as they incite a man to Obedience. The minds of
men, however, are so various, that what leads one to piety
excites another to laughter and contempt Hence individual
freedom must prevail, in reference to dogmas, according as the
individual is led by one or other to obedienca 3. Only a
few dogmas can be established about which there can be no
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THE VIEWS OF SPINOZA. 411
dispute, and which are necessary as a condition of obedience
to GhxL They are limited to such positions as, that God, the
Supreme Being, is just and merciful, and a pattern of the true
life ; that He is one, omnipresent and omniscient, and invested
with the highest power over all things ; that the right religion
consists only in justice and love of our neighbour ; and that
the obedient are saved and all others are condemned, although
to those who repent Grod forgives their sin.
The claim is set up that the Scriptures contain absolutely
true knowledge, and accordingly that they prescribe laws to
philosophy; and this claim is founded upon the assertion
of an immediate divine revelation. Spinoza likewise asserts
a revelation, for the fundamental truth of religion, that
salvation depends on obedience to God, does not spring out of
our own insight. Our own reflection only leads us to seek
our blessedness in intellectual knowledge and the love of God
that is connected with it (intellectualis amor Dei). This
is the twofold ground which gives occasion to Spinoza
entering upon a detailed discussion of Bevelation. He rejects
the claim maintained by his opponents, that Eevelation
establishes infallible truth and indubitable knowledge, and
he explains that religion discloses to us a truth of which
philosophy knows nothing.
The Prophets are vehicles of divine revelation. The Jewish
people claimed that they alone had prophets ; but this claim
is unfounded, for divine revelation is found among all peoples«
The election and the privilege of the Jewish people do not
relate to superiority of knowledge nor to rest of soul, but
only to the political commonwealth and its constitution. Our
wishes are directed towards three things: res per primas
causas intelligere ; passiones domare secure ; et sano corpore
vivere. The first two points depend on the common human
naturse, and the third on the institution of the commonwealth.
Hence it is only to the latter that the special pre-eminence
of the elect people can refer. The common idea of election,
which rejoices over one's own advantages in contrast to the
disadvantages of others, is founded in the human passions of
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412 DESCABTES AND SPINOZA.
self-love, of envy, and of malice ; and it has therefore nothing
in common with piety and love to God. In truth, the Section
of the people referred to the external goods of fortune, and
these rest upon the right ordering of the civil commonwealth.
Laws are specially subservient to this end. Hence the
legislation of Moses, in so far as it had no other purpose in
the Ceremonial Law than to found the Jewish nation, and to
form in it a peculiar and exclusive national spirit, had not a
religious, but entirely a political character. On this side,
accordingly, the Jewish Eeligion, having the founding of a
national state and the external prosperity of the people in
view, is far removed from the true Eeligion, which sees the
means of blessedness in obedience to God, or in the purification
of the heart from all selfishness and earthly wishes.
There are therefore Prophets as vehicles of divine revela-
tion likewise among the heathen peoples, just as the Jewish
prophets also prophesied to heathen nations. In so far as
Revelation is the certain knowledge of something communi-
cated by God to men, natural knowledge may in this sense
also be called Revelation, for even our natural knowledge
depends on the knowledge of God, or on the fact that our
nature participates in the divine nature. It is usual, how-
ever, to apply the term Revelation only to what has been
supematurally communicated. Such communication takes
place either by woi*ds or by visions, or by both words and
visions ; and these words and visions are either real or they
exist only in the imagination of the prophet. Revelation by
real words was communicated to Moses only, who spake with
Grod face to face as a man with his friend. Spinoza says it is
probable that God created a voice by which He Himself
revealed the Decalogue (Deus aliquam vocem vere creavit,
qua ipse decalogum revelavit) ; but this is a mystery. A still
higher degree of Revelation was communicated to Christ.
As God revealed Himself to Moses by the voice in the air,
the saving will of God was revealed to Christ without words
and visions, immediately by the Spirit, so that the voice of
Christ may be called God's voice ; and we are justified in
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THE VIEWS OP SPINOZA. 413
saying that the wisdom of God'has assumed human nature in
Christ, and Christ has become the way of salvation. — The
characteristic peculiarity of the prophetic knowledge consists
in the fact that it was communicated by means of the
imagination (ope imaginationis). By what laws of nature this
took place, Spinoza declares he does not know. He draws,
however, several consequences from the fact. 1. The Prophets
knew much that goes beyond the limits of our intellect, " for
far more ideas can be formed out of words and images than
merely out of the principles and conceptions on the basis of
which all our natural knowledge is reared." Unfortunately
there is no further explanation or grounding of this principle
given, although the recognition of it excludes any criticism
of a professed revelation by our natural knowledge. 2. The
Prophets knew and taught everything, " parabolice et eenig-
matice," and expressed everything spiritual in corporeal images.
3. The Imagination manifested itself in extremely different
ways ; in the case of very many not at all, and in the case of
those who were favoured with it, extremely seldom. Far more
important, however, is another consequence drawn by him.
The certainty of our knowledge does not follow from the
vividness of the Imagination (potentia vividius imaginandi),
but from the clearness and distinctness of ideas (clara et
distincta idea). Now, if prophecy rests upon the vividness
of the imagination, the prophets themselves — and we still
more — would require a reason for regarding their communi-
cations as true. In order to become certain of their revelation,
the prophets needed an external authentication or a sign
(signum). This sign might, however, deceive us ; and accord-
ingly, in order to be sure of the prophetic testimony, we
require above all to be convinced of the good and just habit
of mind of the prophet (animus ad solum sequum et bonum
inclinatus) ; for God cannot deceive a pious man. Hence in
regard to the prophets and the revelations communicated by
them, we have always only moral and never mathematical
certainty. Our faith is, in this case, founded only upon the
twofold moral conviction, first, of the honesty of the prophet ;
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414 DESCABTBS AND SPINOZA.
and, secondly, of the fact that (jod does not deceive the
righteous man. — ^This sign that is required by every revela-
tion in order to confirm it, is not to be regarded as a miracle
in the usual sense, as an operation of divine power to the
exclusion of natural laws. On the contrary, Spinoza proceeds
to show, under reference both to principles of reason and to
Scripture, that nothing happens contrary to nature, but that
everything takes place according to an eternal fixed order, and
that we know the existence, essential nature, and providence
of God not so much from miracles, as rather from the fixed
order of nature. Hence we obtain the hermeneutical principle
that is to be applied to the interpretation of Scripture, namely,
that we have carefully to distinguish between the actual
occurrence of a fact and the form in which it is dressed up
in the narrative of the writer who records it
As the sign is given by regard to the prophet whom it
serves to certify (pro opinionibus et capacitate prophetae), it
obtains a definite, local, and temporal, as well as individual
stamp. In like manner, the revelation changes, not merely
according to the peculiar character of the different prophets,
but even in the case of the same prophet (pro dispositione
temperamenti corporis, imaginationis et pro ratione opinionum
quas antea amplexus fuerat). If the prophet was cheerful,
victory, peace, and similar things were revealed to him ; if he
was melancholy, war, humiliation, and all evils were revealed
to him; and thus one prophet was more adapted for one
I'evelation and another for another. If the prophet was
refined, he also caught the view of God in elegant language ;
if he was confused, he rendered it in a confused way. lu
like manner the images in which the revelation was exhibited
changed. If the prophet was a shepherd, we have oxen,
goats, etc. ; and if he was a soldier, we have generals and
armies. The prophesying itself changed ; and thus the birth
of Christ was revealed to the Magi by the appearance of a
star rising in the east, while the devastation of Jerusalem
was revealed to the augurs of Nebuchadnezzar through inspec-
tion of tlie entrails. If it be so, then the opinion of those
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THE VIEWS OF SPINOZA. 415
is quite false who assert that the Scriptures contain truth in
all things, and even in those which do not belong to religion.
The Scriptures themselves expressly say that the Prophets
did not know many things. Only from this connection with
the personal peculiarities and human weaknesses of the
prophet, can the fact be explained that the Scriptures speak
in so many places so improperly of God.
Spinoza specially emphasizes the fact that the human side
in the prophetic revelation is to be largely taken into account.
This he does when he proceeds to lay down principles for the
Interpretation of the Scriptures. He complains that the
theologians often try rather to derive their own fantastic ideas
from the Scriptures, and to invest them with Divine authority,
than to inquire into the true meaning of Scripture. Scrip-
tural interpretation must necessarily be historical, for the true
opinion of a writer, and even of a Biblical writer, can only be
known if we know who this writer is, and when and under
what circumstances, and from what intention he wrote. Quite
in the spirit of a Semler, Spinoza already points out that the
Biblical writings have to be explained in the spirit of their
age and in the sense of their authors ; that the question of
their authorship must be investigated ; and that exact know-
ledge must be obtained of the historical conditions of their
origin, and the moral conditions and modes of culture pre-
vailing among the people in question. Spinoza was thus the
founder of a historico-critical investigation and interpretation
of the Old Testament. He shows that tlie Biblical books,
from the Pentateuch to the Books of Kings, do not belong
to the age and the authors to which they are ascribed. It
is probable that Ezra, the collector of the laws, may have
composed the history of his nation, in the form we now have
it, from various older historical works. In any case, the
Pentateuch was not composed by Moses. Before the time of
the Maccabees there was no Canon of the sacred writings ;
it was the Pharisees of the Second Temple who established
the Canon.
Nevertheless the Scriptures are the word of God, and this
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416 DBSCABTES AND SPINOZA.
applies to the whole of Scripture. For although Spinoza
puts Christ far above the Jewish prophets, he recognises no
material difference between the revelation of the Old Testa-
ment and that of the New. The doctrine is the same, only
the Prophets preached religion before the coming of Christ as
the law of their country, and by virtue of the covenant con-
cluded in the time of Moses ; whereas the Apostles, after the
appearing of Christ, preached the very same religion as a
universal law, and by virtue of the sufferings of Christ The
Scriptures are the word of God ; not, indeed, in the sense that
God has willed to communicate to man a certain number of
books, but because the authors of these books did not teach
from the common natural light, but as they were ** moved by
the Spirit of God." In other words, they taught because they
had a special and extraordinary power, and because they
cultivated piety with special energy, and received the com-
munication of God. But the Scriptures are called the word
of God chiefly because they contain the trae religion. The
true religion is, at the same time, the highest divine Law.
The divine Law relates only to the highest good. As the
intellect is the better part in us, our highest good consists
in its perfection. And as all our knowledge depends on
knowledge of God, our highest good hkewise consists in the
knowledge of God. But because knowledge of what exists
in nature, according to the degree of its being, includes
knowledge of God, we therefore know God the more perfectly
as our knowledge of natural things is more perfect ; and thus
does the knowledge of natural things lead to the highest
good. The object of Spinoza's Mhics is to show the way
from natural knowledge to the intelledtcalis amor JDei. The
Scriptures teach us how to reach the same goal by obedience.
Eeason, which is in truth the light of the Spirit, without
which it sees nothing but " insomnia et fragmenta," does not
go so far as to determine that man can attain the highest good,
or be happy by obedience or without knowledge of things.
Nevertheless this fundamental dogma of religion is not con-
tested by reason, but is recognised as unquestionable ; nay,
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THE VIEWS OF SPINOZA. 41 Y
when that truth which we cannot know by the natural light
is communicated to us by revelation, we are able to use our
reason so as to accept it with moral certainty. On this
fact the distinction between natural and positive religion
rests.
iN'atural Eeligion might be called the way that is pointed
out by philosophy to reach the highest good by knowledge of
truth. This is represented as a ** natural law of God," and
it is essential to it that it shall hold good for all men, because
it is derived from the common human nature of man ; and
that it shall require no faith in histories, because it can be
known merely from observation of human nature, so that it
could have been known just as well by Adam as by any
other man, whether livin^ij in solitude or in society. Histories
can only be of use for the guidance of our civil life. Nor
can this Natural Law require any ceremonies or actions
which in themselves are indifferent, but are called good
merely because of their institution, or because they typify a
good that is necessary to salvation, or because their meaning
goes beyond human understanding. The reward of the
Divine Law is to know the law itself, which is God, and to
love it with all the heart This leads to a series of questions,
two of which in particular throw more definite light upon the
relation of the positive religion in the Scriptures to this
natural religion. 1. What do the Scriptures teach regarding
the Light of Nature and the Law of God ? Spinoza seeks to
prove, by a series of passages in Scripture, that the Scriptures
and the Natural Light are entirely in harmony with each
other. The command of God to Adam not to eat of the tree
of knowledge of good and evil, already indicates that he was
to do the good from love to the good, and not from fear of
eviL Solomon declares quite distinctly (Prov. xvi. 22) that
the intellect or knowledge is the source of the true life, and
that unhappiness consists only in folly (Prov. iii 13). It is
well for the man who has found wisdom and gained know-
ledge. All this is in the most beautiful harmony with
natural knowledge. 2. Of what use is it to know and to
vou I. 2d
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418 DESCARTES AKD SPINOZA.
believe the sacred Histories ? In considerable detail, Spinoza
answers this question somewhat as follows : — ^There are two
ways of bringing men to the conviction and acceptance of
things that are not clear in themselves; the one proceeds
from sensible experience of what takes place in nature, and
the other from axioms that are clear in themselves in the
form of intellectual notions (notiones intellectuales). The
latter way frequently requires long co-ordination of percep*
tions, great caution, clearness, and persistency of mind, things
which ai*e rarely enough found among men. Hence most
people will rather be taught from experience. And from this
it follows that whoever will communicate a doctrine to a
whole nation or even to the whole human race, so as to be
understood by all, must confirm it only by experience, and
conform his reasons and definitions as much as possible to the
intelligence of the multitude. Now as Scripture was destined
at the first for a whole people, and afterwards for the whole
human race, what it contained required also to be adapted to
the intelligence of the multitude, and to be confirmed by
experience alone. Thus does Scripture explain from experi-
ence even the purely speculative doctrines contained in it,
such as that God is ; that He has created and preserves all
things ; that He cares for men ; and that He rewards the
righteous and punishes the wicked. And although experience
may give no clear explanation and establishment of these
doctrines, yet it can teach men as much of them as is neces-
saiy to implant obedience and reverence in their hearts.
Hence the knowledge of the sacred Histories, and belief in
them, is absolutely necessary for the people, as their minds
are not capable of attaining to clear and distinct knowledge.
Hence whoever denies these histories, because he does not
believe that there is a God, or that He cares for men, is god-
less ; but any one who does not know them, and yet, in
virtue of the Natural Light, knows that there is a God who
cares for men, and who, at the same time, leads a correct life,
is blessed ; yea, he is more blessed than the people, because
he has a clear and distinct notion that is above correct
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THE VIEWS OF SPINOZA. 419
opinions. And, finally, if one neither knows the holy Scrip-
ture nor knows anything by his Natural Light, although he
may not be entirely godless or intractable, he is not a man,
but almost a wild beast. But if the necessity of the sacred
Histories is asserted, this does not mean the necessity of all
the histories contained in the Bible, for that would go beyond
the capacity of the people, and even of all men, to take in.
It refers only to those histories which specially put the
doctrines referred to into clearer light. Such narratives as
those relating to the disputes of Isaac, the counsels of
Ahithophel, and the civil wars between Judah and Israel,
are superfluous for this purpose. The great crowd, however,
from the weakness of their minds, require pastors and
preachers to introduce them to the right meaning of these
Histories. In short, the belief in historical narratives does
not relate to the divine Law, nor does it of itself make men
happy, nor is it of any use as regai'ds the doctrine they
contain. Hence if any one reads the Scriptural narratives
and believes them, and yet gives no regard to their doctrine,
and does not improve his life, it is all the same to him as if
he had read the Koran, or the fables of poets, or common
chronicles. On the other hand, if any one does not know
these narratives, and yet has sound opinions and leads a
correct life, he is blessed, and has in truth the spirit of Christ
within him. The opposite opinion of the Jews is entirely
false and also contrary to Scripture, according to which true
opinions and the right conduct of life are of no advantage
in r^ard to salvation, so long as he receives them merely
from natural light and not as divine revelation.
There is a further proof adduced for this view of Scripture
as a remedy for the human weakness that is not able to know
the truth by the natural reason. It is founded on the fact
that religion was communioated to the oldest Jews in the form
of a written Law because they were then regarded as children,
whereas Moses and Jeremiah foretold for the future a time in
which God would write His Law in the heart
So much then for the theological views contained in the
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420 DESCARTES AND SPINOZA.
Tractatus theoloffico-polüims. A few words may bo added
regarding its political side. The object of this Tractate
was to exhibit the complete separateness of theology and
philosophy, or of religion and knowledge. The mixing up of
these two necessarily leads to controversy, as they both lay
claim to the highest authority. But controversy and wrang-
ling endanger our external well-being, the promotion of which
is the chief duty of the State. Hence the State has also an
interest in preventing the conflict that arises between theology
and philosophy. This conflict, indeed, is never occasioned by
internal piety as a sentiment, but only by its outward practice
in doctrine and worship. This latter must therefore be sub-
jected to the command of the State ; and just because God
exercises no peculiar government over men, except by those
who exercise external authority. Further, this holds because
love to one's country and the well-being of the people is the
highest rule to which everything human and divine must be
subordinated. This exercise of the power of the State relates,
however, only to what is external ; it must allow freedom of
thought and of speech.
Spinoza obtained his influence upon the future by his
philosophical system. This System, presented in a preparatory
sketch in his Tractatus de Deo et homine ejusque felicitate^
was finally expounded in his Ethica. The far-reaching in-
fluence which this System has exercised upon later thinkers,
is frequently accounted for by the strictly logical connection of
its principles. And it is true that Spinoza has fulfilled the
demand laid down by Descartes, but not strictly carried out
by himself, that philosophical investigation must be conducted
according to a mathematical method in order to give to
philosophical knowledge the certainty of mathematical know-
ledge. Hence in the Ethica we find all the cumbrous
mathematical apparatus of definitions, axioms, propositions,
corollaries, etc., and it presents an imposing aspect to any one
who imagines that the mathematical method can be transferred
directly to philosophy. This conceit, however, vanishes as
soon as it is seen that in geometry the definitions already
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THE VIEWS OF SPINOZA. 421
contain everything which is developed in the series of the
propositions by the aid of a few axioms. Nor will it escape
the critical reader of Spinoza's Ethics, that here, too, in the
definitions and determinations that are prefixed to the whole,
everything is already presupposed that is seemingly derived from
them with a magnificent application of methodical auxiliaries.
He is most perfect and most happy who loves the intellectual
knowledge of God above all things ; and it is the task of the
Ethics to lay down the means of attaining to this end. The
main thoughts of the Ethics are summarised in the following
three propositions : (1) That we have the knowledge of God
only through the knowledge of things, leads to the immanence-
relation of Grod to the World ; (2) That the cognitio intellecttuüis
is the highest stage of knowledge, points to the three stages of
knowledge as opinio, ratio, cognitio irUuitiva ; (3) That the
cognitio intellectiudis goes along with the amor Dei, shows us
the close connection of knowledge and the will. Spinoza
also stops on the ground of dogmatism ; he gives no criticism
of our faculty of knowledge ; and just as little does he give a
psychological explanation of the religious process. Of chief
importance, however, especially on account of their later
influences, are his Definitions of the conception of Gk)d and
His relation to the world.
The application of the mathematical method already
indicates the peculiar character of the Spinozistic System.
In mathematics every proposition follows from a former
proposition, and all the deductions go back in an ultimate
line to a series of fundamental truths, definitions, and axioms.
To this there corresponds, in actual reality, the relation of
cause and effect ; and hence all things must be the effects of
an ultimate cause which is the cause both of itself and of all
things. In the relation of the many things to each other and
to the first cause, final ends find no place, but there are merely
Efficient Causes. Nor is there any Freedom in the sense of
" being able also to be otherwise," but there is only necessity,
which, however, is designated freedom in distinction to external
compulsion as a merely internal compulsion from one's own
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422 DE6CABTBS AND SPINOZA.
nature. The notion of the EfiBcient Cause is the predominant
one in Spinoza's Systenu Hence GUxl is determined as First
Cause (causa prima), and the relation of God to the world as
that of cause to effect, or of the natura naturans to the natura
naturata. The full contents of these formulae are only dis-
closed after the explanation of Substance, Attribute, and
Mode.
" By Substance I understand that which is existent in
itself and is conceived by itself ; that is, it is that the con-
ception of which does not need the conception of another
thing from which it is to be formed." ^ As an effect can
always only be conceived from its cause, the latter definition
implies that Substance cannot be the effect of any Cause, or
be produced by any other thing. This position may be other-
wise expressed as follows. All that is has its being either in
itself or in another, that is, it is either Substance or Üie
affection of a Substance or a Mode. For " by Modus I
understand the affection of a Substance, or that which has
being and is conceived in another."* Now Substance is
earlier than its modes ; and hence a Substance cannot be
produced by a mode, but at most by another substance. This,
however, is also impossible ; for things that have nothing in
common with one another cannot be one the cause of the
other. But two or more Substances can have nothing in
common with each other, for they have either the same
attributes or different attributes ; and in the former case they
are only one substance ; while in the latter they have nothing
in common with one another. " By Attribute I understand
that which the intellect apprehends of Substance as constitute
ing its Essence." * From this the same consequence follows,
namely, that a Substance cannot be produced by any other
thing. In other words, Substance is causa sui ; for ** by coAise
1 [" Per Sabstantiam intelligo id, quod in se est, et per se concipitur ; hoc est
id, ci^us conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat."]
>[*'Per Modum, intelligo substanti» affectiones sive id, quod in alio est,
per quod etiam concipitur.'*]
'["Per Attributum intelligo id, quod intellectus de substantia percipit,
tauquani ojusdcui essontlam constituens.'*]
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THE VIEWS OF SPINOZA. 42 J
of itself, I understand that whose Essence includes existence
in itself, or whose nature cannot be thought otherwise than aa
existing." Hence " Existence belongs to the Nature of Sub-
stance;" and on this account Substance is eternal For **\sy
Eternity I understand existence itself, so far as it is known
as following from the definition of the eternal thing alone by
necessity." Spinoza expressly guards himself from holding the
view that this eternal existence can be explained by duration
or time. The same Definitions imply that Substance is free.
For " that thing is called free which consists solely from the
necessity of its nature, and is determined of itself alone to
action ; that is called necessary or rather compelled, which is
determined to existence and action by another according to a
certain and determinate reason." * All activity of Substance
rests not upon external compulsion as the influence of external
things, but upon the inherent immanent power and efficiency
of the substance itself.
All that has been hitherto said of Substance likewise holds
of God ; for God falls under the conception of Substance, or
as it is otherwise put, as it is asserted that ^ every Substance
is necessarily infinite," it follows that there can be only one
Substance, and therefore Grod Himself is the One Substance.
Spinoza's definition of Grod is as follows : " By God I under*
stand the absolutely infinite Being ; that is, a Substance that
consists of innumerable attributes, every one of which is the
expression of an eternal and infinite Essence." * The con-
ception of " the absolutely infinite " (absolute infinitum) is
opposed to that of " the infinite in its kind " (in suo genere
infinitum). This holds of those things which cannot be
limited by things of the same kind, but only by things ot
another kind. For example, an infinite body cannot be
limited by another body, but it may be limited by thinking.
^ [" Ea res libera dicetur, qu» ex sola 8uie natane necessitate existit, et a se
sola ad agendum determinator. Kecessaria autem, vel potius coacta, qu» ab
alio determinator ad ezistendnm et operandnm certa ao determinata ratione.'*]
' [*' Per Denm intelligo ens absolate infinitum, hoc est, snbstantiam cou-
«tantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque fletemam et infinitum
essentiam exprimit"]
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424 HESCABTES AND SHNOZA.
The former expression applies to that whose Essence exclades
all negation, and which rather contains in itself all that
expresses being. It is implied that 6od is the sole Substance
in this absolute or perfect Infinity ; and hence *' besides God
there can neither be another Substance, nor can another
Substance than God be thought."
God is the One Substance; and hence He exists of
necessity. This follows at once from the conception of
Substance as causa sui ; and this ä priori or Ontological
Argument for the existence of God is undoubtedly the most
important element of the kind in the whole connection of the
Spinozistic thinking. Some further explanations, however, are
added to it, such as the following. Everything must have
a reason for its existence as well as for its non-existence ;
and a thing exists as soon as there is no sufficient
reason for its non-existence. This reason lies either in the
thing or out of it. God therefore also exists, unless there is
given in EUs nature or out of it a reason why He does not
exist. The latter position would assume a Substance which
had nothing in common with God, and yet occasioned His
existence ; the former would put a contradiction into God, the
absolutely infinite and most perfect being. Both alternatives
are absurd, and therefore God must exist. The possibility
of not existing constitutes a want of perfection, whereas
the possibility of existing is a perfection ; and hence either
nothing at all necessarily exists, or the absolutely infinite
Essence or God does so exist. More closely regarded, these
arguments are also founded solely on the position that Gkxl is
Substance, and that existence necessarily belongs to the
nature of Substance, and consequently to the conception of
God.
God is Substance, and therefore He is causa sui, Nay
more, God is the only Substance. But nothing exists except
Substances and their afiections ; or to leave the more precise
relation of the modi to the substance out of account, it may
be said that nothing exists but Substances and their Effects.
God is therefore the cause of all things, or the absolutely
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THE VIEWS OF SPINOZA. 425
First Cause (absolute causa prima). All things are Effects of
God. With regard to the mode of the action of Substance, it
has been already determined that it acts freely, that is,
according to the inherent laws of its internal nature, and not
as compelled by external things. The same holds true of
God. " God acts only according to the laws of His own
nature, and He is compelled by no one." " There is no cause
which impels God to action, from without or from within,
except the perfection of His own nature." " God alone is a
free cause, for He alone exists merely in virtue of the
necessity of His nature, and He acts merely in virtue of the
same." Some call God a free cause, because He can act so that
something that is in His power shall not happen ; but this is
just the same as if we were to assert that God can act so that
it shall not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three
angles are equal to two right angles. Just as absurd is the
assertion that God's intellect reaches farther than His power,
and that He has in reality created only a portion of what
He could have created. " I believe I have distinctly shown
that from the supreme power of Grod, or from His infinite
nature, that which is infinite has flowed (effluxisse) in an
infinite manner, and all by necessity; or that it always
follows (sequi) with the same necessity and entirely the same
way, as it follows from the nature of a triangle, and from
eternity to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two
right angles. Hence God's omnipotence has been active from
eternity, and will continue to be active to eternity." (Quare
Dei omnipotentia actu ab aeterno fuit et in ffitemum in
eadem actualitate manebit.)
The " Freedom " of God is thus opposed not merely to the
compulsion of external influence, but equally so to irrational
arbitrariness of mere liking or good pleasure. Arbitrary will
can at most occur where there is a mode of action in accord-
ance with ends combined with self-consciousness and free-wilL
But according to Spinoza, nature has no end set before it, and
all final causes are nothing but figments of the human brain.
In like manner, neither intellect nor will pertains to God.
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426 BESGABTES AND SPINOZA.
(Ostendam, ad Dei naturam neque intellectum neqae volun-
tatem pertinere.) The will is not a free, but a necessary or
compelled cause, because it is continually detennined by an
idea out of itself. Hence neither will nor understanding
belongs to the nature of God ; they are related to it in the
same way as rest and motion are ; they are related to it as
is everything natural that follows from the necessity of the
divine nature, and is determined by it in a certain way to its
existence and action. It is therefore entirely erroneous to
think of God's nature according to the analogy of human
nature. Those who imagine that God consists of body and
spirit like men, are not only far from the true knowledge of
Grod, but it is altogether an error to represent God as if He
were subject to human passions. "Hence, philosophically
taken, it cannot be said that God desires anything whatever
from any one whomsoever, or that anything is repugnant or
disagreeable to Him; for all these are human qualities, which
have no place in the essence of God.** Nay more, although
we were to ascribe understanding and will to God according
to the human analogy, it would still always have to be con-
sidered that in spite of the same names, there must exist
between the divine and human faculties such a difference as
would exclude all agreement, "and so they are as distinct
from one another as the dog which is a constellation in the
sky, and the dog which is a barking beast" In fact, while
our understanding comes later in relation to things, God's
understanding is in truth the cause of things, and is the cause
of their essence as well as of their existence, " which appears
to have been correctly observed by those who assert that
understanding, will, and power are one and the same in God."
The understanding forms purposes and represents them, and
the will acts in accordance with purposes; but God has
neither understanding nor will, and therefore He cannot
possibly act according to purposes or final ends.
God is therefore the cause of things. He is not, however,
an external cause working according to ends set before
Himself, but He is the internal cause from which things
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THE VIEWS OF SPINOZA* 427
necessarily follow, according to the eternal laws of their
nature. '' Deus est omniam rerum causa immanens, non vero
transiens." "As regards God and nature, I entörtain an
entirely diflferent opinion concerning them from that which
the Christians of the modem stamp are wont to maintain at
the present day. I assert, in fact, that God is the indwelling
cause of all things, and not the external cause of them."
Hence it is likewise said of things, not merely that they
cannot either exist or be known without God, but that they
are in God (quicquid est in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse
neque concipi potest). — God is therefore nothing else than the
ultimate ground of all things, the eternal, infinite, uninter-
rupted, active power of nature, from which all that exists
proceeds with unalterable necessity, and in which all that
exists is contained. Hence His activity is inseparable from
His existence, and God and nature are thus often regarded as
synonymous. *' ^Eternum illud et infinitum Ens, quod Deum
seu naturam appellamus, eadem qua existit necessitate agit."
The essence of God is identical with His power. His power
is nothing but His acting power, or the immanent cause of
things ; and this cause of natural things is nothing but nature
in action ; and hence God is the same as nature (Deus sive
natura). Cause and effect are essentially identical; and
therefore tlie acting (efficient) cause and the eflfected things, or
God and the world, are essentially identical. They are both
in fact Tiatura, only with the difference that God is natura
ncUurans, and the world is natura naiurata.
Another consequence follows as to Spinoza's conception of
God. God is the absolutely infinite Being. This conception
at once implies that this Being has numberless attributes.
Taking now as valid the proposition that " the more reality or
being a thing has, so many more are the attributes that
pertain to it," and converting it and applying it to God, it
follows that God is the infinite Being ; that is, He combines
all reality in Himself, or, as the latter terminology puts it, He
is the most real Being (Ens realissimum). — A further con-
sequence immediately arises in the following way. Every
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428 DESCARTES AND SPINOZA,
determination of a thing is a limitation of it. A determina-
tion of a thing distinguishes it from another, and shows, not
what this thing is, but what it is not " Omnis determinatio
est negatio. Determinatio ad rem juxta suum esse non
pertinet, sed e contra est ejus nonesse." God includes all
reality in Himself, there is no being which is not in God, and
hence there is no determination of God, but as absolutely
infinite Being He is necessarily also absolutely undetermined.
" If the nature of God does not actually consist in this or that
kind of being, but in a Substance which is absolutely undeter-
mined. His nature also demands all the predicates which per-
fectly express being, because this nature would otherwise be
limited and defective." Just because God includes all kinds
of being in Himself, He cannot be conceived and named
according to an individual determinate kind of being.
In order to represent more exactly the relation of God to
the world as it is given in Spinoza's system, we must enter
more minutely upon his definitions regarding " Attribute " and
" Mode " in their relation to " Substance." There is nothing
but substance and its modes. The one substance is God, and
all individual finite things are modes ; and between the two
stand the Attributes. An Attribute is what the understanding
knows of the substance as constituting its essence. Now
God appears as the absolutely infinite Essence, because He
''consists of infinitely many attributes of which each one
expresses eternal and infinite essentiality." Every attribute
thus expresses eternal and infinite essentiality ; and therefore it
is also said that " every attribute of a substance must be con-
ceived by itself." The former infinity, however, is carefully
to be distinguished from that of the substance ; the former is
merely suo genere, the latter is absolute. Hence it is not so
absurd as at first sight it appears " to attribute to a substance
several attributes ; " indeed, there is nothing clearer in nature
than that everything must be known under some attribute ;
and the more reality or being it has, so much the more
attributes has it which express necessity or eternity as well as
infinity. The Attributes are therefore the several powers
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THE VIEWS OF SPINOZA. 429
working in the substance distinguished really from one
another, subsisting of themselves, entirely independent of each
other, original and eternal. The diflBculties, then, do not exist
for Spinoza at all which mislead his interpreters even now
into the rashest explanations, namely, as to how the one
indivisible Substance can unite in itself innumerably many
original powers that are reciprocally and qualitatively diflferent
from each other, and therefore exclude each other ; and as to
how the Attribute can be conceived by itself without thereby
itself becoming the Substance.
In God there are infinitely many Attributes ; but we have
experience in particular only of two : Thinking and Exten-
sion. It is only of these two that we have knowledge ; for,
in our own nature, there work only two powers, the capacity
out of which ideas arise, and that out of which bodies arise, or
Thinking and Extension. Hence, " Thinking is an Attribute
of God, or God is a thinking Being," and " Extension is an
Attribute of God, or God is an extended Being." In this
connection Spinoza says not a word about the diflSculty which
inevitably presses itself upon us, that Substance is represented
as having numberless attributes, and yet there are only two
taken into account. Do these two Attributes include the
others? This would negative the independence of the
Attributes. Are these only the two that are active in man ?
This would be contrary to the view that all the Attributes
are active in everything.
The Attributes are entirely independent as regards -each
other. There is no transition from the one to the other,
nor any reciprocal interpenetration, nor even any reciprocal
interaction. " The body cannot determine the mind to /
thinking, nor can the mind determine the body to rest or
motion or anything else (if there be anything else)."
" The special existence of ideas has God as their cause, in so
far as He is regarded merely as a thinking Being, and not in
so far as He gives Himself His expression in another^ attri-
bute ; that is, the ideas of the attributes of God as well .
as of individual things have not the objects which form
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430 BESGABTES AND SPINOZA.
their contents or the things perceived as their efficient cause,
but God Himself in so far as He is a thinking Being." But
because the two Attributes are attributes of one and the
same Substance, or because thinking substance and extended
substance are not two but only one, there is no thinking
without extension, and no extension without thinking. Every*
thing as an effect of the one Substance rather participates in
both attributes, and is at once Thought-being and Extended-
being, or at the same time soul and body. Hence there
follows also the parallelism of the two sides. The world of
bodies and the world of ideas are both founded in the acting
power of the one substance ; and hence the world of ideas is
the completely faithful image of the world of bodies, and the
world of bodies is fashioned throughout exactly as it is
apprehended in the ideas.
The Substance with its attributes is God, or efficient
Nature. The World or effected Nature falls under the con-
ception of " modus." *' By raodus I understand affections of
the Substance, or that which is in another and by means of
which it is conceived." Instead of " affeetion," he also uses
the terms " modification " and " accident" The Modes
have therefore their being not in themselves but in another,
that is, in the substance or in God ; and particularly in such
a way that their being is contained and included in the
being and essence of the Substance, so that in the '' modi "
the essence of the substance enters into existence in a special
way. The Modes are therefore the determinate, finite forms
of the existence of the one comprehending, all-effecting power,
and hence it is said that things are distinguished from one
another not realiter, but only modalüer. The " Modi " thus '
arise from the divine causality. God is the cause of things,
and not the distant cause, but the efficient cause ; things are
effects of God, and special representations of His essence. On
the other side, the " modi " are finite things, and therefore
are always dependent on one another, although everything is
only dependent on those things that are homogeneous with it ;
that is, they are subject to necessity as an external compul-
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THE VIEWS OF SPINOZA, 431
sion. On the former side, they are grounded in God, and
are eternal ; on the latter side, they are grounded in the
external connection of things, and are finite. Both sides are
united in every individual thing; eternity constitutes its
conception or essence (essentia), finity constitutes its limited
existence (existentia). The essences of things are eternal
truths; but eternal truths do not exist for Spinoza in the
human spirit merely, but are distinguished even in this
from propositions, such as, ex nihilo nihil ßt, that they
exist realiter. Finity, on the other hand, consists in the
partial negation of the existence of a nature, or in the
limitation of one thing by things of the same nature ; it
is founded in the universal course of nature and its causal
nexus. Every finite thing is thus grounded, on the one hand,
in the causality of the divine essence, which is in all things
as the one Substance ; and, on the other, in the causality of
finite things. The former constitutes its eternal essence ; the
latter its finite existence, or its limitedness, quantitatively as
having a beginning and end in time, as well as qualitatively
in its passivity. The two together, the eternal essentiality
and the finite limitedness, do not exclude each other, but
actually coincide with one another in the unity of the actually
existing finite things ; and this has its ground in the fact that
the natural causal nexus of finite things is also grounded in
God, and thus both causalities, although in a different way, go
back to God. But Spinoza does not spend a word on the
diflRculty as to how the one Substance can work in such a
different way, and how this double causality copstantly leads
to a single result. " Things are conceived by us as real in
two ways, according as we conceive them as existing in rela-
tion to a definite time and a definite place, and according as
we conceive them as contained in God and following from the
necessity of the divine nature. But the things which are
conceived in this latter way as true or real, are conceived
by us under the form of eternity, and the ideas of them
include the eternal and infinite essence of God in themselves."
Of Spinoza's further views, only those are of importance to
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432 DESCABTES AND SPINOZA.
US here which refer to the goal of philosophy as the happi-
ness of man in the intellectual love of God (amor intellectualis
Dei). In every individual thing there is included an eternal
modus as its essence ; the finiteness of the individual thing
consists in the fact that this eternal modus is partially
limited by external causes, and is prevented from fully
unfolding itself. This principle also applies to man, and
upon it ultimately rests the goal which Spinoza sets up in his
theory of knowledge as well as in his Ethics. The goal of the
human mind is that it has to work itself out of its limitation
in finiteness to the complete unfolding and the pure existence
of its eternal Essence, and that it has to mount up from im-
perfection and want of reality to more reality and perfection.
Our knowledge rests upon ideas of the affections of bodies,
by which the mind perceives the affected as well as the
affecting body. A distinction is to be made in everything
between its essence and its existence, or between its being
grounded in God and its being grounded in the connection of
finite things. Ideas refer to both of these relations, and this
is the basis of the distinction between adequate and in-
adequate ideas. Inadequate knowledge is sensible perception
(opinio or imaginatio). Adequate knowledge is partly rational
knowledge {ratio), which refers to what is common in things
and apprehends them as necessary effects of the divine attri-
butes under the form of eternity, and partly intuitive know-
ledge {cognitio intuüiva), which regards the essence of every
individual thing in all its features and properties as grounded
by eternal necessity in the essence of God, and which there-
fore contemplates it under the form of eternity. This is the
highest stage of knowledge, and upon it rests the immor-
tality of the human mind. The imagination ceases with the
existence of the body ; " for it is only during the existence of
its body that the mind expresses the actual existence of its
body, and conceives the affections of its body as existing in
reality.*' Yet " the human mind cannot be completely
destroyed with its body, but there remains something of it
after, which is eternal" This eternal something is the idea
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THE VIEWS OF SPINOZA. 433
which expresses the essence of the human body under the
form of eternity. The mind is thus only partly immortal ;
" the eternal part of the mind is the understanding ; and
that part of it which perishes, as we have shown, is the
imagination." Hence '' the more things the mind under-
stands by means of knowledge of the second and third stage,
so much the greater a part of it remains after the destruction
of the body and is not affected thereby." The mind which
continues to endure, is therefore no longer the same individual
thing that it was during the existence of the body ; and the
minds that continue to exist, can only be distinguished from
each other by the amount of adequate knowledge they have
appropriated. Nevertheless, Spinoza assigns to them personal
self-consciousness ; for the stronger any one is in knowledge
of the third stage, so much the better conscious is he of him-
self and of God.
According to Spinoza, '' intellectus et voluntas unum et
idem sunt," that is, knowledge and will are inseparably united
with each other ; and hence the ethical hfe must necessarily
develop itself in exact parallelism to the intellectual life. To
inadequate knowledge corresponds the dominion of the im-
pure passions ; to adequate knowledge there corresponds the
control of these passions by the pure self-activity of the
mind. Out of the intuitive knowledge there is developed, in
the ethical sphere, the intellectual love of God. This love
rests on the fact that man rejoices when he contemplates
himself and his active power, and that he knows God as the
ground of this power and the joy connected with it, and
accordingly loves God as the cause of this joy. ** From the
third stage of knowledge there arises, of necessity, a rational
love of God (amor Dei intellectualis) ; for from the know-
ledge of this stage there arises joy accompanied with the idea
of God as its cause ; and this is love to God, not in that
we imagine Him as present, but in that we rationally con-
ceive the eternal being of God, and it is this which I call
rational love of God." This love is eternal, as is the know-
ledge from which it flows. It may attach itself to all ideas
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434 DESCABTES AND SPINOZA.
and to all the affections of the body ; it is identical with the
love with which God loves Himself and men ; it is the
foundation of the continued striving after perfection. This
love is at the same time the highest good of man ; it is
true blessedness, and therefore the ultimate goal of oar
striving. "Our happiness, or our blessedness and freedom,
consists in constant and eternal love to God ; and this love or
this blessedness is called in the holy Scriptures a glory, and
not unjustly so, for it is the true satisfaction of the soul ajid
the highest triumph of the mind." " This love is a part of
the infinite love with which God loves Himself. For this
love is an activity by means of which the mind contemplates
itself and at the same time knows God as the cause of the
mind ; it is therefore an activity by means of which, in so
far as He gives Himself expression in the human mind,
God contemplates Himself, and at the same time beholds
Himself as the Cause of Himself."
IV.
Opponents and Adherents of Spinoza.
The views of Spinoza, especially regarding religion, lay so
far from the modes of thought of his time that they could not
but excite the most violent antagonism.^ And it is intelli-
gible, although it is also lamentable in the highest d^ree,
that a correct understanding of his doctrines rarely preceded
this opposition. The first assaults were directed against the
early Tractatm theologico-polüicus. Already in 1670, Fre-
dericus Eappoltiis, Professor of Theology at Leipsic, in his
Oratio contra naturalistas, reckoned Spinoza among the deniers
of God. Van Blyenburg, in his treatise De veritate rdigvmis
ChristiaruB (Amstel. 1674), objects to Spinoza that he even
* On the History of Spinozism, see Antoninus van der Linde, Spinoza, seine
Lehre und deren erste Nach Wirkungen in Holland, Göttingen 1862 ; and P.
W. Schmidt, Spinoza und Schleiermacher, Berlin 1868.
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OPPONENTS AND ADHERENTS OF SPINOZA. 433
subjects God to necessity, and thus makes Him completely
impotent This objection was met by Cuflfelarius in the only
apology of that age for Spinoza's views. In his Specimen artis
ratiocinandi, etc. (Hamburg 1684), it is urged that, accord-
ing to Spinoza, necessity does not mean the dependence on
external things, but the state of being conditioned only by
the internal essence of the being in question, and therefore
that the necessity attributed to God does not detract from His
perfection and power. J. Musaeus, in his dissertation entitled
Tractatus theoloffico-politiciis, etc. (Jenae 1674), begins with
some bitter invectives against the inexpressibly bold man who
sees in free philosophical inquiry a remedy for the contro-
versies of theologians, and who even dares to doubt of the
divine inspiration of the prophets and apostles. He then
proceeds to a fundamental refutation. With far more candour
than the men already referred to, he transports himself into
the peculiar circle of thought of his opponent, and although
his exegetical proof is somewhat weak, and his explanation of
natural right and sovereign authority is not always tenable,
it deserves attention that he places religion in the inner life
of the soul : yet not merely in obedience, but essentially in its
proper kind of knowledge. He specially objects to Spinoza
that he had left the most important part of Christianity out
of account, namely, the reconciliation with God by the atone-
ment Musseus characterizes his own standpoint by the
way in which he defines faith, not as " sentire de Deo," but
as "Assentiri propter divinam revelationem." — In point of
fact, the polemical writings directed at that time against
Spinoza are not worthy of much consideration. The tone in
which it was customary to speak of him in learned circles, is
shown especially by Chr. Kortholt, who in his De tribm
impostoribus magnis liber (Kiloni 1680) accused him of com-
pletely identifying God with the universe, and putting God as
regards finite things into the relation of a whole to its parts ;
and he reckons Spinoza along with the two other arch-
impostors, Herbert and Hobbes, among the most shameless
enemies of religion. When the JEthica appeared, the philo-
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436 DESCAUTES AND SPINOZA.
sophers, and especially the strict followers of Descartes,^ like-
wise set themselves in opposition to the new philosophy.
They take their starting-point from the substantiality of the
individual subject or personal ego, which appeared to them to
be too much endangered by Spinoza's doctrine of the ** all-
unity," and this at least indicates their interest The number
of these polemical writings became so great that Jänichen
published a special Cataloffus Scriptorum arUi-Spinazianoruni,
If these Opponents were not capable of refuting Spinoza's
philosophy, neither, on the other hand, were its Adherents
competent to obtain for it a more general acceptance. The
principles of a historico-critical investigation of the Bible,
laid down in the Tractaius theologico-polüicus, first exerted an
influence upon theology, although it is still undecided as to
whether the pioneer work of Eichard Simon (1638-1712)*
in this direction was directly determined by it The theolo-
gians were thus already roused into anxiety lest Spinozism
should overthrow religion. And this anxiety could not but
be strengthened by the way in which the adherents of the
new philosophy, instead of working for its further scientific
development, brought some of its positions like u new gospel
to the knowledge of the people, a gospel which had certainly
hardly anything in common with that of Christ This
antagonism to the prevailing contemporary theological modes
of thought was the reason that " Spinozist " came to be
regarded as a term of reproach, and synonymous with atheist,
naturalist, and similar terms. It is owing to the attitude thus
taken up that a just estimate and a scientific appreciation of
Spinoza's thoughts only date from the efforts of Jakobi and
Lessing.
In Holland, Jacob Verschoor (f 1700)' of Flushing, after
having been refused entrance into the office of the ministry,
^ We may name two of them, Vclthuysen and Wittich (Lambert Velthuysen,
TractatuB de col tu naturali et origine moralitatis, etc., Roterod. 1680 ; Chris-
toph Wittich, Anti-Spinoza, Amst. 1680).
• Histoire critique du Vieux Testament, Paris 1680.
' Compare H. Heppe, Geschichte des Pietismus und der Mystik in der
reformirten Kirche, p. 375 ff., 1879.
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OPPONENTS AND ADHERENTS OP SPINOZA, 437
gathered a number of adherents around him from 1680.
His main doctrines are as follow. All that happens takes
place accordiDg to unalterable fate and by necessity. God
Himself is not free, for His will is necessarily determined by
the nature of His essence. There is no distinction between
good and evil : and hence man is not obliged to improve his
mode of conduct Grod is not angry at sin, because His
honour is not violated by it. Hence Christ by His death has
not made satisfaction to the justice' of God, but only shown
that God willingly forgives sin. After Christ's death, those
ordained to blessedness no longer commit sins of their own ;
but any one who believes that he has sinned shows only his
unbelief thereby. The true belief and the true conversion
consist in the man who believes he is a sinner returning from
this conceit, attaining an immoveable confidence in the forgive-
ness of sin that is guaranteed since Christ's death, and con-
sequently being comforted with the sense of his salvation. —
In Germany, Matthias Knutzen,^ the head of the sect called
" the Consciencers " (Gewissener)^ appears unquestionably to
have followed the principles of Spinoza's Tradatits theologico-
poliiicm. Born at Oldensworth in 1646, where he early lost
his parents and was then brought to an uncle in Königsberg,
from whom he ran away twice, Knutzen continued for a time
to lead the adventurous life of a wandering scholar. We find
him at one time acting as a tutor, at another prosecuting his
studies at a university, and again roaming aimlessly about
and begging for the means of support, but everywhere raising
subtle questions regarding philosophy and theology. When
he made his occasional attempts at preaching the means
of violently attacking the worldly disposition, ambition, and
greed of the preachers of the time, the authorities made
^ Compare Joliann Musseas, Ableinung der ausgesprengten abschenlichen
Verläamdung, als wäre in der fttrst. S^bs. Residentz und gesammte Univer-
sität Jena eine neue Sekte der sogenannten Gewissener entstanden, etc., Jena
1674. Knutzen's Chartaquen are appended to the second edition (1. Gespräch
zwischen einem Gastwfrth und dreien ungleichen Religionsgästen zu Altona ;
2. Gespräch zwischen einem Feldprediger, Namens Dr. Heinrich Brummer und
einem Musterscbreiber ; 3. Ein lateinischer Brief).
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438 DESCAKTES AND SPINOZA.
inquiry into the origin of his title as master and licentiate.
Knutzen escaped hy flight from the discovery of his decep-
tion, and in the autumn of 1674 he came to Jena, where he
circulated several tractates, after which his sect, called *' the
Consciencers," numbered adherents in all the great cities, there
being seven hundred in Jena alone. Knutzen afterwards
appeared in Altdorf, and later again in Jena, and thereafter
he disappeared without leaving a trace of himself behind.
Knutzen's doctrine, however, is not to be regarded as much
more than a freak ; it is of some importance as an opposition
to the rigid orthodoxy of the seventeenth century, but insuffi-
cient as a starting-point for any vital reform. He represents
the Bible as being wrongly referred to divine inspiration, for
it contains the greatest contradictions (e,g. 1 Kings vii. 26
and 2 Chron. iv. 5). In respect of its form, it is wholly
confused and without order, having neither grace nor colour
in its expression, while assertions that are quite silly may be
proved from it, e.g. that there are dragons and four-footed
beasts in heaven. In short, the ambiguity and indefiniteness
of the expressions of the Bible show that this book cannot
possibly be regarded as a source of higher knowledge and of
correct moral principles. Hence to us who are " conscience-
sure," the knowledge, not of one, but of many is available ;
this is common science or conscience (scientia, conscientia,
conjunctim accepta). This conscience, which the good mother
has implanted equally in all, is, says Knutzen, our Bible ; and
with us it takes the place both of the secular government and
the clergy. If we have done evil, it is more to us than a
thousand tortures, whereas it is heaven when we have done
good. From it follows the supreme principle of the sect : Live
justly and honestly, and give every one his due. Hence
there follow these further consequences : (1) There is no
God; (2) there is no devil, for according to Luke viii. 33 the
devil has been drowned ; (3) governments and preachers are
useless, and must be got rid of, for Conscience is the only
legislative and judicial power ; (4) marriage is not a morally
necessary institution, and there is no difference between
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OPPONENTS AND ADHERENTS OF SPINOZA. 439
marriage and fornication ; (5) there is only this earthly life ;
with death all is past.
Among the extremest Spinozists is commonly reckoned
Friederich Wilhelm Stosch or Stossius. His Concordia
ratumis et ßdei sive Harmonia philosophic^ moralis et
rdigumis Christiance (Amstelodami 1691) gave great offence,
and was suppressed by the employment of harsh measures.
The offence is easily understood. It is not only declared that
all that is taught in the Scriptures, as in the history of
angels and demons, is to be regarded as dreams and visions,
phantasies and morbid conditions, inventions and deceptions.
It is openly declared that the soul is not a separate substance,
but only consists of a peculiar fermentation of the blood and
of the secretions, and that the thinking mind consists in the
brain and its organs, which are variously modified by the
inflow and circulation of a fine matter. The distinction
between good and evil appears as a merely relative one, and
at the most it is conformed to the utility of man. The
supposed freedom is mere deception, and the assumption of a
future life is entirely groundless. The Christian religion only
prescribes the law of nature. — These expressions do not show
a very close connection with Spinoza, and this is even less so
in regard to the conception of God that is set up. God is
indeed represented as unica et sola substantia, and as infinitum,
cogitans, et extensum; yet He commonly appears as the creator
and first mover of the world. Nevertheless, numerous refer-
ences point to the influence of Spinoza, and reference to the
work is accordingly in place here.
Johann Christian Edelmann (1698-1767)^ was an enthu-
siastic adherent of Spinozism, in decided opposition to the
' With regard to the development of Edelmann we refer to his Autobiography^
edited by C. R. W. Close (Berlin 1849), and to his Unschuldige Wahrheiten
(after 1735). For a knowledge of the last phase of his doctrines, the foUowing
works require to be considered : Moses mit aufgedecktem Angesichte, von zwei
ungleichen Brüdern, Licbtlieb und Blindling beschauet, etc., 1740; Abge-
nöthigtes, jedoch Anderen nicht wieder aufgenöthigtes Glaubensbekenntniss,
1746. Cf. also Pratje, Historische Nachrichten von Job. Chr. Edelmannes
Leben, Schriften und Lehrbegriff, 2 Auf. Hamburg 1755. Bruno Bauer, Ein-
floss des Englischen Qaäkerthums auf die deutsche Cultur und auf das englisch-
russische Projekt einer Weltkirche, Berlin 1878.
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440 DESCABTES AND SPINOZA.
then generally accepted Leibniz - WolflBan philosophy. But
he was too obscure and confused to exercise a permanent
influence, and the age was so averse to such views that
Edelmann was compelled to move restlessly from one place
to another in search of protection and a safe residence. The
sale of his Mo9t8^ which was planned for twelve " views,** was
prohibited, after the appearance of the first three, by the
imperial fiscal, and his writings were burned by the public
executioner in Hamburg and other place& Trained in Jena,
especially under the theologian Buddeus, who was a bitter
opponent of Wolff, Edelmann was at first filled with a ''just
aversion for the so-called orthodoxy " by Arnold's Impartial
History of the Church and of Heretics, and was inclined ** the
longer the more to the side of the Pietists." After a closer
connection with Zinzendorf had broken down, and the zealous
reading of the writings of Dippel had carried him further in
the views of the Pietists, Edelmann went, in 1736, to
Berleburg, where he laboured on the Berleburg translation
of the Bible, and found protection for several yeara But the
English Deists always gained more influence upon his mode of
thinking, and the more that Pietism degenerated into fanaticism
and effeminate sentimentalism. In consequence, Edehnann
withdrew himself the more from it, especially after his meeting
with the celebrated new prophet, Johann Friederich Bock, in
1737. He then wrote against his former associates a tractate
with the title, " Blows upon the fools' back," etc
He had stumbled accidentally on the proposition of
Spinoza, *' Deum essentiam rerum immanentem, nontranseun-
tem statuo," that is, God is the essence of things in such a way
that He is permanently in the most inward presence with
them, and is not absent or separated from them. To Edelmann
this proposition appeared so conformable to the majesty of
God, that he could not conceive how Spinoza could be x^aided
as an atheist, and he became desirous to know his writings
more exactly. On the 24th June 1740, be obtained the
\vi8hed-for books, and turned himself at once to the Tractatus
thcolugico-politiciis. On the 1st November 1740, he already-
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OPPONENTS AND ADHEBENTS OF SPINOZA. 441
wrote the preface to the first part of his Moses with unveiled
face. This title indicates the unprejudiced examination of the
Scriptures, for " to lift the curtain drawn by Moses " means
to take away from revelation its unfounded authority. Thus
Edelmann says : " I propose to peep under the veil of this
famous leader of the Jews, and to give twelve views in succes-
sion somewhat more exactly than has been hitherto done."
The first " view " or section was to show that we have in our
time as little remaining of the true writings of Moses as we
have of his natural dead body. With skill and some knowledge
of the subject, he proceeds to show that the Bible itself tells of
lost parts and narratives, and that Ezra had made an entirely
new Bible. But from the fact that the Bible is not unmuti-
lated, it is not to be inferred that the truths it contains are not
inspired by God. All truth is inspired by God, whether it
stands in Ovid or the Bible ; for there is only one Spirit of
truth, who communicates of His gifts to every one. " On the
other hand. Master Stockfinster (Block- window) and his official
brethren pretend that the Holy Spirit has dictated all the
words of Scripture to the pens of the Biblical scribes, as the
schoolmaster at Eumpelskirchen does to the peasant lads whom
he is training to be learned Jackanapes, so that, under fear of
punishment, they could not have written a single false word in
the Bible ; but such men must know little of the spirit of the
living God, and they ought therefore to be justly ashamed of
lying so shamelessly before people who are better acquainted
with this great Being," etc. The word of the living God is not
without us, but is nigh to us in our mouth and heart. In so
far as the Bible contains truths, it is a token that the spirit of
the living God has formerly spoken to men, but it is only fit
for fools and unthinking beasts to suppose that it has now
crept out of us into the dead letter. What does not run
counter to the perfection of God and the nature of things,
is truth. It is similar with the Creeds. " The Bible is a
collection of old writings, the authors of which have written
according to the measure of their knowledge of God and of
divine things ; " and hence it is neither the only nor the chief
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442 DESCABTES AND SPINOZA.
source of our knowledge of (xod ; for the God who entered in
earlier times into such confidential intercourse with men» and
who wills that all come to the knowledge of the truth, cannot
possibly speak to us merely through foreign and entirely
unknown languages, or through a multitude of ignorant and
divided interpreters. Eather does God speak so distinctly in
the conscience of all, that we can know quite infallibly, at
all times and in all places, whether we do right or wrong.
The second " view " presents the doctrine of God and His
relation to the world. It is entirely the doctrine of Spinoza
which Edelmann expresses here and elsewhere ; and he also
takes up the writings of his spiritual associate Knutzen. He
cannot understand how Spinoza can have been stamped as
an atheist ** For he expressly makes God the cause of all
things, not in the way that an artist produces a work and
then afterwards goes away from it and leaves it to the
management of others ; but, as he distinctly confesses, God has
produced His works in such a way that He continues always
essentially present in all things, and by His very existence
causes it to be that they are what they are. Wherefore
Spinoza rightly calls God the being and essence of all things,
and our present godless and stupid Christianity could not
have better betrayed itself than by its representatives agreeing
to make this man an atheist'' " We are the brooks, (jod is
the spring. We are the rays. He is the sun. We are the
shadows. He is the substance." As the sun, by the effusion
of its rays, makes the day, but the day could not be without
the existence of the sun ; so does the permanent life of our
God make creatures without intermission, but so that they
could not continue without His enduring essence and existence.
Yet just as the sun and the day are differ^iit, so are God and
the creature. — " Matter is nothing but the shadow of the great
Substance of our God." But as the substance of the shadow
continually emanates from the being and substance of the
body without our yet being made into what is thus but
shadowy, so God does not become a material thing by the fact
that the substance of matter continually streams and emanates
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OPPONENTS AND ADHEKENTS OF SPINOZA. 443
from His incomparable essence. — God is the all, yet not as
that which is subject to inconstancy and transitoriness ; He is
that which gives and maintains the being and essence of all
things. As no one denies that something exists, there are no
atheists. God has understanding and will, but only in so far
as these are found in the creature. God and the world are
eternally identical The creatures are modifications of God,
and in particular the soul is a ray from God and is therefore
immortal with Him. There are no supernatural things or
nqiracles, otherwise we would have to assume, either that
there is another being besides God, or that the one God is
changeable.
The third " view " is turned against the Leibniz- Wolffian
philosophy, with its assertion of a contingent best world among
all possible worlds. " A philosophy which does not guide man
as to how he may again attain to the forfeited identity with
God, but only flatters Him with empty titles, and pretends to
him that he lives already in the best world, is a frivolous
deception, which it is not worth a rational man lending his
ear to." It is the greatest " Philomory " or Love of folly that
has ever been ; and they who follow it are poor, bewitched,
and deluded people.
So far the Moses. We may add some further points from his
other writings. ** Nothing has been given to me as the rule of
my faith and life but my reason ; I must judge everything in
the world by it, and even the Bible, if I am to draw any
advantage from it. I am otherwise worse than a beast, which
cannot be compelled by anything in the world to believe that
it is eating oats when it gets chopped straw." Along with
reason and nature, internal feeling also appears as a source of
our knowledge, for what I feel inwardly cannot possibly be
otherwise than I feel it. — Of the positive revelation of God by
prophets, it holds true that God cannot speak otherwise to a
man than in accordance with the ideas which his heart is
capable of forming regarding Him at the time ; for otherwise
our words would not agree with our thoughts, and God would
speak otherwise to us than as He appears to us, which is con-
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444 DESCARTES AND SPINOZA.
trary to the immutable truth of Go<L Our idea certainly never
reaches the true conception of God ; for all that men upon the
earth can ever think, speak, or write of this great Being is but
a fragment. Hence we may indeed mutually explain to each
other our views of (Jod, but may never compel any one to accept
them without investigation as infallible. For the same reason,
we ought not to seek the knowledge of God from other men,
but to open the eyes of the soul, and attend to the testimony
deposited in our heart and conscience ; we ought thus to see
how God manifests Himself in all nature, or in ourselves and
in other things. God has not given a positive law ; this would
not be worthy of God's majesty, and it would be inconceivable
by us and therefore useless. The law of nature binds us, and
the practice of it is true religion. — Obedience to the voice of
God in the conscience produces a true heaven, and disobedience
to it produces an inexpressible helL As the Spirit continues
to exist, this heaven and this hell last beyond the grave. —
Christ was a true man as we are : like to us in all respects, but
equipped with exceptional gifts and virtues. It is only on
account of this excellence that He is called " Son of God."
Christ did not wish to found a new religion, or any external
religious ceremonies, but to show the nugatoriness of external
religion and the foolishness of hatred on account of a difference
of religious opinion. He thus intended to abolish all religious
wranglings, to restore universal love, and to guide men to the
worship of God in spirit and in truth. Like all other positive
religions, Christianity is also a superstition. The Trinity has
been constructed out of the fables of the heathen and the
Jews. The doctrine of the fall of the first man, of original
sin, and of the darkening of reason, is but vain falsehood.
There are no devils or angels. The Christian " doctrines " of
the order of grace and the operations of grace, are partly fable
and partly deception. As the world is eternal, the doctrines
of the second coming, of a day of judgment, and such theories
are absurd. Marriage cannot subsist along with true moral
discipline and chastity. Christ is called Saviour and Eedeemer
" because He sought to redeem those who could understand and
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OPPONENTS AND ADHERENTS OP SPINOZA. 445
grasp His doctrines, from the yoke of their oppressors who
fattened on their sins." " And this, His inestimable merit,
i do in no way deny, but I turn it in such a way to account
that all those who tell me the opposite of God, and who
undertake to charm one of His own creatures into an ofi'en-
sive and pernicious idol, are confidently regarded by me as
ignorant ninnies, .and notwithstanding their obstinate ortho-
doxy» as antichristian belly - slaves, and as anything but
servants of my Jesus." — '* Christ has not merely risen in the
spirit, but He also comes again daily in many thousands of
His witnesses to judge the living and the dead. The judgment
begins in the case of every man when he begins to know God."
''What ignorant priests have hitherto dreamed about their
so-called devils, to terrify the rabble, are most absurd and most
irrational lies." And these things have been invented to the
detraction of the Creator.
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SECTION SEVENTH.
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY IN FRANCE.
fTlHE Eighteenth Century is designated by the French, by
-*- preference, as the philosophical century. We do not
indeed owe independent thoughts or any permanent furtherance
of speculation to that age, yet philosophy then controlled the
interests of all circles in France as it has never done before or
since. From another point of view, it is common to designate
the philosophical movement of France as materialism. This
is correct enough if the designation is used to indicate the
general character of the spirit that dominated the century, but
it is wrong if it means to assert the complete homogeneity of
all the phenomena that then appeared. For, more exactly
regarded, there are four different cun*ents of philosophical
thinking that may be distinguished in successive periods a^
well as by distinct facts. 1. In the first place, we have
Scepticism as represented by Bayle. 2. Then comes the
Deism that was grounded on Newton's Natural Philosophy
and proclaimed by Voltaire. 3. Next, we have the Material-
ism of De la Mettrie and others. 4. And, lastly, we have
the Eeaction against it that was grounded on immediate
Feeling as represented by Jean Jacques Eousseau.*
I.
Scepticism. Pieere Bayle.
Scepticism seems to be the form of philosophical activity
that corresponds to the. character of the French people. In
* In connection with this Section, compare Hettner, Literaturgeschichte des
18 Jahr, ü 1860; and F. A. Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus, 8rd ed.
1876. Noack, tU supru.
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SCEPTICISM. PIERRE BAYLE. 447
the period of the transition from the ancient to the modem
world, it is in France that we specially meet with the renova-
tion of Sceptical thoughts ; and even yet, all who have won an
enduring place among the French in the History of Philosophy
are inclined to this tendency. At first, however, the French
thinkers employed their Scepticism in order to bring men to
accept revelation as the only certain truth. — FranQais de la
Mothe le Vayer (1588-1672) regards all knowledge as
uncertain, because neither the perceptions of sense nor the
axiomatic principles are free from deceptions. Hence the
greatest happiness of our mind consists in an immoveable rest
in theoretical questions and in moderation in practical matters.
This conviction is likewise pre-eminently fitted to prepare us
for the reception of religion. Since we cannot rely upon the
Sciences, we are inclined to submit ourselves of our freewill
to the divine revelation, and in this consists the meritoriousness
of faith. — Pierre Daniel Huet (1630-1721), in like manner,
on account of the uncertainty of knowledge, sees the only
acceptable philosophy in Pyrrhonism. The insight that we
know nothing, is the best preparation for the faith by which
we receive the truth that God Himself communicates to us.
— Saint Evremont (1613-1703) turns himself against the
doctrines of positive religion. Full of wit and satire, he
combats the dogmas and the ambition of the Catholic Church,
yet acknowledges that Christianity is the purest and most
perfect religion, because it preaches the purest and most
perfect morality.
Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) was the most important of the
Sceptics of his time. He is not, like the earlier sceptics,
sceptical as a philosopher ; as a philosopher he is essentially
an adherent of Descartes. Bayle is a sceptic of his own
kind, and of a peculiar mental tendency. He is fond of
pointing everywhere to difficulties, and of bringing forward
contradictions ; yet his object is not to solve them, but to
persist in an unsatisfying ignorance, and, in spite of all his
acuteness and his astonishing knowledge, he stops everywhere
without reaching fixed results. Nor does he employ his
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448 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTÜBY IN FRANCE.
scepticism in order tx> bring men from the ignorance of natural
knowledge to the irrefragably certain truth of the divine
revelation : rather is his sceptical thought especially directed
upon revelation. Bayle points out again and again that the
doctrines of our faith are incompatible with the knowledge of
our reason, although always with the assurance that revelation
claims to be believed.^
The most difficult problem» according to Bayle, is the
repeatedly discussed question : How is the belief in an
almighty and all-good Grod compatible with the fact of evil ?
On the side of Beason, the often repeated result is that the
acceptance of two divine beings, one good and one evil, gives
a better explanation of the actual relations of the world ; but
Sevelation, which is undoubtedly certain, teaches the existence
of only one divine Being. If we start from the conception of
God, Beason leads us ä priori to the acceptance of only one
God, but it is otherwise if we would explain the facts presented
in experience. Man is undeniably burdened with a multitude
of physical evils; and this suffering is completely inconceivable
if we assume only one God, who is at the same time all-
powerful and all-good. But if we regard physical evil as a
consequence of moral evil, the question then arises, whence
comes moral evil ? To say that God has permitted it, but not
caused it, is a mere empty play of words ; for, seen in the
light, such permitting is nothing else than effecting, as it is
only by the entering of a definite efficient cause that a definite
reality can arise out of a multitude of possibilities. God also
foresaw the danger of sin in any case ; and if He did not avert
it, He acted as wrongly as a mother would who might allow
her daughters to go to a dangerous dance. It is also au
untenable evasion to say that God would have injured human
freedom by fixing man in the doing of what was good; and the
^ Besides the Dictionnaire, the following of Bayle*8 writings are taken specially
into account here : Commentaire philosophiqne sor ces paroles de J^os-Christ,
Contrain-les cTeTitrer, ou Traits de la tolerance Universelle, ed. iL, Rotter-
dam 1713. R^ponse auz questions d*un Provincial, Rotterd. 1704. Regarding
Bayle, see Ludwig Feuerbach, Pierre Bayle, 2 Ausg. 1844. Jeanmaire, Essai
snr la Critique religieuse de Pierre Bayle, Strassbourg 1862.
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SCEPTICISM. PnCRRB BAYLB. 449
Church universally teaches that the angels and the saints
cannot sin, and that God's grace co-operates in the regenerate
without denying freedom in any of these. The assertion is
also false, that the good is only known from contrast with the
bad, and that it can only be borne mixed up with it ; as is
also the pretence that evil exists in order that the wisdom of
God may shine forth the more. This latter position would be
just the same as if the head of a household were to break the
legs of all the members of the house in order to exhibit to
them his healing art. In short, to our reason, the evil that
actually exists is inconceivable if we accept only one God
with perfect power and perfect goodness. If we maintain the
unity of God, we must think of either His power or goodness
as limited. On the other hand, the mixture of good and evil in
nature as well as in the actions of men is very simply explained
if we regard the world as the work of two powers, one good
and one evil, and that they have concluded a compact with
each other as to how far the influence of each should extend.
The same contradiction between knowledge and faith is
shown by Bayle in other points. In science, it holds as an
incontrovertible truth that two things that are not different
from a third thing are equal to one another ; but the dogma of
the Trinity subverts this proposition. It is an undeniable
truth of reason that the union of a human and a rational soul
constitutes a person ; but the dogma of the Incarnation contra-
dicts this truth. In our natural knowledge, the principle
holds good that no body can be in more places than one at the
same time ; but the dogma of the Lord's Supper teaches the
opposite, so that we do not know whether we are not at this
moment in the most diflferent places. — The same opposition of
Beason and Bevelation is shown in the sphere of morals.
Among the Christian nations, the moral requirements of
religion do not at all prevail ; on the contrary, the law of
honour, regard to public opinion, selfishness, and similar
principles determine our conduct Nay, while many men
accused of atheism deserve all recognition on account of their
strict morality, there are some of the persons in the Bible that
VOL. 1. 2 F
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450 THE EIGHTKKNTH CENTUKY IN FRANCE.
are held up to us as models who were guilty of the gravest
moral oflTences. Moral philosophy teaches that it is a sin not
to prevent an evil deed if we can ; dogmatic theology makes
it no objection to God that He did not prevent sin. Moral
philosophy teaches that no one is guilty of an action that took
place before he existed ; dogmatic theology makes us all
sharers in the guilt of Adam's falL In order to bring out the
opposition between faith and knowledge in the greatest possible
sharpness, Bayle sums up the principal contents of theology
in seven propositions, and sets over against them nineteen
philosophical propositions indicating their incompatibility by
the antithetical form in which they are presented.
Theology and Philosophy are thus as contrary to each other
as day and night It is impossible to combine them either by
the distinction of a double truth or by the evasion that the
doctrines of the faith are not contrary to reason, but only above
reason. There is nothing left, then, but to choose between
the two, and either to follow natural reason or supernatural
revelation. On this point Bayle generally expresses himself
as if he regarded the choice as in no way doubtful He says
that a true Christian can only make himself merry about the
subtleties of philosophy; for faith raises him far above the
regions in which the storms of controversy rage. In matters
of religion we ought therefore not to enter at all upon
principles of reason, but simply to believe ; the more the
object of faith transcends the natural powers of our mind, so
much the more meritorious it is to believa Philosophy is
never able to lead us to the truth ; revelation alone can do
this. This revelation is contained in the Scriptures, which
have been verbally inspired by God, and hence they are to be
respected as the infallible source of truth.
It appears to me, however, to be extremely improbable that
this was Bayle's real opinion. In the first place, as has been
said, he did not proceed in his scepticism as a philosopher ;
he despairs of our natural knowledge, less on account of the
untrustworthiness of its foundations, than because its clearest
propositions are subverted by the definite dogmas of faith.
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SCEPnCISM. PIERRE 6ATLE. 451
Again, he shows how to trace out all the instances which
speak against a dogma, with an acuteness that can only
proceed from the interest of personal conviction. And above
all, he expresses himself quite otherwise in the beginning of
his Commentaire Phüosophiqus, In the first chapter of this
work, Bayle undertakes to show generally that the light of
nature, or the universal principles of our conscience, are the
first rules of all interpretation of Scripture, and especially in
matters of morality. It is true that he protests against the
view of the Socinians, who intei*pret the Scriptures only by the
light of nature and the principles of metaphysics, and who
reject everything that does not agree therewith, such as the
Trinity and the Incarnation. But he holds that there are
certain axioms which one cannot repudiate, such as that the
whole is greater than its part, that if equads be taken from
equals the remainders are equal, that two contradictories
cannot possibly be true at the same time, or that the essence
of a thing cannot subsist after its destruction« Although the
oppqsites of these propositions were to be found a hundred
times in Scripture, or were seen to be confirmed by a thousand
miracles, they would not be believed; but it would rather
be supposed that the Scriptures spoke metaphorically and
ironically, or that the miracles were performed by a demon,
than it could be believed that the natural light erred in these
principles. Above all in moral questions, reason has the
same importance. AU moral laws are subject to the natural
idea of equity as it is inborn in all men, so far of course as
that idea is not darkened by regard to personal advantage and
the customs of the country. Adam had certainly the con-
sciousness of good before God spake to him ; and after the
fall this inner light was necessary as a criterion in order to
distinguish the divine revelation from devilish suggestions.
All dreams and visions, as well as all appearances of angels
and miracles, must be tested by the natural light. So it is
with the Law of Moses, for it is only on account of its agree-
ment with the natural law that it could be recognised as a
positive law. As in geometry a proportion that has been
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462 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTÜBY IN FBANCEL
proved from unquestionable principles becomes a principle in
regard to other propositions, so in like manner the positive
law when it was once verified by the natural light could also
hold as a rule. Hence before Moses revelation could only be
tested by the natural light, but after Moses by the natural
light and the positive law. The two must necessarily agree,
as they both come from God, who cannot contradict Himself.
The gospel is also a rule which is verified by the clearest
and distinctest ideas of the natural reason, and it therefore
deserves .to be accepted as a rule and criterion of truth« At
the first glance it appears, indeed, as if many laws of the
natural reason were contrary to the gospel, such as the
right to defend ourselves when we are attacked, or to take
vengeance on an enemy, etc. In truth, however, it is only
our natural judgment that is corrupted by self-love and bad
habit, whereas Christ lays down for us the true laws of
reason, which we must approve on earnest examination.
Eegarding the essential nature of Religion, Bayle expresses
himself in the following way. By the clearest and distinctest
ideas we are conscious that an absolutely perfect being exists,
who governs all things and is to be worshipped by men, and
who rewards some actions and punishes others. In like
manner we are conscious that the essential worship of God
consists of inward actions or in acts of the spirit Hence
it follows that the essence of Religion consists in the judgments
which our mind forms regarding God, and in the affections of
reverence, fear, and love which our will feels towards Him, so
that a man, when alone, can thus without any external action
satisfy his duty to God. Commonly, however, the internal
condition of the mind, in which religion consists, expresses
itself in external signs of reverence ; but without the internal
sentiment, such external actions have no greater value than if
a complement were made to a statue in consequence of a gust
of wind. Briefly, then, religion is a specific conviction of the
soul, which brings forth in the will the love, reverence, and
fear that are due to the Supreme Being, and the external
actions corresponding to them.
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DEISM. VOLTAIBB. 453
An immediate consequence of these positions is the prin^
dple of Toleration. The one right way of evoking religion
can only be by calling forth certain judgments and feelings in
the souL By forcible external measures the external actions
in question may indeed be constraioed» but the proper senti-
ments cannot be effectuated. Hence it is not possible to take
the words of Jesus literally when He says, " compel them to
come in" (Luke xiv. 23). Instead of persecuting those who
confess other religions, as is often done in the most cruel way,
we ought to practise unlimited toleration towards alL This
is not to be done as if all religions were true, but because no
one but God has a right to control the conscience. Even
an erring conscience has the right to demand liberty and
unlimited toleration. History also shows that religious in-
tolerance has had the most dreadful consequences, whereas the
State has been found to flourish under the peaceful toleration
of different religions.
II.
Deism. Voltaire.
The Spiritual development of France in the Eighteenth
Century was influenced by nothing more powerfully than by
the increasing acquaintance with England. Buckle asserts in
his History of Civilisation in England, that at the end of the
Seventeenth Century there were hardly five persons in France
who understood the English language ; whereas, during the
two generations between the death of Louis XIV. and the
outbreak of the Eevolution, there was scarcely a Frenchman
of distinction who did not visit England, or at least learn
English. In England at that time, however. Deism prevailed
as the result of the impulse that proceeded from Newton and
Locke, and this deism was forthwith transplanted also to
France.
Pierre Louis de Maupertuis (1699-1759) first represented
Newton's Natural Philosophy in opposition to that of Descartes.
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454 THE EIGIITKENTH CENTÜBY IN FRANCE.
He also drew from it its logical consequences as r^rds
religion and morals. In his Ussai de cosmologie, Maupertais
turns himself against those who employ the doctrine of final
causes to prove the existence and the wisdom of God from the
most unimportant trivialities, such as the folds in the skin of
the rhinoceros, as well as against those who deny all final
causes and regard the world as a mere mechanism. He seeks
the Supreme Being in the primary laws which He has given
to nature. The motion of the material world must have a
mover as its cause, and this mover must be almighty and all-
wise, because the scientific examination of nature shows that,
in the economy of nature, only the least possible expenditure
of means is applied for every end. In his Essai de la
Philosophie morale, Maupertuis finds the wisdom of life in the
attainment of happiness, and happiness in the practice of the
love of God and our neighbour, as required by Christianity.
Voltaire (1694-1778), during a long life, by his poetry
and prose, and with earnestness and caustic wit, naturalized
the philosophical and theological views of the English Deism
in France. Poor in thoughts of his own, he gained by the
power of his words the widest infiuence upon his con-
temporaries ; and he has thus been justly designated by his
great countryman Comte as the founder of the profession
of the Journalist. Voltaire himself summed up his religious
convictions by saying, "we condemn Atheism, we abhor
Superstition, we love God and the human race, — this in a few
words is our creed." The several members of this confession
may serve as a guide in the following exposition of Voltaire's
views.
1. Voltaire is still regarded by some as an Atheist, and yet
he has very decidedly repudiated atheism and repeatedly
asserted the existence of God. The attempt has been fre-
quently made to weaken Voltaire's argumentation for the
existence of God by the assertion that it was not meant in
earnest, but was only occasioned by regard to the utility or
indispensableness of a belief in God for the order of the
political and social Ufa His moral argument appears indeed
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DEISM. VOLTAIRE. 455
to support this assertion. Bayle had asserted that a State
composed of Atheists might exist, and Voltaire admits this in
the case of philosophers ; but adds that if Bayle had to govern
even but five or six hundred peasants, he would forthwith
preach to them a God who rewards and punishes actions,
because a retributive God is absolutely indispensable for the
common weaL Without such a God we would be without
hope in our misery and without remorse in vice.
** The sacred truth goes still beyond man's highest thought,
Yet forms the bond of States, and guides to what we ought ;
It chains the evil-doer, but lifts the righteous head," etc
In connection with such expressions the well-known saying
of Voltaire is especially noteworthy, that if God did not exist
it would be necessary to invent Him (si Dieu n'existait pas, il
faudrait Tinventer). This has been interpreted as if Voltaire
regarded a belief in the existence of God 6ts necessary indeed
from practical considerations, but was himself not convinced of
it. Yet he has immediately added to these words, " mais toute
la nature nous crie, qu'il existe ; " and Voltaire is so firmly
convinced of the existence of God from reasons of the under-
standing, that he declares it is only such as have lost all sound
human judgment who can suppose that mere matter is suffi-
cient to produce sentient and thinking beings. Of the arguments
then current for the existence of God, Voltaire rejects the
arffwmentum e eonsettm gentivm, because he denies the univer-
sality of the idea of God. He, however, repeatedly brings
forward the Cosmological Argument : I am, therefore there is
existence. What is, is either of itself or from another. If
anything exists of itself, it is necessary and eternal, and there-
fore God exists. Does anything exist through another, then
this other thing exists by a third thing, and so on, until we
come to God. If we will not accept a Grod as the ultimate
cause of all other existence, we have an endless screw, which
is an absurdity. — ^But while this argument inevitably leads to
a being who exists of itself, and who is therefore eternetl and
the ground of all things, it is equally unjustifiable on the
basis of this argument to assert the personality of God.
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456 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY IN FRANCE,
Voltaire prefers the Teleological Argument. This argament
presupposes the existence of ends or design in nature. In
this connection Voltaire, indeed, with his biting satire blames
the way in which many physico-theologians endeavour to
prove the existence and the wisdom of God from the most
petty and often the most entirely mistaken relations of design
in nature ; but, in opposition to Spinoza» he represents the ends
and purposes of God in nature so decidedly, that he even
makes nature complain that she is called " Nature," when in
fact she is art, "If we see a beautiful machine, we infer
an intelligent and skilful constructor of it. And in view of
the wonderful world, will we set ourselves against the accept-
ance of a creative master of it ? " As it would be absurd in
the presence of a watch to deny the existence of a watchmaker,
so it would be ridiculous not to infer from the constitution
of the world a wise maker of it This inference cannot be
invalidated even by evil, as Voltaire either simply denies its
existence, as in his early years, or exculpates God from it, as
after the catastrophe of Lisbon in 1755.
But although the existence of God is firmly established
according to Voltaire, he does not consider himself justified in
saying anything regarding the essential nature of Grod. Philo-
sophy is not able to say what God is, why He acts, whether
He is in time and in space, whether He has acted once for all,
or acts without intermission, and so on ; for in order to know
this, one would need to be God Himself. On account of evil,
Voltaire is inclined to think of God's goodness as infinite, but
His power as limited. — His utterances regarding the nature of
the soul are undecided as to whether it is an independent
immaterial substance or not And hence his utterances regard-
ing the future existence of the soul are also undecided. Such
a future existence is improbable on the principles of natural
science ; yet a belief in it is indispensable, not merely for the
moral conduct, but also for the inner needs of the heart
2. "We abhor all Superstition." This is the second article
of Voltaire's creed. The struggle against Superstition formed
the work of Voltaire's whole life. Almost everything appeared
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DEISM. VOLTAIRE. 457
to him to be superstition which has ever been taught by a
positive religion, — not merely the Eoman hierarchy, with its
meaningless institutions and its oppression of believers, but
also the most important dogmsts of the Christian Church, as
the Trinity, the incarnation, and others. In his Epistle to
Urania he describes the God of the Church as a tyrant whom
we must hate. This God created men like Himself in order
to humiliate them the more ; He has given us corrupt hearts,
that He might have the right to punish us. Seized by a
sudden fit of repentance, He makes the waves of the sea
destroy the work of His hands ; but instead of better men, He
only lets a race of horrid robbers, dishonourable slaves, and
cruel tyrants arisa Yet the same Gkxi who drowned the
fathers will die for the children. Among a most wretched
people, the byword of the other nations, God Himself becomes
man, undergoes the weaknesses of childhood, and after a
wretched life, suffers the punishment of a shameful death.
And yet His death is without avail ; even after He has shed
His blood to extinguish our misdeeds. He continues to punish
us for sins that we have never committed. Numberless
peoples have been lost simply because they have not known
that once on a time, on another side of the world, in a comer
of Syria, the son of a carpenter died on the cross. In this
picture I do not recognise the God whom I ought to worship-
God does not need our constant worship. If we can oflfend
Him, it is by doing injustice to men. He judges us by our
virtues, and not by our sacrificea — Jesus is represented as an
unknown individual from out of the dr^ of the people ; he
was a man of energy and activity, and above all, of irreproach-
able morals, and he possessed the gift of winning adherents.
The morality preached by him was certainly good, but good
morality is always and everywhere the sama The miracles
ascribed to him may be partly later inventions and may partly
rest upon the deception by which Jesus sought to win the
superstitious people to his wholesome doctrine. Jesus was an
honest enthusiast and a good man ; he had only the weakness
of wishing to make himself spoken of, and he did not love
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458 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY IN FRANC A
the priests. It never came into his mind to found a new
religion. Jesus is used as the pretext of our fantastic doc-
trines and our religious persecutions, but he is not their author.
It was under the influence of the Alexandrian Platonism, and
with the help of a whole series of delusions and inventions,
that Christianity first arose as a distinct religion. The
disciples from being deceived became knaves; they became
falsifiers, and maintained themselves by the most unworthy
frauds. The foundations of the Christian religion are nothing
but a web of the most commonplace deceptions that proceeded
from the most wretched of the canaille, of which alone the
adherents of Christianity consisted for centuriea At first they
attempted to carry on with the assertion that God had raised
Jesus from the dead. When this coarse piece of jugglery
succeeded, a sketch was drawn up of his legendary life, with
all its miraclea Writings after writings were invented, and,
in short, the first four centuries of Christianity form an unin-
terrupted succession of falsifications and pious frauds. The
whole history of the Christian Church shows us an increasing
series of aberrations of the human mind. The massacres and
slaughterings which Christian intolerance has exhibited in all
ages have cut off about ten millions of men. The doctrine
of the Church is distorted with abundance of the crassest
superstition which puts the civilised nations deep below the
savages. They have even given God a mother, a son, and a
supposititious father. It has been asserted that he died a
shameful death, and it has been taught that gods can be made
of meal and such like. Thus did Voltaire incessantly combat
the Christian Church with the terrible weapon of his irony,
because he saw in it only the bearer of superstition and fana-
ticism. It is to the Church that his well-known saying is to
be applied, " Ecrasez Tinfäme."
3. If we now ask. What are the contents of the true reli-
gion of reason which the philosopher would put in the place
of the corrupt superstition of Christianity ? the answer does
not include much. The true religion contains nothing but
the general worship of God and love to the human race. The
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MATERIALISM AKD 8ENSATI0NAUSM. 459
term " Christian," which has now come into general use, may
remain ; and if it cannot now be otherwise, Gkxi may be even
worshipped through means of the name of Jesus, but the
intolerable burden of uninteUigent dogmas must be taken from
us. To worship God, the Supreme Being, as the cause of our
existence and the rewarder of our actions, and to love men,
this is the religion of philosophy. " Leave your monastic
prisons, leave your contradictory and useless mysteries of
faith, as but the objects of universal laughter. Preach God
and morality, and I will guarantee that there will be more
virtue and more happiness on the earth.''
III.
Materialism and Sensationalism.
Newton and Locke may be regarded as the intellectual
leaders of the English Deism. Their thoughts were adopted
without any essential change in France, and they gave rise to
views which were in the main identical with Deism. What
was peculiar in the way in which they were developed in
France arose &om the conditions of the time. The leading
principle of Newton's Natural Philosophy is that motion
proceeding according to definite laws is known as an insepar-
able quality of bodies or matter. This principle does not
itself decide as to whether motion is communicated to the
material world by a higher power external to it^ which is
(Jod ; or whether it belongs to matter by nature, and there-
fore indwells in it from eternity. Newton asserted that
every moved body points to an immaterial being who has
given motion to matter. In England, this view W6tö
universally accepted by the Deists with the single exception
of Toland, who, as we have seen, asserts that motion belongs
to matter by nature, and that thought is but corporeal motion.
In France, however, the view that motion is a quality
inseparable from matter found numerous adherents; and
what Locke had only thrown out as a casual remark, that
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whoever asserts that GUxi was not able to give matter the
capability of thinking would limit His omnipotence, was
accepted as an indisputable fact by the French materialism
and atheism.
Locke's theory of knowledge had put an end to the
assumption of innate ideas ; and the founding of all insight
upon sensation and reflection had called in question the
universal objective significance attributed in morals to the
conceptions of good and evil The moral elements were
thus referred to the various individual sensations of pleasure
and pain. The English Deism followed Locke's doctrine,
only the attempt was made to restore to the moral conceptions
their objective and universal validity, and this was mostly
done by the assumption of an innate moral sense. With
regard to morals, the French materialism went back to Locke
himself; and as to the theory of knowledge, it developed his
Empiricism into Sensationalism. Etienne Bonnot de Condillac
(1715-80) considers it as the fundamental error of Locke
that he set up two different sources of knowledge in Sensation
and Eeflection, instead of recognising that our knowledge
rests only upon sensations or the immediate feelings of the
senses. Beflection, instead of being an independent source of
knowledge, is only the channel through which ideas come
into our mind. In his TraiU des Sensations (1754), Condillac
describes, by reference to a gradually animated statue of a
human being, which is equipped with all the senses but is
yet unaffected by any impression, the gradual growth of our
mental activities. Of the senses, touch alone gives us
presentations of external objects or ideas; the other senses
only give presentations of our own states or sensations. AU
the mental activities are composed of Ideas and Sensations.
Perception is the mere receiving of ideas and sensations.
The liveliness of these excites our Attention. Past perceptions
leave traces behind, which gives Memory ; and if these traces
are as lively as were the impressions themselves when
present, we call them Imagination. Comparison of different
impressions by memory and imagination leads to conceptions,
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THE MATERIALISM OF LA METTRIE. 461
judgments, and feelings of pleasure and pain. These feelings
excite the passions, and consequently the will. Thus the
whole mental life is gradually built up out of the simple
elements of the immediate sensations. It was only a small
step farther on the path thus entered upon, when Cabanis
(1757-1808) openly declared that "the development of the
organs of the body and the development of the sensations and
passions correspond so exactly and completely to one another
that the doctrine of bodies, the doctrine of knowledge, and the
doctrine of morals, are only the three different branches of
one and the same science, namely, the universal science of
man."
Among the most important representatives of the French
materialism, we have first to mention De la Mettrie (1709-
1751). In his two works, Hidoire Naturelle de Vdme (1749)
and rhomme Machine (1748), he holds that the senses are the
only ways to knowledge. It is absurd, he says, to assume
an extramundane God in order to explain motion. Like
motion, sensation is also absolutely essential to matter, and,
indeed, whatever has sensation must be material. The
inconceivability of this assumption should not lead to its
rejection. It is only faith that can convince us of the
existence of an immaterial soul, whereas science only takes
the corporeal organization into its view. The natural moral
law knows only the one precept, *' Not to do to others what
we do not wish them to do to us." It rests only upon the
fear of our losing everything were this commandment
disregarded. It is probable that a Supreme Being exists,
but the necessity of a cultus does not follow from this
existence. As regards our own rest, it is absolutely a
matter of indifference for us to know whether there is a God
or not, and whether He has created matter or not; it is
a purely theoretical truth that is without influence upon
practice. The world, however, will never be happy so
long as it is not atheistic. For it is only under atheism
that theological wars and other abominations will cease ; and
only then will men, following their individual impulses.
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462 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY IN FRANCE.
attain by the pleasant path of virtue to happiness. Lamettrie
develops his moral theory in his Diseours mr le honheur. The
happiness of man rests upon the feeling of pleasure; and
every kind of pleasure is equally justified in principle, although,
in accordance with individual differences, one prefers one
pleasure and another another. As we are only bodies, the
highest mental enjoyments rest upon the sensible feelings of
pleasure. The conception of virtue is merely relative, and is
only determined by regard to the well-being of Society. The
stings of conscience are to be repudiated, because we always
act of necessity. — This eudaemonistic morality is furüier
developed by Helvetius (1715-1771), whose standpoint is
sufficiently characterized by the cynical thought of his
proposing to reward virtue and valour by the enjoyment
of the most beautiful women.
One of the most influential advocates and leaders of
materialism was Denis Diderot (1713-1784). At first, the
representative of a theism that believed in revelation, then an
enthusiastic adherent of a deistic religion of reason, Diderot,
about 1753, entered the lists in the cause of materialism.
He regards matter as existing from eternity and not as created
by a God external to it The whole of matter is filled with
activity and sensation ; it is universal sensibility. " If faith
teach us how all living beings have proceeded from the hand
of the Creator, the philosopher rather forms the conviction
that nature has had its proper material elements from eternity,
and that these combined with each other, because this com«
bination lay in their possibility. This embryo, sprung from
the elements, has passed through a series of transformations
and forms, and has finally risen through a constant series of
stages to motion, sensation^ thinking, and passion, to speech,
law, science, and art, just as it will, perhaps in the future,
pass through other hitherto unknown developments." The
soul is not an independent immaterial substance, but is only
the highest product of the incessantly changing mixture of
matter. There is no freedom of the will nor immortality.
What is advantageous or prejudicial to the advantage of all
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DIDEROT. TON HOLBACH. 463
is good or bad. — ^In this spirit the well-known EncydopSdie
was conducted. It was published from 175 6-1 7 6 6 by Diderot,
assisted by numerous collaborateurs holding the same opinions.
The Encydop6die, on account of its general circulation, obtained
the greatest influence over the thought of that time.
The work which sums up and in a manner concludes this
movement is the Systhne de la Nature^ 1770, of the German
Baron von Holbach (1 723-1789). It falls into two parts ; the
first deals with general fundamental principles and anthro-
pology, the second with theology. We may here pass over
the first part, which only sums up, in a final manner, what
was advanced by numerous materialistic writers to explain
the world and man, nature and morals, from matter and its
motions. The second part, consisting of thirteen diffuse
chapters, combats the conception of Gk>d and religion as the
main source of all corruption.
If men had the courage to subject their religious opinions
to an exact examination, they would find that they are
void of all reality, and are nothing but phantoms which owe
their origin to ignorance, and are rooted merely in a morbid
phantasy. As soon as man enters into life, wants begin to
make themselves felt, and all passions and strivings, all
thinking, willing, and acting, are the necessary result of the
stimuli given to us by these wants. It is these wants of
human nature that have also given occasion to the origin
and development of the idea of God. Were man always
contented, he would give himself up to the undisturbed
enjoyment of the moment; but along with his regularly
returning wants, there are also innumerable evils and mis-
fortunes which make him feel his impotence. The more the
experience of man increases, the more he learns to protect
himself against such evils, and the more do his courage and
security grow. But where the clearness of his thinking is
obscured, and the impulse to action is compelled to fruitless
striving, then is he mastered by his imagination which
mc^nifies all things, and his ignorance and weakness then
become the foundation of all superstition. When man saw
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464 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY IN FRANCE.
himself exposed to destructive forces whose starting-point he
could not find on the earth, he turned his look to the
heavens, as if the residence of these hostile powers must be
there. Fear and ignorance thus brought men at first to the
idea of a Deity ; and as all national cults fall into times of
general oppression, the individual likewise created the un-
known powers under whose influence he believes he stands
in moments of pain and fear.
Now man always judges of what he does not know by
what he does know ; and thus he attributes to that unknown
cause human intelligence and understanding, human deigns
and purposes, and human desires and passions. He then invokes
these supposed powers in prayer, seeks to win their goodwill
by self-humiliations and the presentation of gifts, builda them
temples and surrounds them with everything which appears
to them valuable and precious ; and thus does worship arise.
The supervision of worship was usually assigned to the
elders among the people. They added all sorts of formulae
and ceremonies, sacred l^nds and institutions, and thus
with the priesthood there arose a fixed order of worship and
doctrines of faith. As the idea of the Deity is rooted in
ignorance of nature, the study of nature leads to the destruc-
tion of this idea, and it is to be hoped that in the future all
superstition will give place to a better understanding of
principles, to insight, and to experience.
The elements of nature, according to D*Holbach, were the
first gods. All nature and its several parts were raised into
personal beings by the help of poetry, and thus mythology
arosa The people did not see through these allegories, but
worshipped mere personifications as real persons. Later
thinkers then separated nature from her own internal power,
and raised this activity to a separate being which they called
God, yet without having any clear ideas of such a being.
An unknown power was thus preferred to one that was
known ; for man does not heed what lies at hand, but rather
turns away to the mysterious, which gives a welcome employ-
ment to his imagination. And now men vied with jeach
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DIDEROT. YON HOLBAGH. 465
Other in decorating this 8elf*created Being with the moat
inconceivable attributes, but they could only excogitate
mysterious words without meaning. As man knows nothing
except nature, he was compelled to transfer the qualities of
nature, and especially of man himself, to God, only that these
were increased to infinity. As man believes that the principle
moving his body is a spirit or an immaterial substance, he
likewise thinks of God as a spiritual or immaterial essence.
The perception of opposite effects in nature leads to the
assumption of different gods ; and, in particular, the opposi-
tion of the useful and the prejudicial leads to the assumption
of a good and an evil Deity. On the other hand, the view
that God is the soul of the universe leads to the unity of
God ; but even then it is imagined that God has distributed
the cares connected with the government of the world
among a whole series of lower gods. And because it is
believed that man cannot soar to the Supreme Being without
intermediate connecting members, the assertion is made of a
whole series of divine beings. In order to escape the diflBculty
that the one God, who is equipped with infinite goodness,
wisdom, and power, brings forth the most contradictory effects,
certain hostile powers are assumed, which, edthough subordi-
nated, are yet capable of destroying G<xl's purposes and plans.
This conception of God is found to be absolutely unten-
able. But then came the theologians who interdicted the use
of reason and withdrew God always more from the intelli-
gence of men in order that they might alone interpret the
will of this inconceivable Being. The theologians persuaded
men that the right faith consists in the humble acceptance of
mysterious and inconceivable religious truths, and that the
denunciation of reason is the most agreeable sacrifice that can
be brought to God. The universal inclination to regard the
inconceivable as venerable, is the root of the fantastic pro-
perties with which theology decorates the nature of God.
All these qualities are merely negations, and ought to raise
God above the sphere of human comprehension ; they are
only negations of the qualities which man perceives in him-
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466 THE EIGHTEE5TH CENTURY IN FRANCE.
self and in the beings that surround him. Hence Grod is
called infinite, eternal^ unchangeable, and immatetial, without
its being considered that nothing positive can ever proceed
from a union of negative attributes. Now, as such a process
of abstraction always volatilizes the idea of God more and
more, and withdraws it from man's circle of visicMi, the
attempt is made to bring God nearer to us in another way,
namely, by His moral qualities. These are all derived in
reality from the human modes of being and acting, alihou^
men thereby fall inevitaUy into contradiction with the
metaphysical qualities already attributed to Grod. As the
human perfections are further transferred in the highest
degree to God, the most incompatible predicates are put
together, and a conception of God is obtained which is
refuted every moment by experience. " 0 foolish rashness
which arbitrarily creates a Lord of nature and equips Him
with human qualities, impulses, and inclinations in order to
mirror itself in this self-created being ! " The most powerful
objection to the theological conception of God is the actual
existence of evil This compels us either to assume two
opposite principles, or to admit that God is alternately good
and bad, or that He acts by necessity. An exact examina-
tion shows irrefutably that the moral qualities ,can just
as little be united with each other as with the metaphysical
qualities. God is not omnipresent, if He is not also present
in the man who sins ; He is not almighty, if He admits evil
into the worid ; He is not infinite, if a nature different from
His can exist along with Him ; He is not unchangeable, if
His sentiments can change. Bevelation likewise contradicts
the justice, goodness, and unchangeaUeness of God. For it
presupposes that God for a long time reserved the knowledge
necessary to salvation ; that, full of partiality. He directs His
communication only to a few men ; and that He conceals His
will at one time and communiiates it at another. The
traditional Arguments for the existence of God prove nothing.
In expounding them, the author shows a certain acuteness,
although he rarely rises above a shallow reasoning, and he is
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DIDEKOT. VOK HOLBACH. 467
not without skill in pointing out the difiSculty of a convincing
demonstration. In his view an appeal to the order and
harmony of the universe appears the weakest argument of
all ; for this order and harmony are the necessary result of
the laws of matter itself. If it is said Üiat a creature cannot
be without a creator, it is overlooked that nature is not
created, but has existed from efcemity. The internal self-
active power of the elements is the properly formative
principle in nature, and along with it a special ordering and
movii]^ principle is neither necessary nor admissible.
As the Deity thus exists merely in the phantasy of man,
the colouring of his individual character must naturally be
communicated to this object Man's God will accordingly
undergo all the changes of his organism and of his internal
states ; He will now be a cheerful, benevolent^ philanthropic
being, and again a gloomy, misanthropic, cruel being, according
to the momentary mood in which man finds himself. But is
not that a strange Grod which must feel every moment the
changes of our organism ? Again, if men will fall back upon
natural religion or the empty belief in the existence of
God, they commit the greatest inconsequences. If it is
believed at all that God exists, then everything must also be
believed that His ministers say of Him, and the worst super-
stition is not more incredible than the God in whom this
superstition is rooted. What is thus devised is as little
capable of degrees as the truth itself; and hence the most
superstitions among the superstitious is more logical than those
who first assume a God and then are unwilling to draw
the necessary consequences of that assumption. For is there
a greater miracle than the creation out of nothing? or a
more inconceivable mystery than a God whom our knowledge
cannot reach, and who would yet be recognised ? or a greater
contradiction than an all-wise and almighty architect who only
builds in order to pull down ? — But although the existence of
the theological God and the reality of the attributes assigned
to Him were to be recognised, nothing would follow therefrom
to justify the worship of God which is represented as our
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468 THE laGHTEENTH CBNTÜBT IK FRANCS.
duty. What cause have we to fear God, if He is infinitely
good ? What reason have we to be concerned about our fate, if
He is infinitely wise ? Why should we storm Him ¥rith prayers
and in£(»in Him of our wants, if He is all-knowing 1 Why should
we erect temples to Him, if He is omnipresent ? Why should
we present Him offerings and gift8,if He is the Lord of all things ?
like all other opinions and institutions, Beligion must also
be judged in the last resort by its practical utility. Bearded
in this light, Seligion fells under a still severer condemnation.
In particular, it has c^ompletely undermined morality ; it has
founded the moral laws upon the will of God, and thus
subjected them to all the variations of the divine caprice ; it
has represented actions which should be reprobated, as directly
commanded by God; it has called forth the cruellest persecutions
and slaughtered numberless men in bloody wara The priests,
instead of being models of morality, have always distinguished
themselves by their rapacity, ambition, intolerance, and similar
qualitie& In politics, religion has also produced the most
pernicious effects, and it has strongly hindered the progress of
the human sciences. Hence it is an indispensable duty to
remove delusions which are only fitted to destroy our rest
and our peace. But although there are atheists, and although
atheism is absolutely unprejudicial to morality, it is still
improbable that whole nations will make it their confession.
The idea of God is rooted too deeply in our whole manner of
thinking for the majority of men ever to get rid of it The
continuance of the customary notions suits the convenience of
most men better than passing into a new mode of thinking ;
and hence atheism is as little suited to the people as would be
the pursuit on their part of philosophy generally.
IV.
The Opposition of Eeligious Feeling. Rousseau.
The last remark and others of the kind, such as that men
prefer the most incredible fables to the clearest utterances
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THE OPPOSITION OF RBLIGIOUS FEELING. EOITSSEATJ. 469
of reason in matters of religion as by an irresistible necessity,
might well have led the author of the SysUme de la Naiv/rt
to the conjecture that religion is founded more deeply and
more certainly in the nature of man than merely on fear
and ignorance. At all events, his hope that the advancing
enlightenment would put an end to religion has not been
hitherto fulfilled. On the contrary, there arose among his
contemporaries one who enthusiastically proclaimed the truth
that Beligion lived in his heart and could not be set aside
by any cold reasoning. This was Jean Jacques Bousseau
(1712~1778). The same course was taken here as appeared
repeatedly in the case of the Grerman " Enlightenment" The
first opponents of the empty Enlightenment and naturalistic
rejection of religion did not go beyond the immediate feeling
of the religious life in the individual himsell Positive
religion, both in its origin and its special value, still continued
to be unintelligible to them.
Bousseau, starting from humble and limited circumstances,
and rising to literary celebrity after long hard struggles and
not without many aberrations, is known as the enthusiastic
Apostle of Nature. He wished for himself a life in and with
the beauty of nature, undisturbed by the npise of cities and
by the showy glitter of modem civilisation. He saw in the
secular sciences a dangerous enemy of natural morality ; he
regarded property and civilisation as the first foundation of
social inequality and its lamentable consequences ; and he
recognised in nature the only sure guide in education. He
thus went back directly to what is of nature, and his view of
religion as we find it especially expressed in the Confession of
the Savoyard Vicar, an episode of his Umile, corresponds to
this position. As the Vicar is not led by scientific criticism
to his doubts about the doctrine of the Church, but by
the contradiction of his celibacy to the law of nature, he will
not found his newly- won conviction upon scientific principles
but upon the infallible voice of his heart. This position
separates him from the natural religion of a Voltaire, with
whom he in fact essentially agrees, but his conflict is hardly
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470 THX EIGHTEENTH OKNTUBT IN FRANCS.
less against positive religion than against atheism and
materialism.
The Vicar, kd to doubt by the reason indicated, could,
however, not remain in this state; for it is intolerable to
doubt of things the knowledge of which is of importance
to us. The philosophers, however, proved themselves to be
incapable of giving help. Proudly and peremptorily they
assert everything without proving anything whatever. The
human mind is entirely inadequate to understand the world,
and it is only our pride that makes us obstinately defend our
own opinion as true. Hence it is necessary to limit our
inquiries to what immediately concerns us, and instead of
external authorities, to follow the internal light and the
immediate conviction connected therewith. The first truth to
which I cannot refuse my assent is this, that I exist and have
senses by which I become affected. I feel that the objects of
my sensible perception are external to me, and hence the
existence of an external material world, when I reflect upon
the objects of my sensible perception, is as certain to me
as my own existence. I become conscious of myself in the
process of judgment as an active and intelligent being. This
power of thinking, however, is entirely different from sensa-
tion ; for while it is not in my power whether I will feel
sensations or not, it entirely depends upon myself as to
whether I will investigate more or less what I feel What-
ever philosophy may say, I lay claim to the honour of think-
ing. No material body can move itself and think; but
because I think and am free in my actions, I am animated by
an immaterial substance.
In external material things I observe motion and rest ;
and rest appears as their natural state. Motion is partly
communicated and partly voluntary. I am immediately
certain of voluntary motion, because I feel that the motions of
my body depend merely on the will Inanimate bodies again
have motion, not of themselves, but from a wül which moves
the system of the world. How a will produces a corporeal
action is to me inconceivable, but that such takes place I learn
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THE OPPOSITION OF BEUGIOUS FEELING. K0T7SSEAÜ. 471
by experience in myself. I know the will as a moving cause,
whereas to conceive of matter as a producing cause would be
to conceive an effect without a cause, or to conceive nothing.
— ^If moved matter shows me a will, then does matter when
moved according to certain laws show me an intelligence or
an intelligent being. The final end of the universe is con-
cealed from us, yet everywhere I find order cmd harmony;
the part subserves the whole, and the whole again serves
the part It is not possible that this harmoniously ordered
world can be the last result of accidental combinations in
which matter moved by blind forces makes trial of itself ;
it necessarily points to an intelligent cause. This Being, who
moves the system of the world a|id arranges things in order, I
call Grod. It is rash to rationalize about the nature of God.
A wise man will never enter on such thoughts but with
trembling, and in the assurance that he is not in a position to
fathom them. I do not even know how Gk)d has created the
world, for the idea of creation goes beyond my understanding ;
bat I believe it in so far as I apprehend it. Without doubt,
Grod is eternal ; and although my mind cannot grasp the idea
of eternity, yet I conceive that He has been before all things,
that He will be so long as they exist, and that He will
still be when everything has passed away. If I thus discover
the various attributes of Gtod, of which I have no definite idea,
it is done by necessary inferences or through the good use of my
reasoa If I say that God is such and such, I feel it and
prove it to myself ; but I do not therefore conceive any the
better how God can be so.
If I now consider the position which is assigned to us as
men in the universe, I find that we unquestionably occupy
the first rank, and that everything is made for us and is
related to us. In view of this there then arises in my heart
a feeling of thankfulness and praise towards the author of my
being, and from this feeling springs my first homage to the
beneficent Deity. I invoke the Supreme Power, and I am
moved by its benefactions. It is not necessary that I be
taught this worship ; it is prescribed to me by nature herselt
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472 THI EIGHTEINTH CINTUBT IN FfiAVCS.
Is it not a natural consequence of self-love to honour what
protects us, and to love what wishes our well-being? — ^But the
more I strive to contemjdate God's infinite being, so much
the less do I conceive it ; and the less I conceive it, so much
the more do I worship Himself. I humble myself and say :
" Being of all beings, I am because Thpu art ; I rise to my
source when I unoeasin^y meditate on Thee. The worthiest
use of my reason is to annihilate itself before Thee. It is the
rapture of my mind, it is the very stimulation of my weak-
ness, when I feel myself oppressed by Thy greatnesa"
God who can do all things can only will what is good.
Gk)odne8s and justice are therefore the two attributes which
we nrost necessarily assign to God. Evil seems to speak
against goodness, but the principle of evil lies in man,
who, by his freedom, chooses what is bad, and dius draws
evil as a punishment upon himself. It is urged i^ainst
Justice, that the just man has so often experience of what is
bad on earth, while what is good happens to the unjust
This fact, however, only shows that there will be a compen-
sation in the future life. Although I had no other proof of
the Immortality of the Soul than the triumph of what is bad
and the suppression of what is just in this world, this alone
would keep me from doubting of it. Above all, however»
I feel by my very vices that I now only half live, and that
the life of the soul only begins with the death of the body.
In the life beyond, the remembrance of what we have
done here will constitute the happiness of the righteous
and the torture of the wicked, although it is hard for
me to believe that the tortures of the godless will be
eternal
The fundamental rules of my conduct I likewise find
inscribed by nature with indelible lines in the depths of my
heart All that I feel as good is good ; and aU that I feel as
bad is bad. The conscience never dec^ves us, but is to the
soul the same as instinct or natural impulse is to the body.
We feel not merely what promotes our own happiness to be
good, but edso what conduces to the happiness of others,
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THE OPPOSITION OF RELIGIOUS FEELING. BOUSSEAU. 473
This is the notion of the good that is everywhere the same,
and which history shows us, in spite of the vast variety of
manners and characters among all nations and at all times.
'' Oh, conscience ! conscience I Divine impulse I Immortal
and heavenly voice I Sure guide of an ignorant and limited
but intelligent and free being, infallible judge of good and
bad, making man like to God, Thou dost constitute the
excellence of man's nature, and the morality of his actions.
Without Thee I feel nothing in myself which raises me above
the brutes, except the melancholy privilege of straying from
error into error by means of an understanding that is without
a standard, and a reason that is without a principle ! "
This emphatic struggle against atheism and materialism,
and this decided testimony for religion as immediately felt
in the heart of the individual, are accompanied with a hardly
less earnest opposition to every positive religioa
They see, — Bousseau thus makes his Vicar speak, — they
see in my preaching only Natural Beligion ; it is but seldom
that any other is required. No foundation for any other
requirement is seen; for it is not possible that I can be
punished if I serve God according to the knowledge which He
gives to my mind, and the feelings which He inspires in my
heart It is impossible that I can get a purer morality
and a purer faith from a positive doctrine than from the good
use of the powers of my souL Bevelations only lower God
by giving Him human passions. Instead of purifying men's
ideas of the great Being, they only confuse particular doctrines,
add absurd contradictions to the inconceivable mysteries which
surround Him, and make men arrogant, unbearable, and cruel.
The diversity of religions", instead of being removed by
revelation, rests upon it ; for as soon as it occurred to men
to make God speak, every individual made Him say what he
wished. If, on the contrary, men had only listened to what
Grod says to the heart of man, there would never have been
more than one religion on the earth.
The various revealed religions all raise the same claim.
Every one claims that it alone possesses the truth, and that
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474 THE EIOHTEENTH CSNTURT IN FBANCI.
all the others are false ; and yet thej all ground this daim
upon the authority of their own priests and faüiers. In
support of die belief that something is a divine revelatioii, I
am always presented only with human testimonies. Men
inform me what Qod has said ; men give narratives of the
accompanying miracles ; but as miracles are far less suited to
lead us to Ood than the inviolable order of nature, so does
the irrationality of the revealed doctrines encumber their
acceptance. Beason teaches that the whole is greater Üian
the part ; revelation teaches that the part is greater than the
whola Ought I then to assume that God contradicts
Himself when He says something in revelation that is
different from what he says in reason? And yet the
proclaimer of revelation would move one to accept it by
grounds of reason. Further, it is to be noticed that revela-
tion can only be communicated by books to the after
generations ; nay more, by books written in dead languages.
Does it correspond to the goodness of Grod to make the
knowledge of the true religion so difiBcult, and to make it
dependent on accident ? But although I cannot admit that
the Scriptures are an infallible and necessary revektton, yet
I confess that their majesty astonishes me, and that the
hoUness of the gospel speaks to my heart The books of the
philosophers, with all their pomp, how small are they when
compared with it ! Can He whose history the gospel relates
be a mere man ? Can a book which is at once so sublime
and so simple be indeed the work of men i
I worship God in the simplicity of my heart, and only
seek to know what is important for my conduct In regard
to those doctrines of faith which have no influence upon
actions, I give myself no troubla I look upon all the
separate religions as so many sacred institutioi» which
prescribe in every country a uniform mode of honouring Grod
by a public worship, and which have their foundation in the
climate, in the form of government, in the characteristics of
the people, or other local causes. I regard them all as good,
if God is worshipped in them in a becoming way, but the
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THE OPPOSITION OP RELIGIOUS FEELING. ROUSSEAU. 475
essential worship is the worship of the heart. The true
duties of religion do not depend on the institutions of men.
An upright heart is the *true temple of God ; and in every
country and in every sect, to love God above all things, and
one's neighbour as oneself, is the sum and substance of
the law.
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SECTION EIGHTH.
LEIBNIZ AND THE GERMAN AUFKLABÜNG.
AUFKLÄEUNG (" InteUectual Enlightenment" or "lUu-
minism ") is the term which is used to designate the
leading characteristics of the spiritual life of Germany about
the middle of the last century. But it is difficult to settle
the precise meaning of this expression ^ with which at that
time the related expresssion Aufhellung, or sometimes also
Aufheiterung, was used as interchangeable. Moses Mendels-
sohn describes the aim of Aufklärung or "Enlightenment"
to be "rational knowledge and the capability of rational
reflection upon the things of human life, according to the
proportion of their importance and their influence on the
destination of man." According to Kant, "Enlightenment"
is "the issuing of man from a pupilage which is due to
himself." And this pupilage is "the incapability of using
his understanding without the guidance of another." The
essential nature of Enlightenment or Illuminism accordingly
consists in the liberation of the understanding from the
sway of authority when it has become certain of itself. The
authority to be got rid of is that of the ecclesiastical dogma,
^ [It is practicaUy impossible to give «n exact and adequate rendering of the
German term Au/klänmg by any one available English equivalent It is usually
represented by "Enli^tenment," or ** Illuminism," or "Illumination;'* but
none of these terms carries the historical connotation of the original, and any
one of them by itself would be occasionally misleading. In these circumstance
it has been thought advisable to retain the Gennan term where it is important to
indicate precisely the historical movement described in this Section, and only
to use " Enlightenment,'* or ** Illuminism,^' or '* Intellectualism " as its
equivalent when it is sufficiently accurate. The term Aufklärung (literally, a
"clearing up") is now commonly adopted in the literary usage of English
writers on this phase of German thought. It will be evident from what follows
that, in connection with the Philosophy of Religion, the term may be taken
generally as a technical designation for the intellectual, and mainly negative,
stage of the German Rationalism of the 18th century before Kant — Ta.]
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LEIBNIZ AND THE GERMAN AUFKLÄRUNG. 477
and it has to be set aside by the unlimited supremacy of the
natural reason or of the sound human understanding. — ^This
definition must here suffice. Anything more precise would not
give room for the various currents that are found within the
period of the ÄufHärung. It at least indicates the two most
important characteristics of the movement, namely, that religion
and theology entirely control the interest of the time, and that
intellectual reflection is brought into the field against them.
This '' Enlightenment " or "Uluminism" is thus in brief
the German parallel to the English Deism and the French
Materialism. The movement appears in Germany later than
the English and the French movements, because the German
people were then behind the other nations in all departments
of the spiritual life, mainly in consequence of the thirty
years' war. Accordingly, if the ultimate principle of the
Aufklärung lies in the universal advance of the mind as it
ripens to independence, the question as to its causes need
only take primarily into account the occasions that come into
view. Among these, we consider that too little importance is
commonly laid upon the dissolving influence of Socinianisifi.
Although Socinianism was persecuted by the Church and
the State with equal zeal, its intellectual and juridical con-
ception of religion, and its cold rational criticism, found not a
few friends in Germany, some of whom belonged to the learned
circles. That elements akin to it were at least not entirely
awjmting, is shown by the work entitled De tribvs impostorHms^
and the " Corresi)ondence regarding the nature of the soul," *
a purely materialistic production which was much discussed
in its time. Nor is the influence of other countries to be
under-estimated. France was regarded at that time by the
higher classes in Germany as the model that was worthy of
imitation in all questions of the spiritual life. Hence not
only were French mvarUs attracted by Frederick the Great
to his Court, but their writings were also much read in
^ Cf. Gen the, De impostura rdigionum^ Leipzig 1838.
• Bri^vsechsel über das Wesen der Seele, Cf. F. A. Lange, Oeschichte des
Materialismus, 8 Aufl. i. 819.
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478 LEIBNIZ AND THE GSfiMAN AOTKLIsüNO.
aristocratic circles. The English Deists worked more upon
the learned circles. Their writings were numerously diffused
in the original, as well as in French and German translations,
and they were incisively discussed in the widest read reviews,
such as the Leipsic Acta Erudüorum and Löscher's Unsekd-
dige Naehrichietk They were also violently attacked in
special treatises, and especially in acadendc disputations and
programmes, and were even made the subject of special
lectures in several Universities. In the Netherlands, partly
in consequence of the toleration of all ecclesiastical parties
prevailing from the time of the Beformation, partly on
account of the weakening of the ecclesiastical orthodoxy that
arose with Arminianism and Coooejanism, and partly under
the influence of the speculations of Descartes and Spinoza,
there sprang up an earnest but unbounded criticism, which
exercised no small influence upon the Grerman theology. In
Germany itself, the ecclesiastical orthodoxy had already lost
its supremacy, less from the isolated efibrts of mystics or
fantastic doubters, than from the influence of Pietism. Slowly
yet constantly and generally, had this process of dissolution
advanced during the course of the Seventeenth Century, so
that, in the beginning of the Eighteenth Centuiy, the supre-
macy of Pietism was universal, and the last really orthodox
dogmatic — that of HoUaz — appeared in 1707. But the cold
intellectual Enlightenment that empties religion of its peculiar
contents and the deeply inward Pietism are direct opposites,
and their irreconcilability soon enough showed itsel£ They
found their common enemy, however, in the ossified orthodoxy
of the Seventeenth Century ; and in overcoming this ortho-
doxy. Pietism did no little to prepare for the Aufklärung. In
another way it also contributed to call forth this movement
The principle of Spener, that piety ought to be a principle of
life permeating all things, was carried by its later advocates
to the extreme of a contempt for all science. Francke, who
made it the object of his scientific activity to make the theo-
logians Christians rather than to make the yoimg Christians
theologians, expresses his principle by saying that "a grain
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LEIBNIZ AKD THE GEBHAN AUFKLAfiUNa 479
of living faith is to be reckoned higher than a hundredweight
of mere historical science, and a drop of love is to be regarded
as higher than an ocean of the knowledge of all mysteries."
According to the known law of development» this onesided-
ness could not bat call forth a counter onesidedness* Laying
stress merely on piety thus led to laying stress merely upon
intellectaal insight The repeated attempts to bring about
a union of the different confessions, although without success,
may also have co-operated in preparing for this movement
At least it is a fact that the violent attacks of the time were
directed against IndifferenHsm as well as against Naturalism,
Atheism, Deism, and Pantheism. The most dangerous repre-
sentative of this tendency appeared in Ericus Friedlich,^
^ho asserted that faith does indeed demand a science of the
understanding, but only a little is required, and that need not
be according to any definite formula. In order to be saved,
he held that we must indeed confess the Christian religion,
but it is not necessary to belong to a particular sect, or to
accept its brain-formulas ; it is enough to know that Christ is
the saviour of the world, and that God, for His sake, forgives
\xa oxur sins, and bestows power to be good. Above all, a
distinction must be made between brain-belief, as a mere
acceptance of certain doctrines, and the true faith of the
heart, which is known by love to God and our neighbour and
the denial of oneself.
As the English Deism was determined more precisely by
the philosophy of Locke and the natural science of Newton,
as the Dutch Criticism was determined by the speculations of
Descartes and Spinoza, and as the French Materialism was led
by the dissolving scepticism of Bayle, so does the German
lUuminism receive its characteristic stamp from the system
* Under the name of "Ericus Friedliebins" there speared in 1700 an
'* UnUrtMchung des indifferentismi religionum, de man für hält, es kßime ein
jeder selig toerden, er habe einen Glauben oder Religion^ welche er wolle.**
The real author was the jurist Jakob Friedridi Lndovici. Cf. Waloh, JSinlei-
tung in die Beligions-StreUigkeiten ansser der Evangelisch -Lutherischen Kirche,
Th. T. The same position was combated in England under the name of
' ' Latitndinariauism. "
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480 L1EIBNIZ AND THE GERHAK AUFKLARUKG.
of a pliilosopher who preceded it This philosopher was
Leibniz. The philosophy of Leibniz may appropriately be
regarded as a grand apology or speculative constniction of
the Christian religion ; and in my opinion, the strictly l(^cal
connection and the profound movement of thought that
characterize the Leibnizian system is overlooked when its
undeniably Christian character is referred to mere accommo-
dation. In consequence of this influence, the German
AufHärwng, in so far as it stands under the influence of
the philosophy of Leibniz as popularized by Christian WolfT,
presents a character that is throughout friendly to religion.
Certainly its distingmshing character is not supra-naturalistic.
For although the possibility of revelation remains uncontested,
yet every alleged revelation is subjected to the test of a series
of criteria ; and in fact all religious utterances are referred as
regards their origin to reason, and as regards their contents
to natural religion, and consequently to the principles of
natural morality. Naturally men were not wanting who
went beyond this position ; but as they were combated on
all sides, they may be regarded as mostly attaching them-
selves to the foreign influences. This may suffice as a pre-
liminary sketch of the course of the following exposition.
I.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.
. We find the key to the philosophy of Leibniz ^ in his
definition of the conception which stands in the foreground
of the philosophical inquiry of the time. This conception
was that of Substance. The Materialists asserted that there
were only corporeal substances. Spinoza asserted a single
substance with infinitely many attributes, of which, however,
thinking and extension are the only two that are known to
' Leibni2*8 works, as referred to here, are edited in 2, vols, bj Erdmann
(1840). Cf. Zeller in his OtschichU der deutschen Philosophie, 2 Aufl. 1S75,
and Knno Fischer, ut supra. A. Pichler, Die Thedogis des Z^eibnitz, 2 Bde,
1869-70.
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THE DOCTKINES OF LEIBNIZ, 481 '
US. Descartes assumed an infiDite substance which is abso«
lutely independent and is the ground of all things, and two
finite substances that are entirely independent of each other,
but are established by the infinite substance, namely, body
and mind, or extended and thinking substance. Leibniz,
however, recognises that as Materialism is refuted by the
undeniable fact of self-consciousness and thinking, so is
Descartes refuted by the circumstance that bodies and their
phenomena, especially resistance, impenetrability, and inertia,
cannot possibly be explained by extension alone. He accord-
ingly goes back to the conception of Force. Immaterial force
is the only thing that is real and truly essential in all things;
this force, however, is active, constantly and unceasingly
active, and matter is only the appearance or effect of
immaterial force. The rigid opposition between thinking
and extension is thus set aside, and in contrast to the
dualism of Descartes a single principle is gained for the
explanation of the world. If, with Spinoza, one substance
only is asserted, we would have to conceive of individual
things as entirely without power and without effect In
order to escape this consequence, Leibniz asserts, on the
contrary, that every individual thing rests upon a force that
is special to it, and that it is a distinct substance; for as
many things äs there are, there are just as many forces or
just as many substances. But it must be well imderstood
that it is not the compound things as we find them in com-
plexes of more or fewer parts that are thus regarded as
substances. On the contrary, every simple thing that is not
compound, and which is therefore no longer divisible, is a
force or substance ; for whatever is active is as such properly
a substance. And if everything is a substance, the diversity
of things (meaning, of course, simple and not compound things)
can only rest upon the diversity of substances. Hence there
are not merely infinitely many substances, but there are also
infinitely diverse substances, equipped with their individual
characteristics. For substances as thus defined, Leibniz intro-
duces the expression " monads." Monads are single substances,
VOL. L 2 H - T
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482 LEIBNIZ AND THE GEBHAN AUFKLABÜNG.
and thejr are infinite in number ; they are not compound but
simple, and they are therefore real unities. They are points,
but they are not physical points as corporeal and divisiUe
magnitudes are: nor are they mathematical points without
real existence ; but they are metaphysical, or substantial and
essential pointa They accordingly approach the nature of
atoms, but they are distinguished from atoms, partly by their
quality as points being actually indivisible, and partly by
their active forces. Further, they are not indifferent as
regards their form, but are essential or substantial forms ; and
hence they are specially determined in themselves as distinct
individual things. These Monads form the fundamental prin-
ciple of the metaphysics of Leibniz.
Monads are immaterial forces. Such Monads are presented
immediately in our own consciousness, in the percipient opera-
tions of the mind. Now we have to choose between two
views : either the mind alone has perceptions, and then we
have the rigid contrast of mind and body as in Descartes ; or
we assert the essential identity and the thorough analogy of
all things, and then all substances must be conceived as per-
cipients. Leibniz can only accept the latter view. He is
led to the same result by another consideration. Everytiiing
is an Individuum, that is, it has a distinctive form founded in
its unique connection of the manifold into unity. But every
form points to a perception, it being all the same whether this
is realized as conscious in us or as unconscious in things. For
" the passing state, which embraces and apprehends a plurality
in unity, or in a simple substance, is just what is called Per-
ception, and it must be distinguished, as afterwards become
clear, from Apperception or Consciousness. And here lies the
main error of the Cartesians, that they have reckoned the
Perceptions of which there is no Consciousness, as nothing."
The Monads are thus percipient beings. If Perception
constitutes the essence df the Monads, their individual
differences can only be founded in the differences of their
perception, that is, in the different degrees of its distinctness.
The most important distinction is that between Perceptions
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THE DOCTRINES OF LEIBNIZ. 483
and Apperceptions, or between unconscious and conscious ideas.
The latter are the special prerogative of minds, but it is at the
same time erroneous to ascribe to minds none but conscious
perceptions. Apart from this, the perceptions are clear at one
time and obscure • at another, according as they avail to^
cognise the object, and to distinguish it from other objects,
or not. The clear perceptions again are either distinct or
confused, according as we can distinguish the several marks
in them or not
The object of this perception is not the percipient Monad*
alone by itself, but every Monad embraces in its perception
all other individuals, or the whole universe as well. For no
Monad can exist alone» and its individuality just consists in
this distinguishing relation of it to all other Monads. Hence
every Monad is a representing thing ; it is a mirror of the
universe, not as if the universe entered into it through
windows from without, but in virtue of its own essential
power of representation.
** This bond or this accommodation of all created things to
everything, and of each thing to all the rest, brings it about
that every simple substance has relations which express all
the other substances ; and it is in consequence a perpetual
living mirror of the universa" The individuality and per-
fection of the Monads are thus determined by the degree of
the distinctness with which they represent or mirror the
universe in themselves. It is only by means of this perception
and representation that any influence of the different Monads
upon each other becomes possible. It consists in giving
regard to the rest of the universe in the activity of the
Monad; for things as substances are entirely independent
of one another; and hence can they neither by external
influence nor by external assistance exercise an influence upon
one another
Monads are active forces or efficient powers. At the same
time, every Monad is individual; and it is thus limited
self-activity. A Monad is therefore a union of active force and
of limitation or passive force. Activity is the ground of all
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484 LEIBNIZ AND THE GEBMAN AUFKLlBÜNa
perfection, pasaiyity is the ground of all defect or imperfection.
Matter rests upon passive force or passivity. The form or
the soul rests upon active force or activity. Hence as we
distinguish in every Monad active and passive force, so also
do we distinguish in it soul and body. Their reciprocal
relation rests therefore neither upon immediate influence nw
upon the immediate guidance of God, nor upon the pre-estab-
lished harmony, but on the Cact that every Monad has, according
to its peculiar individuality or the degree of its perfection, a
definite measure of active force and an exactly corresponding
measure of passive force, so that it is a determinate union <rf
soul and body. If the active force or the soul changes, there
results €0 ip$o a change of the body. Now, in the sphere
of bodies, the mechanical explanation, from the conception
of causes, holds good ; and in the sphere of soul, tiie
teleological explanation from the conception of ends holds
good, because the soul is in fact a self-active force, and every
self-active force proceeds by setting befo^ it ends. If body and
soul are immediately one in a single body, or if every Monad
is an animated body, the dualism of efficient and final causes,
and of the mechanical and teleological explanation of nature,
is thus removed and their unity is immediately given.
The same position becomes clear from a consideration of
Monads as representative beings. Every Monad represents
the universe, and with a degree of distinctness that is peculiar
to it Excepting God, a perfectly clear and distinct represen-
tation of the universe is proper to no Monad ; but to all there
is only a more or less confused or obscure representation.
This want of distinct representation is the principle of matter
or of body, whereas distinct representation is the principle of
form or the souL Both distinctness and indistinctness of
representation come together in a quite definite way in a
definite degree of perfection ; and hence the . mysterious
harmony of soul and body.
The same holds true of organic bodies as complexes of
Monads. One Monad in fact determines others ip so far as
in it there is a clear and distinct representaticm of what these
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THE DOCTKINES OF LEIBNIZ. 485
obscurely and indistinctlj represent. Now, if there is in a
Monad a clear and distinct perception of what takes place in
more imperfect Monad3, they form together a complex of
Monads, or an organism. The Monad with the clearest and
distinctest representation forms the Central-Monad or Sool ;
while the Monads with obscure or confused representations,
which are only connected with each other through their
relation to that Central-Monad, form the body. In these
organisms, and particularly in man, the relation of body and
soul is, of course, entirely the same as in the simple Monads.
A corporeal mass therefore exists only as a confused represen-
tation, yet not existing merely in our representation ; but, as the
confused or obscure representation is as such the foundation
of what is material, material bodies are likewise a " pheno-
menon bene fundatum."
Monads are active forces or efficient powers. As a con-
stantly operating power, a Monad is in a {Nroeess of perpetual
change or in perpetual development. According to its inter-
nal characteristic, it is engaged in a continuous striving to
exchange its present state for another. This striving is called
by Leibniz " Appetitiou." "The action of the internal prin-
ciple which effects the change or transition from one percep-
tion to another may be called Appetition." Perception and
Appetition thus constitute together the characteristic nature
or the individuality of the Monads.
These two elements, however, do not stand in an exclusive
relation to one janother. Every development is directed
towards a goal ; every striving will attain a purpose. Such
goal and purpose, however, only exist as they are perceived,
and thus can only operate as perception. In the perception,
there must therefore be already present in the beginning of
the development what the Monad becomes in the course of it
It is not indeed present as a conscious or distinct perception ;
for, as the essence of the Monad consists in perception, its
development is only a development into always clearer and
distincter perception. But as unconscious obscure perception,
or as capacity or disposition, the goal of t^e development is
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•486 LEIBNIZ AND THE GERMAN AUTKLARUXO.
already contained in the beginning. The conception of
development accordingly now becomes clear. It is not
merely a change of the Monad, but a perpetually advancing
change, tt is not founded on external causes, which in
general cannot work upon a Monad, but in an internal
principle. Besides this principle of change, tiiere must,
however, also be " un detail de ce qui change, qui fasse poor
ainsi dire la sp^ification et la vari^t^ des substances simples;"
that is, some particular thing which changes, and which, so to
•speak, constitutes the specification and the variety of simple
-substanoesL " This particular thing must include a plnralitjr
in unity or in simplicity." In other words, development is
nothing but the unfolding of the specific nature of the Monad
realizing itself through a series of regulated actions ; or it is
the realization of its original endowment "Every Monad
contains in its own essence the law of the constant succession
of its actions; it contains in itself its past and its future."
Every form of manifestation or stage of development is the
result of all the earlier and the cause of all the following
forms or stages. ** As every present state of a simple
substance is the natural consequence of its past, the present
is pregnant with the future."
Here again we have the same unity of the mechanical and
the teleological explanation. Development is continually
directed to an end, and it is therefore always a working in
accordance with purpose ; it is an activity that strives
towards a goal At the same time, however, the development
is founded entirely in the specific internal condition of the
Monad, that is, in its constitution or obscure perceptions ; and
thus it is also sufficiently explained causally. There is
therefore no opposition between efficient causes and final
causes, or between a mechanical and a teleological view of
the world ; in the immanent development the two are
immediately one.
According to the degree in the distinctness of their per-
ceptions, we have to distinguish as the most important classes
of Monads, Bodies, Souls, and Spirits. Spirits are Monads
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THE DOCTRINES OF LEIBNIZ. 487
with self -consciousness; they are Monads that know and
wilL But although this is the distinguishing prerogative of
Spirits, unconscious perceptions are not to be denied to them,
as Descartes does. Between these main classes, however,
there are again found stages of transition ; and, as the
inventor of the Differential Calculus* teaches, they occur in
infinitely small differences, for nature is not inclined to make
a leap ; she forms a continuous series. The members of this
series may be far from one another, and they may also be
very different from one another, as their differences are merely
quantitative and not qualitative, and they are besides connected
by a series of intermediate members. But however this may
be, there yet exists between them the highest harmony and a
thoroughgoing analogy. Analogy and continuity are thus the
two great laws which govern the graduated realm of the
Monads or the Universe. The former law establishes the
unity, the latter the variety of things, and both together
constitute the Law of Harmony, which, according to Leibniz,
governs all things in the universe. Harmony is the expression
which Leibniz uses for the highest Order that embraces the
world. It implies a fulness of beings entirely independent
and individually different, which by their powers and actions
stand in a universal harmony. This view is essentially
different from that of Spinoza. Spinoza establishes the order
of the world realiter. According to Spinoza, individual things
without any independent significance and power all proceed
from the one substance as the cause that effects everything ;
according to Leibniz, the order of the world is an ideal bond
which embraces all the fulness of self-active individual things
into a universal harmony. This harmony appears in the
system of Leibniz imder a twofold point of view. It is
regarded first as a natural order, indwelling in the Monads,
founded in their immanent natural constitution and the
advancing development which is founded thereupon, as a
\} This designatioii suggests a celebrated controversy, with regard to which
reference may be made to Ueberweg's careful and candid summary in his
History of Philosophy , vol. ii. pp. 98-100.— Tr.]
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488 LEIBNIZ AND THE OEBMAN AUFKLARUNG.
*' parfait accord naturelle ;" and, in the eecond place, it is viewed
determined and arranged beforehand bj God, or as a divine
Law or Pre-established Harmony (harmonie pr^^tablie). It
is false, however, as we shall afterwards see, to designate this
double mode of view as an opposition. Leibniz has even
been blamed on the ground that what in the spirit of his
system necessarily appears naturalistic as immanent order of
nature, has been introduced by him by mere accommodation
to the ideas of his contemporaries in a teleological form as a
divine aiTangement or pre-established harmony. To him such
an opposition has no existence; on the contrary, the harmonious
order of the world, in so far as and because it is natural
law, is at the same time also divine arrangement and
predetermination.
Such is a brief outline of the Metaphysics oi Leibniz.
Only a few points may be further noticed from the several
departments of science, especially such as bear upon the
treatment of the religious questions.
With regard to Physics, it follows from the definition of
the Monads as original substances that they can neither be
derived &om natural elements nor be r^olved into such
elements. Apart from the fact that they are called by God's
creation into existence from nothing and return into nothing
by His annihilation, they are eternal Further, all Monads
exist together from the origin of the world, or, in other words,
the sum of the forces contained in the world continues eternally
the same. Along with the Law of Continuity, this is the
second of the two laws upon which Leibniz's dynamic
explanation of nature rests. The philosopher thus set up
that law of the Conservation of Energy which plays at present
so great a part in natural science, only he did not yet clearly
distinguish between elasticity and vital force, and he wanted
the means of verifying the law by experiments.
In the theory of Knowledge, Leibniz could not but oppose
the empiricism and sensationalism which were advocated at
the time, especially by Locke. If the mind be a complete
tabula rasa, and if all knowledge comes only from external
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THE DOCTBINES OF LEIBNIZ. 489
impressions, then the direct and immediate inflaence of exter«
nal bodies upon our mind must be presupposed as an indis-
putable fact. Leibniz, however, rejects this supposition. He
emphatically opposes the view that a monad, such as the soul,
is capable of receiving external influences, and he holds that
everything is to be explained from its internal development.
Accordingly Leibniz found it necessary to return to '* innate
ideas ; " but he was compelled to admit to Locke that these
are not present in our mind as clear conscious ideas or as real
facts, and he seeks the solution of the difficulty in the view
that innate ideas are in us as virtual knowledge or as uncon-
scious ideas, but become developed into clearly conscious ideas
with the general development of the soul. It is no difficulty
to our philosopher that this capacity must realize itself without
the influence of external things, and yet realize itself in some
and not in others. For he holds that this distinction is
grounded in the different degree of appetition which dwells in
the individual monads. The denial of external influence does
not, however, at all involve denial of the distinction between
sensible perception and thinking. The difference between these
two is also recognised by Leibniz, only he does not make per-
ception either the efficient cause of thinking or the elaborated
object of thinking. Perception is the preliminary stage of
thinking, and hence it is prius in time ; the two are dis-
tinguished only as the more imperfect and the more perfect
perception, or as confused and distinct representation, and the
continuity of the development demands this gradual transi-
tion as necessary to knowledge. Hence Leibniz agrees with
Empiricism in accepting the well-known Aristotelian maxim,
nihil est in inteUeetu quod non erat in sensu, " there is nothing
in the understanding which was not in the sense ; " but he adds
very significantly, nisi intelledus ipse, *' except the understand-
ing itself." Although sensible perception in the usual sense,
as the receiving of an impression produced from without, is
thus denied, Leibniz distinguishes between rational truth and
empirical truth, the former being necessary and the latter con-
tingent. At first this may appear as a contradiction, but it is
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490 LEIBNIZ AND THB OERHAN AUFKLABUNO.
explained by the following consideratdon : We are not a single
monad, but a complex of monads ; and our soul, as a self-
conscious mind, first knows itself and then all the things with
which it stands in connection, although but darkly or con-
fusedly. The former knowledge gives the rational truths,
which are founded in pure thinking, and which form universal
and necessary c(^itions ; the latter gives the empirical truths,
which rest upon perception and relate to individual and con-
tingent cognitions. This distinction may also be derived from
the essence of the individual monad. Every monad, as has
been already shown, is a limited self-activity, a combintU^ion of
activity and passivity. The agreement of the thing with itself,
or its ideal and merely possible existence, rests upon the active
force of the monad ; while the agreement of the thing with
other things, or its real existence, rests upon its pa^ve force.
For each of these two classes of truths, Leibniz lays down a
universal proposition as an ultimate principle : the rational
truths rest on the principle of Identity, the empirical truUis
on the principle of Sufficient Season. The axiom of Identity
says nothing more than that everjrtbing must agree with itself,
and therefore that nothing can unite contradictory marks in
itself, and that no proposition can be true which includes a
contradiction. By its very nature this axiom can only serve
for those judgments which express in the predicate the same
thing as is contained in the subject ; and these are identical or
analytical judgments. These judgments, however, say nothing
regarding the existence of the thing, but only that if the
subject exists, it has this or that predicate ; for example, if a
triangle exists it has three angles. Such judgments therefore
assert only the abstract logical possibility of things. On the
other hand, the second axiom refers to actual things, and states
that each of these has its sufficient reason, and must therefore
be known from the principle of causality. The conception of
causality, however, is itself prior to experience. " Our infer-
ences are grounded upon two great principles, the principle of
contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. There are
thus two classes of truths, rational and real ; the rational truths
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THE DOCTKINBS OF LEIBNIZ. 491
are necessary, and their opposite is impossible ; real truths are
contingent, and their opposite is possible." — These theoretical
principles of knowledge, as we will afterwards show, are
important in relation to Leibniz's Theology. The knowledge
of God rests upon actual truths or truths of fact ; for " the
ultimate ground or cause must consist of a necessary being,
from whom, as its source, the stream of things arises, and this
is the being we call God." Upon this distinction of rational
and real truths, rests the further distinction of doctrines that
are contrary to reason and doctrines that are above reason.
Whatever contradicts a rational truth is contrary to reason,
and is therefore impossible ; whatever contradicts a real truth
is above reason, and is therefore possible.
Leibniz also founds .Esthetics upon his own special
prindplea Our ideas relate, at the highest, to the form,
order, and harmony of things. If these ideas are per-
fectly clear and distinct, they constitute philosophy ; but if
they have not yet risen to consciousness, we are still living in
crude desire and in the enjoyment of sense. Between these
two stages there is a clear-obscure point of transition ; and
here arises the Form-feeling of the aesthetic ideas.
With regard to Ethics, Leibniz, in accordance with his
principle of the universal analogy, cannot possibly put the
subject in rigid opposition to physics. All monads are in a
condition of perpetual development and continuous striving.
Now there is no striving without a goal, or without an idea of
this goal, only the distinctness of this idea may vary. If the
idea is unconscious as a mere form of nature, the striving is a
blind force. If the. idea is conscious, but is only obscurely
felt, the striving is obscure instinct. If the idea is conscious,
And if it is clearly and distinctly conceived, the striving is
will. These are all only variously complete stages of the same
universal development Hence it is at once seen to be im-
possible that there should prevail in one sphere that necessity
of causes which is without exception, and in another the
groundless arbitrariness of self-chosen ends, or freedom, in the
usual sense of free-will for choice. Again this is not possible
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492 LEIBNIZ AND TUE GERMAN AUFKLÄRUNG.
from another reason. Active striving, and consequently the
will, is always determined by its idea ; bat this idea is not
arbitrarily received from here or there by groundless choice,
but is necessarily grounded in the natural capacity of the
monad or in its degree of perfection. In short, the develop-
ment in question, and consequently the will, is in no way
caused by external influences or even at all influenced by
them; it is nothing but the immanent evolution, or the
realization in detail of what is already contained in germ in
the natural individuality of the monad. Hence the will is
never to be regarded as empty, but is always determined and
directed to a determinate object; and hence there is no
freedom of will in the sense of an absolute indifference, as
if we could have wished and done just as well soinething else
instead of what we actually will and do. Our will is rather
constantly and wholly determined, and is specially determined
by internal inclination, which is founded in the natural con-
dition of the particular individuality. This is the decided
view of individuality which appears in Leibniz. When he
protests against holding the view that our will is subject to
necessity, he is so far right in that he thus decidedly separates
his position from the determinism of Spinoza. For he does
not, like Spinoza, make the will be determined by the mechan-
ism of nature and be therefore externally compeUed ; he sees
the ground of its determination only in the nature of the
willing subject itself. But when he proceeds to argue that
various decisions are possible in themselves, and that the
actual decision has only become a reality by the act of
choosing out of the possibilities, this is mere word-fencing.
These possibilities in fact only exist in so far and because
there is a possibility, according to the principle of identity,
that my nature might be different from what it is. This
particular nature, however, has no possibility to will or to act
otherwise, but it must necessarily so will and act. — It is well
known how the representatives of the German Enlightenment,
intelligibly enough from the point of view of the wisdom of
the sound understanding, gave up determinism, and keeping
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THE DOCTRINES OF LEIBNIZ. 493
to the phrase, freedom of the will, raised it to one of their
fundameDtal tmths.
Along with the question regarding the freedom of the wUl,
there stands in the foreground of ethical investigations the
other question as to the supreme Principle of Morals. This
principle, according to Leibniz, is of course innate in man,
although it slumbers in us at first as an unconscious capacity,
and only gradually enters into consciousness. Hence it must
be that idea which the will always follows, or what excites the
strongest inclination in it ; for " the will always follows the
greatest inclination." Now an agreeable idea works more
strongly upon the will than one that is disagi:eeable, and a
higher degree of agreeableness is stronger than a lower degree.
That inclination therefore is the strongest which is attracted
by the idea of the highest persistent joy or by happmess. The
striving after happiness is the fundamental innate tendency of
human nature, and it rules all our inclinations. " That is good
which ministers or contributes to our joy, and an evil is what
prepares us pain." The highest good is what prepares happi-
ness a? lasting highest joy. — This purely eudeemonistic and
individualistic moral principle receives, however, higher and
more universal contents. Joy and pain are thus defined:
" Joy is a feeling of perfection, and pain a feeling of imper-
fection." The striving after happiness is therefore nothing
else than a striving after our own perfection. The degree of
perfection is determined by the distinctness of the perception
and the perfection itself, as the perfection of our being consists
in perfectly clear and distinct perception, or in the perfect
illumination of the mind. The striving after happiness is
therefore a striving after a perfect mental development Thus
the true freedom is given at the same time, as the will that is
conformable to reason is truly free ; for " to be determined to
the best by rejwon is the highest degree of freedom." — The
more the mind is illuminated, so much the more perfect a
mirror of the universe it is. A wholly illuminated mind will
clearly and distinctly mirror the whole universe, and be clearly
conscious of its connection with all other beings. For this
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494 LEIBNIZ AKD THE GIRICAK AUFKLARUNG.
perfect being there is no longer any joj or pain egoisticalljr
referred by it only to itself ; tlie happiness of snch a being
consists wholly in sympathetic joy at the happiness and at the
perfection of all other beings, and especially of men ; or, in a
word, it consists in love« For " to love means to rejoice at
the happiness of another ; or what is the same thing, it is to
regard the happiness of others as one's own." Thus does the
originally eudaemonistic and egoistic principle of morals
become a comprehensive principle of enlightenment and
universal philanthropy.
As we r^ard Liebniz as pre-eminently the founder of the
German Enlightenment, we may also here sum np his views
regarding immortality as being in place beside the theory of
fi*eewill and happiness. At the outset, it may be mentioned
that Leibniz adduces some arguments for immortality which
stand in no relation to his own system, but are almost even
inconsistent with it The desire after happiness and the dis-
inclination to unlu4>pine8S, are implanted in our nature.
Happiness is nothing but lasting joy ; but our joy here below
is not lasting, because we are exposed to many accidents. The
existence of Grod, however, makes it enough to be virtuous in
order to be happy ; for if the soul follow reason and the
commandments given by God, it is sure of its happiness,
although it cannot be found in this life. The greatest happi-
ness here below consists in the hope of future happiness. —
Further, in the case of most men, it is only the tliought of
eternity that is able to keep them faithful to virtue, if r^ard
to the life in time does not incite them to it It is only the
fear of punishment that can keep many from crime, and only
the hope of reward that can strengthen them to struggle for
right and truth. — It is also inconceivable that the wise and
just God will not reward goodness and punish evil in a future
life, seeing that in the present world there remains so much
that is unequalized. — The consideration that the immortality
of the soul is an innate idea, already corresponds to the si»rit
of this system. It is represented as the foundation of all
theology. Without it even the doctrine of Providence would
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THE DOCTBINES OF LEIBNIZ. 495
be useless ; all natural theology would be vain ; and nothing
cotild be done against atheism.
It is only by proceeding from his conception of the Monad
that we obtain a correct insight into Leibniz's doctrine of
Immortality. It is an essential characteristic of substance
that it does not perish« Descartes had also maintained
immortality in the sense of the imperishableness of substance ;
but as he teaches only two substances, body and mind, and
makes individual things, and consequently individual bodies
and minds, arise out of these substances, he does not thereby
exclude the view that things pass through numberless trans-
formations; that matter which now forms a human body
perhaps belonged earlier or will belong later to a block of
stone or a plant ; and that the soul which now constitutes my
ego, has perhaps already belonged to a thousand others or will
belong to thousands more. Not so Leibniz. To him every,
monad is a substance, and every monad has at the same time
a determinate individuality of its own. Hence in his view the
imperishableness of substance implies at the same time the
continued existence of this determinate definite individuality.
— Every monad, as we have seen, is an ensouled body ; and
hence souls cannot exist without bodies, nor bodies without
soula Every monad is an individual thing, that is, a deter-
minate soul with a determinate body ; and hence the direct
passage of the soul out of one body into any other, or a metem-
psychosis, is impossible. " As regards the transmigration of
souls, I am far from holding this doctrine of Pythagoras, which
van Helmont the younger and some others have wished to
revive ; for I maintain that not merely the soul as such, but
the very same indimduum, continues to exist" The Monad,
however, is engaged in passing through a perpetual develop-
ment Because of the inseparable unity of soul and body, this
development can only be a development of both, including the
body. In other words, the soul, when developed to a higher
degree of perfection, must necessarily obtain a more perfect
body ; it cannot attain this by metempsychosis, and hence it
can only be through gradual transformation of the body.
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496 LEIBNIZ AND THE GBBIIAN AUFKLIbUNG.
Both these points of view demand a perpetual metamorphosis
of the body. — ^And hence death is not the separation, nor birth
the union, of a soul and a body. They are severally but
** the going out of and the entering into a special form of this
advancing matamorphosis ; death is the assumption of the
chrysalis form and is decrease, birth is unfolding and increase.**
Hence in the strict sense of the term there is neither a
complete generation nor a complete death, such as would
consist in a separation of the body from the souL What we
call generations are developments and enlargements. What
we call death are chrysalizations and diminishings. — If there
is no first birth, either by way of the. origination of an indi-
vidual nor of a union of body and soul, the whole individual
must have existed from the beginning. It did not indeed
exist in the form of its later development, but as a capacity or
preformation. In this capacity the individual itself exists;
and by means of generation it is only made capable of a great
metamorphosis of form. Outside of the order of generation we
see similar things : as when worms become flies, or caterpillars
butterflies. This capacity, however, itself constitutes a living
body ; and thus Leibniz, under reference to numerous authorities,
assumes " that the souls which once on a time become human
souls, have existed in the seed like those of the other species,
and that they have always existed in the form of organized
bodies in ancestors up to Adam, or from the beginning of
things." He found this view confiimed by the contemporary
discovery of the so-called spermatozoa by Leuwenhoek.
This is the so-called natural immortality, or as Leibniz puts it,
imperishableness(indefectibilitas),from which the so-called moral
immortality, that is alone called immortality (immortalitas) by
Leibniz, is strictly distinguished. The former belongs to all
beings, the latter only to men. This is not to be taken as if
a new principle came in here ; it holds because the monads
last and persist in their special individuality, and because men
as persons or moral beings are essentially distinguished from
the lower beings. The immortality of man is therefore also
entirely of a special kind. Man is a being with self-conscious*
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THE DOCTBINES OF LEIBNIZ. 497'
ness and memory: and these prerogatives of his spiritual
personality remain after the natural death. With the identity
of the self-consciousness, the moral identity is also immediately
given. The continuity of the development of itself excludes
the idea that any state or activity can ever be entirely without
subsequent effect, or be as it were completely extinguished.
Hence it is also impossible that the guilt of our sin and its
consequence in the consciousness of guilt and its internal
torment, can cease. And thus Leibniz, quite in the spirit of
his system, comes to the assertion of the eternity of punish-
ments. These indeed are not external, corporeal punishments,
but it is inexplicable how Leibniz, from any other reason than
too great an accommodation to the doctrine of the Church,
could say regarding Purgatory, to which the reference is
limited : '* I do not give up the view that a certain temporal
punishment after this life is very rational and probable." The
good also obtain a heavenly reward : and as goodness consists
in the enlightenment of our mind, the heavenly reward consists
in the blessed vision of God, who is Himself the light of our
soul and the only immediate object of our knowledge. Our
happiness hereafter will consist in making constant progress
to new joys and perfections, of which the joy and the satisfac-
tion which arise from earnest scientific investigation of the
works of God in this life are only a foretaste. For " we know
not how far our capacities and our cognitions may be extended
in the whole eternity that awaits ns.'' At the same time,
however, it is declared that as God is infinite and we are
always but finite, our knowledge of God can never be entirely
perfect. — On account of the necessary connection of the soul
and the body, the continued existence is naturally related
also to the body. " The soul always retains even in death an
organized body." The possibility of the continued existence of
the body is founded upon the view of a "seed" already
referred to. Or, as Leibniz also says, every body of men
and of animals, no less than of plants and of minerals, has a
germ of its substance which is so subtle that it remains even
in the ashes of things that are burned, and contracts as it were
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498 LEIBNIZ AND THE GERMAN AUFKLÄRUNG.
into an invisible centre. Or, as he says again, there is in
every body a sort of substance-blossom which is given in birth
and remains always preserved without increase or diminution.
Even a cannibal contains within him only his own substance-
blossom, as he whom he eats retains his, without there being
any mixture of them. And as death is in general but the
laying aside of a particular phenomenal form of the body and
at the same time the unfolding of a new form, so it is with
the death of man. Leibniz, however, is too reserved and sober
in his expressions to give more precise statements regarding
the state of this body which must correspond naturally to the
perfection of the soul belonging to it
Thus far we have not yet mentioned the Theology of
Leibniz, not because we agree with those who make his
theology directly contradict the monadology, or at least allow
only a loose connection with it ; but, on the contrary, in order
to make the dose connection and the exact correspondence
of both come closely into view. We will begin with the
Arguments for the existence of God ; then we will consider
his doctrine of the nature of Gkxl and His relation to the
world ; and finally, we will take up his views regarding the
essence of religion and the relation beween revelation and
reason.
The knowledge of Gk)d, according to Leibniz, is of the
greatest importance. This holds not merely in reference to
religion, but generally because it is impossible to love God
without knowing His beauty. This knowledge is of the
greatest value for science. *' The knowledge of God is not
less the principle of the sciences than His being and will are
the principle of things. It amounts to a consecration of
philosophy when its waters are made to flow from the fountain
of the attributes of (Jod.** The happy life is also conditioned
by this knowledge. So far from its being the case that *' the
thought that there is no God has never made any one tremble,
but the thought that there is such a Being has done so."
Leibniz r^ards it as the loss of a great good if there is no
God, as we can only find true happiness in love to Him. — Of
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THE DOCTfilNES OF LEIBNIZ. 499
the Arguments for the Existence of God, Leibniz regards the
Ontological Argument of Descartes as incomplete. It infers
from the idea of the most perfect Being to His existence ; for
if He did not exist He would not be perfect ; and hence His
existence is necessary. In this, however, it is assumed that
an absolutely perfect being is possible ; if this possibility is
admitted, the argument stands, but if it is denied, it falls.
This defect Leibniz seeks to get rid of by completing the
Ontological Argument by the Cosmological Argument, which,
however, under his hand passes into the Teleological or
Physico-theological Argument. Individual things can only be
explained by the conception of causality, which is the principle
of all empirical truths. Everything must have its sufficient
reason ; and guided by this axiom we are led at last to a
Being who is the cause of all things, and who is therefore not
caused by another, but exists merely of Himself. If we start
from the contingency of finite things, we come to a necessary
Being ; and if we take their unity of design into account, we
come to a single and all-wise Being. Upon this turn of the
argument, which closely coincides with the idea of the pre-
established harmony, Leibniz lays the greatest importance.
''It is clear that the harmony of so many beings which exercise
no mutual influence upon each other, can only spring from a
general cause which directs all things, and which must com-
bine infinite power and wisdom in itself to predetermine their
harmonious orders." The argument from the eternal truths,
set forth by Leibniz, is only a special application of this
argument. There are eternal truths ; these can only exist in
the understanding of an eternal and necessary Being ; there-
fore this Being or God must exist. — His most characteristic
argument for the existence of God lies, however, in the
position that the doctrine of monads necessarily implies it.
The law of continuity rules in the world of monads ; and in
infinitely small differences the graduated realm of the monads
advances from lower forms to higher. Every monad is
involved in a process of development, and is thus striving
after a higher monad. It is therefore wrong to regard man
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500 LEIBNIZ AND THE OEBMAK AÜFKLABUNG.
as the conduding member of the series of stages in this realm,
although he is the most perfect of the beings given to us in
experience. In like manner, our soul, far from being the last
of all, finds itself rather in the middle of things, from which
position we can descend and ascend. There would otherwise
be found in the realm of things an error *' that some philo-
sophers call a vcuntum farviarum" These higher beings we
certainly cannot know distinctly, but we must postulate their
existence on the ground of the law of continuity ; and we
may also infer by the law of analogy that they are more
perfect individuals, more finely organized beings, higher
spirits, more transparent bodies. In short, they are " genii"
Leibniz only indicates as possible the view that after death
we are transformed by the process of metamorphosis into such
genii and ascend to always higher perfection ; but the repre-
sentatives of the German Enlightenment were fond of dwelling
upon this idea. With the very same necessity, according to
the law of continuity, we must conceive the graduated realm
of the monads as closed by a supreme power, which no other
power transcends ; that is, by a supreme Monad which is the
last end and the highest goal of the universal striving of all
the other monads. This Supreme Monad is God.
Those positions already contain the most important deter-
minations given by Leibniz regarding the nature of Grod. As
a Monad, God is a simple, independent, individual Being ; that
is, there is only one God, and He is absolutely distinct from
the world. "It is absurd to assume only a single active
principle as the world-soul, and only a passive principle as
matter." Let us remember that every monad is a limited
self -activity, a union of activity and passivity, and that
perfection rests upon activity, and imperfection, and particu-
larly matter, rests upon passivity. The more perfect the
monad is, so much the greater is its active power, and so
much the less is its passive power. In the highest monad or
God, there is therefore only activity and no passivity ; He is
without limit and without matter. '' God alone is a substance
truly free from matter, because He is pure activity (actus
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THE DOCTBINBS OF LEIBNIZ. 501
purus), and without any passivity, such as everywhere
constitutes the nature of matter." Hence God is immaterial ;
He is pure thinking ; He is without limit ; He has therefore
nothing out of Himself that can be independent of Him ; He
is the sum of all realities; in short. He is the absolutely
perfect Being, "For perfection is nothing but greatness of
positive reality taken in the exact sense, without any of the
limits and bounds of things. But where there are absolutely
no limits as in God, there the perfection is absolutely infinite.'*
As the absolutely perfect Being, God is elevated far above
all other beings, including the human mind. Yet God is a
monad. He is not therefore exempt from the law of analogy ;
and although Leibniz declares that '' the idea of the infinite is
not formed by an extension of the finite idea," yet the attri-
butes of God are to be known by our raising the powers of
our soul to the highest potence, although it may only be by
an analogy widened to the utmost difierence. Every monad
is an active power, and in the form of perception and striving
we have this active power in man as understanding and wiU.
When these are potentiated to the highest perfbction, we get
the divine attributes of omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness.
" In God there exists the Power which is the source of all
things, and the Knowledge which embraces the world of ideas
down to its least parts ; and, finally, the Will which produces
changes or creations according to the principle of the Best
And this corresponds exactly to what constitutes the funda-
mental powers in the created monads, — ^namely, the power of
perceiving and striving." Of these attributes, however, in
correspondence with the whole character of the system, it is
wisdom which is mentioned most
The relation of God to the world is determined primarily
to be that God has created the world. This groundedness of
things in God goes so far that even the possibility of things is
grounded in (Jod ; for if God did not exist, nothing would be
possible, as even what is possible from eternity is included in
the ideas of the divine intellect God is thus as the Supreme
Monad, and not merely the end and the goal of all finite
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502 LEIBNIZ AND THB OKRMAN AUfKLAKUNG.
monads. He is ät the same time as higliest Power their
ultimate sole-sufficient cause; and in this relation lies the
hi^^iest union of final causes and of efficient causes» Things
do npt arise bj emanation from the being of God, nor are they
to be regarded as a product of His development Such a
development is excluded in the case of the highest Monad ;
for development consists in a capacity, or in merely obscure
and unconscious perceptions being worked out to greater
clearness, but the highest Monad is clear and distinct percep*
tion through and through without any obscure capacity.
Things are therefore created by Ood, and they are created oat
of nothing. Accordingly, the creation of things is not neces-
sary, but free. This, however, is not to be misunderstood.
Leibniz expresses himself frequently to the effect that God,
before the creation of the world, viewed as present in His
understanding all the innumerable possible woiids, and out of
these He chose the most perfect This free choice, however,
does not imply that G^ might just as well have created
another world« This very God must create this very world,
and could create no other world ; this is the main argument
for the philosopheme of '' the best world." But this necessity
was not a metaphysical one ; that is, the creation of another
world would have included no contradiction, and therefore
would not have violated the axiom of identity. It is, how-
ever, a moral necessity ; that is, it would have contradicted
the laws of the divine will, that act according to ends and
always carry out what is best and perfect, either to create no
world or to create another world. On this moral necessity
rests physical necessity, or the fact that in nature everything
must have its sufficient reason. The world created by God
likewise needs to be preserved by Him. Leibniz decidedly
opposes the opinion that nature can develop herself in virtue
of indwelling forces, and that she does not need the assistance
of God. Bather do all monads depend on God as they have
their origin in Him; and although we do not comprehend
how this is in detail, yet the scholastics have very correctly
understood that preservation is nothing but a constant
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THE DOCTRINES OF LEIBNIZ. 603
creation. The preservation of tilings is conceived as a con-
stant divine influence upon the creatures. Leibni^ however,
protests decidedly against the view that God is to be
regarded as thereby making from time to time a oorrectiom
on His work, and that such had become necessary.
It seems as if there could be no place for Miracles along
with the Pre-established Harmony, but it is only apparently
so. Leibniz indeed emphatically exhorts us not to assume a
miracle without reason when the natural explanation involves
difficulty; and he cannot recognise the wonderfal facts re-
corded of the angels as true miracles, because these are
naturally explained by the higher perfection of the genii.
How much importance Leibniz puts on the reality of mimcles
is clear from his question : ** Would it not amount to making
God the soul of the world, if all His actions are natural
like those which the soul performs in the body ? God thus
becomes a part of nature." Miracles, although they are con*
trary to physical necessity, are possible, because the moral
order of nature stands higher than its physical order» God
has also instituted the physical order, and not without
reason ; but the universal reasons for the good may in certain
cases be outweighed by more important reasons of a h^ber
order. As the higher order is also comprehended in God*s
plan, it is not correct to speak of arbitrariness on the part of
Ood; for "miracles also belong to the universal order, ard
conformable to the plan of God, and are contained in the coil-^
ception of this universe which is the result of the divine
plan.'* Miracles, instead of being opposed to the order of the
world, are thus included as possible in God's plan of the
world; and God had resolved to perform them when Ho
chose this world. These miracles indeed are not subservient
to the preservation, or even to the correction of the work of
creation, but only to redemption. "If, then, God wörkä
miracles, this does not arise from the requirements of nature,
but those of grace. To judge otherwise would be to have a
very poor idea of the wisdom and power of God." It is
further to be noticed that miracles do not contravene physical,
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604 LEIBNIZ AND THE GERMAN AtTFKLARUNtf.
but metaphysical necessity; and they are thus only above
reason, but not contrary to reason. It is clear that the whole
justification of miracles rests upon the distinction of physical,
moral, and metaphysical necessity.
The actually existing world has been chosen with moral
necessity out of the innumerable possible worlds, and it has
been realized by Grod ; and hence it is completely dependent
on God, and it is also the best world.
Determinism necessarily follows from the pre-established
harmony which does not allow the least deviation from the
plan that has been established. "Out of numerous possi-
bilities God has chosen that which He knew to be the most
suitable. But when He has once chosen, everjrthing is com-
prehended in His choice, and nothing can be altered ; for He
has foreseen everything and arranged everything once for alL"
Optimism is a necessary consequence of determinism. The
world rests upon God's decree, and God's will is perfect, that
is, it involves essential union of the highest power and the
highest wisdom ; and hence the world must be perfect, or at
least be as perfect as possible. In other words, the world
must be the best of possible worlds. This is shown ä priori
in two ways : from the conception of God and from the con-
ception of the world. God's power is suflScient to perform
what He wills ; His perfect understanding excludes all decep-
tion as to what is truly good ; and His perfect will is always
determined by what is perfect or best. Hence, in accordance
with His own nature, God must necessarily have created a
perfect world, or at least the best possible world. If we
start in our reasoning from the world as the sum-total of all
things, then viewing it merely as real, it is contingent, and
other worlds than it are possible. But the fact can only rest
upon an act of choice that of numberless possible worlds just
this one has become real ; this choice must be occasioned by
a sufficient reason; and this reason can only lie in the
superior excellence of the real world, or in the fact that it is
the best of all possible worlds.
This assertion, however, seems to be contradicted ä pos-
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THE DOCTRINES OF LEIBNIZ. 505
ieriori by the fact that there is in this world so much imper-
fection, evil, and sin. How is this undeniable fact to be
reconciled with that assertion of the best world ? This ques-
tion has earnestly occupied Leibniz from the beginning to the
end of his philosophical career, and his HUodicie is specially
devoted to the solution of it. The result of his examination
of this question shortly is, that the evil in the world can
detract so little from its perfection that, in spite of all its
evils, this world is more perfect than any other world would
be even though it contained less evil, because it would also as
regards perfection necessarily stand below the existing world.
Evil is distinguished into metaphysical, physical, and moral.
Metaphysical evil consists in imperfection or want ; and this
imperfection is absolutely inseparable from the nature of
finite things, so that whoever would require God to call
creatures without imperfection into existence, would demand
from Him nothing else than that He should create no creatures
at all Of metaphysical evil it is to be said that it has no
causa eßeUns but only a eavsa deßciens, because it consists in
a deficiency, and it is necessary in an unconditional or meta-
physical sense, because no creature by its very idea can be
without deficiency or want Physical and moral evil follow
as necessary consequences from metaphysical evil. Acting
and willing follow from power, and from a limited power
there can only proceed limited action and limited will.
Physical evil is limitation of action, and moral evil is limita-
tion of will, and they are both accordingly conditioned, or
physically necessary. — ^Imperfection is therefore only a want
of perfection; pain, as a feeling of imperfection, is only a
want of joy as the feeling of perfection ; and the bad is only
a want of the good. In short, evil is not opposed to good as
an independent power, but it is subordinated to it as mere
defect, and it stands continually under the supremacy of the
good. Nay more, evil appears even as a necessary condition of
the good, as in a musical composition dissonances are often
requisite to bring about a satisfying impression on the whole ;
or as in a picture what appears a dull and artless daubing of
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?06 LEIBNIZ AND THE GERMAN AUFKLÄRUNG.
colours in detail is conducive to the harmonious effect of the
whole. The perfection of the world consists in nothing else
than in the perfect harmony of the universe, and in the
universal progress to higher perfection. Harmony requires
that there should exist beings of the most various degrees of
perfection, and therefore also such as are affected with imper-
fection. Development consists in the gradual stripping off of
imperfections in order to rise to higher stages. Hence no
objection can be made to God because of evil, for **the
creatures have their perfection from Qod, and their defects
from their own nature, which cannot be without limitation.
And it is just in this that they are distinguished from God."
God Himself, however, cannot change metaphysical necessity,
that is. He cannot think things otherwise ; and as the will is
guided by wisdom, neither can He will them otherwise than
as their perfection allows. As their idea includes imperfec-
tion or evil, He can only think and will them along with this.
— ^The same holds also of moral evil or the bad. We have
already seen that Leibniz decidedly denies human freedom in
the sense of a groundless or irrational choice. Kesponsibility
for what is bad is not thereby taken away from us ; but as
freedom is as decidedly affirmed in the sense that all com-
pulsory external influence is repudiated and the grounds of
our actions are found merely in our own proper nature, man
is thus alone responsible for his sin.
Such is a brief outline of Leibniz's system of philosophy,
which is religious through and through, and the question
now comes as to how he judges regarding Religion itself
As already stated, all monads are viewed as going through a
constant development, and every development has a deter-
minate goal set before it. Development is thus a striving
towards a certain goal. We have seen that God as the
supreme Monad is this goal. All monads thus represent Grod
and strive towards Him.^ This representation and striving,
however, come first to consciousness in man ; they are first
^ This view is at least the logical consequence of the system, and is in corre-
spondence with it. Leibniz says in the Monadologie (§ 83) *'that souls in
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THE DOCTRINES OF LEIBNIZ. 507
felt and consciously present in him. Now, as has been
already shown, all conscious perception of another being leads
to love, and thus the conscious perception of God and the
striving after Him lead to love of God. And this love to
Grod, which consists in the felt striving after God, and which,
from the essential connection of willing and knowing, caif
never be without knowledge of God, is the dimple element
i^hich forms the psychological foundation of all religion. — ^As in
all monads, according to the degree of their perfection, there
is more or less actual perception of God and striving towards
Him as the highest end, and as this first comes into conscious-
ness in man, religion is to be regarded as a prerogative of
man above all the lower creatures. Hence God stands in a
much more inward relation to man than to these creatures.
God stands related to the lower creatures or the corporeal
world as the former and architect of the world (inventeur et
architecte). On the other hand, minds or spirits enter into a
certain communion with God ; He stands related to them as
a prince to his subjects or as a father to his children. Spirits
feel themselves, on the one band, subject to God, because they
are finite while He is infinite ; and, on the other hand, they
feel themselves related to Him, because both God and man
are spirits, and men as intelligent spirits are created accord-
ing to the will of Gk)d. " Spirits are capable of entering into
communion with God, and God is related to them, not only
as an inventor to his machine (which is his relation to the
other creatures), but also as a prince to his subjects, or better
still, as a father to his children. The assembly of spirits
therefore constitutes the city of God, or the most perfect
State that is possible under the most perfect monarch.'' —
According to this distinction between the relation in which
God stands to the lower creatures and the relation in which
He stands to spirits, Leibniz contrasts the " moral world " or
the " kingdom of grace " with the merely " natural world " or
general are living mirrors or images of the nniverse of the creatures, bnt the
spirits are also images of the Divinity Himself, or of the very Author of
Nature," etc
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508 LEIBNIZ AND THE OEBMAK AUFKLÄRUNG.
the "kingdom of nature." "This city of God, this truly
universal world, is a moral world in the natural world. It
is the most sublime and divine of the works of God, and in
it God's glory truly exists ; for there would be no glory of
God at all were not His greatness and goodness known and
admired by spirits." " And as we have already established a
perfect harmony between the two kingdoms of nature, known
as that of eflScient causes and final causes, we must here
also bring into relief another harmony between the physical
kingdom and the moral kingdom of grace, or between God as
the architect of the machine of the world and God as the
monarch of the world of spirits."
Religion is love to God resting upon correct ideas of God.
In this Leibniz comes into contact with the mystics, yet his
agreement with them is not so great as some expressions of
the work Theologia Mystica might lead us to suppose. The
" internal light " of which he speaks is not a supernatural
illumination, but is natural reason. Love to God is the
highest joy and blessedness of man, and religion in this love
comes into contact with morality, the highest goal of which is
happiness. All love is happiness, because it is joy in the
happiness of another. Now (Jod is the most perfect object
of our love, and hence love to Him is the greatest happiness.
Everything else must accordingly be sacrificed to this happi-
ness and to this love. " Every act by which we prefer our
enjoyment to that which corresponds to the honour of God
and His good pleasure, as reason and faith teach us to know
them, is actually a real union with God, even although there
may be a thought inexpressly of its revocation ! " Love to
God leads by necessity to true love for oneself and one's
neighbour, because the kingdom of His spirits cannot be
separated from God. Eeligion in its exercise or practical
application thus leads necessarily to morality. "Can it
be believed that Christians have actually imagined they
could be devout without loving their neighbour, or be pious
without loving God ? " Here we find the scientific establish-
ment of the assertion which we have already met with in the
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THE DOCTRINES OF LEIBNIZ. 509
English Deists, and which constitutes one of the most essential
principles of the German Enlightenment, that true religion
cannot, in fact, be contrary to morality.
Leibniz does not express himself regarding worship and
ceremonies in connection with natural religion. The thought
does not appear to have occurred to him that love to God
requires another external representation than moral action.
Nor is there anything more implied by the statement in the
Syatema Theologicum, that " every religion requires that God
be worshipped in an assembly of men (in coetu hominum)."
The form of worship established in the Catholic Church is
assailed in the strongest terms. Leibniz sees in it merely a
support of superstition and a means of leading the people at
will by the aid of their easily excited phantasy and of turning
them away from what is essential. Ceremonies appear to
him a bad substitute for the fulfilment of real moral duty, and
they are therefore extremely pernicious. " Piety has, contrary
to the intention of our divine Teacher, been reduced to cere-
monies, and His doctrine has been burdened with formulae.
These ceremonies were often little fitted to serve virtue, and
the formulas were often very obscure."
Eeligion is love to God, and love is not possible without
knowledge. Hence religion is not possible without know-
ledge of God ; and the more perfect the knowledge of God
is, so much the more perfect also is religion. It is upon
this that the confidence of Leibniz and the early Enlighten-
ment rests, that religion and culture, theology and philosophy,
are in no respects opposites, and hence their demand for the
enlargement of knowledge even in religion. The idea of God
is felt within us in consciousness, and thereby it becomes
faith. The knowledge of God belongs to the ideas that are
innate in us ; it is always present in us, but it is developed
gradually according as our knowledge in general or our nature
is developed. The thought is approached that this is the basis
of the agreement and the difference of many religions, and
that in so far as the consciousness of God lies at the basis of
them all, they are identical; while in so far as the conscious-
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610 LEIBNIZ AND THE OEBMAN AÜFELABUKG.
ness of God lies at the basis of each of them at a special
stage of its development, thej form the different positive or
historical religions. This thought is at least approached and
almost touched by Leibniz, but it was not clearly expressed
till much later.
Our knowledge of God is partly grounded in ourselves, and
thus religion is natural ; and it is partly realized by external
communication, and thus religion is historical or positive.
Begarding this communication of the knowledge of religion,
a distinction must be made between the first communication
on the part of God and its conveyance through other men,
or between immediate and mediate revelation« " Revelation
is an extraordinary communication of God. But a man
inspired by God can communicate to others no new simple
idea, because he can only employ the words, or external signs,
or their combination, which awaken in us simple ideas such
as are ordinarily connected with them. Whatever may have
been the new ideas that the Apostle Paul may have received
when he was carried. into the third heaven, all that he could
say of them is that they were things which no eye had seen,
nor ear heard, and which had not entered into the heart of
man. Suppose there were creatures in Jupiter with six
senses, and that God conveyed to one of us in a supernatural
way the idea of their sixth sense,- he could not convey it by
words to other men. We must therefore distinguish between
original and traditional revelation (r^v^lation originelle et
traditionelle). The former is an impression which God
immediately makes upon the mind, and to which we can
set no limits ; the other only comes by the usual channels
of communication, and cannot give new simple ideas."
An immediate revelation is declared by Leibniz to be
entirely possible. Its possibility rests upon the essential
relationship of the nature of God to the nature of man, which
makes the reception and the understanding of divine com-
munications possible to the latter. This question, however, is
not discussed in detaiL On the other hand, Leibniz expresses
himself several times at length to the effect that prophecies do
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THE DOCTRINES OF LEIBNIZ. 511
not at all contradict the pre-established harmony that is
asserted by him. Indeed he has always said that the present
goes pregnant with the future, and that however distant things
may be from one another, so complete a connection subsists
between them, that whoever might be acute enough might read
the one in the other. As there may perhaps be in another
world dogs with so fine a nose as to scent their game thou-
sands of miles away, so there may perhaps also be in the
universe a planet where prophesying is more common than on
ours. — ^Kegaitling visions and revelations, we ought not to
decide cavalierly, but if we meet persons endowed with such
powers, we ought to preserve them like a curiosity or an
object for a cabinet, and to admire the nature of the human
mind, all the powers of which we do not know.
Bevelation, however, attaches itself to the nature of the
prophet Visions stand in relation to the natural disposition
of the persons to whose spirit God accommodates Himself,
because He does not work superfluous miracles. This was
also the case with the actual prophets, so that we must almost
imagine that Ezekiel had studied architecture, and haul been a
court engineer, because he sees such fin^ buildings in his
visions. On the other hand, a prophet belonging to the
country, like Hosea or Amos, sees only landscapes and rural
images ; whereas Daniel, who was a statesman, expresses the
regulated order of universal monarchies. But notwithstanding
this, the great prophets, and especially those who teach the
detail of the future, need supernatural gifts; for it is impossible
that a human mind, however acute, should be here sufficient
of its natural power, because eveiy particular event of nature
depends on the co-operation of an endless number of causes.
Mediate revelation specially requires to be tested in order
that we may not fall from easy credulity into unbelief, or take
the illusion of an evil genius, or our own false apprehension,
for the will of God. Revelation must therefore carry certain
marks in itself, and these are usually called motives of credi-
bility. If it is without these, we may with a good right
refuse to give credence to it, only if a command neither con-
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512 LEIBNIZ AND THE GERMAN AÜFKLiRTTNG.
tradicts reason nor another revelation it is safer to follow it
The miracles of the teacher of the religion and the holiness of
his doctrine, are regarded as such marks ; and the possibility
of any revelation is specially in its favour.
The relation of Bevelation to Beason is such that the prin-
ciples of reason should determine us to a believing reception
of the revelation, and that the contents of revelation can
never be contrary to reason, although they may be above
reason. To believe a thing is not merely to repeat it and to
adopt it without reflecting earnestly upon it ; and hence intel-
ligent i^en have always rightly regarded those with suspicion
who asserted that they did not need to trouble themselves in
matters of faith about reasons and proofs. Whoever is in
favour of this blind belief has no reason for preferring the
Bible to the Koran, or to the ancient books of the Brahmins. —
The contents of revelation are not contrary to reason, but they
are above reason. They cannot be contrary to reason ; for
one truth can never contradict another truth, and therefore the
truth of reason can never contradict the truth of revelation.
Further, our conviction can have no firmer ground than
demonstration, and if a revelation is contrary to the truths
resting on demonstration, it can never reckon upon being
accepted with full conviction. Bevelation may well go beyond
reason. The truths of reason are of two kinds. Some of them
are the eternal truths of geometry, of logic, and of metaphysics,
which are absolutely necessary, and which accordingly can
never be contradicted by faith. The other truths of reason
are the positive truths, or the laws which God has given to
nature, and which He can also dispense with. Bevelation
may contradict such truths. Further, right reason is to be
distinguished from perverted reason; the former forms a
chain of truths, the latter is altered by prejudices and passions.
Beason, however, has to avoid and to correct such errora and
deceptions by its own power.
Leibniz believes that he has thus proved that Theology and
Philosophy do not all stand in antagonism to each other. " To
renounce reason in mattera of religion is^ in my eyes^ almost a
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THE DOCTEINES OF LEIBNIZ. '513
sure mark either of a wilfulness which borders on fanaticism,
or what is still worse, of hypocrisy." Philosophy, however,
has no right to set itself in opposition to religion and its
revelation. There is a whole sphere that lies between what
is necessary and impossible, or between what must happen
according to a logical necessity and what cannot happen
according to the same necessity, and this embraces the whole
of the region of facts which depends only on physical neces-
sity. Here reason cannot refute revelation. This distinction
between what is against reason and what is above reason
became the shibboleth of the whole of the German Aufklärung,
Leibniz reckons the most inconceivable Christian dogmas
among those things which are merely above reason, such as
the Trinity, transubstantiation, incarnation, etc. The German
AufUarung always contracted the boundary of this sphere,
until the whole distinction was dissolved, and the inherent
spirit of criticism historically carried itself out to com-
pleteness.
Eeligion, as love to God, leads to action as well as to
knowledge. This action coincides with what is required by
morality, and the knowledge leads to certain theoretical prin-
ciples or dogmas. The doctrines of natural religion relate to
the divine nature and to man. The belief in the existence of
one God and the immortality of the human soul constitutes
the whole sum and substance of natural religion. Knowledge
and moral action are the purer forms in which religion is
found in a select few. The great crowd, however, always
pervert the true fear of God into formalities. These formali-
ties are likewise of a twofold kind: formulae of faith corre-
sponding to knowledge, and external ceremonies corresponding
to conduct. If these formalities were of such a nature that
they were conducive to the knowledge of the saving truth and
the practice of right conduct, they would be quite good, and
the striving of Moses and of Christ, who was the founder of
the purest and most enlightened religion, was directed towards
them. The heathen had only one kind of formalities, namely,
religious ceremonies, while they had no articles of faith.
VOL. I. 2 k
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S14 LEIBNIZ AND THE GERMAN AUFKLÄRUNG.
They did not know whether their gods were actual persons or
mere signs and symbols of natural powers ; their mysteries
consisted only of secret institutions, which were often ludicrous
and absurd. Abraham and Moses established among the
Hebrews the belief in one only God as the origin of all that
is good and the creator of all things. For although among
other nations wise and prudent persons spake in a similar
way of Grod, they did not succeed in making men follow them
and receive their doctrine as law. Moses, however, did not
bring the doctrine of immortality into his law, although it
accorded with his opinions, and was virtually taught. Jesus
Christ first took away the veil and taught that the immortal
souls enter into another life, and there receive rewards cor-
responding to their deeds. Christ turned natural religion
completely into a law; and gave it the authority and validity
of a public doctrine. He alone did what so many wise philo-
sophers had laboured in vain to accomplish ; and the religion
of the wise became the religion of the whole people. Even
Mohammed did not depart from these important doctrines of
natural religion, but brought them to the distant peoples in
Asia and Africa, who, in their heathen superstition, were
opposed to the Christian truth. In regard to the knowledge
of God, Christianity stands higher than Judaism. Christ has
brought to perfection what was begun by Moses. He has
made (Jod not only the object of our fear and reverence, but
also of our love and heartfelt affection. This true religion,
which is natural religion made into a imiversal law by Christ,
was afterwards again corrupted and falsified. '* Godliness has
been turned into ceremonies quite against the opinion of our
divine Master, and doctrine has become encumbered with
formulae."
These are essentially the views expressed by Leibniz
regarding the several positive religions. That his statements
are defective is evident enough. We are left in the dark
äs to whether in the beginning of history natural religion
prevailed purely by itself, so that heathenism is to be
regarded as a corruption ; or whether the law of development
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. WOLFF AND THE POPULAR PHILOSOPHT. 515
rules here also. Nor do we learn anything as to whether and
\^here a divine revelation has actually taken place. Moses
and Christ, although divine prophets, are still represented
only as founders or rather renovators of natural religion. It
thus naturally became the task of the German Enlightenment
to shell out natural religion in its greatest possible purity
from the later corrupted form of Christianity. As regards
the historical mode of viewing religion, the German
Aufklärung did not advance essentially beyond the position
of its founder until the time of Lessing.
IL
Wolff and the Populak Philosophy.
Leibniz continued throughout his life to be an aristocrat
even as a thinker. His thoughts, indeed, found a response in
a small circle of select spirits, but were not able to become a
universally ruling power. His views, however, came to be a
power after his death in consequence of their being popularized
by Christian Wolflf (1679-1774).^ Wolff himself zealously
asserted the independence of his philosophy, and was indignant
at his scholar Bilfinger because he used the expression
" Leibniz - WolflSan philosophy." An impartial historian,
however, must acknowledge that WoIfiT '' has not established
one new point of view of general importance," but that he
borrowed all the important thoughts of the philosophy of
Leibniz. His systematizing, however, is mainly his own, and
it is not to be reckoned as a slight merit Leibniz, as is well
known, has expressed his thoughts without systematic order
in a series of letters, and in treatises that are often of small
extent, and not without repetitions in one place and lacunse
in another. The application of his principles to the several
sciences is also wanting. Wolff, possessing only a logically
^ Of Wolff's writings we have specially to consider here his Theologia
iicUurcUis methodo acientißca pertracia, 1787, and his Vemüvßige Oedcmken
von Oott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, 3 Anfl. 1725. Cf. Zeller,
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616 LEIBNIZ AND THE GERMAN AUFKLABXTNG.
clear and diy mathematical understanding, but without anj
original faculty of his own, has arranged the fragmentaiy
thoughts of his master into a system, and constructed a formal
whole out of them. He has also cultivated the several
sciences, with the exception of .^thetics, from the point of
view of this system. He defines philosophy to be "the
science of the possible, as regards how and why or wherefore
anything is possible ; " and he thus again sets up philosophy
as the all-comprehending and universally-established queen of
all the separate sciences. Moreover, Wolff wrote mostly in
German, and he thereby introduced philosophy to wider circles
of readers.
It is not possible to systematize, and especially to popularize,
a philosophy in detail for wider circles of readers, without
adopting a correspondingly superficial . treatment of it. We
find this in WolfT, yet it is to be remembered at the same
time that the profoundest work of Leibniz, his Nouvea'iuc Essau
mr VEntmdement, was not published till 1766, after Wolffs
death. We have seen how Leibniz, along with the clear and
distinct knowledge in which he sees the foundation of all
theoretical and practical perfection, likewise attributes great
importance to obscure and confused knowledge. Wolfif speaks
only of the former, and thus intellectual enlightenment is the
high goal to which his whole striving is devoted. Hence he
demands nothing more urgently than distinct conceptions and
fundamental proofs; for philosophy ought to deduce all its
principles by correct inference from irrefragable principles, or
in other words, it must proceed according to the mathematical
method. Within this intellectual enlightenment there is,
however, a certain dualism which distinguishes WolfiF in a
manner that is not to his advantage.
Leibniz likewise recognises die promotion of happiness by
knowledge, but to him the two are identical and immediately
one. With WolfiF, science has to serve the external end of
making men happy, and what he misses in the previous
philosophy is not only evidence, but above all practical
utility. Leibniz distinguishes empirical knowledge from
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WOLFF AND THE POPULAR PHILOSOPHY. 517*
rational knowledge, but it is Wolff who on this basiB first
carries out the separation of rational and empirical science, as
in rational and empirical psychology and theology. Leibniz
finds the essential nature of all things in the activity of per-
ception, the limitation of which by individual determinate-
ness gives the matter or the body of all monads. Wolff
distinguishes in things as two different elements: (1) the
matter which gives body extension with its power of resist-
ance, and (2) an active power which is not exactly percipient,
or matter, substance, and moving force. Leibniz everywhere
refers the harmonious combination of individual things into a
universe to the pre-established harmony ; Wolff only applies
the doctrine to the union of soul and body, while with regard
to the lower corporeal beings he has recourse to physical
influence. In Wolff the harmony of the world appears no
longer as the natural immanent order of the world, but as an
order introduced into the world externally by God. God
foresaw into what sort of circumstances every body would
come, and He constituted the human soul so that it would
bring forth of its own essential power all its sensations and
perceptions in the corresponding order. God likewise foresaw
what external movements of the body man's soul, in virtue of
its freedom, would desire, and He constituted the machine of
the human body so that it would perform of itself at the right
time the corresponding motions. The end which controls
everything is no longer the immanent end or purpose, but a
purely external one ; and in place of the immanent conformity
to design, there comes in the common external utility. The
highest that man now experiences is the useful ; and therefore
the value of all things is measured by the direct or indirect
advantage which man draws from them as that which most
appeals to the " sound human understanding."
This is the general character of the Wolf&an system in its
relation to the philosophy of Leibniz. The system itself falls
into Pure Philosophy and Applied Philosophy. The former
has to do with the Deity, the human soul, and the corporeal
world, and it is thus divided into Theology, Psychology, and
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518 LSIBNIZ AND THE GERMAN AUFELARUNa
Cosmology, to which Ontology is prefixed as an expositicm of
what belongs to existence generally. Applied Philosophy
lays down precepts for cognition in Logic, and for action in
Practical Philosophy, which is subdivided into Ethics, Politics,
and Economics.
Wolff carefully distinguishes Natural Theology from tiie
revealed knowledge of God. The former is founded merely
upon our natural knowledge, while the latter is exclusively
based upon Scripture, but the former serves as a preparation
and introduction to it Natural Theology has to prore the
existence of God, and to develop His attributes. In doing
so it pursues a twofold way. Proceeding a posteriori, or
from experience, Wolff infers the existence of Gk)d by the
Cosmological Argument, and in such a way that the con-
tingency of the world is specially accentuated. Henoe this
Argument as presented by Wolff is commonly designated the
Argrcmentum e cotUingentia mundi. It proceeds as follows.
If anything exists, it must have its sufficient reason ; now we
at least exist ; and therefore we must have a sufficient reason.
This reason does not lie in us, but out of us. This other
being may also have its sufficient reason out of itsel£ But
if we go on fistrther, we must at last come to a Being which
has the sufficient reason of its existence in itself, because
otherwise everything would be without ground or reason.
This ultimate Being is the JEns necessarium, which does not
need for its existence the power of another being, but exists
of its own power, and is sufficient of itself for its existence ;
it is JEn$ a se. This necessary Being is not the world, nor its
elements, nor the soul, but an extra-mundsme Being, which is
the ground of the existence of the world, or God.
Wolff proceeds ä prun'i to prove the existence of God by
the Ontological Argument from the conception of the most
real being. The most perfect Being, Ens perfectissiraum, is
that Being in which all realities dwell in the highest degree.
Such a Being is unlimited, unchangeable, infinite, and without
any want Whereas in a finite being the various states of
which it is capable by its nature can only arise one after the
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WOLFF AND THE POPULAR PHILOSOPHY. 619
other» an infinite Being can only have necessary and un-
changeable determinations ; that is, its states are all present
in it at the same time. This most perfect Being is God, and
hence all realities are in Gk)d. And as this also implies
necessary existence, God necessarily exists. Because God
necessarily exists, His existence is not dependent on another
being ; He exists merely of His own power. Hence God is
Etia a se. Here the ä priori investigation of the second part
of natural theology flows wholly into the ä posteriori result of
the first part, and the further details of both are essentially
the same.
The JSns a se has not arisen and cannot perish ; it has no
beginning and no end of being ; it is JSns primttm et ultimum^
that is, it is eternal It is not compounded nor corporeal, for
all that is compounded and corporeal arises and perishes ; it
is " Ens Simplex et corporeus esse nequit" The visible world
and all its parts have not their being of themselves, and hence
the Uns a se must be distinguished from these things. In
this Being all other things have the sufficient ground of their
existence, and therefore all those attributes must be ascribed
to it in which the sufficient ground for the existence of the
world lies. This is the most important canon for obtainment
of the attributes of God. God is thus the £ns a se, and contains
the sufficient ground for the existence of this world and of
our BouL Hence He is constantly active power, whence He
is also called living, and life is ascribed to Him. In this
power the ground must lie for the fact that this world is,
instead of its not being, as well as the fact that it is just this
world that exists and not another. The reason of this latter
fact cannot lie in those points in which the various worlds are
like each other, but only in those in which they differ from
each other. Hence God must have represented all possible
worlds to' Himself, and have chosen out of them the one that
has become real Accordingly reason and freewill belong to
God, and thus God is a spirit (spiritus independens). All
realities that belong to us as spirits must also be ascribed to
God, only not with those limitations that follow from our
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620 LEIBNIZ AND TUE QEBHAN AUFKLAEUNG.
finiteness. This is the second canon for obtaining the divine
attributes.
In wearisome detail Wolff then treats of the at^bates
which constitute the being of God as a spirit. These attri-
butes are reason and will. God's knowledge, as distinguished
from that of man, is not merely a capacity, but it is cu^tis. It
is not obtained by senses and imagination, but is purdy
rational, and consists in the contemplation of the ideas that
are eternally and unchangeably present in God as the mwidus
intelligibilis. God knows not only what is real, but all that
can be known. He knows everything at once. In the least
paxt of the world He knows at the same time the whole world.
He knows what is most individual, and also the verUatn
universales. In short, the manner of the divine knowledge
is elevated above all our conception.
The power of God is the capability of making real what is
possible in itself. For as the knowledge of God is limited to
what is knowable in itself, so is the divine nature limited to
what is possible in itself. God can neither will nor realize
anything that is impossible, but this is no limitation of His
omnipotence. As regards what is possible, there must ako be
a definite reason why God wills anything, or does not will it
Of the many possible worlds, God has willed and realized this
world only because it is the best The evil in the world is
not an objection to this fact A distinction must be made
between what is absolutely bad and what is relatively bad ; the
former cannot be avoided in a finite world, the latter does not
exist in the 6W5tual world. God's power, which is limited only
by what is impossible in itself, therefore extends much üarther
than God's will, which is constantly put into activity by some
particular reason. God can likewise make all the other
worlds real, etc.
This external relation between divine power and divine
will forms, according to Wolff, the basis of the possibility of
justifying miracles and immediate revelation. God can
perform miracles to whatever extent He may will God can
do what goes beyond the power of all nature. He can
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WOLFF AND THE POPULAR PHILOSOPHY. 521
annul the order of nature whenever and as often as He
will. The question as to how a miracle is compatible with
the order of nature, is explained by Wolflf, in his cosmology,
in a somewhat unsatisfactory way. By miracles, he says, are
meant those changes of bodies which cannot be explained by
the way in which their parts are connected with each other,
or by their qualities and laws of motion. A miracle does not
contradict the nature of that body in which it takes place, for
in that case it would be impossible. If a miracle takes place,
its occurrence is possible according to the nature of things, but
natural causes, or the so-called catisoe eßcientes sußcierUes, are
not capable of realizing it Hence every natural effect would
be a miracle if it took place without a sufficient natural cause ;
and therefore we know a miracle primarily from the want of
a natural cause. A miracle goes beyond the powers of nature,
and must therefore be effected by a Being external to the
world ; but as nature is controlled, not by an absolute, but
only by a relative necessity, such a miracle is impossible. The
whole point is that God likewise receives miracles into His
eternal world-plan.
On this position is also based the possibility of an imme-
diate revelation, for such a revelation is only possible by a
miracle. The further consideration also comes in, that it is
not impossible that God should reveal His will to men. God
knows by what words His will must be made known, and He
also knows with what words or signs He must represent it in
order that the recipient of the revelation may know what Grod
wiUa — But Wolff endeavours to establish various criteria by
which every alleged revelation ought to be tested. Divine
revelation must have certain contents which it is necessary
for man to know, but which it is impossible to know in
another way. This follows from the fact that God never does
anything superfluous ; but it would be superfluous to reveal
things of which the knowledge was either not necessary to
i^an, or attainable without this means. It is, however, tenable
that there may be certain things contained in a divine revela-
tion as concomitants of it, such as we may know even by the
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522 LEIBNIZ AND THE GERMAN AUFKLÄRUNG.
right use of reason. Besides, every revelation desiderates a
miracle ; a miracle is a great change of the material world ;
and hence Qod has recourse to this means only from entirely
special reasons. Hence revelation must contain mysteries, as
things which go beyond reason, but which are nevertheless
possibla Nor is an alleged revelation to be regarded as such
so soon as it can be shown that the recipient has come to it
by the natural powers of his mind. Further, the divine
revelation may not contradict the divine attributes ; for Grod
wills what is becoming to Him, and hence, in His attributes»
there must lie the reason why He wills this and not that.
The divine revelation can relate only to what is knowable,
and hence it cannot contain contradictions ; and just as little
can it contradict necessary truths, although it may contradict
contingent truths. It can contain nothing which contradid»
reason or experience, or propositions which are demonstrated
from the principles of reason, or facts that are established by
trustworthy experience. The knowledge that is founded upon
reason and experience is raised above all doubt; but God
cannot possibly plunge any one in error; and hence such
knowledge and revelation must harmonize with each other.
The divine revelation can prescribe nothing that is contrary to
the law of nature, or to the essence and nature of the souL
For what corresponds to the right of nature corresponds also
to reason ; and as revelation cannot be opposed to the latt^,
neither can it be to the former. The nature of the soul,
again, is unchangeable ; and hence it is impossible to com-
mand anything that is opposed to it, such as that food and
drink which taste agreeably shall not taste agreeably. In the
divine revelation the individual things must be said with
words or exhibited in. signs, so that the receiver of the revela-
tion may know that the opinion of God is really contained in
it ; and hence neither more nor fewer words may be employed
than are necessary to know God's judgment, and only those
that are subservient to this purpose. Hence in revelation
God cannot presuppose that other conceptions are connected
with the words than the man addressed himself has. Where-
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WOLFF AND THB POPULAB PHILOSOPHY. 523
fore God in His revelation must employ the ideas that are
taken from present things, and observe the rules of grammar
and rhetoric.
We do not find in Wolff any application of these criteria
to the positive religions. He indeed supports the affirmations
of his natural theology point after point by statements of
Holy Scripture, but all that was accomplished afterwards by
the ÄufMärung in the way of a shallow and emptying criti-
cism of Christianity rests in principle upon these criteria. This
is the reason why they have been reproduced here in such
detail
In his views regarding the relation of God to the world,
Wolff also attaches himself essentially to Leibniz, but he strongly
externalizes his doctrine. God has created the world out of
nothing, so that all being, as regards its internal possibility,
depends on the intellect of God ; as regards its external possi-
bility, it depends on His will; as regards its existence, it
depends on His power ; and as regards its future duration, it
depends on His unalterable decree. God perceived all worlds,
chose out of them this world as the best, and by a miracle
created it and the order that prevails in it In his deter-
minism as in his optimism, Wolff agrees entirely with Leibniz,
yet he speaks at times as if God could not have created the
world, and he recognises innumerable miracles as well as
divine permission and assistance. The manifestation of the
divine glory appears as the final purpose of the world, to
which everything else is subordinated as a means, and yet
this conformity to design is quite externally apprehended.
This is seen, in the first place, in reference to the ground of
the world; for instead of referring to immanent order and
harmony, Wolff lets us see divine purposes in everything that
arises from the nature of things. Again, this holds regarding
the goal of the world ; for although it is said ^ that God has
not made everything in the world merely to please us," yet
usefulness for men and animals is to be regarded as an accom-
panying purpose in the divine plan of the world. And
indeed the ultimate end of the world lies only in man, because
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524 LEIBNIZ AKD THE GERMAN AUFKLÄRUNG.
God can only reach through him His purpose to be known
and worshipped as God. This thought is beaten out till it
becomes trivial in his " Bational Thoughts on the purpose of
natural things/'^ so that the whole constitution of the earth
appears as nothing eke than " a means arranged by (Jod to
attain all that is necessary for our wants, our convenience,
and our delight" Thus the interchange of day and night is
lauded because men and animals can refresh themselves at
night by sleep, and because the night is subservient to certain
pursuits, such as the catching of üshes and birds, which
cannot be well carried on by day.
The allusions of Leibniz to the nature of religion are in no
way taken up by Wolff, to say nothing of their not being
further developed. To Wolff, as to the theology of his time,
Beligion is simply a " modus Deum cognoscendi, colendique."
The soul is a simple substance, and can therefore only have
arisen by creation ; and as the creation of all things happened
at the same time, it could only have come into being at the
creation of the world. Souls have existed from that time in
an imperfect unconscious state, until they attained to human
existence. In death, human souls are not annihilated, but
continue to be immortal with full consciousness of their
former state, whereas the souls of animals come to an end.
Practical philosophy is likewise founded entirely upon the
natural being of mem. It is only when we act according to
the natural destination of our bodily and spiritual powers
that we can attain the end of our existence, which is advanc-
ing perfection combined with always increasing happiness.
This moral law also springs from God ; but God could give
no other law of action than what is an eternal, necessary, and
unchangeable condition of the furtherance of human nature.
Along with the WolflSan philosophy, there was another
movement which co-operated in promoting Enlightenment
It embodied the tendency which was averse to all profound
inquiries, and especially to the syllogistic procedure of the
^ VemüJ\/lige Oedanktn iibtr die Absicht der natürlichen Dinge,
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. WOLFF AND THE POPULAR PHILOSOPHY. 525
school with its mathematical demonstrative method, and it
worked out a universally accessible PoptUar Philosophy on the
basis of the utterances of the sound human Understanding.
This movement first showed itself in the department of
Natural Law. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) had already led
the way in this direction, and he was also known as a
theologian by the philologico-historical exegesis of his AniW'
tationes to the Old and New Testament, and by his widely-
circulated apologetic work, De veritate rdigionis Christianm
(1627). In his De jure belli et pads libri tres (Paris 1625),
Grotius endeavoured to make the knowledge of right inde-
pendent of the precepts of divine revelation. The preserva-
tion of society in conformity with human reason is the source
of natural right ; for as society rests upon a social impulse
peculiar to man, so does the natural right of society rest
upon principles which man carries internally in himself. But
it is expressly recognised that these natural principles are
implanted in us by the will of God, and thus is right also
indirectly referred to him. The chief follower of Grotius in
Germany was Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694). His conflict
was mainly carried on with the *• peripatetic knights " or the
learned " school-foxes," who wished to judge of everything in a
scholastic way by their infallible master Aristotle, and who
fell into the greatest embarrassment whenever his schematism
left them in the lurch. In like manner, he is zealous against
the demand of an exclusively Christian philosophy. He holds
that this demand rests upon an unjustifiable mixing up of
theology and philosophy; for the predicates of orthodoxy
and heterodoxy should have no application to philosophy.
Pufendorf distinguishes Natural Law, Civil Law, and Moral
Theology. All the three sciences have to deal with the
knowledge of Sight and Law, but each of them draws its
knowledge from a special source, and deals with a particular
form of duty : Natural Law, on the basis of natural reason,
deals with the duty of sociality ; Civil Law, on the basis of
the ordinances of the legislator, deak with the duties of the
citizen to the State: moral theology on the basis of the
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62B LEIBNIZ AND THE GSB^IAN AUTKLAJtUNO.
diviDe revelation, as contained in the commandments of Holy
Scripture, deals with the duty of the Christian towards God.
Natural Law is therefore not opposed to the injunctioBB of
theology; but there are certain of its demands, however,
which it does not take into consideration. But so far as we
can know the existence and the will of God by the powers of
natural reason, the natural law of Sight also leads by itself to
certain duties towards God. On account of these position^
Pufendorf had to undergo many attacks ; but such a work as
that of his contemporary Valentin Alberti, entitled Cam-
pendium juri$ naturce, orthodox^ theologim canfamuUum, etc.
(Leipsic 1678), still entirely shows the spirit of the Mediseval
jurisprudence. The source of the knowledge of Right is here
referred to the remains of the divine image, or rather the
orthodox dogma of the state of innocence.
Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) likewise started from
juristic studies, but he proceeded to take up the struggle in
all the departments of the spiritual life against old traditional
prejudices and unjustifiable authorities. He began his career
at Leipsic with lectures upon Grotius and Pufendorf, but
according to his own confession the latter had brought him
to the conviction that the theologians unanimously maintain
many things that belong to ethics or to jurisprudence. Beii^
thus liberated from the oppressive anxiety of being con-
demned for heresy, he proceeds to liberate natural right from
the bonds of theological authority. The light of nature
and the light of revelation are different sources of truth.
Theology draws from Scripture, philosophy fix)m reason;
philosophy aims at the earthly well-being of men, and
theology at his heavenly well-being. In like manner, right
and morality must be sharply distinguished. What is right
or just (justum) consists in our doing to no one what we do
not wish that he should do to us; what is becoming
(decorum) consists in our manifesting to others what we
wish to be done by them to us ; and what is moral (honestum)
consists in our doing ourselves what we find laudable in
others. What is right therefore relates to outward peace.
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WOLFF Ain) THE POPULAR PHILOSOPHY. 527
and can be constrained ; what is moral refers to inward peace,
and cannot be constrained. This reform of jurisprudence led
Thoraasius farther. The greatest evil in this connection was
that the " school-foxes ** compelled everything to go into the
strait-jacket of the syllogism, and that they would determine
everything according to the empty schematism of Aristotle.
In order to break its supremacy, he laboured to introduce a
universally intelligible and useful philosophy, which would be
available, not merely for the school, but also for the higher
life of business. Thus arose his Introductio in phUosophiam
avlicam (Leipsio 1688), with his directions to think rationally,
to live rationally and well, and such like. Its philosophical
value is very small, but it was highly conducive to its
purpose, which was to "enlighten." Averse to all logical
rules and to all scholastic formalism, Thomasius in his
struggle against tradition and prejudice appealed only to the
utterances of " the sound human understanding " as to that
which enlightens every one whose understanding is not led
too much astray by alien knowledge. "What agrees with
reason is true, what does not agree with it is false." This is
given as the extremely simple criterion of truth. A philo-
sophy of the sound human understanding naturally strives
after the widest diffusion that is possible. Hence it is not
surprising that it was Thomasius who broke down the barrier
which then separated the learned circles from the unlearned
in the Latin language, by his giving lectures in the German
language, and by the founding of German scientific periodicals.
— In his religious views Thomasius shows considerable varia-
tions. At first he attached himself warmly to the Pietists,
but less from internal affinity to them than because they both
saw their common enemy in the ecclesiastical orthodoxy.
" Devoted to the religion which the Apostle strives to
impress upon his Corinthians in the passage in which he
so greatly glorifies love and so highly estimates good works,"
Thomasius demands from the State toleration of the various
religious communities. He also shows considerable insight in
his relations to Mysticism, but afterwards, under the advancing
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528 LEIBNIZ AND THE GERMAN AÜFELARUNa
influence of the empiricism of Locke, he turned more and more
towards Naturalism.
This eclecticism of the sound human Understanding was
specially influential in opposing the universal diffusion of the
views of Wolffi For although Thomasius also reckons the
Eamists, Philippists, and Cartesians with the " School-foxes"
or the old Aristotelians, it was only the latter that really came
into consideration, and they had long since lost their former
authority. Hence but a few decades passed until the
struggle — which specially turned about the question as to
whether the theory of pre-established harmony or that of
physical influence .was to be received — tended decidedly in
favour of Wolff. Ludovici, the historian of the Wolffian
philosophy, by the year 1737 already knows of one hundred
and seven literary Wolffians.^ All the universities and all
the schools were dominated by them ; the whole of the sciences
were cultivated in accordance with the mathematico-demonstra-
tive method, and according to the criterion of the principle of
the sufficient reason. Such a wide diffusion of a system is,
however, always connected with a corresponding superficiality
of treatment, and from the Wolffian philosophy there was
thus developed about the middle of the century that eclectic
Popular Philosophy which chiefly characterizes the German
Enlightenment.
The relation of the Wolffian Philosophy to Theology still
remains to be considered. In theology there were then two
Schools : the Orthodoxy which was dying out, and the
Pietism which was striving to obtain the supremacy. The
Wolffian philosophy had points of contact with both. With
orthodoxy it represented the strictly scientific method against
the mere pectoral theology of pietism ; and with pietism it
demanded the liberation of the subject from the fetters of
the ecclesiastical authority. At the same time, however, its
thoroughly rational character separated it from Orthodoxy as
^ A more detailed exposition of this subject would be out of place here.
Kefereuce may be made to Zeller {Op, cit.) and Benno Erdmann's Martm
Knutzen und $eine Zeit, 1876.
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WOLFF AND THE POPULAR PHILOSOPHY. 629
well as from Pietism. It is no wonder then, notwithstanding
a transitory friendliness, that it ultimately fell out with them
both.
Tlie Orthodoxy of the beginning of the Eighteenth Century
can hardly be compared with the powerful ecclesiastical
Theology of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, which
ruled without limit. Eather is the coarse remark of Edel-
mann not entirely without truth; when he says that " the
Lutheran sect must have rotted in its own dung, had not
the Wolffian philosophy taken pity on this pig-sty, and
brought the sin-filth which these swine had now deposited
for two hundred years in their common dunghill, among the
necessary things in the best of worlds." It is only from this
internal decay of ecclesiastical orthodoxy that we can explain
how, in its struggle for existence against Pietism and the
Ifaturalism that was always gaining ground in consequence
of the Socinian reaction of the English and French influences,
it laid hold of the Wolffian philosophy with its mathematico-
demonstrative method, as a sure anchor of safety. Wolff had
indeed left supernatural revelation unaffected^ and hence a
series of theologians laboured more or less to prop up a
moderate supranaturalism upon the Wolffian rationalism, and
to prove the doctrines of the Church by means of the principle
of the sufficient reason. Beligion appears in them, as to
Wolff, wholly as a " modus Deum cognoscendi colendique."
Eevelation is shown to be necessary from the limitedness of
the human faculty of knowledge, or as springing from the
divine omnipotence and compassion. A series of rational
criteria serve to test true revelation, and to distinguish it
from merely alleged revelations. The conception of the
suprarational serves to remove the antagonism between reason
and revelation. The universal principles, the introductory
inquiries regarding revelation and reason, the propositions
regarding God's existence and nature, and regarding providence
and anthropology, all gain in range and depth, while the
specifically Christian doctrines retreat considerably into the
background.
VOL. I. 2 L ^ ,
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630 'LEIBNIZ AND THE GEKMAN AUFKLARUNG.
We may now approach the most important of the theological
Wolffians somewhat more closely. Gottlieb Canz (t 1753) of
Tübingen* sought to prove the agreement of philosophy with
the fundamental truths of the Christian religion point by
point; for grace does not annul the powers of Nature, but
improves them by furnishing a new light in holy Seripture.
To subordinate the truth communicated to us by God through
the instrument of reason to that which is directly presented
to us by Kevelation, would be the same as to make the water
dug out of the earth a servant of the water that falls as Tain.
In this spirit Ganz wrote a continuation of Eeinbeck's " Con-
templations on the divine truths contained in the Augsburg
Confession," * a work consisting originally of four parts. This
continuation is of wearisome length. By a popular mode of
rationalizing, Canz labours to make the Biblical doctrines
at least probable. Kothen, a Protestant preacher at Geneva,
published, in 1736, a treatise on "the excellence and the
usefulness of the Wolffian philosophy in the confirmation and
practice of the Christian religion." It professes to furnish the
best means of refuting Scepticism, Materialism, Idealism,
Spinozism, Fatalism, Deism, '' the common religion of people
of a worldly disposition and of sensualists," Manichseism,
nationalism. Fanaticism, Predestinationism, Socinianism, and
Freethinking. Jakob Carpov of Jena (t 1768) proceeds in a
thoroughly scholastic way to maintain revealed theology on
the foundation of natural theology.' He argues that it is
possible in itself that G<»d reveals or immediately communi-
cates definite truths to men. In virtue of His omniscience,
God knows all the words and signs by which things must be
brought to human cognition. In virtue of His omnipotence.
He is able to produce sounds in the air like those by which
we speak, or motions in the ear such as the voice excites, or
to produce immediately in our mind perceptions of the things
* Uhus PhUoeopfUfB LeibnUtana et Wofßance in theologia^ 1783. Philo-
nophice Wcißance consensus cum theologia, 1735.
* Betrachtungen über die in der Atigsburgischen Confcmon enthaltenen
göttlichen Wahrheiten, Frankf. 1733.
* Theologia rei^lata dogmatica methodo 8cxent\fica adontata, 1737.
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WOLFF AND THE POPÜLAK PHILOSOPHY. 5 31
that are to be known. The reality of an immediate revelation
may be also inferred from principles of reason, at least with
great probability. Moved by pity, God's will was to rescue
men from their guilt, but He could not do this otherwise than
by Himself becoming man, and doing satisfaction for men.
Our natural reason perceives this, but does not recognise the
time and the other circumstances of this divine satisfaction.
It is extremely probable that God has come to the help of this
defect by the aid of immediate revelation. As God generally
can do nothing without a reason (sine ratione), certain rational
criteria for revelation may be also set up. Bevelation must
communicate to us truths which it is necessary for us to
know, but which it is impossible for us to know in any other
way. The former condition holds only of the means of
reconciling man with God, the latter only of suprarational
truths, which, however, cannot be in contradiction with
themselves nor with the truths of natural reason. And
because these truths go beyond reason, they can only claim
to be received when they are accredited by miracles. Above
all, however, they must correspond to the divine perfection.
Carpov, at the close of his inquiry, enumerates ten criteria
by which a revelation must be tested. Tried by these criteria,
it results indubitably from rational grounds that the holy
Scripture is in truth a divine revelation. Having attained
to this position, Carpov then moves pretty much in the
traditional paths of the ecclesiastical orthodoxy, although not
entirely without some softening of certain doctrines that
were especially repulsive to intelligent thinking. Beusch,
who also belonged to Jena (t 1758),^ proceeds in an entirely
similar way, only that in dogmatic theology he brings the
regard to happiness into play. There is no happiness without
* The title of his principal work is of itself characteristic. It mns in full as
follows : — Jo. Petri Reuschii Introductio in theologiam revelatam seu theologicp,
revekUcB pars gentralut, qna necessarius religionis verm ae felieitatis nexutty
doffmatum Christiance reliyionis eonewdia cum verUaHbus naturcUiter coguUiM
atque religionis electio rationalis ad Christianam determinata in luce ponuntur
Uemque UM canonici religionum quce perhibcntur rtvelata recensentur, Jen»
1744.
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532 LEIBNIZ AND THE GEBMAN AÜFKLÄBÜNG.
religion, and hence there must exist a necessary connection
between them. Revealed religion is not contrary to nataral
religion, but is rather supported by rational principles, as all
rational criteria show Holy Scripture to be a true revelati<ML
On the other hand, one of the most important sources of our
happiness, the reconciliation of man with God in the atone-
ment, is known to us only through revelation.
Some of the WolflBans even ventured to apply their mathe-
matical method of proof to the profoundest mysteries of the
Christian religion. Carpov thus deduced the satisfaction
worked out by God become man. But these attempts were
mainly directed to the doctrine of the Trinity. Daijes
(t 1791) of Jena, at the first a zealous Wolffian, though
afterwards alienated from the school, attempted in 1735 to
prove the ''pluritas personanim in Deitate ex solis rationis
principiis methodo mathematicorum," but the theologians
found no fewer than twenty-two errors in his treatise,
lleinbeck deduces the Trinity from the idea of the supreme
good as inclined to communicate itself. Eeusch seeks to
comprehend it by a comparison with the three grades of
human cognition and will, the first of which comprehends
all possibilities, the second brings these possibilities into
definite order, while the third chooses one possibility as the
best.
Along with these WolflBan theologians, there may also at
least be named Ribow (t 1774), who, at Göttingen, applied
the Wolffian method to the art of preaching ; and Joh. Ernst
Schubert (t 1774), who, in a more popular way, tried to
make the doctrines of the Church acceptable by at least
probable arguments. This alliance between Orthodoxy and
Wolffianism was utterly contrary to nature. Even if the several
doctrines remained unaffected in their expression, they yet
lost, not only their supernatural character, but even their
religious character. With a correct instinct Kappelier pro-
tests against this in his Epistle directed against Darjes, where
he says : " Nunquam concedemus, mysteria ex solis rationis
principiis demonstrari posse, quod nee concessit unquam nee
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WOLFF AND THE POPULAR PHILOSOPHY. 533
concedere potest verus philosophus aut theologus, ne dicam,
veriis Christianus," History also showed very soon that this
alliance was untenabla In spite of its temporary apologetic
value as against the naturalistic views which were always
coming more forward, the alliance only formed a transition to
the " enlightened " evisceration of the Christian religion in the
popular theology.
The Wolfl&an philosophy fell very soon into conflict with
pietism. This was inevitable, for the antagonism between
the immediateness of faith and the trustworthiness of know-
ledge, according to the demonstrative mathematical method,
could not be concealed. The external course of the struggle
is well known. Wolfif was compelled by an order of the
Government in 1723, under threat of the halter, to leave
Halle and the Prussian territory within forty-eight hours ; but
seventeen years afterwards, in 1740, he was recalled in the
most honourable manner. Our attention may be briefly
turned to the questions discussed in these controversies.^
The objections to Wolff's philosophy rested partly on a com-
plete misunderstanding of it, and the controverters of it
everywhere kept to details, without entering upon theiproper
spirit of the system. These objections in essential were such
as the following : — ^It was objected that the simple elements
of the world and the souls of animals, as well as of men, and
even God Himself, were designated as essentially the same,
and as differing from each other only in degrees, and particu-
larly as percipient substances. This definition of God as a
substance that always perfectly perceives the world, was objected
to as far from exhausting the nature of Grod, and as putting
Him too much on the same stage as other things. The best
and most current arguments for the existence of God were
said to be laid aside as insuf&cient by this system ; and as
^ As regards the controversial writings then published, reference may be made
to Joachim Lange, Avsftthrliche Recension der wider die Wolßaniache Meta-
phyaik auf 9 Universitäten und anderwärUg edirten aämmtlicJien 26 Schriften :
mit dem Erweistf etc., Halle 1725. Carl Günther Ludovici, Sammlung und
Auszüge der sämmtlichen Streitschriften wegen der Wolffischen Philosophie,
etc., 1737, 1738.
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534 LEIBNIZ AND THE GEBMAN AUFKLÄRUNG.
the argument brought forward by it instead of these was not
at all demonstrative, it was alleged that this only abetted
atheism. Again, it was said that atheism was advocated by
the assertion that it was only its abuse that was dangerous to
morality. Further, the eternity of the world was taught in
the system, and, instead of divine Providence, it maintained
the necessity of all things, doctrines that destroyed religion
from its foundation. As the soul had no power to work upon
the body, and the body was incapable of communicating
influences to the soul, man thus became a double machine«
so that even the speaking of the mouth and the writing of
the hand go on of themselves without being guided by rational
thoughts of the souL And, in general, the fanciful notion of
a pre-established harmony was the source of all the errors of
the Wolffians. As the actual world, with its evil and its sin,
was designated as the best of worlds, God was thus made the
author of sin. Miracles were spoken of in such a way that
they might just as well be denied. Morality was completely
undermined, partly by the denial of human freedom, partly by
the assertion that the moral law rests upon its own internal
truth, and would therefore exist without a belief in God, and
partly by the setting up of false ethical principles.
Such is an anthology of the most important objections that
were raised against the Wolffian philosophy. Every one
sees how truth and falsehood are here largely mixed together,
and at the same time how great was the bitterness of the
opponents of the system, and how correct was their instinct
(for it can scarcely be called insight) as to the antagonism
between their mode of thought and that which was now
coming up. Nevertheless, the new system triumphed, and
even Pietism was not able to prevent the advance of the
popular theology.
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THE AUFKLÄRUNG AND ITS CHIEF EEPRESENTATIVES. 535
III.
The Aufklärung and its Chief Eepresentatives.
The Wolfl&an Philosophy had also to yield to the process
which has repeatedly shown itself in history, according to
which.« a philosophical school, when it has universally prevailed
for a considerable time, begins to lose its scholastic exclusive^
ness and its strictly scientific character. It is thus that a
philosophical system gradually becomes mixed with hetero-
geneous elements that were at first zealously combated, until
it loses its peculiarities in the practical application of its
principles to the special questions of science and of life. It
was thus that the Popular Philosophy of Germany arose about
the middle of the last century.^ Its special character may be
defined both in a formal and material relation. In the
formal relation, its character was manifested in a disinclination
to all scholastic or rigidly scientific modes of proof; and in
the material relation, its character was exhibited in its giving
constant regard to human happiness as the ultimate practical end
of Ufe. The cumbrous garb of the mathematico-demonstrative
method is completely stripped off, and the most difficult
questions of science and of life are explained in the elegant
form of an easy-flowing, and often even aphoristic reasoning.
It is not speculative principles, but current opinions and the
natural judgment of the sound human understanding, that are
recognised as the highest criteria of truth. In short, a
philosophy, not for the school, but for life and for the world,
is striven after, or rather it is no longer a special philosophy,
but a universal wisdom that is desired.* Viewed as to their
contents, all subjects of investigation are determined by regard
to their usefulness, and as such human happiness appears to
be the highest good« Hence it was that the consideration of
the personal ego came so strikingly into the foreground, as
> A brief characteristto is sufficient for <mr examination here. But see the
detailed exposition of Zeller, Op. dt. 248 ff.
* In this relation the title of Engel's work, Der Phüo$opk ßtr die Welt
(Leipzig 1775), universally read at that time, is of itself characteristic
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536 THE GEBHAN AÜFKLABÜKG.
was seen in relation to life in the innumerable self-examinations,
confessions, and confidential correspondences of the time.
The same characteristic is shown in the sphere of science by
the preference for psychological investigations.^ In the study
of nature purely physical inquiry falls into the background,
and everything is measured by its usefulness to man. Thus
Sulzer, in his " Moral reflections on the works of Nature "
(2nd ed. 1750), in this way finds the advantage which is
furnished by the contemplation of natural things in the
encouragement they give to praise the Creator and to grow in
virtue. He will not speak of the physical foundations of
natute, but only of final causes. '* The will of the beneficent
Creator was to furnish men with nourishment and pleasure ;
and therefore He commanded nature that she should not bring
forth all the plants at once, but in succession ; for the former
method would not have been suitable to any of the purposes
mentioned." Tlie vegetable kingdom has been constituted as
it is '' in order that men and animals might have nourishment,
and that along with nourishment men should also have as much
pleasure and delight as possible." — Socrates was the model
and the shining example of these lovers of wisdom, and they
felt anything that derogated from his fame as an attack upon
themselves.' Nicolai was specially identified with the efiforts
to carry on this literature, and in his " Universal German
Library " * he made the whole German literature pass for
several decades before his judgment-seat like every philo-
sophy that is directed to life, this system also matnred a
Pdedagogic of its own. Its leading expounder was Basedow
(tl790), a man who, like Eousseau, was forced to a conscious-
ness of the value of a good education by his own want of
training. Happiness is regarded by him as so certainly the
* We only refer to the following, giving their works : Karl Franz v. Irving,
Erfahrwiigen und Untersuchungen über den Menschen, 4 Bde. Berlin 1772-
1785. Tiedemann, Untersuchungen über den Menschen, 8 Bde. 1777.
Nicolaus Tetens, Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur, 2 Bde.
1777. J. Q. H. Feder, Untersuchungen Über den menschlichen Willen, 4 Bde.
Berlin 1779-98.
* Cf. Eberhard, Neue Apologie des Socrates, Berlin 1772.
' Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek,
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BEPRESENTATIVES OF THE AUFKLÄRUNG. MENDELSSOHN. 537
goal of humau life, that he maiutaiBS that all are obliged to
accept as true all propositions which are so closely connected
"with human happiness that it could not exist without them.
Such truths appear to him to be the existence of God, the
divine providence in the government of the world, and the
immortality of the human soul ; and it is a " duty of belief "
to accept them.
Moses Mendelssohn (1728-1786) is unquestionably the
noblest representative of the German philosophy of Enlighten-
ment. The son of a poor Jewish sclioolmaster of Dessau, he
went to Berlin, and there, impeded by poverty as well as by
his nationality, he yet acquired the scientific culture of his
time under indescribable difficulties. Even then he remained
in the humble position of a book-keeper, yet he won the
universal esteem of all Germany, not less by his mild and
estimable personality than by his literary activity.^ As a
philosopher he belongs entirely to the popular philosophy of
the German Aufklärung, He starts indeed from the Leibniz-
Wolffian philosophy, but the cumbrous scholastic terminology
is replaced by an extremely flexible and easily intelligible
language. The sound understanding and the reason are
expressly declared to be one and the same, and they are only
distinguished in that the human understanding makes rapid
steps by means of feeling, and goes quickly forward without
any fear of falling, whereas reason feels about as it were with
its staff before it ventures a step. Both of them may turn
into side paths, but as reason finds it far more difficult to get
right again, the wise thinker will not trust reason when it falls
behind the sound understanding or diverges from it, but will
rather follow the sound human understanding itself. With
regard to the subject of philosophical inquiry Mendelssohn
says : " This is the way which philosophy, as universal wisdom,
should always take. It should begin with an examination of
external objects; but every step it takes, it must turn its
look to man, towards whose true happiness all its efforts
should be aimed."
> His collected works have been published in seven Yols., Leipzig 1843.
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538 THE GERMAN AUFKLÄRUNG.
The truths of natural religion are especially subservient ta
this end ; for " without God, providence and immortality, all
the goods of life have, in my eyes, a contemptible value.
What is more wretched than a man who sees annihilation
approach him with strong steps ? " Mendelssohn's philoso-
phizing is therefore directed in the first line to the establish-
ing of these truths. In the form of a Dialogue and in the
spirit of Plato, he seeks in his Fhädan (1767) to prove the
Immortality of the Soul on philosophical grounds. The soul
is a simple substance, and as such it cannot cease by dissolu-
tion, but only by annihilation. An annihilation of the soul
would only be possible by the direct interference of the
Deity, or by a miracle; but it is inconceivable that God
should perform a miracle for this purpose. Besides, the
future duration of the soul is also supported by the striving
after ceaseless perfection implanted in men, as the hindrance
of this striving would be incompatible with the goodness and
the wise providence of God. On the same ground, it is also
impossible that souls should fall after death into a sleep-like
state ; but if the soul continues to exist, it must continue to
think and to will During the last years of his life Mendels-
sohn devoted the first hours of the day — which was all the
time that a violent nervous disease left him for literary work
— to the composition of his Morning Hours} Along with
metaphysical explanations, he here enters upon a detailed
examination of the question as to the existence of God. The
idea of an absolutely perfect and necessary Being must be
developed with mathematical strictness. In doing so, we
may by inferring from the conditioned to the condition, and
from the actual to the necessary, start either from the external
sensible world, or from our own Ego. The former procedure
is objectionable, as the objective reality of a material world is
called in doubt. The latter leads to the conviction of the
existence of God, as the contingent changes of the Ego can
only be conceived as the efifects of a necessary being, to whom
knowledge and the faculty of approbation, or reason and will,
^ Morgenstunden, 1785.
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THE PHYSICO-THEOLOGIES. BEOCKES. 539
belong in the highest degree and without limitation. Besides,
we may also venture to infer from the conception of mere
possibility to the reality and necessity of the corresponding
being. A most perfect being is possible, for it is only affirma-
tions and negations that contradict each other, and it contains
no contradiction to say that all realities are affirmed of such a
being. Now, this being cannot have the ground of its exist-
ence in another being, because it would then be contingent,
and therefore not perfect ; and hence it must exist of itself or
necessarily.
Theology was also seized with this spirit of enlightenment
and popularization. In consequence of the predominantly
teleological contemplation of nature, physico-theology flourished
at that time in a way in which it has never done befoi-e nor
since. On the basis of the principle of the sufficient reason,
an argument was advanced for the existence of an almighty,
all-wise, and all-good God, borrowed from a thoroughly ex-
ternal study of nature in every one of its smallest depart-
ments. There thus arose about the middle of the Eighteenth
Century numerous works in the department of physico-
theology, such as Petino-theologies, Ichthyo-theologies, Acrido-
theologies, Testaceo - theologies, Insecto - theologies, Phyto-
theologies, Litho-theologies, Hydro-theologies, Pyro-theologies,
Astro-theologies, Bronto-theologies, Ghiono-theologies, Sismo-
theologies, and Melitto-theologies. Of the writers of such
works, we may only mention B. H. Brockes, who, in the nine
volumes of his Earthly Pleasure in Ood^ sets forth in truly
prosaic verses his "physical and moral contemplations on
the three kingdoms of nature." It is not so much the con-
formity of the internal constitution of the individual things
of nature to design as their usefulness to man that inspires
him to a deep-felt praise of the divine power and wisdom.
Thus —
" In the bodies of the chamois Ood hath put snch organs good,
That they fear no plunge or fall, and go where'er they would."
^ ' Irdiaehes Vergnügen in OoU,
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540 THB GERMAN AUFKLAKUNG.
But the main thing here too
** That they to as so nsefol are :
Good for phthisis is their tallow ; for the sight their gall is good ;
And chamois flesh is good to eat, they heal the dizzy with their blood ;
Nor less of use their skin. Does not this beast show clear,
With His wisdom and His power, the lore of the Creator here T "
The universal striving after popularity led in theology as
well as in philosophy to a plienomenon peculiar to that time
in the so-called popular or practical Dogmatics, which not
merely in its form of exposition, but also in its contents,
evacuated the substance of what was hitherto known as Dog-
matics. Thus Griesbach^ defined the popular dogmatic theology
as the sum of the truths which have an intimate bearing upon
the moral improvement and happiness of men, as these are to
be realized by the religion of Jesus, but with the exclusion of
all learned speculations. Beason already tells us that there
is a God who governs the world in order to promote the
virtue and happiness of His rational creatures. We realize
happiness in the feeling of increasing perfection, but moral
goodness without religion continues to be extremely defective
and inconstant. The voice of reason is the voice of God in
nature, yet an immediate revelation is not merely possible,
but is even probable; for experience teaches that if reason is
left to itself, the truths of religion fall short of completeness,
correctness, certainty, and universal effectiveness. An alleged
revelation, however, can only be regarded as true if it does not
contradict natural religion, if it is conformable to the dignity
of God, if it is conducive to the ennoblement and the happi-
ness of men, and if there is no ground for suspicion of fanati-
cism or fraud against those who first proclaimed it Judged
by these criteria, the doctrine of Jesus is shown to be true«
The importance laid upon practical utility is clearly enough
expressed even in the title of the work of the venerable
' Anleitung zum Studium der populären Dogmatikf besonders ßkr hälftige
Beligionslehrerf 4 Aufl., Jena 1789. Similar works are the following : — Le^
Christliche Religionslehre oder Versuch einer praJcUschen DogmcUik, Göttingen
1779. Niemeyer, Pop^däre und praktisdie Dogmatik^ 1792. Ammon, ßnt-
vmrf einer wissenschaftlich praktischen Theologie nach den Grundsätzen des
Christenthums und der Vernunft ^ Göttingen 1797.
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J. J. SPALDING, W. A. TELLER. 541
Johann Joachim Spalding (t 1804) "on the usefulness of the
office of preachiog." * Religion, in his view, is virtue and joy
on account of God, and virtue is represented as the necessary
condition of this joy. The ethics of Christianity is just the
same as that of the pure reason and of the original nature of
man, only it possesses greater definiteness, is more easily
understood, and makes a more living impression. Now the
preacher is, in the first place, a servant of his religious
society, he teaches religion and spiritual happiness, and is a
friendly guide to rest of heart and joyous hope. The
preachers likewise serve the State ; for they are the proper
depositaries of public morals, and without morals no State
can subsist. In another work, entitled " Eeligion a concern of
man," * the same author answers the question as to whether
religion belongs to those things that relate to the essential
nature of man and its original unalterable purpose, and
"whether on this account it is of much concern to a thinking
man ? Exact self-observation shows us, in the first place, the
desire after happiness, and then, as something higher, the
fundamental feeling of morality. Our nature itself thus
shows us that morality is to us the best means of attaining to
happiness. Religion, with its thought of an omnipresent and
omniscient Lawgiver, and of the wise government of the world
and the beneficent providence of God, serves in a high degree
to support the only worthy purpose of humanity, that is, to
heighten the activity of the moral feeling and to satisfy the
desire of happiness. On account of this intimate and import-
ant relation to the highest purposes of humanity, religion
deserves the utmost consideration, only we must be on our
guard against profound speculations as well as sensational
faith ; for both of these are without value as regards the pro-
motion of Christianity. Wilhelm Abraham Teller (t 1804),
starting from the idea of the perfectibility of Christianity, in
his " Religion of the Perfect," * distinguishes the three stages of
1 Von der Nutxbarkeü des PredigtamUs, 1772.
* Beligion tine Antj^Ugmhtit des Mtnschtn^ 3 Aufl., Berlin 1799.
* Mdigion der Vollkommentn, 1804.
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542 THE GERMAN AUFKLÄRUNG.
absolute historical belief, of the belief of reason, and of the
purely rational Christianity. This last stage, the comprehen-
sive alliance of the virtuous sentiments, alone corresponds to
the destination of man, as it fills the soul with agreeabk
emotions and sensations, and furnishes the means of strengthen-
ing ourselves to the practice of all the virtues. It was Üie
object of his "Dictionary of the New Testament" (1772) to
guide to this religion of the perfect as it is in Scripture ; and
by the aid of a very arbitrary exegesis this work naturally
explains in a very rationalizing way, or rather sets aside,
everything that is inconceivable, from the demoniacs up to
the Trinity. Sack (t 1786) was connected with these two
authors by similarity of opinion, as well as by his position as
a consistorial councillor in Berlin. He likewise represented
virtue as the essential element of religion, and divine revela-
tion as a confirmation of natural religion.
The most distinguished among the popular theologians of
that time was the Abb6 Job. Friedr. Wilhelm Jerusalem
(t 1789). His "Meditations on the most important truths of
religion" (1744) were much read as a book of edification, and
they were translated into almost all the European languages.
Natural or rational religion is likewise, in his view, what is
essential, and its essential parts are constituted by our recti-
tude and God's assurance of His grace, especially regarding
eternal salvation. Bevelation is not denied, but it is only an
extraordinary instruction given by God regarding natural
religion ; it is an assisting and promotion of reason, a more
rapid bringing of it to a goal which it would either not have
attained at all by itself alone, or would only have done so
after long round-about ways. Of the narratives of Scripture,
some are treated as useful ; others, like the taking away of
the golden and silver vessels by the Israelites, are excused ;
and others, such as the speaking of the ass, are regarded as
untrue.
This popular literature gives us a better knowledge of the
spirit of the theology of its time than can be got from the
more scientific works on dogmatic theology. In these works
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THE POPULAR LITEBATÜEE. 543
a peculiar method was generally observed. The old dogmatic
theology of the Church was retained as a framework or as a
basis, and where its definitions were too much in contradiction
■with the author's own views, they were silently passed over, as
in the case of the dogmas of the Ubiquity and the Descent into
hell ; or they were emptied of their mysterious contents by
intellectual interpretation. Thus the fall was explained as the
eating of a poisonous fruit; original sin was rendered as
defective disposition, and the doctrine of satisfaction was
brought down to a morally meritorious sacrifice. At other
times the ecclesiastical dogmatics were got rid of by going
back to Scriptura Great arbitrariness prevailed in the
interpretation of Scripture. Inconvenient doctrines were
explained away on the ground of ignorance of languages, mis-
understanding of words, or accommodation to contemporary
prejudices. No attempt was made to comprehend dogmas
that appeared unintelligible. Eeligion was regarded through-
out in an entirely intellectual way. And because the sound
human understanding appeared to be the highest power in
knowledge, yet as its one-sided intellectualism was unable to
grasp the darker side of the life of the human mind in feeling
and sensation, the dogmas had also to give way. It was only
a certain unintelligent awe, the natural effect of the long
supremacy of the ecclesiastical doctrine, that restrained a
decided assault upon them and the open rejection of
them.
Nor was this entirely awanting, although it proceeded less
from the Wolffian, or the Popular Philosophy, than from the
influence of the English and the French freethinkers, or from
the influence of such men as Dippel and Edelmann. Yet it
borrowed from that philosophy not a few of its weapons, and
especially the universally-applied principle of the sufficient
reason. It would indeed have been inconceivable if only the
supernatural possibility, and not also the thoroughly rational
reality, of the Wolffian system had been brought into applica-
tion. The first product of this movement was the so-called
Wertheim Bible (1735). The author, Johann Lorenz Schmidt
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544. THE GERMAN AUFKLARUNG.
(t 1751), undertook to translate the Bible and to explain it
according to the principle that in revelation only that can be
accepted as true which does not contradict reason. Instead
of transporting himself into the thoughts and the poetical
spirit of the Bible, he treats it as a text-book of the Leibniz-
Wolffian philosophy, renders it in the dullest prose of a cold
intellectuality, and puts general intellectual conceptions into
the place of its images and similes. Johann Heinrich Schulz,
known as the " pigtail " preacher of Gielsdorf, Wilkendorf, and
Hirschfeldt, has embodied his thought in a systematic form in
his "Philosophical meditation on theology and religion in
general, and on the Jewish in particular" (1784).^ According
to Schulz, the first fundamental rule of the understanding is
that all that exists must have its cause. Thus arose the belief
in a supreme Being who is the universal cause of all things in
the world, an idea which men borrowed from themselves and
from their own operations. A series of lower gods was added
to this highest God, and they were quite different in different
countries. Moses, probably the child of the first innocent love
of an Egyptian princess, reared in all the wisdom of the
Egyptians, and intimately acquainted with the conditions of
the wilderness, took advantage of the ignorance and credulity
of the Jewish people to impose upon them a religion invented
by him, and to procure for himself the position of the highest
and only mediator. The character of Jehovah appears always
just as the passions of Moses would make and have Him to be,
full of the desire of revenge, bloodthirstiness, and the lust of
murder. From the butchery of men that was usual among
the Jews, all the human sacrifices of the other peoples have
taken their origin. By this conception of Jehovah the
character of the whole Jewish nation was determined to the
most inhuman cruelties, so that their history is a register of
deeds of violence and inhumanity. Jesus of Nazareth was
shaped upon the formative wheel of nature into the happiest
genius, but His doctrine does not contain a single clear con-
iPhilosopliiache Betrachtung über Theologie und Religion Überhaupt und
über die Jüdische insonderheit, 1784.
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ANDREAS BIEM. 543
ception of the nature and being of God, He says, indeed, that
God is a spirit ; but a spirit is only a chimera, because it is
never the object of our sensible perception. His instruction
aimed only at awakening the conviction that all the wants of
all the beings existing in the world, are provided for in the
best way. And yet we cannot know from whence this
beneficent and necessary connection between ^ causes and
consequences takes its rise. The conception of Jehovah must
be given up. If you would form an idea of the Supreme
Being for your own consolation, conceive of Him rather as a
Father who knows the wants of His children, and who is as
willing as He is able to help them with the wisest goodness.
Yet is this but a figurative idea which we make for ourselves,
because our phantasy will positively have a certain goal. —
The only rational conception of the word " God," is that of
the sufBcient ground of the world. In this strictest sense, no
man is an atheist In comparison with one another, however,
all are atheists ; for on account of their individual differences,
they all diverge from one another in their special ideas of the
Deity. Whereas the universal reason leads only to the
general conception of the sufBcient ground or principle of
things, it is the different phantasies of individuals that first lead
to particular ideas of God. Hence it is completely absurd to
blame or to persecute any one on account of. atheism or his
divergent idea of God, while at the same time Beligion as
distinguished from natural morality leads partly to useless
ceremonies, and partly to actions that are most pernicious and
most prejudicial to human society.
Andreas Biem, preacher at Friederichswald and then at
Berlin, likewise showed his zeal in several works against the
foolish and unintelligent doctrines of the religions which
prudent priests have devised for their own advantage, " No
class of men has ever been so pernicious to the world as the
priesthood. There were laws at all times against murderers
and bandits, but not against the assassin in the priestly garb.
War was repelled by war, and it came to an end. The war of
the priesthood against reason, has lasted for thousands of years,
VOL. I. 2 M ^ T
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S46 THE GEEMAK AUFKLÄRUNG.
and it still coDtinnes to go on without ceasing." George
Schade, in his " Immutable and eternal religion of the oldest
investigators of nature and of the so-called adepts,"^ etc
(1760), also proceeded to show that natural religion is
sufficient, and he declares that all who assert a supernatural
revelation are godless impostors. — ^We may pass over other
representatives of this view, as they are of no importanee
with regard to the solution of the problem of the Philosophy
of Beligion. But reference has still to be made to the
theologian who was, as it were, the Enfant terrible of the
German Avfkläruvg, and whose changeful life passed through
its various transformations. This was Karl Friedrich Bahrdt
(1741-1792).* Endowed with remarkable gifts, Bahrdt at
first attached himself in philosophy and theology to Crusius,
and in spite of his youth he became a distinguished teacher
and preacher in Leipsic, working as an opponent of tli^
Wolffian philosophy and a zealous defender of orthodoxy.
But the public offence which he excited by his dissolute
life compelled him to leave Leipsic. In 1769 he became
I^ofessor of Biblical Antiquities at Erfurt, and two years
later Professor of Theology and Preacher at 'Giessen, Bahrdt
himself says he would have continued faithful to orthodoxy
rU his life, had he not had to endure so much hostility from
the theologians. It was in consequence of these attacks that
the destruction of positive religion became the remaining
purpose of his life. On his entering upon his office at
Giessen, Bahrdt did not hesitate to remove the scruples about
his orthodoxy by delivering a " Christful "sermon in the style
of Lavater, with frequent invocations of Christ and a loud
unimpeachable confession of the chief doctrines of Lutheranism.
^ Unwandelbare und ewige Beligion der ältesten Katurforscher und sogen-
annten Adepten, etc.
^ Bahrdt has given an account of his life and efforts with great frankness in the
GeachichU seinfs Lebens, 4 Th. Berlin, 1790-91. His writings fill 120 volumes.
We may only mention : Die nettesten Offenbartingen Gottes in Briden und
Erzählungen, 1772-75. Brief e über die Bibel im Volkstm, 1782. Aw/ührung
lies Plans und Zwecks Jesu in Briefen für wahrheitsuchende Lrser, 1784-86.
Katechisinus der natürlichen Beligion, 1783. Kirchen und Kttztralmanach^
1781.
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BAHRDT. 5 47.
He certainly declares that at that time lie was still very
orthodox. " My belief in the divinity of revelation, in the
immediate mission of Jesus, in His miraculous history, in the
Trinity, the operations of grace, natural corruption, the justifi-
cation of the sinner by laying hold of the merit of Christ, and
especially the doctrine of satisfaction, seemed still unshaken.
My reason had only been arrested and occupied by the thought
of how Three persons could be in one God." Bahrdt, how-
ever, made progress in Giessen, in the way of " Enlighten-
ment" The doctrine of the Trinity fell ; Christ appeared as
a mere man immediately endowed with divine wisdom, and
called God because God worked in Him and by Him ; the
Holy Ghost was regarded as a mere power of God. He then
threw overboard the doctrine of the Atonement, and especially
the view of an angry God and an external satisfaction of
Christ for us, under the influence of a naturalist who was
travelling through the district When he had come to see this
doctrine as a most pernicious and damnable error, Bahrdt says
he felt himself as if new-born. From this newly-gained
knowledge flowed his treatise entitled " The Latest Eevela-
tions." ^ — In consequence of the persecution thereby excited,
he withdrew from Giessen, and in 1775, following the invita-
tion of Herr von Salis, he undertook the supervision of a
Philanthropin at Marschlinz in Graubündten. Next year we
find him acting as General-superintendent at Dilrkheim in
the Hardt, in the Principality of Leiningen-Dachsburg. On
this occasion he gives instructive directions as to how a
preacher may obtain matter when his reason has happily
rejected all positive truths, — such as the Trinity, the Atone-
ment, supernatural Grace, Original Sin, and eternal punishment
in Hell, — and when he only still maintains the immediate
mission of Jesus, the divinity of the Scriptures, and the truth
of the Biblical history. At the request of his patron, Bahrdt
set about establishing a Philanthropin in the Castle of
Heidesheim, and in order to obtain foreign pupils he made a
journey to Holland and England. During his absence the
* Die neuesten Offenbarungen,
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648 THE GERMAN AUFKLABUNG.
Imperial Chancellor, on the 27th March 1779, prohibited him
from publishing books regarding religion, or teaching and
preaching, under the threat of heavy penalty. Bahrdt then
wrote his " Confession of Faith," which was delivered to the
Imperial Diet at Regensburg, but saved his person by going
to Halle. Here the theological Faculty, with Semler at its
head, opposed his admission. This has wrongly been made a
ground of reproach against Semler. What separated the two
was not a difference of theological opinion, but the matter of
morals. The excellent Semler, a man of irreproachable
purity of character and scientific earnestness of investigation,
and the frivolous Bahrdt, a man without principles in science
and life, licentious and scandalous in his conduct, could not be
friends. Bahrdt obtained the right to deliver Lectures in
Halle on philosophy and Humaniora; and he lectured on
everything possible with much applause. But the Minister
Zedlitz had vainly reminded him ** that you must now be
extremely cautious in your conduct in order not to make it
be believed that the free mode of thinking has not sprui^
more out of the desires of the heart than out of the convic-
tion of the understanding." In 1787, Bahrdt bought a
vineyard at Halle, and became an innkeeper. Having been
punished by imprisonment as the author of a pasquil against
Wöllder's religious Edict, Bahrdt lived dissolutely to his end,
and died of the consequences of his excesses, — a worthy
conclusion of such a life.
In Halle, Bahrdt lost the last remains of belief. In his
** Letters on the Bible in a popular tone," he seeks to prove
that all that is miraculous and supernatural in the Bible is a
mere colouring of the narrative, and that it comes from the
remains of the Jewish superstition of the narrators. At the
same time, he touches on the thought which afterwards
became so important, " that such miraculous circumstances,
even in the case of Christ, had been invented out of enthu-
siasm for the most sublime teacher of mankind, and especially
the circumstances regarding His coming and His superhuman
origin." Naturally Bahrdt was not able to appreciate the
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BAHRDT. 649
full value of this thought Christ, " the greatest and most
venerable of mortals," had planned, " by the founding of a
secret society, to preserve and propagate among mankind the
truth that had been suppressed by priests and priestcraft."
The whole of His sufferings was a well-devised plan, a part
which Jesus carried through dexterously and happily with the
greatest sacrifice, up to the time of His reawakening. By
this means the disciples were to be cured of their hope of an
earthly Messias.
Bahrdt's "Catechism of Natural Eeligion" may un-
doubtedly be regarded as the coarsest product of the platitudes
which were matured by the German AufUärmg, Eeligion
is practical knowledge of God ; theology is only a theoretical
knowledge of God. The Triuity and similar doctrines merely
belong to theology. If religion is founded upon a rational
contemplation of our own mind, and of the other things in
the world, it is called natural ; if it falls back upon immediate
revelation, it is supernatural or revealed. Such a revelation
is, however, improbable, whereas reason leads by necessity to
the acceptance of God, especially because it is only by
accepting the existence of God that the authority of the moral
law becomes compatible with the impulse towards happiness.
Christ pursued no other end than to restore the suppressed
reason to its rights against the claims of the priests, and
to advance men in their happiness by proclamation of the
truth. The most fniitful sources of this truth are nature and
history ; the former teaches me the wisdom, love, and veracity
of God ; the latter shows me human actions with their con-
sequences. In both, I know the providence of God as it
pursues wise and beneficent purposes with the creatures.
The bad are not bad, but are poor sick creatures. Evils are
inevitable consequences of the imperfection of the finite, and
are not to be referred to the wrath of God, because God as
pure love is never angry. On this fact is founded our love
to God as the conviction that God will always give us what
is for our happiness. This belief gives me rest even in death,
as I expect from my Creator, beyond the grave, a more perfect
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550 THE GER34AN AUFKLÄRUNG.
life and a higher degree of felicity. Besides this knowledge
of God, knowledge of ourselves and knowledge of men are
likewise conducive to happiness.
Happiness consists in contentment and cheerfulness of mind.
It is founded upon the consciousness of those actions which
gain the approbation of God and the approval of our fellow-
men. Its foundation is health of soul and body. The health
of the body rests especially upon regular evacuations and per-
spirations. Hence Bahrdt does not shrink from the coarseness
of laying down the rule that we should accustom the body to
evacuate itself early in the morning, and that we should not
take cold drinks when full of sweat, nor go into a current of
air. In this way rules are given about food and drink, fresh
air, cleanliness, sleeping, calling in the physician, etc. The two
hundred and fortieth question of this section runs as follows :
Does inoculation with the pox belong to the duties towards
thy children ? This question is afiBrmed, and a number of
reasons are assigned for the view. Virtue is the means of
happiness, especially as justice and common usefulness. Only
fanatics and imbeciles have doubted that the virtuous man
may enjoy sensible pleasures; but the question is, how to
enjoy pleasures rightly ? Hence Bahrdt gives the exhortation
to scan all possible pleasures and not to enjoy them too pre-
cipitately, to heighten all enjoyments to the utmost, and to
accustom oneself to all the joys that God supplies to men.
Such is the gospel of the theological public-house keeper of
Halle.
It is more pleasing to turn our attention to the man who
may be regarded as the culmination of the German Aufklärwng,
and who, with all the keenness of his criticism, wins the
afiection of his readers by the in'eproachable purity of his
moral character and the profoundly religious earnestness of
his investigations. We refer to Herrmann Samuel Keimarus
(1694-1768). — In his much-read treatises "On the chief
truths of Natural Religion," ^ Eeimarus moves entirely in the
' Abhandlungen von den vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Beligionj
Hamburg 1754. The first sentence of this work gives the best cbaraeteristie of
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REIMABÜS. 551
thoughts of the Leibniz-WolflSan philosophy. Men and animals
do not owe their origin to themselves nor to the corporeal
world. The corporeal world is lifeless in itself, and has
therefore received its existence and its qualities in time from
an independent eternal Being. It does not exist for the sake
of itself, but only on account of living beings.
" Whoever would know the world as to what sort of thing
it is, must take into account its use for living beings as a part
of its explanation, and of its essential conception." With well-
known prolixity, Keimarus then proceeds to show how every-
thing in the world, the greatest as well as the least, is sub-
servient to our advantage. — The independent necessary Being
that has created the world is God. We know His attributes
by rational inferences deduced from the conception of God, and
by experience from the works of God. Among these attributes
wisdom and goodness are conspicuous, as they appear in the
wise constitution and perpetual guidance of the world. Here
Eeimarus combats the materialistic Atheism of Lamettrie and
Maupertuis, as well as the pantheistic atheism of Spinoza. lu
like manner, he combats the naturalism of ßousseau, in
connection with his consideration of man and his special
prerogatives ; and he refutes the objections of Bayle, in his
consideration of the most perfect world. Immortality is
taught with special emphasis, and it is founded partly upon
the essential nature of man as a simple immaterial substance«
and partly upon the purpose of God in the creation, His
providence over men, His justice, our desire of happiness, and
other grounds. In considering Religion, prominence is also
given to the condition that it is conducive to our happiness.
It is only Religion that leads parents to take upon themselves
the burden of rearing and training their children. Eeligion
alone makes the existence of human society possible. Eeligion
it : ** Whoever has a living knowledge of God is justly regarded as having a
religion ; and in so far as this knowle Ige is obtainable by the natural power of
reason, it is called a natural religion.'* " Such a knowledge of God will be
living in itself, that is, it will be active, and will bring about a pleasurable
insight into the connection of things, a willing impulse towards virtue, and
undisturbed contentment of mind."
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652 THE GEEMAN AUPKLAEUNG.
heightens our joys by limiting sensual enjoyments and intio«
ducing higher pleasures; it (done brings satisfaction to oar
natural powers in accordance with their laws and ultimate
purpose, and creates true lasting contentment.
On the basis of these presuppositions Eeimarus, however,
comes to an entirely different judgment regarding miracles and
revelation than his masters did. The assumption of a miracle
in the once created world, is at variance with the moral neces-
sity that is founded upon the providence of God which is
strongly emphasized. It is also at variance with the divine
intentions, which can have created nothing without a purposa
** The divine insight is at the same time a constant motive for
the divine will to keep the world unaltered in all its reality
and permanence. For if God's decree were changed by actual
events and their means, He must also have other motives for
this than He had at the beginning. Consequently He would
thereby Himself declare His previous knowledge and decrees
to have been not good and wise. He would thus have erred
and chosen badly, either at the first or at the last ; and this is
contrary to the infinite perfection of God." — " The ordinary
maintenance of nature cannot be such a (miraculous) effect of
divine power ; rather would it be contradictory of it." " If,
then, God did everything directly and by miracles. He alone
would do everything ; and why should He then have under-
taken a creation of finite things? If He checked every
moment the energies of created substances and the laws of their
nature, why should He have given them these energies and
laws ? T(ie more miracles He did after the creation, so much
the more would He again overthrow nature, and He would thus
have created it in vain, and would not be maintaining it. In
performing miracles, He would make it appear either that He
had not comprehended the natural means that were possible
for His purpose, or He would be often changing His purpose
and working against His own influence in the maintenance
of nature."
Without miracles, no Eevelation ! We already know this
principle from Wolff. If Eeimarus, then, being on the whole
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BEIMARUS. 553
a decided disciple of Wolflf, denies miracles, will he be able
and willing to hold by Eevelation ? How he really thought
on this question, none of his pious readers could certainly
divine ; for his ** Apology for the rational worshippers of
Grod " ^ only became known after his death. It was a work to
which Keimarus had devoted the earnest reflection and the
strenuous industry of his leisure hours during the lifetime of
a generation, and he explained his views with regard to
positive religion in it without reserve.
The substance of this work may be indicated in brief as a
criticism of the Biblical revelation. As a Christian, Reimarus
indeed accepts it. But on what ground is he a Christian ? It
is really only because his fathers and grandfathers had believed
this or that A rational man should not found his belief and
the hope of his salvation upon such an accident. He must
examine with his reason and without prejudice this paternal
religion, which being purely accidental may just as well be
false as true. It is, however, declaimed from the pulpit that
Eeason, being corrupted by the fall, is, as it were, thoroughly
incapable of judging about divine things. Yet those theolo-
gians themselves contradict this principle when they declare
that the doctrines of other churches are contrary to reason,
and support the doctrines of their own churches as much as
possible on grounds of reason. — In proceeding to examine
divine revelation, Beimarus first points out with emphasis
that there is no immediate revelation, but only a mediate
revelation given to us, the credibility of which we must
exactly investigate according to all the rules by which the
truth of any human testimony is investigated. For the rest,
he holds entirely to the criteria of revelation which had been
already set up, although not applied, by Wolff. We can only
* Sckutz»ehrift oder Apologie für die vemür^fttgen Verehrer Gotten. It is weU
known that the first fragments of this work were published by Lessing in his
Beiträge zur Oeschichte der Literatur aus den Schätzen der Herzogl, Bibliothek
zii Wol/enbüttel. A complete reprint of the work was begun by W. Klose in
Niedncr's Zeitschrift für historische Theologie^ 1850-52. A comprehensive
analysis of the whole work is given by D. F. Strauss in his Hermann Samuel
Reimarus und seine Schutzschriß für die vemävßigen Verehrer Gottes, Leipz.
1862 {Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. v.).
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554 THE GEKMAK AUFKLÄRUNG.
recoguise, as the messengers of a divine revelation, such men
as agree in their discourse and action with its purpose, and
not such as show impure human purposes, or even act im-
morally. We can only accept as divine doctrines and precepts
such as correspond to the nature of Grod and are subservient
to the perfection and happiness of man ; and we cannot accept
such doctrines and precepts as contradict themselves or other
revealed truths, and especially the divine perfections and the
laws of nature. What cannot be accepted as divine revelation
according to these principles, cannot l>e accredited either by
the assertion that it is divine revelation or by a miracle. For
" what is contradictory cannot be resolved by any miracle, nor
can vices be miraculously transformed into virtues." And
*' what is in itself impossible and absurd, and what, in any
other history, would be called falsehood, deception, violence,
and cruelty, cannot become rational, honest, permissible, and
right, by having added to it the words: 'Thus saith the
Lord.' "
When these principles are applied to the representatives of
the Old Testament revelation, the patriarchs before Moses by
no means appear as messengers of revelation. They do not at
all think of how to propagate a saving religion, but attend to
their cattle and their fields. In the history of Noah and
of the flood there are found innumerable contradictions and
impossibilities, such as natural history, architecture, and other
circumstances show us in connection with this narrative. In
the history of Abraham we find innumerable divine manifesta-
tions, miracles, commandments, and institutions, but they have
all worldly things as their subject, and are without influence
as regards a saving religion. Nor is this history without its
contradictions and moral ofifei^siveness. In this way the
whole of the Old Testament is examined as to whether it
indeed contains divine revelation. The answer does not turn
out very favourable. There is no history in which miracles
are so accumulated and so carried to excess ; nor is there any
history " which is so full of contradictions, or in which the
name of God has been so frequently and shamefully abused;
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BEIMABÜS. 555
for all the persons who are here brought forward as men of God
cause utter offence, repulsion, and aversion by their conduct,
to a soul that loves honour and virtue." " There is not found
any one whose ' proper and earnest purpose had been to
propagate a true knowledge of God, virtue, and piety among
men ; to say nothing of the fact that we seek in vain for a
single great, magnanimous, and beneficent action in the whole
of it The history consists of a tissue of utter follies, infamies,
deceptions, and cruelties, of which selfishness and ambition
were mainly the motives/ What is said in it about super-
natural inspiration, revelation, prophecy, and miracles, is mere
delusion, deception, and abuse of the divine name."
Nor can the doctrines of the Old Testament be regarded as
springing from divine revelation. The doctrine of God and
our duties, is crushed into the background by the mass of
ceremonial commandments, whereas in the communication
of a true religion there should have been explained the
nature, existence, and attributes of God and His works and
purposes in the creation. Hence it will astonish no one to
find that the Scriptures of the Old Testament arose gradually,
came accidentally to higher authority, and were only after-
wards made divine. The Scriptures of the New Testament,
even though their origin from apostles and the disciples of
apostles were to be admitted, have no claim to divine inspira-
tion, but were written in an entirely human and occasional
way, and were not recognised till afterwards as canonical.
Hence they require to be historically interpreted. The
doctrine of Jesus is to be carefully distinguished from that
of the apostles. The sum-total of the doctrine of Jesus
was shortly this : Eepent, for the kingdom of heaven is at
hand. The preaching of repentance contains great, noble,
and even divine doctrines that are valid for all times and
peoples. But Jesus connected it with the intention of
establishing a kingdom of heaven, that is, a worldly kingdom
with eternal power and glory, such as the Jews expected.
Jesus did not mean to introduce any new religion. The
original plan of Jesus was frustrated by His death. His
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556 TUE GERMAN AUFKLARUNG.
resurrection was devised by the disciples. The testimonj
of the Boman watchers was inveoted, the testimony of the
disciples regarding the appearances of the risen Christ comes
to nothing on accoant of its contradictions, and the testimony
from the Old Testament prophecies is untenable, like the old
Jewish interpretations of Scripture. From mere nece^ty,
and on account of their disappointed hopes, the disciples
worked out a new system. With the minority of the Jews,
they now read out of the Old Testament that Jesus had come
to atone for the sins of the whole world by His sufferings and
death. They stole the dead body, and asserted that Jesus
had risen again, and that after forty days He had ascended
to heaven, from whence He will soon come again to hold
judgment and to establish His kingdom. They retained the
beautiful rational morality of their master ; but, accommodating
themselves to the characteristic weakness of men, they added
all sorts of unfathomable mysteries and miraculous aids. In
addition to the great enthusiasm of the apostles, the propaga-
tion of Christianity was specially promoted by the introduction
of the community of goods, by chiliasm, and by the so-called
miraculous gifts. Paul then brings the apostolic doctrine to
a close. " See now," says Beimarus, " whether the whole
doctrinal system of the apostolic Christianity does not rest
from beginning to end on utterly false positions, and specially
upon positions which constitute the foundation and essence of
this religion, and with which it must stand and fall"
As in the case of the history and doctrines of the Bible,
the doctrinal system of the Protestant Church is likewise
subjected to a sharp criticism. The original perfection and
the fall of man are contrary to the divine nature. The
doctrine of original sin, is " but intelligible words in which
nothiug can be thought without manifest contradiction."
The doctrine of the work of Christ and the imputation of
His merit, appears to Beimarus to be just as incomprehensible ;
and, above all, the eternal damnation of unbelievers appears to
him to be entirely contradictory of the goodness of God and
His purposes with men.
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EEIMARÜS. 557
Reimarus, however, is not even satisfied with applying the
criteria of a divine revelation set up by Wolflf to the revelation
presented in Christianity, and thus dissolving it. He further
proceeds to show the impossibility of such a revelation at all.
A revelation which all men could believe in a well-founded
way, might, in the first place, be immediately communicated
to all men ; but this would be a constant miracle, and as such
it would be opposed to the divine wisdom. In the second
place, such a revelation might be addressed to individual
persons among all or among some nations ; but in that case
the divine revelation would have to be accepted upon human
testimony, and such testimony is uncertain. Hence this
method is also contrary to the divine wisdom. In the third
place, one people only, at certain times and through certain
persons, might have received the revelation. This hypothesis
has some advantages in its favour. But it maintains the idea
of miracles, and such revealed knowledge is necessarily obscure
and inconceivable, and it also becomes uncertain on account
of false prophets and the human testimony of tradition. The
universal diffusion of it is also impossible on account of the
diversity of languages, the limited diffusion of true religion,
and the difficulty of independently examining Scripture.
Hence it is entirely incompatible with the goodness and
wisdom of God, that the acceptance of this revelation should
be the necessary and only means of salvation. The revelation
in nature, or natural religion, is much rather to be regarded as
constituting the necessary and sole means of salvation.
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SECTION NINXa
the opposition to the aufklärung,
Lkssing. Herdek. Hamann. Jacobi.
rilHE German Aufklärung was strongly influenced by the
-L Philosophy of Leibniz. This influence, however, did
not proceed directly from the genuine expositions of Leibniz
himself, but from the form his Philosophy assumed as
popularized by Wolff. This popular form of the system,
wlien compared with the original exposition, was, from the
outset, defective in two respects: it under - estimated the
value of History, and it ignored the importance of Uncon-
scious Feelings. In both of these relations we find certain
other currents flowing along with and supplementing the
philosophy of the AnfUämng, although they were not im-
portant enough to be able to change the general characteristic
of the age. In relation to the Christian Beligion, one of
these currents of thought laid the beginnings of a historico-
critical investigation of the documentaiy sources of our
Beligion, in order to incorporate them generally from a
wider point of view in the connection of the historical pro-
cess of growth and event. The other current, that flowed
in opposition to the negative treatment of the Christian
doctrines by the emptying method of the intellectualism of
the German Enlightenment, brought forward the immediate
Feeling of the pious soul ; and in the consciousness of this
certain and inalienable possession, its aim was to reject all
intellectual examination of religion by reflective thought.
The former method is essentially based upon the intellectual
principle of the AvfUarutig. It was from this movement that
the critical method obtained the degree of freedom in relation
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-WETTSTEIN. EICHHORN. MICHAELIS. 559
to revealed Eeligion that made a criticism of its sources
possible; and with it, it shared the conception of religion
as a moral doctrine, and its high estimation of the so-called
Natural Eeligion. In the course of time, however, this
historical method of inquiry gradually, yet constantly and
necessarily, passed beyond the standpoint of the AufUwmng.
The latter method of appeal to immediate Feeling stands
higher than the critical method, inasmuch as, having a
profound sense for the essential nature of religion, it is
decidedly opposed to mere intellectual Enlightenment; but
as it stops at what is immediately felt, and sees in every
efiPort of thought an attack upon the inviolable sanctuary of
religion, it is likewise incapable of understanding Religion,
and of doing justice to its historical forms and development.
The historico-critical movement found its first representa-
tives in the theology of Holland and of England. In
Germany, Wettstein (t 1754) first began to restore the
original text of the New Testament from a vast number
of various readings that had been handed down, and this
effort came into hard collision with the old ecclesiastical
notion of inspiration. He was followed by Griesbach
(t 1812), who declared that a supernatural revelation was
not merely possible, but probable and desirable, and only
desiderated that it should not contradict any truth of natural
religion. By a classification of the manuscripts of the New
Testament, he turned the lower criticism into new paths, and,
at the same time, founded the criticism of the synoptic
Gospels, the traditional harmony of which appeared to him
to be impossible. Eichhorn (f 1827) then began to subject
the New Testament Scriptures to the same unprejudiced
historical criticism as the products of the profane writers.
The same thing was done for the Old Testament by Joh.
Dav. Michaelis (t 1791), the learned founder of a systematic
Textual Criticism, and in his work on the Mosaic Law,^ also
the beginner of an unbiassed and purely historical examination
of the Old Testament history. In contrast to the hitherto
* Mosaisches Recht, 1770.
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560 THB OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLÄRUNG.
common dogmatic exegesis, Joh. Aug. Ernesti (1707-1781)
became the founder of the historico-critical method of inter-
pretation. He was essentially a philologer, and in his
InstUtUio interpretis N. T, (1761) he defines interpretation
as the art of exactly and completely communicating the
thoughts of others as contained in any discourse. The
interpreter should never aim at anything else than to receive
completely into himself, and to correctly reproduce the
meaning which may lie in the given words according to the
intention of the writer. The relation of the words to the
ideas and things is mediated by language, but this finds its
proper application in every passage according to the relations
of its origin and its purpose. Interpretation must therefore
be not merely grammatical, or determined by the general
rules of the language in question, but it must also be
historical, that is, it must take into consideration the
historical origin of the writing that has to be explained.
Johann Salomo Semler (1725-1791) is the most im-
portant name in this series of critics. Praised by some as
the father of the modern theology, condemned by others as
the man with whom the falling away from the faith of tbe
fathers became universal, honoured as an individual by all
who strove for a rational view of religion, and regarded in
his old age with distrust on all sides, Semler presents two
aspects which it is diflBcult to reconcile with each other in an
objective estimate. From his pietistic training he retained
a living internal religiousness, but the acuteness of his critical
understanding made him give up many of the objective
doctrines of the Church as soon as his personal piety
no longer depended upon them. An indefatigable worker,
yet without a sense for system, he produced no fewer than
171 works. His works are entirely wanting in form, being
in part mere extracts or summaries of books interpolated
with critical remarks ; but he thus gave the impulse to new
inquiries in almost all the departments of theology, although
he has nowhere produced anything complete in itselt In
his criticism of the text and his judgment of the canon,
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HISTORICAL CRITICISM. SEMLER, 561
Semler attaches himself wholly to the writers just mentioned.
The canon is not original, but is a product of history, and
should not therefore be regarded as the basis of the Christian
faith. A book of Scripture is not divine because God has
composed, written, or inspired it, or because it stands in the
canon; but it stands in the- canon because men held the
judgment that this book served to promote their perfection
and happiness. This is properly what is divine in Scripture,
yet all the Biblical writings contain many things which have
a purely historical and accidental significance, and contribute
nothing to the promotion of human perfection and happiness.
This historical view makes the Biblical Scriptures appear as
occasional writings which were written at a particular time,
under particular circumstances, and for a particular purpose.
The books of the New Testament arose out of the original
opposition and the later reconciliation of a more Jewish and
a more heathen, or more liberal, party in the primitive
Christianity. Hence arises the demand for a historical
exegesis in the interpretation of these books. In the depart-
ment of Church History, Semler strove mainly to reach an
understanding of the original Christianity from the relations
of its time, and to attain a more correct appreciation of
heretics. In the History of Dogmas, he wanted the power
of recognising what was always permanent and everywhere
the same, while he is fond of pointing out the external
changes in the dogmatic definitions, and the influence of the
private opinion of a conspicuous teacher of the philosophic
views of the age, and of local and temporary circumstances.
Dogmas have merely a local value to the Christian Church,
as a means of distinguishing the members of one local religious
community from those of the others. In Dogmatic Theology,
Semler's weakness lay in the want of a philosophical view of
the religious material, and it shows itself plainly, usually
he only contrasts the dogma in its historical form with his
own divergent " mode of expression,** and leaves the reader
to choose between the two. The only point that specially
deserves attention is his distinction of public and private
VOL. L 2 N
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562 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AÜFKLAKÜNO.
religion, an obscure anticipation of the distinction between
theology and religion. At the basis of both lies the historical
religion, or the history and doctrine of Jesus in its literal
form. Public or social religion is the local and temporal
representation of it as it is expressed in the particular dogmas
of the creeds, and as it must be taught and believed by the
members of a particular church, or ecclesiastical community,
for the sake of external order. Moral or private religion
is determined by the different moral development of the
individual, in accordance with which the application of the
Biblical doctrines to his heart is different Social Beligion
requires dogmas and the external agreement of all its
members, whereas Private Beligion requires the greatest
liberty.
It may appear strange, yet it is a fact, that along with Üie
universal striving, after Enlightenment, there moved by its
side an obscure dreamy fanaticism of a fantastic kind, such
as had rarely been seen before. Semler himself made
attempts at gold-making, especially towards the end of his life.
Alchemistic studies, searching for the philosopher's stone,
intercourse with spirits, and the mysterious cultivation of
secret societies, were then quite in vogue. All this reflected
the natural reaction of the life of feeling in man from the
dry cold reasoning of the understanding. This movement
manifested itself in relation to religion in such a way that
the inward life of feeling directly exhibited itself, without
being misled by the criticism of the understanding. Thus
Geliert (t 1769), in spite of all the defects that attached to
him as a poet, cannot be denied the merit of having, as an
apologist of Christianity in woi-d and life, brought dose to
his time the religious and moral thoughts that constituted
his own inmost life. With a far grander poetical flight,
Klopstock (t 1803), in his Messias, sang the recondliation
of man, and carried away his contemporaries in rapturous
enthusiasm. Matthias Claudius (t 1 8 1 5), as the " Wandsbeck
Messenger," in a soberer way gave his testimony to the
revelation that spoke in nature and hist(»y to his receptive
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LAVATER, 563
soal, and not without some keen slashes at the philosophy
which had remained strange in him. The pious Gerhard
Teerstegen (t 1769), by profession a weaver of silk ribbons,
also worked upon wide circles and showed many the way to
Christ by his quickening "Hours of Edification." In like
manner, Jung-Stilling (t 1 847) exercised a kindred influence,
and his rock -fixed confidence in divine providence gave
occasion to the remark of Goethe, that *' the wonderful man
believes he only needs to throw the dice and our Lord God
must set them for him." To this circle Joh. Caspar Lavater
(t 1801) also belongs. To him Christianity waa real
communion with God, realized inwardly in the heart of man ;
the Bible was the record of the divine revelation ; and Jesus,
the first incomparable Son of the eternal invisible Father, the
most direct revelation of God. Along with this religious
inwardness, Lavater, however, possessed an openness for all
secular relations and sciences, and this enabled him also to enter
into connection with circles that were indifferent to religion.
Each of the two movements thus described, produced two
distinguished men who prosecuted reflection about religion so
far that they demand consideration in detail. Lessing and
Herder were the chief representatives of the historico-critical
school, while Hamann and Jacobi represent the inward
feeling of the heart in relation to religion.^
^ Pfleiderer's History may be compared with what follows in this Section.
(Otto Pfleiderer, Religionsphilosophie auf geschichtlicher Grundlage, Berlin
1878.) [The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of its History. By Dr.
Otto Pfleiderer, Proft*8sor in the University of Berlin. Translated by Alexander
Stewart, M.A., and Allan Menzies, B.D. ; voL L 1886; vol. iL 1887.]
Pfleiderer puts Lessing beside Kant as a representative of the Critical
Philosophy of Religion. This appears to me as unintelligible as that Herder
18 brought in between Hamann and Jacobi as a representative of the Mystico-
intnitive Philosophy of Religion, and that Fries was only mentioned [in the
Fint Edition] in an appendix to Jacobi, and dismissed in a few lines. The
more I owe to the penetrating and clear exposition of Pfleiderer, so much the
greater was the temptation to state at every point wherein I differ with him.
Kevertheless, keeping faithfully to the principle observed in the whole of this
wori^ I «have avoided all special assent or polemic, although the expression of
my expositions is frequently determined by agreement with Pfleiderer or by
opposition to him. The order of my arrangement, as well as the divergence of
my exposition in detail, must be left to vindicate itself.
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564 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AÜFKLAKÜKG.
GoTTHOLD Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781).*
Was Lessing a Spinozist t This question, as is well known,
was keenly discussed soon after Lessing's death, between
Jacobi and Moses Mendelssohn, and it cannot be passed over
even yet Jacobi, referring to a conversation which he had
had with Lessing, in connection with Goethe's Promeifuns,
regarding the relation of God to the world and the freedom
of the human will, asserted that Lessing was a Spinozist.
Mendelssohn, who saw in this statement a grave charge
against his friend, wished to save him from this reproach, and
so he hit upon the idea of a " purified Spinozism." If, how-
ever, we remember how little knowledge Mendelssohn had of
Spinoza, and how much Jacobi was inclined to identify all
the systems of philosophy that were based on reflection,
notwithstanding their wide differences, with Spinozism, we
shall be inclined to give little importance to that controversy,
without doubting the fidelity of the statement or the scientific
character of the conversation. However, let us look at it
somewhat more closely. The conversation turned around two
points : the acceptance of an extra-mundane personal God,
and the freedom of the human wilL Jacobi believes in an
intelligent personal Cause of the world ; Lessing confesses
that the orthodox conceptions of the Deity are unpalatable to
him, and that he knows nothing but hf zeal trav^ Lessing
will have everything worked out naturally, and cannot
conceive an extra-mundane personal Deity otherwise than
as afiTected with dreadful weariness. ^ Jacobi feels himself free,
* The philosophical and theological writings of Lessing that we hare to take
into consideration are contained, in greater completeness than in any of tiie
former editions, in Hem pel's Ed. of Lessing's "Works, xiv.-xviL These
volumes are also published separately. " Lessing as a Theologian '* has
become an extremely favourite theme for Essays and Lectures ; but notwith-
standing the enormous number of such productions, we still want a pniely
objective exposition of the subject, equally just to it in the way of praise and
blame.
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LESSING. 565
but notwithstanding this immediate feeling, cannot suppose
that our thoughts only proceed side bj side with the emotions
without determining them. Lessing, on the contrary, desires
no freewill, but, as an honest Lutheran, will hold by '' the
error and blasphemy, more brutal than human, that there is
no freewill" These are the several points that are touched.
Every one knows, however, that the denial of a personal
extra-mundane God, and of the freedom of the human will, is
identical with Spinozism only in the view of Jacobi, who
also declared in this conversation that he knew no doctrinal
system that agreed so much as the Leibnizian with that of
Spinoza. — In order to determine Lessing's philosophical stand-
point, we must therefore necessarily go back to his own
writings.
And, at the outset, it must not be overlooked that Lessing
was a critic and not a systematizes "So systematic thinker
could say with Lessing that "it is not the truth in the
possession of which a man is, or supposes himself to be, but
the honest effort which he has put forth to come by the truth,
that constitutes the value of the man. For it is not by the
possession of truth, but by the pursuit of it, that the powers
are enlarged; whereas the possession makes a man quiet,
inactive, indolent, and proud." "So systematic thinker can
so greatly doubt of the capability of our human knowledge
that revealed religion becomes by him most suspected just on
account of that by which it knows itself most, that is, on
account of its undoubted possession of the truth of immortality.
One of Lessing's well-known utterances was, " If I should call
myself after any one, I know no other " (that is, no other
than Spinoza) ; and his repudiation contained in these words,
of being the scholar of any one, is to be accepted. Herder
has rightly remarked that Lessing was " not created to be an
— ^ist of any sort, whatever letters might be prefixed to
this termination ! " In philosophy, Lessing was also but a
** Fragmentist ; " and he was so on a double ground — materially,
because to his practical and active mind purely speculative
investigations appeared to be superfluous; and formally,
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566 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLARUNG.
because, notwithstanding all his logical acateness, his livdj
intellect wanted patience for methodico-schematic thinking.
The most important thoughts of Lessing, however, undoubtedly
point to a relationship with Leibniz, and to dependence
upon him.
Lessing early applied himself to the study of Leibniz, and
with great zeaL In order to defend Leibniz against the
covert attack of the Berlin Academy, he wrote, along with
Mendelssohn, the treatise entitled " Pope, a Metaphysician." ^
He holds that every page written by Leibniz is, as such,
worthy of publication. He speaks of Leibniz in terms of the
greatest respect, and says that if Pope had followed Shaftesbury
in the explanation of evils, he would have come incomparably
nearer the truth and nearer Leibniz ! Leibniz is defended
from the objection that he has accommodated his system to
the most heterogeneous doctrines and prejudices, while he is
praised on account of his grand way of thinking and his art
of striking fire from every stone. — The most important of
Lessing's thoughts point to Leibniz, as may be seen by
referring merely to his " Christianity of Reason." * Here it
is held that the one sole perfect Being has from eternity con-
templated what is most perfect, that is. Himself. In the case
of God, thinking, willing, and creating are one ; and hence God
likewise creates what He conceives. Now God may conceive
things in two ways : first, He may conceive all perfections
at once, and Himself as their sum; that is, God created
from eternity a being to whom none of His perfections was
awanting. This is the Son of God or God Son. This Being
is an identical image of God, and hence there is the greatest
harmony between God and His Son ; and this the Scriptures
call the Spirit which proceeds from the Father and from the
Son. This harmony is likewise God, and eXL the three are
one. Again, God thought of His perfection as divided ; that
is. He created beings, every one of them having something of
His perfections. These beings together constitute the world.
Because it is created by a most perfect God, this world is the
' Pope, ein Metephysiker. • Das CliristenUmin der Yerntinit.
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LESSING. 567
most perfect of worlds; that is, it is an infinite series of
members in which, in infinite degrees of more and less
perfection, all the members are arranged in a series without
leap or gap. Grod only creates simple beings, and there
exists among them a comprehensive harmony which explains
all the processes in the world. With the diflferent degrees of
perfection these beings also possess different degrees of the
consciousness of this perfection, and of the capacity of acting
in accordance with it Hence the latter are moral beings
-whose law of action is just this : '' Act in accordance with thy
individual perfections." — ^Apart from the attempt to construe
the Trinity, all the fundamental thoughts here remind us of
Lieibniz. All created things are simple beings, and, in
particular, simple percipient beings. Finite things are
different according to infinite differences in their degrees of
perfection. God is the highest and most perfect Monad.
The world, and all that happens in it, is held together by
harmony ; and the striving after perfection is the principle of
our actions.
Lessing also agrees with Leibniz in accepting the theories
of determinism and the perfection of the world. In losing
freedom, he believes we lose nothing that we can use for our
activity here, or for our happiness there. " Compulsion and
necessity make the idea of what is best operative; how
much more perfect are they to me than a bald faculty of
being able to act under the same circumstances, in one way at
one time, and in another way at another time. I thank the
Creator that I must, even must do what is best ! " In regard
to the perfeetion of the world, it remains doubtful in the
system of Leibniz, whether the perfection of the world advances
or remains identically the same ; or, in other words, whether
the highest perfection is the ultimate goal of its development,
or this exists from the beginning. Lessing decides for the
view that the world was as perfect from the beginning as a
world can be. He does not, however, undertake to show this
perfection in detail, nor to establish it against all objections
by a Theodicy.
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568 THE OPPOSITION TO THJK AUFKLiKÜNG.
As regards the Soul and its Immortality, he also attaches
himself closely to Leibniz in the fragment, That there may he
more than five senses for man. The soul is a simple bdng
which is capable of infinite perceptions ; yet as a finite being
it is not capable of these infinite perceptions at once, bat onlj
gradually in an infinite succession of time. Now it is not
conceivable that this capacity should have been given to us
without its also becoming developed. Hence it is absolotdj
necessary to accept the doctrine of a future life In order
that we may obtain more ideas in that life, we shall perhaps
receive another organization, or more senses. We have now
five senses, but as we have only gradually come to them, there
is nothing to prevent our receiving still more. And as, in
fact, the whole material world is animated, the particles which
serve the soul in any one sense constitute homogeneous com-
binations of original materials, and every sense corresponds to
a particular collection of matter ; and so there are as many
senses possible as there are homogeneous masses in the
material world. There are, however, more than five of these.
— ^With the establishment of the doctrine of Immortality, there
stands in close connection his defence of the eternity of hell
punishments, in the treatise entitled '' Leibniz on eternal
punishments." Kot as if Leibniz, and Lessing along with
him, represented the ecclesiastical doctrine, according to which
there is in the future world a final twofold state, that of the
blessed in heaven and of the damned in hell, while they are
both separated in space by an impassable gulf. But in con-
trast to the shallow view of an equaUy blessed state of all in
the world to come, Leibniz sees in the ecclesiastical doctrine,
albeit in the sensible form of an exoteric dogma, a profound
truth, which is thoroughly related to his esoteric doctrine. In
attachment to Leibniz, Lessing represents the same view in
opposition to Eberhard's Apology of Socrates, which on the
basis of illuminative eclecticism asserted the salvation even
of the heathen, in opposition to the ecclesiastical orthodoxy.
The great esoteric truth, in respect of which Leibniz found it
advisable to support the common doctrine of eternal damna-
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LESSING. 569
tion, is that there is nothing insulated in the world, nothing
without consequences, nothing without eternal consequences.
Hence moral conduct, or good and bad actions, cannot be
without their consequences. This is certainly not held in
such a way as to mean that in the other world there are two
separate places, one for the blessed and the other for the
damned, but it means that the good which every one has in
himself is his heaven, and the evil is his hell. Nor is there
between the two an absolute separation; but as there are
infinitely many degrees of perfection, so are there also in-
finitely many stages of happiness passing gradually into each
other, from the heaven of the blessed to the hell of the
damned. And even if, by a gradual development, all ulti-
mately attain to perfection and consequently to happiness,
yet the eternal punishment of sins consists at least in
this, that they delay the attainment of this end. — With
so much of agreement, not much is to be laid on the
fact that Lessing conceives of this immortality more
under the form of the metempsychosis, holding that our
soul has already been several times on the earth in
difierent bodies and under diflferent circumstances of life,
and that in the future it shall also pass through similar
transmigrationa
Lessing is thus essentially a follower of Leibniz, but not of
that Leibniz whom Wolflf had made current in the language of
his time. Lessing returns to the genuine Leibniz whom he
discovered in his own writings, making an exact distinction
between Leibniz's exoteric and esoteric fori^s of doctrine. But
even here he is not a mere reproducer. This is seen when we
look away from minor points. Thus it is that Lessing makes
individuality (the high estimate of which he had learned
from Leibniz) to be the highest criterion of action in the
practical sphere, and that he does not recognise Leibniz's
distinction between truths that are above reason and truths
that are contrary to reason, but, in accordance with the
rationalism of the Aufklärung, he subjects everything to the
decision of the human understanding. The main difference
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570 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLABUNG.
between the two turns upon the hf tcaX irav. Leibniz com-
monlj apprehends God as the first and most perfect monaii
The finite monads are independently bj themselves out of
God ; and it is only incidentally that another view is indi-
cated when he designates God as the central monad, and
thus as the soul, while all existing things are r^arded as the
body. Lessing, in his essay '' On the reality of things out of
God/' already declares that he can form no conception of such
reality. If things are called the complement of possil^ty,
there may or may not be a conception of this in God. No
one will assert the latter alternative, but if it is admitted that
there is a conception of things in God, this implies that all
things are really in Himself ; for as soon as God has a con-
ception of the reality of things, they are no longer really out
of Him. Or if it is said that the reality of a thing is the
sum of all the possible determinations which may belong to
it, this sum must necessarily also be in the Idea of God. l^or
is the distinction between things and God done away with, if
the conceptions which God has of real things are these real
things themselves. Even as such they continue to be contin-
gent, while necessary reality belongs to God. — ^While decidedly
repudiating an extra-mundane personal Gcd after the maimer
of the human personality, he always lays emphasis upon the
iv KaX irav, but in doing so he is still very far from the
genuine Spinozism.
This suflBciently indicates Lessing's relation to the Auf-
klärung. He stands wholly upon the ground of the AufJdarang,
This was due not merely to personal friendship with the chief
leaders of that enlightenment, but the whole character of his
own efforts brought him to it Hence arose his incessant
struggle against cdl the prejudices that were consecrated by
age, and hence his tendency to investigate everything critically
and to put it into a new light Yet because Lessing did not
stop at the exoteric wisdom in Leibniz and its representation
in Wolff, but pressed into its esoteric elements, he took up
two thoughts which had been completely lost by the German
Enlightenment: the idea of Individualism and the idea of
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LESSINO. 571
Development. Whatever exists has already, as such, a claim
to be examined with care ; and Lessing, like few of his age,
nnderstood how to transport himself into other thoughts and
times, and correctly to appreciate other kinds of manifestations,
however strange they might be.
In entire correspondence with this position is Lessing's
attitude towards the religious Enlightenment of his time.
From his youth Lessing had zealously studied theological
controversies, and even when theology was given up as a pro-
fessional study he retained a living interest in it, so that he
could afterwards justly say of himself that he had not wished
controversy, and yet did not need to shun it He was com-
pletely at one with the AufUärung in the rejection of
Orthodoxy. "What are the orthodox to me? I despise
them as much as you do," Lessing writes to his brother. Yet
he respects the orthodox system on account of its complete
logical connection, and in certain dogmas, notwithstanding
their untenableness before the understanding, he even divines
a deeper hidden truth, but without making any attempt to
explain this irrational investment of such higher truths, or to
represent it as a universal law. Hence the modern theology
of the Enlightenment is still more repugnant to him. '' What
is our new fashionable theology compared with orthodoxy, but
liquid manure compared with dirty water ? A final under-
standing had been, thank God, very much come to with
orthodoxy ; a separating wall had been drawn between it and
philosophy, behind which each of them could go its own
way without hindering the other. But what is done now ?
This partition is torn down, and under the pretence of making
us rational Christians, they are making us extremely irrational
philosophers." " We are agreed on the fact that our old reli-
gious system is false ; but I should not like to say with you
that it is a patchwork made by dabblers and half-philosophers.
I know nothing else in the world, in which the acuteness of
the human mind has been more exhibited and practised. A
patchwork made by dabblers and half-philosophers is the reli-
gious system which they would now put in the place of the old
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572 THE OPPOSITION TO THB AÜFKLiRÜNO.
one, and with far more influence upon reason and philosophy
than the old system pretended to." If we ask, however,
for the new system that Lessing would substitute in place
of orthodoxy and of the Enlightenment, the answer cannot
satisfy us. It is possible that Lessing kept silent on much
which his age did not yet seem mature enough to receive;
it is also probable that his power went only the length of
criticism, and soon found its limit in the attempt to create
what was new.
The earliest theological writings of Lessing are very tame.
His Saving of Cardanus (1770) aims at showing how weak
were the grounds on which Cardan had been accused of
atheism. His Saving of the ** Inepttis Beligiosus " shows that
the said work directed against Syncretism was entirely
satirical, and therefore was not a bad, godless book; and
his Saving of Cochlania discusses the suggestion that the
schism of the Eeformation was merely a consequence of an
accidental jealousy between the Dominican and Augustinian
orders. The Berengarius Turonensis seeks, by reference to a
manuscript discovered in the Wolfenbüttel Library, to prove
that Berengar completely expounded the later Lutheran
doctrine of the Lord's Supper. His Thoughts on the
Moravians^ (1750) lay stress upon a practical Christianity;
man was created for action and not for rationalizing, but on
that very account he inclines more to the latter than to
the former. From this perversion of what is essential,
arises the decay of philosophy as well as of religion.
This explanation, however, is not accompanied by any
exact definition, and therefore it remains without value as
regards his conception or apprehension of the nature of
religion. Moreover, this treatise, with some others to be
afterwards mentioned, remained unprinted till after Lessing*s
death.
All the more violently, however, was the controversy
kindled when Lessing published, in 1774-78, a series of
" Fragments of an anonymous (writer) " in the " Contributions
^ Gedanken über die Hermhuter.
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LESSING. 573
to History and Literature."^ It is now universally recognised
that these were fragments from the " Apology for the rational
worshippers of Grod " * by H. S. Eeimarus. We may refer to
these writings, as far as regards the contents of the '* Frag-
ments." They relate to " the Toleration of the Deists ; " " the
decrying of reason in the pulpits ; " " the impossibility of a
revelation that all men could believe in a rational way ; " " the
crossing of the Israelites through the Eed Sea ; " " that the
books of the Old Testament have not been written to reveal
a Religion ; " " the history of the Resurrection ; " and the
''purpose of Jesus and of His disciplea" Lessing did not
entirely agree with the author, and accordingly he added his
"counter-positions." The numerous attacks upon the work
were, however, for the most part directed as much against
Lessing as against the unknown author. Lessing then took
up the conflict, and in particular he turned upon Göze.^
We may pass over the details of this controversy and
examine its ultimate results, or more properly, the general
theological propositions which Lessing propounded and repre-
sented.— The question first treated turned upon the correct
relation between religion and the book of religion, or the rela-
tion between Christianity and the Bible. Orthodoxy and
the Enlightenment were at one in regard to this general
question. Eeimarus and Göze so completely identify the
two, that every attack upon the Bible was also regarded
by them as an attack upon Eeligion. On the basis of this
common assumption, Orthodoxy starts from the position that
Christianity is true, and infers from it that the Bible is true ;
* Fragmenten eines Ungenannten.
* Apologie oder Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes.
* Johann Melchior Göze was the Senior Pastor of Hamhoig. Poor Göze, as
represented by Lessing, was ** held up as the bearer and type of all narrowness
of mind and hostility to science." But Göze has also found his " Saving" (cf.
Rope, /. M, Oifze, zur Rettwng Chex^^y 1860). However, as long as the excessive
over-estimate of the merits of Lessing in relation to the Philosophy of Beligion
lasts, his often more rough than real polemic, and the empty evasions with
which it turns away from the main question, "What Religion does Lessing
understand by the Christian Religion, and to which he confesses himself to
belong t " wiU be too much admired in a one-sided way, for justice to be done to
his opponent.
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574 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLÄRUNG.
whereas the EDlightenment starts from the position that the
Bible is for many reasons, or at least in many points, not
true, and it infers that Christianity is theref(»re likewise
untrue, or at least is incredible. Lessing seeks to shift the
position of the whole controversy by calling in question the
common assumption« The book of religion, he says, is not
religion, the Bible is not Christianity ; and therefore attacks
upon the Bible are not, eo ipso, also attacks upon Christianity.
Lessing was well aware of the bearing and range of his
assertion. Beligion is in his view the palace in which man-
kind have lived from of old in comfort and undisturbed ; the
religious book is the ground-plan according to whidi the
palace was built. At present this ground-plan is so much
over-estimated that, in case of a conflagration, the attempt
would not be made to extinguish the fire, but only to save
the plan. Lessing would make a distinction between the
Bible and Christianity. He would rather not acknowledge
the Bible as the sole foundation of our most holy religion
than give up religion to irresoluble difiBculties. ^
Lessing has briefly summarized his thoughts on this subject
in the following ten axioms : — ** 1. The Bible manifestly
contains more than belongs to Beligion. 2. It is a mere
hypothesis that the Bible is equally infallible in this ' more
than Beligion.' 3. The letter is not the spirit, and the Bible
is not Beligion. 4 Consequently, objections against the
letter and against the Bible are not on that very account
likewise objections against the spirit and against religion.
5. Further, there was a Beligion before the Bible existed.
6. Christianity existed before the Evangelists and the Apostles
had written. It was a good while before the first of them
wrote, and a very considerable period passed before the Canon
came into existence. 7. However much may, therefore,
depend on these writings, yet it is not possible that the whole
truth of the Christian Beligion should rest upon them. 8.
If there was a period in which the Christian Beligion was
already widely spread, and in which it had already won so
many souls, but in which, however, not a letter was yet
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LESSING. 575
written of that which has come down to us, it must also be
possible that all that the Evangelists and the Apostles have
written might again be lost, and yet the Beligion taught by
them would still subsist 9. Religion is not true because the
Evangelists and Apostles taught it, but they taught it because
it is true. 10. What has been transmitted in writing must
be explained by its internal truth, and all the writings
transmitted to us cannot give any internal truth to a thing
if it does not posses such truth ! "
The Bible then is not religion, and this is historically
proved by the fact that Christianity existed before any of the
Evangelists and Apostles had written anything. The first
summary of the Christian faith was the Regula fidd. The
writings of the New Testament arose afterwards, and quite
gradually. We may here, however, pass over the hypothesis
of Lessing r^arding the origin of the Gospels. — Christianity is
thus shown to be older than the Bible ; and hence it is not
Christianity that is dependent on the Bible, but the Bible
that is dependent on Christianity. In other words, the Bible
is not the foundation of Christianity, but its original docu-
mentary record. The Biblical Scriptures are occasional
writings, composed under particular circumstances and for
definite purposes, and they thus contain very much that is
accidental and indifierent as regards religion. Hence the
Bible contains more things and other things than belong to
religion, and for these it does not possess the sanfe authority
as for what properly belongs to religion.
The controversy between Lessing and Göze, turned around
the relation of the Bible to Christianity; whereas the con-
troversy between Lessing and Schumann, turned upon the
significance of Miracles and Prophecies for the truth of the
Christian religion. The treatise "Concerning the proof of
the Spirit and of Power" was directed by Lessing against
Schumann. Lessing here starts from the point of view that
a distinction must be made between prophecies of which we
ourselves experience the fulfilment^ or miracles which have
been seen with our own eyes, and narratives of fulfilled
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576 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLAKÜNG.
prophecies or miracles that have already taken place. If I
had lived in the time of Christ, and if I had seen how pro-
phecies of undoubtedly ancient origin were fulfilled in His
person, or how He performed miracles Himself, I would at
once have subordinated my understanding to His. Or, if
prophecies regarding the Christian religion were still fulfilled
at present, and if miracles were done by Christians . as in the
time of Origen, I would at once recognise the proof of the
Spirit and of Power. But in the present day this proof has
neither spirit nor power, but has sunk down into human
testimonies as to spirit and power. Seeing that the truth of
the miracles is no longer established by current miracles now,
and seeing that we have only narratives of miracles, although
these may be completely consistent as narratives, they cannot
oblige one to believe in other doctrines; for if a historical
truth cannot be demonstrated, neither can anything be
demonstrated by historical truth. In other words, corUingetU
historical truths can never become the proof of necessary rational
truths P — ^Further, what is meant by believing a historical
truth ? It means nothing else than to recognise this truth,
and to raise no objection against another person buüding
another historical proposition upon it. If I have nothing to
object historically to the statement that Christ raised a dead
man and rose Himself from the dead, I am quite willing to
believe that the disciples regarded Him on that ground as the
Son of God ; these truths belong to one and the same class.
This, however, cannot oblige me to believe that Grod has a
Son of the same substance with Himself, and that Chri^ is
this Son. That would amount to deriving the obligation to
believe something against which my reason rebels, from the
inability to raise any strong objection to the testimony of
some one; and this is accordingly a fierdßaai^ ei'i £KXo
yivo^. Kor does an appeal to the inspiration of Scripture
give any help, for even this is only historically certain. It is
^ This principle is still proclaimed io the present day as the highest wisdom,
and yet Lessing might even then have advanced from his view of history as a
development, to a moce correct appreciation of historical facts.
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LESSING. 577
thus always necessary to leap from a historical truth over to
an entirely different class of truths, and by reference to the
former to transform all my metaphysical and moral concep-
tions. "This is the broad foul ditch over which I cannot
pass, however often and earnestly I may have attempted the
leap." Thus miracles and prophecies, of which I have only
historical information, cannot oblige me, although their his-
torical truth is quite indubitable, to accept doctrines of another
kind. The doctrines themselves can only lead me to accept
them.
The Book of Religion is thus not the foundation, but the
documentary record of Eeligion. Miracles and Prophecies, or,
in short, historical facts, are no sure proof of the truth of a
religion. The religion must be founded upon itself; the
truths of religion are internal truths or truths of reason. This
negative characteristic leads beyond the distinction of Beligion
and the Bible and the repudiation of the historical proof of
the Spirit and of Power, to a distinction between the
Christian Beligion and the Religion of Christ. And this
positive determination leads to inquiries into the nature of
Religion.
The distinction thus referred to, is discussed in the
Fragment entitled The Religion of Christ. Whether Christ
was more than man, is a problem ; but it is made out as a
fact, that He was truly and really man. Hence the Religion
of Christ and the Christian Religion, are entirely different
things. The Religion of Christ, is that religion which He
himself, as a man, recognised and practised, and which every
man must wish more and more to have in common with him,
the higher he thinks of the man, Christ. The Christian
Religion is that religion which accepts the position that Christ
was more than man, and which makes Him as such the object
of worship. It is inconceivable that these two religions can
exist in Christ as in one and the same person, since the
doctrines and principles of both are hardly to be found in one
and the same book. The Religion of Christ is contained in
clear and distinct words in the Bible ; the Christian Religion
VOL. I. 2 0 ^ T
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578 THE OPPOSITIOlf TO THE AUFKLAKUNG.
is 80 ambiguous that hardly two men are agreed on the mean-
ing of a passage. — Lessing, however, does not go beyond these
allusions. He does not state, either definitely or precisely,
what belongs to the Beligion of Christ, nor does he explain
on what grounds accidental or necessary, and in what way
the Christian Beligion has entered into the place of the
Iieligion of Christ
The explanations of Lessing regarding the essential nature
of Eeligion, are in like manner unsatisfying. He says that
the truths of religion are eternal truths, or truths of reasoa
This position is regarded by him as established beyond doubt
It follows necessarily from the fact that religion is neither
based upon the religious book, nor upon miracles and pro-
phecies, and that I must therefore accept it because it is true
in itself and because its truths are evident to my reason.
This follows from the fact that Lessing aims at spreading the
Christianity of Eeason ; and he lays stress upon the fact that
what all the religions have in common cannot be without a
foundation in Beason. But the question then arises as to
what sort of truths these truths of religion ai-e. Are they
theoretical truths or practical truths ? There is much to be
said for the latter alternative. Lessing himself breaks a lance
for the Moravians, because they turn away from the commonly-
trodden path of rationalizing, to the only correct way of action.
He wishes " that all whom the Gospel of John separates, may
be again united by the Testament of John."
By the " Testament " of John is meant the words which the
Apostle, towards the end of his life, was in the habit of speak-
ing in the assemblies of the Church. " Little children, love
one another." This alone appears to him to be enough ; it is
sufficient if it is carried out. ''It was this Testament of
John by which formerly a certain salt of the earth swore.
Now this salt of the earth swears by the Gospel of John; and
it is said that it has become a little musty in consequence of
this change." Lessing decidedly rejects the view that the
Christian doctrines of faith must necessarily be added to true
Christian love, in order that any one may be a Christian« ^d
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LESSING. 579
if we think of his Nathan the wise, it appears entirely beyond
doubt that in Lessing's view the true religion is identical with
morality. On the other liand, if we consider his Educaiion of
the Human Race, there are certain truths of reason, or theo-
retical truths, which are of main importance to religion, and
the universal and unmistakeable publication of them consti-
tutes the chief significance of Christianity ; and, in particular,
such are insight into the unity of Grod and the immortality
of the soul. — So little does the question regarding the psycho-
logical nature of religion come into the circle of Lessing's
inquiry, that he puts these statements side by side with each
other vrithout even indicating any mode of combining them.
True religion, according to Lessing, is therefore eternal
rational truth. Hence there arise two questions : first, Does
religion rest merely upon reason without rievelation ? and,
secondly. How do the positive religions with their contents,
in part undeniably contrary to reason, arise ?
Leibniz, in entire consistency with the connection of his
system, distinguished between propositions that are alo^e
reason and propositions that are contrary to reason. A
Revelation may not contain the latter, but it will contain the
former. Wolfif then proceeded to determine in detail the
distinguishing marks of what should be regarded as revelation.
According to this canon, the representatives of the Enlighten-
ment, in accordance with their personal predilections, struck
out at one time more, and at another fewer of the positions
of the Christian revelation as contrary to reason, without,
however, in principle denying revelation itself. Here, too,
Lessing goes farther, by calling in question the assumption of
the supra-rationality of Eevelation that lay at the foundation
of the discussion. Bevelation certainly goes beyond the
natural knowledge of its recipients, but it does not go beyond
reason as such; it communicates knowledge to men which
they certainly would not have had otherwise at that time,
but it is knowledge which they could attain to by their
natural reason in the course of time. Bevelation is thus
entirely rational Lessing proceeds to show this ; and, using
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580 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLÄRUNG.
a figure already found in the church fathers, he represents it
as the Education of the Human Bace. All education is
education to something which is its goal, and it is therefore
a development This is the chief thought of Lessing's
HduccUion of the Human Bace,
Education is revelation happening to the individual man;
and Revelation is education which has happened and still
happens to the human race. Education gives man nothing
that he could not have of himself, only it gives it quicker and
easier. In like manner, Revelation gives nothing to the
human race to which human reason would not come if left
to itself, only it gives it the most important things sooner.
As is the case with parents and teachers in connection with
education, so must God likewise have observed a certain order
and proportion in connection with Revelation. The first man
was indeed already furnished with the conception of one only
God, but human reason when left to itself divided the single,
incommensurable One into several more commensurable indi-
viduals, and thus sank into polytheism and idolatry. In order
to bring men again to the right way, God chose a single people
to be the subjects of His special education, and He particu-
larly chose the Israelites as the people that was most un-
polished and barbarized. To this people, God made Himself
known at the beginning merely as the God of their fathers,
authenticated Himself by miracles as a God who was more
powerful than any other, and thus accustomed the Israelites
to the conception of the one God. This conception of GJod as
one only was, however, based entirely upon the idea of His being
the most powerful, and it was still far removed from the true
transcendental conception of the one only God, In this lay
the foundation of the frequent apostasy of the Israelites, wh«i
another God appeared to them as the most powerful God. In
moral respects, such an uncultivated people could only be
educated by immediate sensible punishments and rewards. It
would have been a paedagogic error if God had at once pro-
ceeded to reveal to the people the immortality of the soul and
a future Kfe, as their reason was not yet sufficiently grown for
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LESSING. 581
these truths. — Meanwhile the other nations of the earth had
advanced upon their own way by the light of reason. Most
of them stopped behind the chosen people, and some out-
stripped them: which, however, proves nothing against
Revelation, Nor does the fact that the doctrine of the
immortality of the soul, and of rewards and punishments in
a future life, is not contained in the Old Testament, prove
anything against its divineness. An elementary book for
children may well pass over in silence some important parts
of science and art, only it may not contain anything that bars
the way to them. During the exile the Jewish people came
into contact with the wise Persians, and as they measured
Jehovah with the Being of all beings, there resulted the first
mutual service between Keason and Eevelation. Hitherto
Bevelation had led Eeason, now Keason enlightened Eeve-
lation. In the light of the Persian Beligion, with its pure
conception of God, the Jews saw in the Jehovah of the
Old Testament no longer merely the most powerful national
God, but in truth the one and only God. The Jews were
also made acquainted with the doctrine of the immortality of
the soul among the Chaldeans and Persians, and especially in
the schools of the Greek philosophers in Egypt. And now
they found in the Old Testament at least prefigurations,
allusions, and indications pointing to this faith. But every
elementary book exists only for a definite time, and the Old
Testament too had its time. Then came Christ, and He
plucked the exhausted book of elements out of the hands of
the child.
The Jews had come so far in the exercise of their reason,
that they required for their moral actions nobler and worthier
motives than temporal rewards and punishments. And so
Christ became the first trustworthy practical teacher of the
immortality of the souL The disciples faithfully propagated
this doctrine, spreading it among all nations, but mixing it up
at the same time with other doctrines, the truth of which was
less evident, and the advantage of which was less important.
The New Testament Scriptures were the second and better
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582 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLAKUNG.
elementary book written for the human race. As we can now
dispense with the Old Testament in reference to the doctrine
of the unity of God, and as we begin to dispense even with
the New Testament in reference to the doctrine of the immor-
tality of the soul, may there not be likewise contained in it
other truths which we may wonder at as revelations, till
reason teach us to comprehend them? For example, the
doctrine of the Trinity may perhaps tell us that God cannot
possibly be one in the sense in which finite things are one ;
that His transcendental unity does not exclude a kind of
plurality ; and that God has a most perrect representation, or
an equally perfect form, or a Son-God. In like manner, the
doctrine of Original Sin, may perhaps tell us that man on the
lowest stage is too little master of his own actions to be able
to follow moral laws. Similarly the doctrine of the Atone-
ment may teach that (Jod might, nevertheless, give man moral
laws, and, instead of excluding him from all moral happiness,
would pardon all transgressions by reference to His Son as
the independent sum of all perfections, in which relation every
imperfection of the individual disappears. We should not be
prevented from speculating about such mysteries of religion.
They are, in short, like the arithmetical example which the
master puts down for his pupils in order that they may be
able thereby to be guided in some measure in their cal<mla-
tions; such speculations are fitted as means to raise the
human race to the highest stage of enlightenment and purity.
This stage we have not yet attained, but we shall attain it.
All education has a goal, and so has that of the human race.
This goal of the race, is the age of a new eternal gospel which
is promised to us by the elementary books of the New Testa-
ment Its nature consists in this, that men will do the good
because it is the good, and not because arbitrary rewards are
attached to the doing of it. And though it may perhaps still
be long till this goal is reached, yet, " Go on Thine own un-
searchable way. Eternal Providence ! Only let me not despair
of Thee because of this unsearchableness I Let me not despair
of Thee, even although Thy footsteps should appear to me to go
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LESSIN6. 583
"backwards ! It is not true that the shortest line is always
the straight one ! "
Thus does Lessing express himself, but it may be
questioned whether this is his real opinion. He does not
enter upon any inquiry into the possibility and the manner
of a Eevelation. Again, Lessing, entirely in the spirit of the
^ußdärung, finds the nature and significance of Christianity
in nothing else than in insight into the unity of Grod and the
immortality of the soul, with retribution in the other world
for the actions done here. Further, in his view Christianity
is not the goal of the religious education; it is not the
perfect religion, but is destined to perish like the Jewish
religion. It may be asked, Is all this only exoteric truth,
and has Lessing kept the esoteric truth to himself ? Has he
perhaps himself acted in accordance with the rule which he
lays down thus : " Beware, thou who art more capable, thou
w^ho dost tread on the last page of this elementary book and
art aglow, beware lest thy weaker fellow-scholars may mark
what thou scentest from afar or already begin'st to see ! "
The latter view appears to us the more probable, yet who can
assert it or prove it? In that case, he could not speak
literally of a revelation. It would only be rational insight
and knowledge to which at first only certain individuals,
and then the mass, attained by means of it ; Judaism and
Christianity would thus be grounded only upon human
reason and not upon a divine activity in revelation ; the
human reason here only struck into a different path. Whence
then could come the pretence of a divine revelation and the
belief in such a revelation ?
However this may be, Eevelation, according to Lessing,
contains, in any case, only what is essentially rational. But
the religions as they actually exist, or the so-called positive
religions, contain much that is indifferent to religion as
arbitrary prescriptions for belief and action. What is the
relationship between these two things ? Lessing again and
again, and always more sharply, blames men for commonly
putting too much value upon these externalities. Many a one
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534 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AÜFKLAUÜNG.
is a Christian who is not called such, while manj onlj assmne
the very easy confession of religious doctrines as a matter of
conscience, instead of the fulfilment of the more diflScoU
duties. In his dialogue entitled Ernst und Falk, he shows
that what is essential in Freemasonry, is founded on the
nature of man and of civil society, and may therefore be dis-
covered by our own reflection, but that the peculiar words and
signs and usages are not Freemasonry. It appears to be the
ideal task of Masonry to show that those who in every positive
religion have risen above the prejudices of the crowd, may
unite in order to get rid to the utmost of the separations by
which they become so alien to each other. Accordingly,
tolerance is an always recurring demand of Lessing, but it is
founded not so much upon a relative estimation of every
positive religion as upon non-estimation of all the positive
religions. The value of the positive religions is therefore
small ; and all the statements of Lessing regarding them tend
to depreciate their value, and none of these to establish them
positively. Whence then did the positive religions arise ?
In his introduction to the Education of the Human Eace,
Lessing puts the question, " Why will we not rather see in all
the positive religions nothing but the order of march in
which the human understanding in every place could solely
and alone develop itself, and is still to develop itself furth^,
than either smile or be angry at any one of them ? "
It thus appears as if he regarded the positive religions as
necessarily founded in the nature of man and its develop-
ment. In the treatise itself, however, we find this thought
carried out only in regard to the religious truth in Judaism
and Christianity, and therefore by reference to the various
degrees of natural religion, but not in respect of what is
properly positive. This treatise at least cannot lead us to
suppose that Lessing afterwards gave up the view which is
expounded in an Essay On the Origin of Revealed Religion,
written from 1755 to 1760.
The sum-total of the contents of Natural Religion, accord-
ing to this Essay, is to acknowledge one God, to form the
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HERDER. 585
most worthy conceptions of Him, and to give regard to these
in all our actions and thoughts. Every man is bound to
follow this natural religion according to the measure of his
powers ; and as these powers are different, so likewise is the
natural religion of the man. For the purposes of the civil
union, instead of this diversity, unanimity must be intro-
duced, and men must come to agreement with regard to
certain things and conceptions, and attribute to them the
same importance and necessity as the religious truths which
are naturally known possess in themselves. This Positive
Beligion received its authority, as revealed, from the person
of its founder ; it is indispensable, and it is inwardly true in
so far as Natural Beligion is modified in it by the accidental
conditions of the State to which it may be subservient.
Hence all Positive Eeligions are equally true and equally
false. The best Positive Beligion is that which contains
the fewest conventional additions to Natural Beligion.
IL
Johann Gottfried Herder (17-44-1803).^
Of the contemporaries of Lessing, there was hardly one so
closely related to him as Herder. The relationship between
them, however, left room for wide diversity in their
viewa The difference between them comes out clearly at
the outset, as we are accustomed to see in Lessing the acute
logical critic, and in Herder the refined congenial interpreter
of popular poetry. The afl&nity between them, however,
relates mainly to their general philosophical view of the
^ Of Herder 8 writings the following come specially into consideration here :
"Aelteste Urkunde de« Menschengeschlechts," 1774-76. ** Vom Geiste der
HebräLschen Poesie," 1782-85. "Briefe über das Studium der Theologie,"
1785. "Ideen znr Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit," 1784-87.
"Seele und GoU," 1787. "Christliche Schriften," 1797. "Briefe zur
Beförderung der Humanität," 1793-97. Cf. A. Werner, Herder aU Theolog ,
BerUn 1871.
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586 THE OPPOSITION TO THB AUFKLÄRUNG.
world. Herder's main efforts were directed towards tracing
out the first stirrings of the human mind in the oldest
monuments of history and poetry. With rare intelligence, he
can think himself into the circumstances and the modes of
thought of long past ages and of the most different peoples,
and he knows how to bring their oldest monuments in poetiy
and history near to his own time and people. Thus does
Herder renew the stress laid by Leibniz upon individuality
and the appreciation of the dim knowledge in the sphere of
feeling, in contrast to the all - levelling and extremely un-
historical view of history characteristic of the AufMärung.
And thus does he open up to his age, in the Voices of the
Peoples^ the means of understanding the most distant products
of poetry, including the Bible. For it was Herder who —
along with the non-dogmatic crijbicism of the Neology and the
historical criticism of Ernesti, Michaelis, and Semler — ^pointed
emphatically to a historico - aesthetic appreciation of the
Bible.
Turning to Herder's philosophical view of the world, we
should not be led astray by his expressions of attachment to
Spinoza. For even Herder did not advance to an objectively
correct understanding of Spinoza, but rather represents a
" purified Spinozism," the main features of which were
borrowed from Leibniz.
At first we find Herder standing in the closest relation to
the Aufklärung, In 1767 he writes full of friendship and
esteem to Nicolai, saying that Berlin was the first place in
which he wished to be, because the spirit of the Berlin
savarUs worked sympathetically upon him. In the same year,
he writes entirely in the sense of the Aufklärung to Kant,
telling him that he had undertaken the office of the ministiy
because he knew, and daQy experienced, that it was the best
means of bringing culture and intellect to the excellent part
of mankind that we call the people. And even afterwards,
when this friendly relation was dissolved. Herder continued
to retain from the Aufklärung the position, that all the
' Stimmen der Völker.
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HERDEB. 587
development of man, including religion, was put at its highest
in its relation to happiness.
With his friend Jacobi, Herder finds himself at one in
opposition to the empty intellectual philosophy of the
AufUärtmg, which believes that it can derive everything
from conceptions and demonstrations. In sharp words, he
trams against the appeal to the common human understanding,
as when he says : " If any one, when his shoe presses upon
liis com, refers at once to the common human understanding
and human feeling, he does not truly honour the genius of
humanity which he transforms into his own com." In like
manner, he says that human understanding and human feeling
" are something else than your own nightcap." In his
Metakritik he decidedly opposes " that human cognition
which is apart from and before all experience, and those
sensible intuitions which are apart from and before all
sensible perceptions of an object," etc. If we overlook the
excited and unworthy tone of this production, — ^remembering
that in his ** Letters on Humanity " the same Herder speaks
of the same Kant in terms of the greatest reverence and
esteem, — a correct estimate of it is only possible by rigidly
separating Herder's own views from his attacks upon Kant
In the former there is much that is valuable ; in the latter
there is awanting even the first indispensable condition of
such an attack, namely, a correct understanding of his opponent.
A single glance at Herder's discussion of Kant's Deduction of
the Categories and of his Idealism, leaves no doubt of this.
In regard to the function of philosophy, Herder is also at one
with his friend Jacobi. Philosophy has to unveil existence,
or to teach us to know what there is in qualities and relations,
and how it exists. Metaphysics is After-physics; in other
words. Metaphysics ought continually to hold on by Physics,
and not to go beyond its discoveries. Actuality, reality, or
active existence, is the chief conception ; philosophy has to
investigate this and to keep by the things of nature.
But this agreement does not go further. Herder protests
decidedly and above all, against the view of an extramundane
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588 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLÄRUNG.
God. " I do not understand," he says, " what you good
people would have with this * existing out of the world.' If
God does not exist in the world, everywhere in the world, and
even everywhere without bounds and whole and indivisiMe,
then He exists nowhere. There is no space out of the world ;
space only arises in so far as there arises a world to us as an
abstraction of the phenomena. Limited personality is as
little applicable to the infinite Being as that personality
arises in our case only by limitation. In God this illusion
falls away ; He is the highest, most living, most active One."
'* With the personal supramundane and extramundane God,
I can get on as little as Lessing does. God is not the world,
and the world is not God ; this is certain. But neither with
the * extra ' nor the * supra,' as it seems to me, is there any-
thing indicated. When we speak of God, we must forget all
the idola of space and time, or our best effort is in vain."
Even the personality of the world-cause is rejected. None
of the meanings of the word " person " (as mask, or as per-
sonal status, or as delineated character) can be applied to
God. As little as God looks upon the person, so little does
He play the part of a person and affect personality, or have a
personal mode of thinking that separates and contrasts Him
with others. He is. No one is as He is. A negative
answer is also given to the question as to whether ** the
highest intelligence requires the term * personality,* so that
unity of self-consciousness should constitute personality ! "
And to his friend Jacobi, Herder objects, " You will have
God in a human form as a friend who thinks of you. Seflect
that He must then also think humanly or limitedly of you,
and if He is partial in favour of you. He will be partial
against others." — ^Against such a separation of God and the
world, Herder always returns again to Lessing's confession,
lj/ Koi irav ; and Spinoza's Philosophy appears to him the
only philosophy which is completely at one with itself. It
is certainly a very purified Spinozism that is proclaimed by
Herder. According to Herder, Spinoza is not an atheist ; for
" the Idea of God is to him the first and last, and even the
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HERDEB. 589
only one, of all the ideas to which he connects the knowledge
of the world and of nature, the consciousness of himself and
of all things around him, and of ethics and politics." Spinoza
is not a pantheist ; " for his infinite and most real being is as
little the world itself as the Absolute of reason and the End-
leas of the imagination are one ; " and the accusation against
him is wrong, " that he encloses his God in the world, and
identifies Him with the world." Spinoza is not a fatalist ; for
he does not speak of a blind external compulsion, nor does he
subject God to a fate, " but I think that everything follows
as necessarily from the nature of Gtod as any one can think
it follows from the nature of God that God knows Himself."
Spinoza does not teach a God that works blindly without
insight, but among all perfections, thinking and wisdom also
belong to Him. Spinoza does not attribute extension to God,
but, compelled by the mode of expression adopted by Descartes,
he only chooses an unsuitable expression for the thought that
the corporeal and the spiritual worlds are both representations
and unfoldings of one and the same Divine Being.
Herder's philosophical views may be reduced to the follow-
ing thoughts. God is power or force, as all that exists ; but
God is the Primary Power, the All-power of all powers, the
Organ of all organs. Finite things are also powers or forces,
but only as effects, as limited manifestations or representations
of the One infinite Power. Thus '' the highest Existence has
given to His creatures what is the highest ; He has given
them reality, existence." Hence Herder will know nothing
of a demonstration of the existence of God ; but in existence
or what is itself real — even though it were only a stalk of
straw — the existence of God appears to him as given with
immediate certainty. In like manner he repudiates the
comprehending of God as an act of conception ; we do not
even know with regard to finite power what it is in its
inmost nature, to say nothing of the divine primary Power.
As it is impossible for us to think anything as nothing, it is
in like manner impossible for us to think that God is not ;
for His existence forms the ground of all things. God is
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590 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLÄRUNG,
thus the first and the most original of all that is. This is
specially evident in the case of our souL For even without
taking into view the origin of the powers which think, act, and
work in the soul, their connection is already proof enough of
an essential ground of an inner truth, harmony, and perfection
included in its very existence. Because there is a reason, or
a connection in what is thinkable according to unchangeable
rules, there must likewise be an essential groxmd of this con-
nection. This self-subsisting truth dwells in everjrthing that
exists, whether it is viewed objectively or subjectively. God
is thus the inner necessary being in all real existence
God is the primary Power; He is the All-power; and
hence He is not a transitory, but an abiding and immanent
cause of all things. But it does not follow from this fact
that the world is equally eternal with Gk>d. The eternal
might of GkKi freely creates, has created, and will create,
because, as an eternally working might, it can never be idle.
The existence of the world, however, rests upon a succession,
and although this succession is endless, the world is not on
that account eternal. Endless succession and eternity are
too frequently confounded with each other, and it is forgotten
that all things in the succession of time are conditioned as
being dependent on one another and entirely dependent on
the cause which produced them, so that none of them can be
compared with the eternal existence of God.
God is thus primarily power or might This might, how-
ever, is not without wisdom. The rules in our soul, according
to which we perceive, separate, conclude, and combine, are
divine rules. There are pure truths only if "that Being,
which is the cause of my reason and every reason, knows
these inner laws of thought in the most eminent way, and
this could not but make His operations fundamental laws of
existence." God possesses all perfections in the most perfect
way ; and hence He cannot be without thinking, which is
the most excellent perfection. This is to be taken indeed
with the distinction that the derived understanding can only
understand what is given to it, whereas nothing is given to
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HERDEB. 591
the original thinking power, hut everything proceeds from it
Further, Ood is not a mere collective name for all the
powers of understanding and thinking that only really exist
and think in the individual ci*eatures. God is therefore as
essentially an infinite and original power of thought as He is
the infinite power of action. The highest power is necessarily
also the wisest. The norm for this wisdom can only be
given in goodness ; and hence power, understanding, and good-
ness are inseparably united in God.
The highest power, goodness, and wisdom being thus one
in God, He therefore works with necessity, that is, according
to the eternal immanent laws of His nature. Spinoza
accordingly is right in his polemic against final purposes, for
these ate nothing but weak reflections and modes of repre-
sentation, arbitrary conceptions, and capricious choices of
will (velleitcUes). Qod is not to be considered as first delibe-
rating and choosing with reference to what He does ; His
working has flowed forth as an effect from the nature of the
most perfect being ; it was unique of its kind, and nothing
else except it was possible. And hence the world is not the
best because He, as it were, chose it from among worse
worlds, but because He could produce nothing bad according
to the inner necessity of His essential nature. The many
anthropopathies are also a defective element in the Leibniziau
philosophy. In Leibniz himself, this was indeed only too
strong an accommodation to the weak understanding of the
multitude ; but his followers afterwards made this mere
vesture of the idea the chief matter. While Leibniz him-
self, by the system of moral necessity, excluded all arbitrari-
ness from God, his followers constructed a multitude of empty
physico-theologies, teleologies, and theodicies. God, however,
works according to inner necessary laws of His existence, that
is, according to the most perfect goodness and wisdom. In
the whole universe, which down to its least connections forms
only one system, the wisest goodness is manifested according
to immutable inner rules ; and in this whole we . may indeed
inquire after wise purpose. But if this purpose is sought in
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592 THE OPPOSITION TO THK AÜFKLABÜNG.
iDdividual things, we necessarily fall into absurdities, or we
must have recourse to secret decrees of Grod. In the spbere
of individual things, it rather holds true that *" ereiy real
law of nature that is discovered is a discovered rule of the
eternal divine understanding, which could only think trodi
and only realize reality."
According to this view of things, there is no room for
Miracles as interruptions or violations of the connection of
nature. On this point we must not be misled by the fact
that Herder deals with the conception of miracle as the
mirabiUy or the object of the faith of earlier ages and peoples,
and that he thus treats of it with deep penetrating intelli-
gence, and with a certain predilection and indulgence. The
Deity manifests Himself in infinite powers or forces in an
infinite way ; that is. He reveals Himself organically. The
expression " organic powers " indicates that the inner and
the outer, the spiritual and the corporeal, are always together ;
there is no power without an organ, no mind without a body.
The whole world is nothing but an expression, or an exhibi-
tion of the reality of the eternally living and active powers
of the Deity. In all things there, are such living organic
powers ; and in every point of the creation they work in
accordance with the most perfect wisdom and goodness. The
simple laws, in accordance with which all the living powers
of nature form their thousandfold organizations, are reduced
to the following three : — 1. Persistence of being, or the in-
ternal continuance of every being ; 2. Union with its like
and separation from its opposite ; 3. Assimilation with itself
and reflection of its being in another.
The Powers which rule the universe, when exactly r^arded,
are one ; for they are all nothing but reflected expressions,
exhibitions, or modes of manifestation of the one divine
Power. Hence, in Herder's view, all the sharp contrasts
which are seemingly found in the finite world disappear. He
knows nothing of the question how Ood works upon and by
dead matter. For matter is not dead ; . it lives ; and manifold
living powers work in it, in conformity with their internal
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nEHDER. 693
and external Organa " In the matter which we call dead,
there are at every point not less and not smaller divine
powers at work." As the partition wall between the inorganic
and the organic is thus broken down, so do the sharp separa-
tions raised between the different kingdoms of life fall away,
" Only one principle of life appears to rule in nature : it is
the ethereal or electrical current which in the stalks of the
plant and in the veins and muscles of the animal is elaborated
finitely, and always more and more finely in the nervous
structure, and which at last kindles all the wonderful
impulses and psychical powers whose working in animals and
men fills us with astonishment." It is only from this funda-
mental thought that we can get to a right understanding
of Herder's " Ideas for a History of Mankind ; " ^ for it is
only from this principle that we are justified, in the considera-
tion of Human Histor}% in starting from the position of our
earth among the other celestial bodies, from the changeful
history and finite formation of our planet, and from the
influence of the condition of the soil and climate, and of the
flora and fauna, upon the development of men. In this
principle also lies the basis of the scientific grounding of
Physiognomies, as indicated by Herder ; it is the ground of
the demand that every Psychology must be at the same time
a physiology ; it also justifies the rejection of the definition
of the soul as an immaterial substance, and it gets rid of the
difficult question as to the reciprocal action of the soul and
the body. It is likewise upon this principle that Herder's
special theory of knowledge had to be reared. Further, it
is on this ground that Herder rejects the Pre-established
Harmony of Leibniz, which he seems, however, only to have
known in Wolffs externalized representation of it ; and it is
on this standpoint that he teaches the so-called Physical
Influence.
Notwithstanding this general identity, however, all things
are essentially different from one another. Each individual
thing is a special exhibition or production of the divine
> Ideen zur Geschichte der MeuBchheii.
VOL. L 2 P
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594 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AÜFKLABUKG.
Power ; everything has an entirely unique individuality. At
every point of the creation, in the essential nature and
properties of everything, the whole God is indeed manifested,
but yet only in so far as He could become visible and eneigic
in any particular symbol or point of space and time. " Eveiy
power is by its nature an expression of the highest might,
wisdom, and goodness, according as this could exhitat and
manifest itself at that position of the universe, that is, in
connection with all other powers." For every being is what
it is; and we are modes of existence or individualities.
'' Every one has and is a special mode of being, or has a
peculiar individuality of his own." The principle of our
individualization lies deeper than the understanding pene-
trates ; it lies as conception and as feeling, involved in the
very word " Self." Self-consciousness, self-activity constitutes
our reality, our existence. This holds not merely of us as
men, but all things like us, are '' various modes of existence
with various kinds and degrees of self-consciousness ; they are
modifications of reality, going deeper and deeper downwards,
and higher and higher upwards."
In the world there are innumerable degrees of perfection
from the lowest up to the highest There is thus found, in
fact, through the whole series of all the creatures a gradually
ascending progress of organization, from the stone to the
crystal, from the crystal to the plant, from the plant to the
animal, and from the animal to man. We thus find every-
where an ascending series of powers which exhibit themselves
in an ascending series of organized forms. As men we occupy
the highest stage, because there dwells in us with inner
consciousness a living expression of the three highest divine
Powers : might, understanding, and goodness. Here, how-
ever, at this highest stage, there is no dualism of body and
soul, but in our whole being and nature we are only power
and activity; and as there is here everywhere one and
the same life, and therefore imperceptible transitions, no
psychology is possible which would not be at every step also
a determinate physiology. Our whole life rests upon the
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HEBDEIL 595
stimulus of external things. However, we do not experience
by it the internal states of nature, but only how we animate
them with our sensations; and thus this, at least, human
truth is the highest of which we are capable. The senses
take in what is external ; the nerves guide and combine it in
the inward sphere. Thought is the power of forming unity
out of the manifold that streams into us. Cognition and will
are one and the same power ; and hence there is no room for
the freedom of the will in the usual sense of a faculty of
choice.
What once exists, cannot cease ; for existence is an indis-
soluble conception. All the eflBcient and living powers in the
world of creation, continue to exist. No power can perish.
We have no example in nature of the perishing of a power ;
nor have we a conception of it in our soul. " If it is a
contradiction that a thing should be or become nothing, it is
still more a contradiction that a living active thing in which
the Creator Himself is present, and in which His divine
power is manifested as indwelling, should turn itself into
nothing." In the created world there is therefore no real
death, no ceasing or vanishing of what has once existed.
Visible death is indeed undeniable, because it is presented in
our daily experience ; but it is in reality nothing but a trans-
formation, and this transformation is a necessary condition of
life. Moreover, because only living powers or forces work in
the world of creation, there is no rest in it ; for a power
ceases as soon as it rests. Powers, as forces, thus continue
always to work ; and this continuous working is at the same
time a continuous advancing according to inner eternal rules
involved in the process. The more a power works, so much
the more does it expand its limits, and at the same time
impress upon others the form of its own power and beauty.
The universal progress of the universe therefore involves the
fundamental law that order rises out of chaos, and that active
powers spring from slumbering capacities. Hence there exists
nothing in the Kingdom of God that is really bad ; there is
only limitation or opposition. But as limitation is iasepar-
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596 THE OPPOSITION TO THE A.UFKLAKÜNO.
able from every existence in time and space, what exists as
opposite must help and further itself ; and even the errors of
men must, in the view of an intelligent mind, be conducive
to what is good, according to laws of reason, order, and good-
ness.— Universal progression to higher stages of organization,
is thus the law which rules the universe. This progress is
only possible through seeming death, by what appears again
disappearing; and every limited being, considered as an
appearance or manifestation, already brings with itself the
germ of destruction. But althougli the visible organ is
annihilated, the invisible power or force is not thereby
destroyed. The apparent death is only the eflPect of an
eternally-young, restless, yet lasting power, which passes from
one organ into another, and which shows its activity in this
very transformation. If the flower dies, the internal living
power which produced it, shrinks into itself, in order to show
itself yet again in young beauty of the world. To be changed
thus means to press on to new life, and towards the power of
new youth and beauty. This change, however, is at the same
time an onward movement out of chaos into order ; it is an
inward increase and beautification of the powers that exist in
new enlarged bounds, according to rules of harmony and order
which are always more and more observed.
On this principle, our hope of immortality is grounded.
The belief in a future life is necessary and natural to men.
It is necessary, that they may not sink down altogether and
in despair, or become in their abominations worse than the
beasts ; it is natural, because they cannot but think of them-
selves as continuing to exist in their operations and powers.
The hope of immortality is connected with religion; yet
religion, too, gives only hope/ confidence, and belief, but no
demonstrative proofs. Such proofs cannot be based upon the
simple immaterial nature of the soul, for physics knows
nothing of such a nature; nor can it be founded upon
Bonnet's " germs," for no one has discovered in our brain a
spiritual brain as the germ of a new existence ; at the highest
it is supported upon the analogy of nature. All the working
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H£RDEIU 697
powers of the world continue to exist It is impossible, then,
that our soul alone should cease : that soul which is the purest
and most active power, the power which can know God, and
love Him, and imitate Him. All things transform themselves
into higher stages of perfection ; it is impossible that our soul
alone can be excluded from this development. On the
<;ontrary, the progress towards true humanity, which begins
here below, must continue to go on after death. When the
present circle of the activity in which the soul now works, is
destroyed, it cannot fail to obtain a new organ, new thinking
powers, and a new connection with the world for new activity.
And as thus a continuous progression must be assumed.
Herder decidedly rejects Lessing*8 hypothesis of a transmigra-
tion of souls. Such an hypothesis is the idea of men who
are still confined to the mere conditions of sense.
Herder's conception of Eeligion, rests upon these general
philosophical views. " We are men, and as such, methinks,
we must learn to know God as He has really given and
exhibited Himself to us. Through conceptions we receive
Him as a conception, and through words as a word ; through
perception of nature, through the use of our powers, through
the enjoyment of our life, we enjoy Him as real existence full
of power and life." This proposition presents us Herder's
view in its briefest expression ; for to become aware of the
power of God working in us, and to feel ourselves in the
inmost recesses of the heart as a member of the divine order,
is religion. Beligion is the inmost consciousness of what we
are as parts of the world ; it is the consciousness of what we
ought to be and have to do as men. Hence religion is
neither an empty service of ceremonies, nor an indiflerent
repetition of doctrines or prayers ; it is an inward light, a
conviction of the heart; and in Christianity as its highest
form it is humanity. Hence Eevelation is not external and
supernatural, but is a purely immanent education of mankind.
And hence of the religions, we are not to consider one as true
and the others as false, but all are true as corresponding to
the stage of the spiritual life of man at its time.
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598 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLÄRUNG.
It is erroneous, with the Aufklärung, to regard the essence
of Christianity as contained in the enlightenment of the sjrstem
and in speculation ; Christianity is more than this, or rather
it is something different from this. Herder devotes a spedal
treatise, entitled "Of Religion, doctrinal Opinions and Usages,"^
to the refutation of this error. Eeligion is a thing of the soul,
or of the inmost consciousness ; it is the marrow of the senti-
ment and disposition of a man, even as a citizen and a friend ;
it is the most careful conscientiousness of his inner conscious*
ness ; it is the altar of his heart. Eeligion is conviction i it
demands belief, builds upon belief, produces belief; it has
therefore nothing to do with doctrinal opinions, regarding
which conflicts and disputations can be carried on. To im-
pose doctrinal opinions upon a man as a religious duty,
amounts to jesting with the words belief, faith, religion, and
even to annihilating religion itself. An appeal to divine
revelation does not alter this position ; for religion is only a
real thing if it becomes my conviction and binds my heart
and conscience. The Old Testament, Christ Himself, and the
Apostles know nothing of such over-estimation of doctrinal
opinions, and such opinions only arose when Christianity
became a State religion. Such doctrinal opinions have indeed
their value, as evidences of the progressive striving of the
human mind and as explaining the opinions of a teacher,^ but
they can never become Religion.
As regards Christianity, Herder then attempts to separate
the true religion from the mere doctrinal opinions, and this
separation assigns even the most of the Apostles' Creed to the
sphere of dogma. He sums up the result of a detailed
examination in the following terms : — " The Christian creed,
when freed from doctrinal opinions, thus confesses the follow-
ing points as irrefutable and indestructible. 1. The great
Rule of Natural Religion : Follow faithfully and willingly the
laws of creation, preservation, and providence ; they are the
* Von Religion, Lehrmeinimgen und Gebräuchen.
3 This explanation of the genesis of Dogma from explanatory reflectioxi on
what is felt in the heart, is frequently found indicated in Herder, but it is
nowhere expounded in detail.
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HERDEB. 599
laws of an almighty, wise, and beneficent Father. 2. The
highest Bale of men and of the religion of the nations : Work
and overcome with love, even to death. Sacrificing love
brings salvation to the human race, for it is a whole and you
belong to the whole. 3. The inmost Rule of the religion of
experience : Be faithful to thy conscience, the Spirit of God
speaks in it Follow every leading towards what is good, and
never despair of a communion that strengthens thee ; believe
in a rising out of weakness, even out of death ; believe in
a never-interrupted march of progress; believe in an ever-
increasing salvation for the good; believe in consequences
eternally rewarding every one that is good." Everything else,
including all the definitions about the nature of Ood, as to
how He is present in space, whether He is within or external
to the world, what He did before the creation, and how He
created out of nothing, with all the formulae as to how Jesus
was the Son of God, whether He was eternally conceived or
generated, whether He was spoken or bom, along with all the
determinations regarding the Spirit as a divine person and His
mode of working, — all this belongs to the class of doctrinal
opinions that are without value. " Eeligion is a thing of the
conscience, of truth. Who is not ashamed before himself,
when he appears with a quasi-satisfaction before Qod and
feels himself as a hypocrite and a formalist ? " Herder makes
the very same distinction between religion and the symbolical
usages ; indeed, it is in these actions that what is alien, mis-
leading, and oppressive in the doctrinal opinions which have
been devised, first becomes rightly observable. He regards it
as certain without further proof, that religion is not identical
with any mode of worship that is void of thought and of
souL
Herder accordingly holds a very poor opinion of Dogmatics
and of the theological system. With bitter irony he refers
to the most varied attempts that have been made in the
course of time to bring the Christian doctrine into a closed
system, from philosophical points of view. How many empty
images of the human phantasy have thus penetrated into the
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600 THE OPPOSmOK TO THE AUFKLAKUNG,
Christian religion! And how was anything else posaiUe!
Philosophy oversteps its own boundaries when it ondertakes
to establish ä priori a history which is authenticated by
written documents. Dogmatic theology steps into the fore-
ground as soon as religion is intellectually apprehended. It
was therefore in the closest connection with this opposition to
intellectuaUsm, that Herder was the first to assign again to
the Bible its proper position. The Bible ought to form the
starting-point in the learned studies, as well as in the prac-
tical activity, of the theologian. Thus far Herder is a Biblical
theologian.
The Bible is not regarded by him as a code of doctrine
communicated by God to men in a supernatural way, and
hence as infallible throughout At the outset, Herder ex-
plains that he entirely agrees with Lessing in holding that
Bevelation is older than the Scriptures. Although he puts
the origin of the Scriptures into a very early period, he yet
makes the basis of our Gospel — the regula ßdei — precede
the Scriptures of the Old as well as the New Testament
Further, he decidedly repudiates the current assumption of a
supernatural inspiration of the Scriptures. It is a low mode
of the thinking of later times that regards the individual who
was moved by the Spirit as having been an "organ-pipe
through which the wind blew, or a hollow machine frwn
which all proper thoughts were taken away." " It is difficult
to think of anything else in human nature than itself; indeed,
this state is hardly thinkable even as a solitude," for every life
shows itself only by the working that is natural to it. In
the songs, and, above all, in the enterprises and deeds that are
ascribed to sacred inspiration in the Old Testament, we there-
fore also see the powers of the inspired individuals in their
most joyous play. The word " inspiration " is thus referred
quite irenically to the salutary conception that the Deity has
caused men to be bom with pre-eminent gifts and with dis-
tinguished powers as men of God. The assistance which the
Deity vouchsafed to them was no wild ferment, no unnatural
excitement and exaltation, and still less any checking or
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HEKDEB. 601
maiming of their powers. On the contrary, it was an awaken-
ing, a furtherance, a stimulation, or an animation of these
powers, whatever might be their kind. The power of God
worked through their spirit, yet not by exciting disturbance
or uproar in their minds.
It was impossible for Herder to judge otherwise about
inspiration, as he neither knows nor will know anything of an
external revelation, any mora than of an opposition between
the Spirit of God and the spirit of man, or between revelation
and reason, or nature ajid grace. This was quite natural
according to his views; for where on the one side all the
powers and operations of nature are divine, and on the other
side there are no operations of God outside of nature, there is
no room for such a distinction. Moreover, it would conflict
with the providence of God, which does not relate to in-
dividual things, but consists in the constant co-operating
presence of God in our life, and of which we become aware in
conscience and reason.
Revelation and reason are related to each other as mother
and child, and hence it is not possible that they can contra-
dict each other. Eeason is the natural use of the powers of
our souL The formed reason, however, does not fall from the
heavens, but reason needs guidstnce and instruction by positive
communications. God taught us to use it ; for from the
first moment God watched over His darling, giving him oppor-
tunities to test and to form his powers. To these first be-
ginnings of a training by God the relationship of the oldest
traditions undeniably refers.
Afterwards, Kevelation attached itself to the history of a
single people. Here then reason and revelation separate, yet
not as hostile powers, but in the way of abstraction and history.
Abstraction, however, has no laws for history, for no history
of the world stands upon abstract grounds ä priori — More-
over, nature is also a Scripture, a very legible writing of God
to men. But although nature is the work of God, yet there is
much required to understand this work, and to find its author
in it Hence revelation serves for the interpretation and
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602 THE OPPOSITION TO THB AUFKLÄRUNG.
explanation of natura This voice of God came and created
wise men of Grod, holy and pure souls, who received it and
communicated it to others. Thus the book of sacred nature
and of conscience was gradually deciphered, elucidated, and
explained from page to page by the commentary of tradition.
Thus did it happen among all the peoples, but chiefly among
the elect people of Grod.
The position is emphatically affirmed and repeated by
Herder, that Christianity and its preparation in the Old Testa*
ment do not rest upon conceptions and principles ä priori,
nor even upon poetical inventions and mythologies, but upon
history and fact This is not to be understood as if the
miraculous in this history could convince ns of the truth of
religion. Belief is conviction, whereas miracles, being at the
same time long past and only announced to us as such by
others, can effect nothing in the way of conviction. '* The
miraculous ought not to become thy religion." Just as little,
however, may the miraculous in history make that history
appear incredible ; for the probable is not always the sign of
the true. In regard to the resurrection of Jesus, Herder
makes an effort, in roundabout and very obscure expressions,
to maintain the fact, holding that if the resurrection w^re an
illusion or a deception, Christianity would be so too, without,
however, decidedly recognising the miracle. The ascension he
puts upon a level with the taking up of Enoch and Elijah,
but he leaves the how entirely in suspenso.
Herder proceeds to show that Revelation is not an external
communication of doctrines, but immanent inworking upon
the whole spiritual powers of man. This he does in bis
treatise " Of the spirit of Christianity." The powers of nature
are primarily the breath of God, yet not as if God were
the soul of the world, but they are so as His word of power.
And because man unites in himself the noblest powers of
the creation, he appears as animated by the breath of Grod,
Further, as the noblest powers of man, namely, his under-
standing, wisdom, and will, are revealed by discourse, the dis-
course of the prophets and sages was designated the word of
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HERDER. 603
GoA All the pre-eminent powers of the sonl are called gifts
of the Spirit of God, and the Gospels designate by the term
Spirit of God the sum of all powers, including the noblest
gifts and talents. It is therefore diametrically opposite to
the Biblical view to regard the Spirit of God as opposed to all
the natural talents. The Spirit of God is a life that com-
municates itself. The miracle of Pentecost did not consist in
the gift of speaking in foreign tongues, but in the fact that the
disciples with inspired enthusiasm proclaimed that what the
Old Testament promised had now appeared. All so-called
miraculous gifts, are resolved into a divine intensification
of the natural powers and capacities of man. Instead of
assuming supernatural operations of grace, before which we
are merely to stand still, it is more correct to apply the natural
powers in joyous activity. The result will not fail to show
itself; and yet it is the Spirit of God that animates and
heightens all natural gifts.
Keligion, then, is purely human. This is clear from the
facts that the beginnings of religion coincide with the be-
ginnings of the spiritual life of man; that the various
religions correspond as stages of educative revelation to the
degrees of the human development; and that Christianity,
which is the highest religion, coincides throughout with the
highest blossom of the natural human development, or in
a word, with humanity.
Eeligion is the oldest and holiest tradition of the earth.
However different the external manifestations of religion may
be, its traces are found among the most uncivilised peoples.
It was not invented, but tradition is the propagating mother,
not only of their speech and scanty culture, but also of their
religion and sacred usages. The symbol is the means of
tradition ; and in his treatise on the " Oldest Record," Herder
gives us an example of how he believes that he can discover
such a symbol in the oldest religions. The priests were the
original sages of the peoples, but when they lost the sense of
the meaning of the symbol, they became dumb servants of
idolatry and speaking liars of superstition. — The divine rules
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604 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AÜFKLARUNG-
of humanity lie already at the basis of all development of
human nature.
With regard to the first beginnings of religion. Herder
emphatically combats the derivation of it from fear, and
refers it instead to the reverential awe before nature, and to
wondering inquiry after a cause. A sort of religious feeling of
Powers working invisibly in the whole chaos that surrounds
us, must necessarily precede the formation and connection
of abstract rational ideas. This feeling, however, rests
upon the recognition of the one in the many, and upon the
idea of the invisible in the visible through the connection of
cause with effect. — ^The chief gift of mem is the understanding,
and its function of tracing out the connection of cause and
effect Even the most savage peoples sought for a cause.
Where they found no visible originator, they believed in
an invisible one ; and although they kept more to the occur-
rences than to the essence of nature, and more to its terrible
and transitory than to its joy-giving and lasting side, and
although they did not subordinate all causes to a single cause,
yet this attempt was religion. '' Thou didst raise man so that
he, even without knowing and willing it, did search after tiie
causes of things, did guess out their connection, and did thus
find Thyself, Thou great connection of all things. Thou Being
of all beings ! " Herder, in his Spirit of the Hebrew Poetry^
accordingly tries to derive the Old Testament narrative of the
creation from the reverential and wondering contemplation of
the dawn.
At the beginning, the whole of nature was thus filled with
gods, and all individual things were referred to divine in-
fluences. Further questions regarding the origin of things
led to a Cosmogony and Anthropogony, and to a Philosophy
regarding the evil and the good in the world. The first crude
Eeligion was accordingly followed by a sort of historico-physical
philosophy. This philosophy was necessarily mythical, as
the answer to those questions could only be taken from the
doctrines of the older tradition. Every nation thought of the
origin of the world and of the human race in the conceptions
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HEBDEK. 605
of its religion, and at the same time these theological tradi-
■fcions were entirely national " The world, and the human
xttce, and the people, were thus construed according to the
ideas of the time, of the nation, and of the culture of each
particular people ; in the least and in the greatest, their ideas
•were national and locaL The Scandinavian huilt his world
out of giants. The Iroquois made tortoises and otters, the
Indian elephants, and lastly, the negro a cow's horn full of
duDg, into the machines of what he wished to explain to
himself." All nations form documentary records according to
the religion of their country and the tradition of their fathers,
and they compose them according to their own ideas in poetical
language. From this point of view. Herder has opened up
new paths for the understanding of the Old Testament He
likewise made valuable contributions for his time towards
explaining the historical origin of the Gospels.
Eeligion is purely human ; it is the highest humanity.
On the side of the understanding. Religion shows itself in
so far as it seeks the cause for effects, and the invisible one for
the visible many. At the same time, however, Eeligion is an
exercise of the human heart, and the purest direction of its
capacities and powers. " True Eeligion is a childlike service
of God ; it is an imitation of what is highest and most beauti-
ful in human form ; and it is consequently the most inward
contentment and the most active goodness and philanthropy.'*
This is also the reason why there is found in all religions,
more or less, a resemblance of God to men ; for either man is
elevated to God, or the Father of the worlds is brought down
to man. " The purest Humanity can alone be thy religion,
and the religion of man ; and it is given to thee in this
religion as what is highest, — summum humanum, rectum, pium,
— as the highest tendency and destination of thyself and of
human nature."
Herder gives but few indications of his views regarding
the different Eeligions. Eevelation is education, partly in
nature and partly in history; and hence the distinction of
natural and social religion, or of the Eeligion of nature and
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6 06 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLÄRUNG.
the Beligion of society. Of the individual it is said, thi^
" in order to enjoy the Deity in Christ, thou must thyself be
a man of God ; that is, there must be something in thee that
becomes participative of His nature. Thou enjoyest God
always only in accordance with thy inmost self." This
principle, however, is not applied to the historical religiona.
Where Herder mentions these, he seeks to find the identical
and common element in their variety. The leading and
fundamental thoughts for a contemplation of these as stages
in the process of the development of humanity, are stated, bat
they are not carried out in detail
Christianity, as the complete and perfect religion, is true
humanity. Christ is wholly like the Old Testament prophets ;
He was a man animated by the spirit of God. Among aU the
noble forms of the men who have been the organs of God, he
is truly the organ of organs, yet God speaks through him
"only as an organ in so far as He was a mortal man."
Nature left man standing half way ; then Christ appeared and
brought what other sages had already taught as true of
religion, into one human and universal religion that binds
heart and conscience together. Christianity is humanity;
for humanity is nothing but the full vigorous unfolding of all
the noble impulses and powers of human nature. And as
the spirit of God constitutes this better divine part of man
and animates all natural powers, Christianity is likewise
nothing but the simple pure religion of man. The doctrine
of Jesus is simple. It is this : God is your Father, all ye are
brethren to one another. This involves the imitation of God
as an ideal of righteousness and justice, and as universal
goodness and magnanimity. At the same time, it connects
men together as brothers of a noble race, divine in nature and
kind. The question is put as to whether any one can be an
upright man without religion ? Herder answers this question
by saying " genuine religion cannot be without uprightness ;
the inmost uprightness is religion, and in religion it is
manifested." "The pure religion of Christ is the same as
conscientiousness in all human duties, with pure human
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HAMANN. 607
goodness and greatness of soul." " How did Christ name
himself ? He called himself the Son of man, by which he
meant a simple, pure man. When purified from dross, his
religion can be called nothing but the religion of pure human
goodness, or the religion of man."
Herder's historical position and importance have thus been
briefly indicated. His merit, as compared with the tran-
scendent intellectualism, lies in his having been in earnest
with the immanence of the divine activity in religion, and in
his having emphasized the fact that the whole man in all his
powers and impulses is animated and elevated by that
activity. His limitation lay in the fact that, in order to
maintain the unity of human nature, he rejected even the
Qonceptual distinction of the different powers of the soul,
and thus shut himself off from a deeper insight into the
psychological character of religion.
III.
Johann Georg Hamann.
It is extraordinarily difiBcult to form a correct judgment
regarding Hamann (1730-1788).^ At the outset his life
makes an unsatisfactory impression. His youthful training
was guided with more zeal than intelligence by his father, a
burgher of the olden school, a man of a simple, honourable,
pious, and solid nature. At the university, Hamann studied
all possible science from " a sort of magnanimity and sublimity,
and not for bread, but as inclination led him and for amuse-
ment." He failed in an engagement as a tutor from the
difficulty of the circumstances, and not from his own fault
The inclination " to try my freedom in the world " made him
suddenly go to London as a merchant in connection with the
business of his friend Berens. Notwithstanding the obscurity
^ We u«e the works of Hamann in the edition of Horitz Petri (Hannover
1872), but we must confess that the accompanying explanations do not seem to
OS to be always clear.
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608 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AÜFKLAHÜNG.
which rests upon this enterprise, we know that Hamaim
neglected his business and gave himself up to a wild lite.
On the very brink of the abyss he retreated into himself and
was converted. Having returned to Germany, he spent the
leisure of several years in the house of his father, and gave
himself to the strenuous reading and study of an astonishing
multitude of books. He looked with contempt upon ofiBce
or position, till want drove him to accept the post of the
manager of a warehouse. Under oppressive relations "he
shoots forth like a palm tree," and notwithstanding constant
cares and frequent sickness, he found strength and time for
engaging in literary work, and for carrying on a refreshing
interchange of thought, both written and oral, with all the
important men of his time. Yet even on this picture»
pleasant though it be on the whole, there falls a dark shadow.
That Hamann, who knew how to discourse so finely and
profoundly on marriage, lived with his father's nurse — an
honest but uneducated woman — as the mother of his four
children in so-called " conscience-marriage," or in other words,
in open concubinage.
In the course of his life there thus lie certain elements
unmixed beside each other, some of which invite us to the
highest estimation of his personality, while others draw us to
severe condemnation of it. In like manner, the style of
Hamann's writings may easily lead us into confusion. He
writes an extremely obscure style that can at times hardly be
unravelled. He confesses himself that he was no longer able
to understand some of his own earlier writings, because the
allusions to his reading at the time were no longer present to
him. He himself calls his style a " locust style," and desires
to have readers " who can swim," that is, who can catch the
right connection between apparently imrelated thoughts.
Such obscure writings, however, have natxirally a twofold fate,
according to the readers who take them up. Some shrink
from the effort required to trace out the hidden passages of
thought in the author, perhaps consoling themselves with the
foolish declaration that the writer did not well understand
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HAMANN. 609
Limself, and tben laying the matter that has not been under-
stood aside as a book that is without meaning. Others, by
incessant efforts of thought, advance at least so far as to
understand something, and tben conclude to what has not
been understood; and although they do not understand it,
they read what is finest and best at their command into the
author, and extol him to the skies. As Groethe says, " there is
much profundity thought in here." It is only in this way
that the entirely opposite judgments regarding Hamann can
be explained.
In truth, none of these extremes is correct. Hamann is
indeed a prophet of something better, but he is only a prophet.
He is a genius, but he is without clearness ; he shows a dark
fermenting of thought, a mysterious reference to what is higher
and better, but he is without the capacity of definitely
grasping it and bringing it forth in clear expression. He
turns away with repugnance from the Aufklärung, with its
shallow sobriety and empty platitudes, and he points to the
only sources of truth ; but it is impossible for him to present
them to himself or others in a clear, intelligible form.
Hamann completely understands the emptiness and
jejuneness of the mere enlightenment of the understanding.
He recognises the great deficiency of Nicolai in his being
entirely incapable of historical investigation, and of distinguish-
ing the different periods of history. He reproaches the
Enlighteners for that in their superficial intellectuality they
recommend us to believe in nothing but what can be heard,
or laid hold of with the hands. " The soundness of reason is
the cheapest, most arrogant, and most brazen self-glorification,
by which everything is already assumed which was to be
proved, and by which all free investigation of truth is
excluded more violently than by the infallibility of the
Koman Catholic Church." Hamann directed his treatise,
entitled ''A little Essay on great problems," against the
way in which the sound reason was glorified in a French
production entitled Le Bon-Sens. The last fruit of all philo-
sopby is the recognition of human ignorance and weakness.
VOL. I. i^it^a Dy %jiv^OQlC
610 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLÄRUNG,
Our reason is given to us, not in order to bring ns know-
ledge, but to bring us to the conviction of how unreasonable
our reason is, and to show us that our errors do increase by it
as sin increased by the Law ; in short, reason is a ''schoolmaster
unto Christ." — The main error of the Understanding consiBts
in this, that it is the great alchemist that tears asunder what
necessarily and inseparably goes together, or that it insists
on merely considering the individual dead members, whidi
only in their original order constitute a living oi^gasism.
With sovereign contempt, Hamann gives his judgment about
all the philosophers. According to his own confession, indeed,
he stands before Spinoza like the oxen before the mountain,
and he tortured himself with him for years in vain ; and yet
Spinoza's philosophy is regarded by him as a Dead Sea apple,
as a lying system, as an outgrowth of our corrupt nature. In
the same depreciatory way he pronounces judgment on
Lessing and Voltaire ; and even Hume and Kant find only a
partial grace before his judgment-seat
Hamann holds that the enlightenment of the Understanding
has no right to judge particularly about Eeligion. Its much
vaunted toleration is nothing but unlimited indifference
towards the Gospel. Its endeavours to find the chief truths
of Natural Eeligion already contained in the heathen
mysteries, and on the other hand, to explain everything else
in Christianity as pure nothing or mere ambiguity, recall the
passage 2 Mace. i. 20, where it is related that Nehemmh
sent out the descendants of the priests who had concealed the
sacred fire to fetch it again, but they found only thick water.
Hamann satirically calls the religion of the strong intellects
an oven of ice. He blames the exegesis of his time tot
exposing the spirit of prophecy pitifully and shamefully
covered with the rags of the old local prejudices of the old
Jewish orthodoxy, while in a Draconian style it breaks the
rod upon every prejudice of our ecclesiastical orthodoxy that
lies in its way. While Christianity is divested of all its
specific and characteristic marks and doctrines, and is reduced
to mere morality, or to the universal truths of natural religion
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HAMANK, 611
it is emptied of its true and sublime contents, so that no one
can conceive how such a Christianity can have produced the
effects that lie before us in history. '* Ä reason which
confesses herself to be the daughter of the senses and of
nmtter, — ^lo 1 that is our religion ; a philosophy that reveals
to men their calling to go upon all fours, is the nourishment
of our magnanimity. The denial of the Christian name is a
condition without which no one may venture to lay claim to
the title of a philosopher." The illuminative theism, with
its argumentation to this effect : " Something is made, con-
sequently there is a something which is not made, and
consequently this something has made that other something I "
makes God a mere something, and divests Him of all the
attributes that are of value for us. " In general, Beligion
has been more desecrated than built up by the Exchange-
Bank of i-eason ; and the usury which is driven by a trans-
position of words — ^from which no one without a hocus-pocus
can draw any more meaning than he is in a position to put
into them — enriches indeed the dealers in doves, but at the
cost of the spirit which is the Lord.'*
This opposition to the Aufklärung will only become fully
intelligible to us, when we observe what Hamann himself
would make the principle of all philosophy and religion. His
objection to the intellectual Enlightenment is that it separates
what should necessarily go together, that, like a chemical re-
agent of the very highest strength, it resolves into their ideal
vanity all the metal of the profoundest and sublimest matters
in sciences whose unity intuitively and natural^ forms the
maximum of all mysteries. Hence he will verily contemplate
this coherence of things ; he will take as the starting-point
of all thinking the human individual viewed as an original
microcosm, as an immediate imity of all opposites, and as an
actual union of all contradictious. For it is only this unity
of opposites that constitutes life ; it is only the knowledge of
this unity that is true knowing ; it is only the " coinddentia
oppositorum " that is the tenable foundation of all philosophy.
Truth aims at apprehending life; life is the unification of
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612 THE OPPOSmOK TO THE AUFKLABUNG.
contradiction, and hence truth is also conditioned. The
Philosophy of the Understanding, with all its striving after
empty abstractions, cannot apprehend this, and for this very
reason it is not truth. Such a philosophy is either spiritoal-
ism, or materialism. Man, however, includes both of these
philosophies ; he is body and soul, sense and reason, in one.
Language is an incontestable evidence of this unity ; it is at
once sensualized thought and embodied mind. These contra-
dictions are united in the human individual This position
explains the stress laid by Hamann upon genial intuitiveness
as contrasted with the strict rules and prescriptions of the
understanding. "What is it in Homer that makes up for
ignorance of the rules of art which have been thought out
after him by Aristotle ? and what is it in a Shakespeare that
compensates for ignorance or transgression of those critical
laws? The unanimous answer is that it is Genius." This
principle of genius was what made Socrates ignorant without
harm, for he had in him the right knowledge; this genius
elevates a man even above the strict precepts of the cold
doctrines of ethics, for it is a higher law in the heart of man
The human individual as an actual unity of contradictions
and opposites, is defined by Hamann as the principle of philo-
sophy. Jacobi calls him the Pan of all contradictions, and
writes of him as follows : " It is wonderfid in what a high
degree he unites all extremes in himself. Hence from his
youth he has had a dislike at heart to the principium contra-
dictionü, as well as to that of the Sufficient Beason, and he has
always gone after the Coincidenita opposüarum. He enjoys
with equal rapture, the most different and heterogeneous
things — whatever is only beautiful, true, and whole of its
kind, whatever has a life of its own, and whatever betrays
fulness and virtuosity. To him omnia divina, et htimana
omnia" Hamann himself writes to Herder : " Jordani Brunt
principium coincidenticB oppodtorum is in my eyes of more
value than all Kant's Critique." To him Kant was nothing
but a ''great analytical chemist" The most important of
his objections to the Kantian Critique is the following: If
uigitizea oy ^kjkjvj^lvk^
. HAMANN. 613
Understanding and Sense both belong to our natural history,
and have perhaps grown out of one common root, we ought
not so to separate and isolate them. Hamann writes further
to Eeichardt : " Ah, if you knew what a world of ergos lies,
according to my taste, in the phrase homo mm ! "
The same human individuality, as a unity of all opposites,
is also, according to Hamann, the foundation of religion.
And because the emptying of religion by the Aufklärung, rests
upon its one-sided relation to our cognition, Hamann's view
of religion is likewise determined by this opposition. " The
ground of religion lies in our whole existence, and it goes
beyond the sphere of our powers of cognition, which, taken
all together, constitute the most contingent and most abstract
mode of our existence. Hence the mystical and poetical vein
which is found in all religions, and hence their foolishness
and offensive form in the eyes of a heterogeneous, incompetent,
icy, beggarly philosophy, which is not ashamed to attribute to
its psedagogic art the higher destination of our lordship over
the earth." Hamann can therefore designate an old fanciful
idea often heard of by him, as " incredibile sed verum." Lies
and romances must be probable as hypotheses and fables ; but
not so the truths and fundamental doctrines of our faith I
Wherefore he can also say : '* The theory of true religion is
not only conformable to every child of man, and is inwoven
in his soul, or can be restored again in it, but it is as insur-
mountable to the bold giant and stormer of heaven as it is
unfathomable by the deepest digger and miner of thought"
What has already been stated, contains Hamann's principle
of knowledge. Mediate knowledge through the understanding,
is repudiated, because it separates what coheres, and hence it
cannot grasp life as the unity of contradictions. Thus there
remains only immediate knowledge, or the direct apprehension
of what is presented to us in the inmost sphere of our being,
or in feeling. Hamann uses for this cognition the expression
'* belief," and in this relation he regards himself as at one with
Hume. But whereas Hume will apprehend by belief only
the actual reality of external objects, Hamann uses the term
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614 THE OPPOSmOMT TO THE AUFKLAKÜNO.
" belief" without distinction to designate entirely different con-
victions. Our own existence, and the existence of all things
out of us, must be believed, and can be made out in no other
way. What is more certain than man's end, and of what
truth is there a more universal or a more authenticated know-
ledge ? No one, however, is so prudent in believing such a
truth — so Moses gives us to understand — as he who is taught
by God Himself, to consider that he must die. What one
believes, does not therefore necessarily need to be proved,
and a proposition may be ever so irrefutable without on
that account being believed. " Belief is not the work of Uie
reason, and it cannot therefore succumb to any assault of
reason, because belief is as little produced by reason as are
tasting and seeing." ** As belief belongs to the natural con-
ditions of our cognitive powers, and to the fundamental
impulses of our soul, every universal principle rests upon a
good belief, and all abstractions are and must be arbitrary,"
etc Belief is thus an immediate conviction resting upon the
feeling of our Ego, and it relates to the reality of external
things, as well as to the correctness of the general utterances
of the understanding, and to moral as well as religious truths,
all in and with each other unseparated.
Every belief points to a revelation ; for belief is a living
experience, and we experience given facts. Such facts must
be given by some one who reveals himself through them.
Belief thus leads by necessity to divine Eevelation. And
as Belief is related without distinction to very different things,
the same holds true of the revelation of (jod ; and Hamann
does not at all attempt to distinguish the revelation of (Jod in
nature, in history, and immediately in ourselves. "Expe-
rience and Bevelation are one and the same; they are the
indispensable wings or crutches of our reason, if it is not to
continue lame and to crawL" "According to the ideas of
Klopstock, physical waking consists in the state of a man who
is conscious of himself. This, however, is the true sleep of
the soul. Our spirit is only to be regarded as awake when
it is conscious of God, and thinks of Him and feels Him, and
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HAMANN. 615
"«^hen it recognises the omnipresence of God in and around
itself, in the same way as the soul of a waking man expresses
its supremacy over the body, and the body expresses the
impressions of a spiritual will." Our understanding can think
nothing that has not been formerly in the senses; but all
sensible experiences are designated as divine revelation. God,
in fact, reveals ELimself to man in nature and His word. The
two revelations explain and mutually support each other, and
they cannot be in contradiction, whatever may be made of
them by the expositions which are given by our reason.
Hence the knowledge of nature and history, forms the two
pillars upon which true religion rests. On the other hand,
unbelief and superstitious belief are founded upon shallow
physics and shallow history. A Newton will be as strongly
moved put physicist, by the wise omnipotence of God, as a
historian will be by the wise government of God. God
reveals Himself. " The Creator of the world is an author."
God has willed to reveal Himself to men, and He has revealed
Himself by men. Hence in accordance with His wisdom. He
has founded upon the nature of men the means of making
this revelation useful to men, and of diffusing and propagating
it among them. It corresponded to His wisdom to give this
revelation at first to a single man, then to a race, thereafter
to a people, and only in the end to all men. " In our belief
there is united only heavenly knowledge, true happiness, and
sublimest freedom. The sciences of the reason, of spirits, and
of morals, are three daughters of the tme science of nature,
which has no better source than revelation." Hamann sees
no other distinction between Natural and Bevealed Beligion
ihan " between the eye of a man who sees a picture without
understanding the slightest thing of painting and drawing, or of
the history which is represented, and the eye of a painter ; or
between the natural hearing and the musical ear." Hence it
is a mere prejudice when we limit God's working and influ-
ence to the Jewish people. God has merely made clear to
us by their example, the secret, the method, and the laws of
His wisdom and lova At the same time we find in the
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616 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLÄRUNG.
histories, laws, and usages of all peoples, the sensus eomnuatiM
of religion. " Everything lives, and is full of alloaions to onr
calling and to the God of grace." Paul likewise teaches tiial
God has given the heathen as good a witness and testinumy
of Himself, Acts xiv. 17. He gave them good t^iogB» and not
merely rain and fruitful seasons, but the influences of the
spirit which communicates to us good thoughts, motions, and
counsels, and which are ascribed in a pre-eminent manner to
the Jews. Even the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, is
put by Hamann on entirely the same line with the universal
activity of God in the creation and preservation of the natural
world. Thus in his second " Mite to the latest German Litera-
ture," he says : " For the hairs of our head, even to the changing
of their colour, belong to the date of the divine Providaw«.
Why then should not the straight and crooked dashes and
lines of our symbolical and typical, though not hieroglyphical,
manuscript be the counter forms of a Theopneustia (2 Tim.
iii. 16), of an unknown central power in which we live and
move and have our being, of an ethereo-magnetic electricity
which penetrates to the simplest substances of the whde
universe?'' Hamann expresses his judgment regarding the
Canon in the fourth of his " Hierophantic Letters." " As litde
as the translation of the LXX. Interpreters can become
canonical by the passages quoted from it by the Evangelists
and Apostles, just as little do I entrust this power to canonize a
book to the church Fathers and Councils." Christ Himself refers
only to the testimony regarding Him which is contained in the
Scriptures. And so the Spirit He promised, does not need the
testimony of the oldest nor of the latest church Fathers.
God thus gives revelation in Nature, History, and Scripture.
Our function is to decipher and to read it For it is tbe
greatest contradiction and misuse of our Beason, if its object
is to reveal itself. In fact, the merely human reason is not in
a position to grasp and to judge the divine revelation. It is a
foolish presumption to make our limited taste and our own
judgment the test of the divine Word. This presumption
was quite common in the Außdärung, and it led to the rejeo-
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HAMANN. 617
tion of revelation and to the emptying out of all positive
religion. But " the subject here discoursed of is not a revela-
tion such as a Voltaire, a Bolingbroke, or a Shaftesbury would
find worthy of acceptance, and which at the most would give
a satisfaction to their prejudices, their wit, or their moral,
political, and epical caprices ; but we speak of a discovery of
truths whose certainty, credibility, and importance formed a
matter of interest to the whole human race/' From the pre-
sumption referred to, there flowed an entirely false view of the
Bible. Is it not otherwise incredible that men should have
sought in the books of Moses for a history of the world I It is
forgotten that the books were to be received by Jews, and
accordingly that many circumstances must be in close and
special relation to that people. It is ridiculous for any one
to demand that Moses should have explained himself regard-
ing nature in accordance with Aristotelian, Cartesian, or
Newtonian conceptions, or that God should have revealed
Himself in the universal language of philosophy. It is always
difficult to transfer the figures and idioms of one language into
another. How much more difficult is it, then, to make things
intelligible and conceivable by us when they lie far beyond the
sphere of our conceptions I — The revelation of God in Nature,
History, and Scripture, can only be understood by a kindred
mind. With regard to all other writings, it is admitted that
they must be read with and in the spirit of their authors, and
why should not this hold with respect to the Bible ? As our
religious books lay claim to the highest inspiration, they ought
also to be read in the spirit of that adorable God who is hidden
from us. As Julius Caesar can only be properly read by a
mind that has been so taught that it can say of itself, '' I am
a soldier ; " so only he can read the Scripture who can discern
in himself something of the breathing of the divine spirit.
From his conception of belief and of revelation, as constitu-
tive factors belonging to one another and exactly corresponding,
Hamann reaches an understanding of the nature of religion, with
regard to which he stands entirely alone for his time. God is the
cause of all effects, be they great or small ; and hence every-
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618 THE OPPOSITION TO THl AUFKLiBUXG.
thing is divina But, in like manner, everything divine is also
human« ** This Cammunicatio of divine and human idiamuäuM
is a fundamental law, and is the chief key of all oar knowledge
and of the whole visible economy." On the basis of tius
universal union of the divine and the finite, there is realized
in man an entirely special participation in the divine nature
as a coming down of God to man and a raising of man to God.
This fellowship or communion, as a divine incarnation and a
human deification, is the essence of all religion; and it is
realised at the highest in Christianity. Union with the Ddty
is the essential element in all religions, and it is what is
common to heathenism and Christianity. They both represent
it in a symbolical way, under the image of the corporeal union
of the sexes. The theism of the Außclärung, from its not
understanding " the eternal, mystical, magical, and logical circle
of human deification and divine incarnation," cannot therefore
embrace the two. '' The first syllable and ray of the gospel
mystery of the destination of man to awOpovurfi^, or a par-
ticipation of the divine nature, which is not merely figurative
but corporeal," was put by God even into the mouth of Lucifer,
the preacher of lies. But the means by which we come near
to the heavens, is " not a tower of reason," but is the " coming
down of God to the earth." " God will Himself be near to us,
and He comes into our heart, not only to make a paradise
out of it, as out of the waste and empty earth, but even to
erect there the tabernacle of heaven itself." This mystery
of the real communication of God to man, is symbolically
represented in a thousand mythological names, idols, and
attributes. The revealed name of this mystery, is the one
unutterable secret of Judaism. Even the unbelief of philoso-
phical knowledge has still a dim presentiment of it in the
striving to be like God. This striving, however, from its neither
knowing nor wishing to know anything of a coming down of
God to us or an incarnation, leads to " the oldest bosom-sin,
that of self-idolatry." Lucifer uses reason and Scripture to
work against the purpose of Jesus and His disciples, when
man assigns divine attributes to the oily idol Beason, and
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HAMANN. 619
makes himself equal to God. The heathen, even the wisest
of them, are men who go backwards ; that is, they have no
knowledge of God according to the depth of the misery into
which human nature had fallen. For " polytheism had turned
the temple of nature, and the mysteries had turned the temple
of the body, into the sepulchre or murderer's vault " of the
mystery of the union of God with men. Mystagogy is a
necessity ; and it is grounded '' in the nature of man and his
relation to the Una entium.'' '* But because this is also an
ens rcUianis, the revealed name of the thing, Kar' i^o^v,
became the one mystery of Judaism, and the irpokr^^i^ of His
concealed name became the thousand - tongued mystery of
Heathenism." " This unity of the head, as well as this divi-
sion of the body in its members, and its specific difTerence, is
the mystery of the kingdom of heaven, from its genesis up to
its apocalypse ; it is the focus of all the parables and types in
the whole universe ; it is tlie Histoire gdnirale and Ch/ronique
Seandaleuse of all epochs and families." Hence Hamann
determines the relation of Judaism and Christianity far more
correctly than his contemporaries. Judaism is a preliminary
stage of Christianity; for Judaism is prophecy, hope, and
longing for a coming time of salvation in the kingdom of
heaven, whereas Christianity consists in fulfilments and sacri-
fices done and accomplished by God for the best interest of
men, in the highest good bestowed by Him, and in the per-
formance of divine deeds and works, and in institutions for
the salvation of the whole world. Christianity is fulfilment
and completion. What lies at the basis of all religions, and
as a dim presentiment even in heathenism, is fulfilled and
completed in Christianity. The incarnation of God has been
realized ; the Deity has taken flesh and blood to Himself, and
thereby the possibility has been given for realizing the longed-
for union of man with God. "The mustard seed of the
Anthropomorphosis and Apotheosis hidden in the heart and
mouth of all the religions, appears here in Christianity in the
greatness of a tree of knowledge and of life in the midst of
the garden. Every philosophical contradiction and the whole
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620 THE opposrnoir to the Aufklärung.
historical riddle of our existence, with the impenetrable night
of its terminus a quo and its terminus ad quem, have been
resolved by the record of the Word become flesh."
But although Hamann thus endeavoured to attain a deeper
conception of the nature of religion and the peculiar essence
of Christianity, he was far from receiving and holding the
ecclesiastical doctrines just as they were. Not as if he stood
in conscious opposition to them and had partly, or even entirely,
rejected them. As he does not separate in revelation the
natural from the supernatural, or what is revealed in nature
from what is given in history, and as to him the most unim-
portant element in Scripture accordingly appears as eternal
truth, although he can well distinguish them at other times,
Christianity in consequence is to him absolutely the truth.
In the zeal of his opposition, he even designates the most
incredible doctrines as the highest truth. But as the letter of
Scripture and historical faith in it can neither be the key nor
seal of the spirit, in like manner the letter of doctrine, or the
dogma, is to him of little authority. For "the pearl of
Christianity is a hidden life in God, a truth in Christ the
mediator, and a power which consists neither in words and
usages, nor in dogmas and visible works, and which in conse-
quence cannot be estimated according to a dialectical or ethical
standard of sight" On account of this high estimation of
the inner life, Hamann could not lay much value upon what
was external. Accordingly he was able even to say that sound
reason and orthodoxy were at bottom, in reality and even in
etymology, synonymous terms ; and that our salvation depended
as little on the stages of rationality and orthodoxy as genius
does upon industry, or good fortune upon merit. Jacobi
accordingly says of him : " To him, as to the author of the
Epistle to the Hebrews, the true faith to which he appeals is
hypostasis. Everything else, as he audaciously says, is but the
holy excrement of the Grand Lama." Hence Hamann can
even reckon dogmatics among the institutions of the public
education and administration, which as such are subject to
the will of the magistrate But these are neither religion
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JACOBL 621
** nor are they the wisdom which cometh from above, but they
are earthly, human, and devilish, through the influence of
Boman Cardinals or Romanic Ciceroni, of poetical father
confessors or prosaic belly -priests, and from the alternating
system of a statistical equilibrium and preponderance, or of
armed tolei-ance and neutrality." — We seek in vain for a
further development of this thought in Hamann.
IV.
Fbiedrich Heinrich Jacobi.
Jacobi (1743-1819)^ was from childhood "a visionary,
a fantastic dreamer, a mystic." Even when a boy, he took more
delight in the exercises of prayer with a pious maid-servant of
the family than in playing games with his comrades ; and
working on difficult religious problems, he then reached certain
peculiar views of eternity and endless duration from which,
according to his own confession, he never entirely detached
himself again. In his early years he was somewhat alienated
from the sciences, and it was not till afterwards in Geneva that
he made a closer acquaintance with philosophy. Geneva was
at that time one of the most important nurseries of the French
sensationalism and materialism; and it was only from this
side that Jacobi learned at first to know philosophy. Both of
these impressions remained ; and as Jacobi did not . find in
himself any way of reconciling the conflicting wants which he
felt in the desire and longing of his pious soul and the intel-
lectual striving after clear knowledge, he gave in his philosophy
a scientific grounding of this discord. To himself personally,
however, the stirrings of the pious soul were of far more
importance than the cognitions of the understanding; and
hence his philosophy decided this conflict between faith and
knowledge, or between feeling and insight, in favour of faith or of
feeling. For philosophy continued to be the chief employment
1 Friedrich Heinrich Jakobi's fTerifce, 6 Bde. Leipz. 1812-20 ; and Eberhard
Zimgiebl, Fr. H. Jakob%*$ Leben, Dichten und Denken, Wien 1867.
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622 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLÄRUNG.
of Jacobi's life ; and as the duties of his calling left him leismre,
he devoted to it his quiet peaceful life at Pempelfort in the
circle of dear friends, until in 1804 he removed to Manich aa
the President of its Academy. At the same time his philo60{^j
was a representation of his purely personal conception of life,
to a degree that holds of hardly any other system.
Before passing to the exposition of Jacobi's views» we most
direct attention to a change in the terminology employed by
him ; for if it be not observed, his writings may appear to be
quite confused. In his earlier period, extending to about 1800,
attaching himself to the terminology in common use, Jaoobi
called the Understanding the faculty of abstraction, which is
inseparably connected with perception, while Season was repre-
sented as '' the mere faculty of conceptions, judgments, and
inferences, which hovers over the sphere of sense, and which
can reveal absolutely nothing directly from itself." While,
therefore, the Understanding elaborates the impressions of the
senses into representative ideas, the Beason seeks to cognize
the particular in the universal by conceptions, or to deduce the
particular from the universal. Accordingly '' he called what is
not Beason by the name of Reason, and what is truly and
really Beason — the faculty of the assumption of what is true,
good, and beautiful in itself with full confidence in the objec-
tive validity of this assumption — was represented by him,
under the name of the ' power of belief,' as a faculty above
Beason." Then came Elant He vindicated the ideas of
Freedom, Immortality, and God as belonging only to the
Beason, but in such a way that the theoretical Beason is
incapable of reaching the knowledge of them, and it is only
the practical Beason that demands their acceptance. From
that time, or from about 1800, Jacobi calls Beason the faculty
of " rational intuition," by which the knowledge of the super-
sensible is immediately given to us. Beason and the senses
are the two sources of knowledge, and between the two stands
the Understanding, as a mere faculty of abstraction and
reflection.
In order to estimate Jacobi's position correctly, it is neces-
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JACOBL 623
•sary carefully to separate his opposition to the previous
Philosophy of Eeflection from the attempt to found a special
Philosophy of Belief or Feeling of his own. It is in the
former relation that his enduring merit lies, although his
polemical effort — as often happens — shot somewhat beyond its
mark. Jacobi was the first to bring the opposition to the
limited enlightenment of the understanding to scientific expres-
sion» and to formulate it precisely. On the other hand, as
regards the tenability of the positive assertions of Jacobi, it is
possible that opinions will long continue to be divided.
The function of Philosophy, according to Jacobi, is "to
exhibit in the most conscientious way humanity as it is, be it
explicable or inexplicable." This involves two things. In
the first place, philosophy has primarily, and even exclusively,
to deal with man and his being. Nature is of no importance
to Jacobi and his philosophy. He does not go further than
the assertion of the reality of the external world, in opposition
to the purely subjective idealism ; and even this is done mainly
with the view of liberating man from the incessant doubts of the
truth of his ideas. From the reality of external things and
their connection with us, the objectivity of Space and Time
is maintained against Kant. Nature does not further interest
Jacobi ; for " Nature conceals God, because she everywhere
reveals only fate or an nninterrupted chain of mere eflBcient
causes, without beginning and end, and never producing what
* is from God alone, and what presupposes freedom, namely,
virtue and immortality." A second and more important point
also follows from the above definition. It is the function of
philosophy to reveal Existence, that is, to make it known ; it
has to show forth existence, not to demonstrate it. " The
greatest merit of inquiry, is to unveil and to reveal Existence.
Definition is its means — the way to its goal — its proximate,
not its ultimate end. Its ultimate end is that which cannot
be defined, the insoluble, the immediate, the simple."
" Philosophy must begin with measure and number, or gene-
rally with what is determinate ; for it is only the determinate
that can become deteimining for what is indeterminate. Our
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624 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLÄRUNG.
coucjeptions are purely reciprocal conceptions : Unity pre-
supposes totality, totality plurality, and plurality unity. Unity
is therefore the beginning and end of this eternal circle, and
it constitutes individuality, organism, object - subjectivity "
" We live, think, and feel as individual things." This existence
is presented to us primarily in man, in our own self-conscious-
ness. Hence follow two consequences : first, that all tiie
Existence which we accept must be given or involved in
our existence, or in self-consciousness, — on which position
Jacobi gives his special grounding of the reality of God as
well as of external things; and secondly, that everything which
we find posited with or given in our own Existence, or in self-
consciousness, is also regarded and known as existing, — and
hence Jacobi*s decided repudiation of the Philosophy of the
Understanding or of Seflection.
The faculty of Eeflection. or the abstracting Understanding,
is found in man. Upon this faculty, as the ultimate and sole
principle, the Philosophy of the Understanding or of Eeflec-
tion is founded. Since Aristotle, the endeavour has arisen to
subordinate immediate knowledge to mediate knowledge, the
faculty of perception to the faculty of reflection, the archetype
or ideal to the ectype or copy, the essence to the word, the
reason to the understanding. '' It was held that nothing
should thenceforth pass as true but what could be demon-
strated or twice shown : alternately in perception and in con-
ception, in the thing and in its image or the word representing
it ; and in this word only, the thing was regarded as truly
lying and as really known." Almost all the philosophers
down to Kant, then attempted to produce the system of
Metaphysics out of Logic by the aid of mere logical
forms. Even Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff sought to obtain
philosophical knowledge from definitions, inferences, and
demonstrations.
But this Philosophy of Eeflection comes to nothing. It is
the function of philosophical knowledge to make existence
manifest, and in particular and specifically to reveal original
existence. On both of these sides, the Philosophy of Eeflection
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JACOB!. 625
is incapable of solving its problem. It can neither apprehend
nor demonstrate existence as objective reality, and it is incap-
able of grasping what is original, individual, and positive in
existence.
The Philosophy of the understanding can neither appre-
hend nor demonstrate existence, that is, objective reality.
The understanding is the faculty of abstraction and reflection ;
it only elaborates the material which is furnished to it by the
senses. It is beyond all doubt — and no one requires any
proof of it — that we have sensations, that is, that things
appear to us as external to ourselves. The understanding,
however, never gets beyond these sensations, and it is impos-
sible for it to grasp the things themselves, that is, to reach
objectively real existence. Further, what justifies us generally
in asserting such an existence ? What justifies us in assuming
that things are not mere phenomena in ourselves, and are not
at all ideas of something external to us ; or in assuming that
phenomena relate to real external beings that have actual
existence in themselves? Doubts may be brought forward
against this view, such as it is impossible to refute by rational
principles. Nay more, this assumption is founded upon an
unjustifiable interchange of the principium generationis and
the principium campasitionis ; or in other words, of the objec-
tive conceptions of " cause " and " effect " with the subjective
conceptions of "principle" and "consequence." For it is
only because of this that the subjective act of becoming
conscious of the manifold in a representative idea, or the pro-
duction of a conception, is identified with the production of
the things themselves. Kant has proved with irrefutable
clearness that a demonstrative proof of the existence of an
objectively real world outside of our representations, is entirely
impossible; and he shows the same with regard to the
existence of God. It is impossible to prove existence by a
demonstration because of the nature of demonstration itself.
To demonstrate cognitions, is in fact the same as to deduce
them, or to refer them to something which is still more valid
and more true than themselves ; for the ground of any
VOL. I. ?, J,ea Dy ^ v^Oglc
626 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLÄRUNG.
demonstration is necessarily above what is proved. If, th^
real existence» or the objective reality of things, is to be
demonstrated, something would have to be found outside of it
by which it could be tested, as the conception with the thin«»,
or by which it could be covered as one figure does another in
geometry ; and therefore there would be required ** a real thing
external to the real thing in question, which would have to be
more real than this real thing, and which yet at the same Urne
would only be — the real." And if the existence of a living
God were capable of being demonstrated, " then (Jod Himself
must derive Himself from something which we could become
conscious of as His ground, and thus He would be capable of
being evolved out of His principle. For the mere deduction
only of the idea of a living God out of the conditions of the
human faculty of knowledge, does not lead to a demonstration
of His real existence. So little is this the case that, on the
contrary (even its complete success being assumed), such a
deduction necessarily destroys the natural belief in a living
God, for the increase and confirmation of which the philo-
sophical demonstration was sought; for it makes it be se^
with the greatest clearness how the idea in question is an
entirely subjective product of the human mind. It is a pure
mental formation which it necessarily constructs by its own
nature, and which therefore perhaps, — but only perhaps at the
highest, — is a representation of the truth, and consequenüj
no mere figment ; and it is perhaps even still more but a
mere subjective formation, and consequently it may really only
be a figment." The result of such arguments is entirely
negative ; and the ultimate consequence of all the demonstra-
tions of the understanding, comes to be: Denial of the
objective reality of the world, Ideahsm, Nihilism, and the
Denial of the existence of God, or AtheisuL
Further, the Philosophy of Reflection cannot grasp what is
oiiginal, or what is singular in existence. It is incapable of
doing so, because the Understanding advances to identity, and
accordingly dissolves all that is singular or peculiar, and
because it rests upon the principle of Sufißcient Reason, a
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JACOBL 627
principle which leaves nothing that is inconceivable and
original.
The Understanding is the organ and principle of the
Philosophy of Eeflection. The Understanding is the mere
faculty of conceptions and of the process of again becoming
conscious of perceptions in conceptions. The senses do not,
in fact, receive what is original, as it is in its own singular
existence. But the simple, unchangeable nature of the
understanding, is at the same time opposed to the manifold
and changing nature of what is given by the senses. The
understanding seeks to cancel and annul all plurality and
manifoldness ; it is the faculty of connection by which all
things are identified with each other, and by which the mani-
fold is minimized and simplified, or, if possible, obliterated
and annihilated. The senses by themselves are aroused by
external objects, whereas the understanding tends to return
into its own homogeneous nature, or to pure consciousless
consciousness. It is only from the counter-movement of
the simple nature of the understanding, in opposition to the
manifoldness of what is sensible, that conceptions arise. The
understanding does not occupy itself with what is sensible in
order to arrange, to co-ordinate, or even to determine it —
which, indeed, would be to cause it, or to bring it forth origin-
ally ; " the understanding proceeds only towards un-deter-
mimng, im-individualizing, de-essentializing, and de-realizing."
The understanding thus seeks to comprehend the manifold
details of the sensible in ever wider circles of conception,
and, if possible, to ascend even to the widest conception of
all which embraces everything individual under it, but which,
on that very account, is an empty nothing. The activity of
the imderstanding exhausts itself in positing pure unity — an
empty idem est idem — in the formation of identical judgments.
But identity is destruction of what is particular ; it is the
removal of what constitutes diversity. Hence we have singular
conceptions only of figure, number, position, motion, and the
forms of thought. Qualities are therefore entirely inconceiv-
able and unknowable by us. We assert that we know them
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628 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLAKUNG.
when we have reduced them to figure, number, position, and
motion ; but in thus reducing them, we have dissolved the
qualities as such«
The knowledge of the understanding, rests* upon the prin-
ciple of SuflSdent Beason as its ultimate principle. *The
Law of Causality resolves itself into the proposition : Nothing
is unconditioned. There is nothing that is highest, supreme,
and first ; there is no starting or absolute beginning." Hence
the understanding, which operates with the law of causality,
can neither reach the Unconditioned upwards, which is God,
nor that which begins downwards, or the positively given,
the singular, or the original — ^We conceive a thing when we
can deduce it from its proximate^ causes, that is, when we
can see into its immediate conditions in a series. It is thus
that mechanical connection is established ; as the mechanism
of its origin in the case of a circle, and the laws of their validity
in the case of the syllogistic formulae. But in this process the
essence of the things, their qualities, and their inner real
being remain as unknown to us as they were before. On
these points, there does not fall the slightest light from the
principle of Sufficient Reason.
In this rejection of the Philosophy of Reflection, Jacobi
saw an ally in Kant ; but it has to be carefully observed that
he so regarded him only in this negative relation, and he
considered him only as an ally. Kant overcomes the Dog-
matic Philosophy by means of his Critical Philosophy ; Jacobi
protests against the emptiness of the Philosophy of the
Understanding on the basis of his living feeling, which showed
him the supersensible in man as real Kant proceeds to
demonstrate; Jacobi merely exhibits those facts which are
real in the living personality of man, although they are
inexplicable to the Philosophy of Reflection. Jacobi's view
was firmly established before Kant's critical works appeared,^
and was only influenced by them in its expression, but
not in its matter. This is the twofold material and
* Jacobi*« Aüwiü appeared in 1776-76, and his Woldemarm 1777-79 ; Eanfs
Kritik d. r. V. {CrUiqv£ of Out Pvrt Reason) a|>peared in 1781.
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JACOBL 629
chronological reason for putting Jacobi before Kant, and not
after him.
Kant's attention was mainly directed to a critical examina-
tion of our faculty of cognition. This faculty consists of
Sensibility, Understanding, and Beason. The Sensibility
believes that it perceives external objects, yet in truth it
does not reach to the thing-in-itself, but phenomena only
are given to us. The Understanding, according to laws
immanent in it, elaborates the material which is furnished
to it by the sensibility. Accordingly, the Understanding can
never go beyond or transcend what has been given to it by
the sensibility. In like manner, the pretension of Beason,
that it can obtain new cognitions by further elaboration of
the conceptions of the Understanding, and in particular that
it can rise to the knowledge of the unconditioned, or to the
ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality, is entirely ground-
less. Sensible being is nothing but the result of the common
activity of the senses, of the imagination, and of the under-
standing ; it is produced by continuous action, that is, it arises
without subsisting, and its subsistence is an illusion. On this
very account, however, the individual is compelled to imagine
the subsistence of things before they thus arise in himself;
and this constitutes the birth of the idea of the Unconditioned
and the Absolute. But these ideas of God, Freedom, and
Immortality, although we form them inevitably and necessarily,
and even ascribe them to a special faculty of Beason, have no
objective reality at all, and are rather full of contradictions
and unrealizable. By the Practical Beason, and as its pos-
tulates, and therefore on the basis of a rational belief, Kant
afterwards brings in these ideas again.
Jacobi entirely agrees with this dissolution of the Philosophy
of the Understanding, which had thought to attain the highest
knowledge merely by demonstrations. And in this respect
he expresses himself in the strongest manner regarding the
philosopher of Königsberg, recognising him as the greatest
thinker of his time. This, however, does not hinder him from
exercising on other points a sharp, and often also an acute,
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630 THB OPPOSITION TO THE AUTKLiEUKG.
criticism. In the first place, he finds fault with Kant for hav-
ing assumed with regard to sensible things that at least their
existence external to us, is taken as incontestably certain. It
is entirely against the spirit of the Kantian system to say tiiat
objects make impressions upon the senses, that they thereby
excite sensations, and that in this way they produce repre-
sentational ideas. But at the same time it cannot be seen
how without this assumption Kant's Philosophy can find an
entrance to itself, and yet it is flatly impossible with this
assumption to remain in it The transcendental Idealism of
Kant, with its assertion of an unknowable thing -in -itself
as the ground of our sensations, is entirely inconsequent
The formation of conceptions, according to the system, is
also called in question. It proceeds from three qualitative
infinite unities and numerical identities: Space, Time, and
wholly pure Original Consciousness. The third of these is to
be viewed as containing synthesis without antithesis, the
former two as containing antithesis without synthesis. From
their union conceptions are formed. Hence everything rests
upon the intellectual synthesis, which stands wholly alone
per 86, independent of the imagination and perception. It is
therefore " nothing but the copula in itself; it is a mode of
connection that is independent of subject and predicate, and
without anjrthing that has to be connected ; it is an
"«,** "is** "is" vrithout beginning and end, and without
"What," " Who," and « Which." Pure conceptions cannot be
represented in thought by themselves alone, and hence it is
not possible that they can condition empirical conceptions or
make them possible, and it cannot be discovered how they can
grasp the finite or receive it into themselves. — ^Further, Kant's
establishment of the Ideas as practical postulates, is not left
unobjected to by Jacobi. After it has been shown to us
by Kant himself that these Ideas are formed by ourselves,
that they are only formations or products of our freely creating
phantasy, nay, that they are even unthinkable, he cannot
possibly be justified in requiring us to suddenly regard these
Ideas on practical grounds, as objective realities. And this
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JACOBL 631
can the less be so, the weaker the foundation of the whole
practical philosophy is, as soon as one goes with Kant in deny-
ing Freedom. liven according to Kant's own view, practical
philosophy is "an impossible hypothesis, an unthinkable,
chimerical, and merely subjective object" Kant, in demand-
ing that the ideas which had been dissolved as theoretical
cognitions shall be accepted as practical postulates, overlooks
the fact that '' Beason, as certain as it is reasonable, can learn
to think nothing that is unthinkable, and that the greatness
of the need does not remove the impossibility of bestowing
objective existence upon certain Ideas when their subjective-
nes3 has been put beyond all doubt" Kant has therefore dis-
solved all objective certainty in his theoretical philosophy, and
in his practical philosophy he only reaches life again by falling
away from his principle. This appears to Jacobi a new proof
of the fact that we must seek a new faculty of cognition, for
even Kant only reaches the Ideas by a rational belief which
rises above all the knowing of the Understanding. Accordingly
we must either perish in mere subjective illusion, " or knowledge
must be obtained in contrast thereto from a Faculty to which
what is true in and above phenomena, makes itself known in
a manner that is inconceivable to the Senses and the Under-
standing."
Jacobi thus finds an inconsequence in Kant's assumption
of an unknowable but objectively real Thing-in-itself as the
ground of phenomena; and hence Fichte's thoroughgoing
Idealism could not but appear to him to be the only logical
outcome of the Kantian Philosophy. He praises Fichte's
system as the one which was complete above all others, and
as irrefutable on account of its internal consistency. On the
other hand, the " Ideal-Materialism " of Schelling appears to
him to be only a falling back into Spinoza.
Spinozism is regarded by Jacobi as the model system of a
logical Philosophy of Eeflection. It is an undeniable merit of
Jacobi that he again called attention to Spinoza ; and he under-
stood him at least better than most of his contemporaries,
such as Mendelssohn and Herder. According to Jacobi's view.
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632 THE OPPOSmOH lO THS AÜFKLiBÜKa
Spinoza started from the ancient principe a nAib nikU ßt^v^
hence he knows no creative transition Crom the infinite to the
finite, no cau^a secunda, no emanating, but only an inumuent
"Ensoph/' no extramondane, bat only an immanent aiui
externally immutable cause of the world, which is also one
and the same with all its effects. Being, the sum-total of finite
entities, or substance, is Ood; this is the only real ''Ens
reale prseter quod nullum datur esse,'* and hence it is IMug or
Natura. God, according to Spinoza, is the identity of what
is not distinguishable ; He is witiiout understanding and will,
which belong only to finite beings. The will is not free, but
all finite things are completely and perfectly contained iu
God. — The personality of God, the freedom of the will, and
final causes, are the three points with respect to which Jacobi
takes decided objection to the philosophy of Spinoza. But, at
the same time, he asserts that there is no understanding that
is faithful to itself and proceeds with correct sequence, that
can come to any other result. ** With pure metaphysics we
can never gain the advantage over the reasons advanced by
Spinoza against the personality of God, freewill, and final
causes." " There is no other means of safety from the steep
heights of Metaphysics than to turn our back upon all philo-
sophy, and to throw ourselves overhead into the depths of
faith." Hence it suits Jacobi to see in the various systems
of philosophical reflection chiefly their aflinity with Spinozism.
Even the Leibniz-WolfBan philosophy, with the Enlighten-
ment that was founded upon it, was to him at bottom
Spinozism, and it was only on this account that he could
deceive himself with regard to the Spinozism of Lessing.
Spinozism is the same as Atheism. This identification of
these systems was early maintained by JacobL It was the
interest he had in examining the ontological argument for the
existence of God that led him to the study of Spinoza, and he
soon recognised that Spinoza did not hold God to be extra-
mundane, but only regarded Him as the sum-total of all
things, or as the universe. Hence, according to Jacobi,
Spinozism is Atheism or Cosmotheism ; for a God who is not
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JACOBi. 633
personally outside of the world is as good as no God. The
existence of God cannot be reached from this point of view ;
for the conception of the cause can only coincide with that of
nature herself, and the understanding can only apprehend the
unconditioned as the indeterminate or as the iv koI irav. All
Philosophy of the Understanding is thus atheism. At the
same time, it is fatalism ; for every logical pldlosopher of the
Understanding, who everywhere applies the principle of the
Sufficient Beason, must, like Spinoza, deny freedom. " Every
way of demonstration leads on to fatalism."
Spinozism is therefore the completest system of the Philosophy
of the Understanding. But Fichteism is also designated as
such, although it is Idealism, while Spinozism is Materialism.
How, then, is this possible ? It is very simple ; for the one
is but the converse of the other. The Philosophy of the
Understanding puts all its notions in the intellectual Ego.
The choice, then, is presented of either regarding the Ego as
what exists and the notions as merely subjective productions
of it, or of ascribing being to things and considering them as
the principle of thinking. The former view giyes idealism, the
latter gives materialism. Each is incontrovertible within its
own sphere; they both, however, belong to the reflective
Philosophy of the Understanding.
This Philosophy of the Understanding, or of Eeflection, is
not in a position to explain or define real existence. How,
then, is such a philosophy possible ? A twofold illusion
deceives the demonstrators. In the first place, they are
misled by the belief that by continued abstraction of the
understanding we can really reach the conception of the
Unconditioned. In the process of abstraction the particular
is let go and the universal is kept, and it necessarily appears
to be more unlimited ; and thus the conceit is formed that the
conception of the Unconditioned must result by abstracting
from all limits. In truth, however, we only thus obtain a whole
that is void of material, and is therefore without limit ; it is
completely indeterminate ; it is pure negation or pure nothing.
This Unconditioned is then apprehended as the ground of
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things, and from the All, which is without any distinguishing
quality, the real world with an infinite manifoldness of deter-
minate qualities, is made to proceed. — ^This first iUusion is
forthwith supported by a second. In sensible perception we
always see what is complete and perfect preceded by some-
thing that is incomplete and imperfect ; we see formlessness
precede form, heedlessness precede reflection, desire precede
law, and crude want of morals precede moral practice. Being
deceived by this, it appears to us as possible that a determinate
being may arise out of that nothing of the understanding.
The Philosophy of the Understanding does not satisfy the
mind, for it cannot explain personal existence. But, as we
have seen, it is the function of Philosophy to unveil existence,
and in the last resort it has not to do with logical truths, but
with historical truths. " Truth is clearness, and it is related
everywhere to reality, to facts." The most immediate reaUty
is our personal existence ; and the person is at the same tune
the subject of knowledge. Hence no knowledge is of value
which is prejudicial to the personal Ego; for "it is a thought
of high and pregnant meaning that development of life is
alone development of truth, and that truth and life are both
one and the same." " The Originator of the world must have
given to every being as much truth as He assigned to it of life."
It is the business of philosophy to exhibit the individual life.
But individual life rests upon two factors: upon conscious-
ness or tlie ideal, and upon the real or actual object of the
Ego ; by the former we exist for ourselves, by the latter we
exist in ourselves. Each of these factors may be made the
starting-point of philosophy. If we start from the ideal, (mt
from intelligence, we come to Spinozism. If we start from
the real, or from life as it specially expresses itself in &ee
action, we come to PlatonisuL The decision as to which of
these two philosophies is chosen, is not made by the understand-
ing on the ground of principles, but is only determined by the
peculiar character of the philosophizing individual, according
as the energy of life or the power of the understanding con-
trols him. In other words, it depends on the man's whole
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JACOBI. 635
soul ; for philosophy does not strive after truth in general,
but after a definite truth that will satisfy the head and the
heart Truth is loved and sought, not as something alien and
disproportionate to man, or as destroying him and his spiritual
existence, hut it is sought and loved for the sake of what it
contains, because of this being something that is decided, most
specific in itself, and tending to elevate the spiritual existence
of man. Man can neither seek nor love a truth that slays
him, that even annihilates him.
Hence Jacobi is clearly conscious that the principles of the
understanding, or demonstrations, are not capable of showing
the truth of one system in preference to another. For him-
self, however, he can only choose Platonism in accordance
with his own peculiar personality. He cannot let go his hold
on independence, self-subsistence, and freedom ; he cannot be
consoled with a God who would only be a blindly working
Nature ; he cannot let go the conviction that a breath of this
free Euler of the world dwells in us with the free personality,
and that having this breath in us we are more than mere
nature. And hence Jacobi cannot be the friend of a science
for which personality, freedom, and the revelations in the soul
of a supramundane God have no importance, a science whose
goal is that there is no God, and which even declares virtue
to be incompatible with itself, or even denies it altogether.
"With this conviction, he would of necessity have to give up
everything that lends substance and value to his life; he
would have to surrender the '* I am," " I act, produce, bring
forth ; " he would have, in a word, to give up free personality
and his own reality. Therefore he turns his back upon this
philosophy in spite of the systematic, firmly closed, and
rounded form in which it appears in Spinozism. And as
Spinozism bears itself as if it alone possessed the right know-
ing, and complete and all-comprehending knowledge, Jacobi
often designates this turning away from it as a turning away
from science generally. Accordingly, it is the proud boast of
Jacobi that he does not shrink from the Scdto mortale, but
calmly flings himself headlong out of the sphere of science
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636 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AÜFKLABÜNG.
into that of faith, and that he always finds the courage to
oppose his Nescience, or Not-science, to the false science oi the
time.
But what is to be said for this Not-science in opposition to
Science, for this Platonism in opposition to Spinozism, for this
Philosophy of Feeling in opposition to the Philosophy of
Understanding or Beflection ? This question still remains
for us to answer.
The Understanding is not capable of grasping reality, either
on the side of its existence or on the side of its originality and
specific nature. If we are not to be entirely cut away from
reality, there must therefore be another faculty of our mind
which makes it known to us. This is the faculty of Percep-
tion, for to perceive is to take something as true, or to hold it
as reaL This perceptive faculty is twofold, according as it is
sensible or rationaL The sensible faculty of perception has
for its object sensible things ; it is, in a word, the senses. The
rational faculty of perception has for its object the supersen-
sible, and — according to Jacobi's later terminology — it is
Beason. Both of these faculties are in us, and do not go out
of us ; but both the sensible and the supersensible are given
to us in ourselves or in our self-consciousness.
According to Jacobi, the definitions laid down regarding the
mutual relations of Sense, Understanding, and Beason are of
little interest to us. Sense and Understanding are nev^
without each other. The former furnishes the material, in
impressions received from without and in sensations; the
latter supplies the form, in the innate conceptions of the
Understanding ; while from the co-operation of the two, the
particular or empirical conceptions of the Understanding arise.
"There is necessarily understanding along with sense; a
sense which were only sense, is not a thing at all, just as a
knowledge that were mediate through and through, is likewise
a nonentity." The two are as necessarily together, as the soul
and the sense together constitute a unum per ae or an indi-
vidual. The Understanding as the universal is the same ifi
all men, and hence our individual characteristics by nature
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JACOBL ' 637
rest merely upon the peculiarity of our faculty of sense ; or
in other words, the individual peculiarities of our thinking
depend upon sensible perception. — ^The characteristic superi-
ority of man over the lower animals is constituted by self-
consciousness, or by what he expresses as the Ego. We
attain the expression of the "I" and "Me" through the
faculty of perceiving ourselves ; that is, through a sense by
"which we perceive not merely the qualities of things, but also
our own qualities in relation to the senses. This faculty of
self-perception is Eeason, and " it is solely and alone by the
proprium of Eeason that man is elevated above mere animal
being." " If we look away from this property, which essen-
tially distinguishes the human species from the animal species,
and which absolutely and exclusively belongs to the former,
and if we assign to the human species only the reflective con-
templation of one and the same sensible matter as is presented
likewise to the more perfect animals through their senses, then
man is really distinguished from the brute only in stage or
degree, and not in nature or kind. Under that supposition the
superiority of the human understanding over that of the lower
animals, is but the superiority of an eye provided with a
microscope or a telescope over another eye that is not fur-
nished with this aid." One of the chief merits of Jacobi lies
in his having thus emphatically referred to this fact that had
been overlooked by the previous philosophy, and had therefore
not been explained by it, and in his having pointed out that
man is not to be regarded as a higher species of animal ; nor as'
a modus, that is, a member in the mechanical connection of
nature, as Spinoza holds ; nor as a monad, that is, a member in
the graduated order of nature, as Leibniz holds ; but that an
absolutely differentiating characteristic belongs to him. This
is Eeason ; and Eeason is primarily the consciousness of the
mind, or the self-consciousness by which the Understanding,
which is inseparably connected with it, is illuminated and
becomes conscious of itself. But it is, at the same time, the
faculty of the supersensible and a source of the new sublime
cognitions : God, Freedom, and Immortality.
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638 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLABÜNG.
Man thus possesses a special faculty of perception by wbidi
be becomes aware of things, or takes them to be real But
the question then arises, What convinces him that these Udngs
are real, and that this perceiving is not an illusion, but is a
real process ? This conviction, according to Jacobi, is entirdy
immediate ; our certainty that our perceptions are not empty
images of our imagination, but that objective reality cor-
responds to them, is founded upon beliel In fact, eveiy
immediate certainty is " belief"
Jacobi writes on this point to Mendelssohn as follows:
" We are all bom in belief and we must remain in belief, as
we are all bom in society and must remain in society. We
may strive after certainty, if certainty is not already known
to us beforehand ; and how can it be known to us otherwise
than by something which we already know with certainty ?
This leads to the conception of an immediate certainty
which not only requires no demonstrations, but absolutely
excludes all demonstrations ; it is itself solely and alone the
idea that corresponds to the thing it represents, and it therefore
has its ground in itself. The conviction that is produced by
demonstrations, is a certainty at second hand ; it rests upon
comparison, and can never be certain and perfect Now, if
every case of holding a thing to be trae which does not arise
from rational grounds, is to be called Belief, the conviction
that springs from rational grounds must itself come from
Belief and receive its power from Belief alone, that is, it must
arise from the mere authority of Beason for which it gives
jthe principle." All our objective knowledge, that is, all our
certcdnty of the reality of what is immediately given to us
merely as sensation, and which is therefore only in our own
consciousness as a determination of it, rests upon Belief. In
other words, it rests upon a unique and peculiar feeling of our
soul, which marks one sensation as corresponding to objective
reality, in distinction from another as an empty product of
our imagination. " All reality, including both the corporeal
reality which manifests itself to the senses and the spiritual
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JACOBL 639
man by feeling ; there is no confirmation or verification of it
out of or beyond this." This Feeling cannot be voluntarily
called forth by us, but is inseparably connected with percep-
tion. Upon this immediate feeling Belief rests, and this belief
is " the element of all human cognition and activity." "Belief
is a primary light of reason. Eradicate original Belief, and
all science becomes hollow and empty. It may indeed sough
like the wind, but it cannot speak or answer. This Belief is
a faith or firm confidence in what is not seen." With full
Tight, Jacobi refers for the support of this view to Hume, who
founds upon Belief even our conviction that there are objects
external to our perceptions, and that a real relation of cause
and efiect corresponds to our inferences of causality.
This Belief is directed, first to our own Ego and its states ;
secondly, to external sensible things; and thirdly, to the
supersensible.
The substantial Ego is a fact of consciousness and not a
product of the understanding. The "is" of the reflecting
understanding is always only a relative " is," and expresses no
more than the mere identity of one thing with another in
conception, and not the substantial " is " of Being. This real
being — or Being os such — makes itself known only in feeling.
In feeling, man is immediately conscious of his real being or
his empirical particularity. " He finds himself as this Being,
by a feeling of essentiality that is immediate and independent
of the remembrance of past states ; he knows he is this one
and the same individual, who neither is nor can be another,
because immediate certainty of mind is insepamble from the
mind, from selfhood, from substantiality." This founding of
the self-consciousness upon belief, does not relate merely to
our mental being ; the existence of our own body can like-
wise only be believed. This assertion Jacobi finds warranted
by the authority of Descartes and some of the later philo-
sophers. The reality of our own I^o thus rests upon belief
or immediate feeling. The validity of this principle is so
certain that it is applied not only to our own existence, but
also to our states of existence, or to the qualitative peculi-
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640 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AÜFKLABÜNG.
arities of our nature. I am in the state in which I perceive
or feel myself.
In self-consciousness, or in the immediate feeling of our-
selves, the feeling of Freedom prominently asserts itself
** Freedom does not consist in an absurd faculty or power <rf
deciding oneself without reasons, nor even in the choice of
what is better among useful things, or of rational desire."
Jacobi expressly declares himself to this effect, and yet in his
polemic against the determinism of Spinoza and Leibniz it is
this conception of freedom that is presupposed. ** This freedom
essentially consists in the Will's independence of desire." We
are conscious of our action and of its intention. We feel that
our actions do not happen by necessity, or only as the result
of co-operating natural powers, but that they are done with
freedom. We call ourselves free in so far as a part of our
being does not belong to nature, and has not sprung from it,
nor has been received from it ; but distinguishing ourselves
from nature, we raise ourselves above it, use it and master it,
tear ourselves away from it, subdue its mechanism by our
free power, and make it serviceable to us. Production in
nature is blind, reasonless, necessary, and mechanical; the
mind alone invents and produces with intention. Hence the
belief in human freedom is also closely connected with the
truth of the human personality ; nay more, the consciousness
of personality stands and falls with that of freedom. Desire
is grounded in nature; for desire and aversion are merely
natural, mechanical expressions of the reaction of our living
nature upon the impressions from without The freewill, as
pure self-activity born of the spirit or mind, is therefore will
as independent of desire. — Freedom is certainly denied by the
Philosophy of the Understanding. This philosophy asserts
that human action rests entirely upon mechanical necessity,
and that the feeling of freedom rests merely upon illusion, an
illusion which has been called forth by the fact that our
acting is always accompanied by thinking. This thinking is
in truth only an accompaniment, and not, as we are so inclined
to persuade ourselves, the original ground of the action. Thia
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JACOBI. 641
asaertion cannot be refuted by the principles of the under-
standing, but an irrefutable immediate feeling testifies against
it. Who, indeed, would really like to suppose that Homer,
Sophocles, Pindar, and bards like Ossian and Klopstock, that
Aristotle, Leibniz, Plato, Kant and Fichte — in short, all poets
and philosophers of whatever name, and all legislators, artists,
and heroes — had brought forth their works blindly and com-
pulsorily ; that in the last resort they produced these works
in consequence of the natural mechanism and in the series of
the necessary connections of cause and effect, while their
intelligence had only acted throughout the part of an on-
looker as an accompanying consciousness. Whoever asserts
this, is beyond the reach of controversy. But our innermost
feeling revolts against it; an insuppressible feeling tells us
that our actions are free and original. There is no more
solid conviction than that I do what I think, instead of that
I think what I do ; and in spite of all science we must and
will persist in this belief. This feeling of freedom is the
ground and fountain of the whole of the philosophy of
Jacobi, as he himself says. "This must continue to be the
root of philosophy. Human knowledge starts from revela-
tion ; reason, in fact, reveals freedom in revealing providence ;
and all the branches of science shoot up from this root."
With this belief in freedom, several things ai« at once
given to us. We feel ourselves free, that is, we feel our-
selves in the spirit to be independent of the mechanism of
nature; we therefore feel ourselves belonging to nature as
well as to mind. ''The union of natural necessity and
freedom in one and the same being, is an absolutely incon-
ceivable fact ; it is a miracle and mystery like creation itself."
Nevertheless this union is a fact; it really exists whether
it be conceivable or not. Man just constitutes this incon-
ceivable but undeniable dualism. In connection with nature
he is a nature - being, and is subject to the conditions of
nature ; in connection with God he is a God-being, and is
elevated above nature. He is neither of these two alone, but
both natures are united in him into an original and indisr
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642 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AÜPKLAEUNO.
solable synthesis. Man as tliis real unity of the divine and
the natural, is a citizen of two worlds, a world of comj^ete
independence and a world of equal dependence. Hence man
points by his proper being to something else, and in par-
ticular he has a twofold relation to what is without him, to a
nature that is below him and a God who is above him.
" The mind of man is certain in itself, but it m eds to add to
its consonant the vowel of nature and God, in order to express
his existence ; " or in other words, the belief in our freedom
necessarily carries with it a belief in nature and in God, as
realities existing out of us.
Hume had already grounded our conviction of the real
existence of external things upon an immediate feeling, or upon
Belief. Jacobi refers to him, but gives the thought a deep«
foundation. He says: **It is by belief we know that we
have a body, and that other bodies and other thinking beings
are external to us." " All that we feel is only our body in
such or such a state ; and in feeling it affected in one way or
other, we become aware, not only of its changes, but of some-
thing else which is quite different from these, and which is
neither merely sensation nor thought, but other real things,
and this with the same certainty as that by which we per-
ceive or become aware of ourselves ; for without ' Thou ' tie
' I ' is impossible." In other words, in the process of sensa-
tion we have not a sense of ourselves in general only, but we
always feel ourselves along with certain particular qualifica-
tions, or as determined in one way or other. This leads us
to the immediate conviction that along with the changes of
the Ego there is also given a real ground of these changes
external to us. Hence the principle " without * Thou ' there
is no ' I ; ' " and hence, too, the assertion that " we become
aware of other real things in perception with the same cer-
tainty as that with which we become aware of ourselves."
It is with the very same belief that we also apprehend the
reality of God. It has already been shown that, according to
Jacobi, the existence of God cannot be demonstrated ; for to
demonstrate means to derive something from its conditions,
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JACOBL 643
but God is the unconditioned. The CSosmological Argument
is also rejected. " The inference from the unfathomablenes«
of Nature to a cause outside of it which produces it and must
have given it beginning, was, is, and remains a defective
inference that cannot be justified philosophically." Never-
theless Jacobi advances a consideration that is entirely similar
to it when he argues that every system, even the least,
requires a spirit or mind to unite and move it, or a Lord and
King of life; and hence the system of all systems, the
universe of beings, must be moved and held together by a
Spirit. " This spirit is Creator, and His creation is that He
has constituted souls, founded finite life, and prepared
immortality." The conviction of the existence of God is
founded upon immediate certainty, or upon Belief. "Man
finds God because he can only find himself along with God."
" We know of God and His will because we are bom of God,
are created according to His image, and are of His kind and
race. God lives in us, and our life is hidden in God."
" Created after the image of God, God in us and above us—
archetype and ectype — separated and yet in inseparable
tmion, — this is the knowledge which we have of Him, and it is
the only possible record; thus does God reveal Himself to man,
livingly, progressively, and for all times." And hence it is also
said that " the belief in God is not a science but a virtue."
The knowledge of God is thus a form of immediate know-
ledge grounded upon belief, and from this it follows what sort
of knowledge it is. As in the case of external things, we are
well convinced by belief that they are and that they produce
sensations in us, but do not comprehend the how of this
production, so it is with regard to God. We have no clear
conception of God that exactly corresponds to Him; the
understanding comprehends only the conditioned, and hence
" a God who could be known would be no God at alL" Nay
more, God is not merely inconceivable, but a conception of
Him is impossible ; for the understanding strives to merge all
that is particular and immediate in the xmdetennined identity
that is formed by it.
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644 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLABUNG.
There is only one determination of the conception of God
vrhich Jacobi dwells upon with emphasis again and again:
it is that of personality. God alone is the One who is one
only ; He is the AU-one ; He is not an individual bdng
conditioned by a preceding and concomitant existence, but He
is the alone perfect Being, the only truly real Being. It is
false, however, to assert that because God is not an individual
of or under a species, that He is without personality ; or in
other words, that He is without self-consciousness and without
reason, or even that He is as one who is not, that is, vrithout
life. " For a being without selfness, is utterly and universally
impossible. But a selfness without consciousness, and again
a consciousness without self - consciousness, vrithout sub-
stantiality and at least the capacity of personality, is as
completely impossible. The one as well as the other is but
the sound of a word without a thought Hence God, if He
is not a spirit, is not ; He would thus be the non-existent in
the highest sense ; and He has not a spirit if He is without
the fundamental property of the spirit, which is self-conscious-
ness, substantiality, and personality." A God who is not
thought of according to the manner of men, is to Jacobi no
God; and the denial of anthropomorphism amounts to
atheism or fetichism. And notwithstanding the half-pan-
theistic sound of his expression, that " we are, we live, and it
is impossible that there can be a mode of life and existence
which would not be a mode of the life and existence of the
highest Life itself," Jacobi continually insists upon thinking
of God as a supra-natural, extra-mundane, and supra-mundane
Being. — It is primarily the personal need that drives him to
this view. The wants of his soul are not satisfied by a God
who permeates the universe in the manner of an all-animating
soul, or who, divested of all resemblance to man, cannot enter
into any living relation to us. Such a God appears to him as
the mere fiction of our mind ; and with the reality of God
the reality of the world, and, in short, all certainty, is likewise
given up. He needs a Grod with whom he can enter into
personal relationship as with a human friend, and exchange
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JACOBL 645
thoughts and feelings ; and the demands of feeling are to him
in themselves unassailable principles of knowledge. — ^Never-
theless he does not neglect to give a scientific grounding to
the Personality of God in the connection of his system. The
understanding cannot grasp the unconditioned, but in our
consciousness of freedom we have an immediate feeling of the
unconditioned. God is the unconditioned for all that is
conditioned; and hence God must also have freedom and
foresight, partly because we only thus think the uncon-
ditioned, and partly because we are only able thereby to
explain freedom and foresight in ourselves. We have freedom
only as mind, as reason, but we have reason only in and with
our personality. God is thus not for us, as for the philosophy
of the understanding, merely that which is unconditioned, but
as the unconditioned One, He is spirit, reason, person. ** If
reason can only be in a person, and the world is to be
assigned to a rational Author, All-mover, and Euler, this
Being must be a personal Being. Suc}i a Being may bQ
apprehended under the form of human rationality 6tnd person-
ality, and the properties which I recognise as the highest in
man must be assigned to this Being, and these are love,,
self - consciousness, understanding, and freewilL" As a
person, God has all the characteristics that belong to person-
ality ; He creates according to ideas, acts with intelligence,
and has created finite things with wisdom and freedom. As
the natural can therefore proceed from the supernatural only
in a supernatural way, Jacobi does not at all attempt to
establish any determinations regarding God's mode of working.
As an artist stands in relation to his work, so does the
personal God stand in a relation of freedom to the world, and
He does miracles according to His will.
Belief in the reality of external things, as well as of the
personal God, thus rests upon the immediate consciousness of
our freedom. The feeling of Immortality and of Morality, is
also closely connected with the same consciousness. " Immor-
tality does not rest upon an idle postulate ; we feel it in our
free acting and working." With reference to Morals, Jacobi
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646 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLAEUNG.
takes an attitude of decided opposition to Kant The good is
not a law which stands cold and unattained out of and above
man ; the good rests upon an internal irresistible impulse of
nature. Morality is immediately involved in freedom; it
consists in exhibiting externally what is inmost in our own
being, and the individual has specially to exhibit his own
personal characteristics in his actions. Hence in his AUwtll,
emphasis is laid upon the fact that all the virtues were
manifested in him '' so entirely from the naked qusdity of his
nature." Hence the virtues are not referred to commands
and laws, but to '' a special sense that is peculiar to man and
a special impulse that is peculiar to him." Hence the high
estimation laid by Jacobi upon the element of " moral genius."
" By genius, nature gives the rule to art, both to the art of
the good and to the art of the beautiful" Such pre-eminently
endowed natures have even the privilege to put the immediate
testimony of the conscience in the place of the universally
valid rules of action«
The Beautiful is likewise associated with the good ; it is of
the same immediate nature. " The Beautiful has this in
common with all that is immediate, that it is known without
any distinguishing mark." "A man of taste is one who
immediately feels the Beautiful, and who draws the feeling of
the Beautiful from the Beautiful" An immediate impulse
leads us with the power of irresistible evidence to the recogni-
tion of the BeautifuL Beauty rests merely in form, and the
form is non-essential to the substance, and is produced by
free action. Accordingly the Beautiful necessarily presupposes
freedom.
We have thus seen that there is a threefold impulse in
man directed to the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, and
that it is combined with immediate certainty or belief. It
is a threefold impulse, and not three distinct impulses ; it is
the one fundamental impulse of human nature. ''Such an
immediate positive truth, discovers itself to us in and with
the feeling of an impulse that rises above every sensible,
changeable, contingent interest, and which announces itself
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JACOBL 647
irresistibly as the fundamental impulse of human nature.**
"What this impulse strives after may be said to be generally
divine things, and its first efifects are virtuous sentiments.
Hence it is sometimes called the Moral Feeling, and sometimes
the Feeling of TrutL " What is true, good, and beautiful in
itself is revealed in it unfathomably and unutterably, wi^ihout
intuition and without conception." " Truth, Beauty, and
Vii-tuel With these we enter into the Kingdom of the
Divine and of the imperishable ; without them we enter into
the. kingdom of what is low, vanishing, common."
It is therefore belief or immediate certainty by which we
are convinced of the reality of our perceptions, and by which
"we lay hold of reality. But we cannot stop at this belief oa
if it were ultimate. Belief necessarily presupposes a revelation
or manifestation. Beflection can only make something mani-
fest to us; all cognitions arise from immediate perception.
The understanding is dependent on what our faculty of per-
ception brings to it from the senses and the reason ; for both
of these are subservient to the communication of what is
xevealed as real.
As is the case with belief, so does revelation, as manifesta-
tion, relate primarily to the Existence of external things. " We
have nothing upon which our judgment can take its stand but
the thing itself, nothing but the fact that things are really
before us. Can we express ourselves regarding this relation
by a more appropriate word than the word ' revelation * ?
We have no proof at all for the existence in itself of a thing
external to us, and yet we are convinced of it. On what is
this conviction based ? It is in fact founded on nothing but
upon a revelation which we cannot but call truly mirabile"
Above all, however, revelation refers to the supersensible.
God reveals Himself to us in recuson or in the fundamental
impulse of the good, the true, and the beautiful, as the really
existent being. In our rational feelings we have God im-
mediately with us; we are immediately one with Him and
live a life in and with God ; nay more, this highest culmina-
tion of our life, is the being and life of God in us. Jacobi
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648 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLABUKa
discourses in enthusiastic language of this divine life as the
revelation of the Highest in us. The fundamental impolse
in man, is the living and loving of God in man ; without tiiis
we should be without any moral capacity, for it is only in ao
far as God wills and works in us that we really possess a
moral freedom. In other words, it is only thus that we are
capable of subordinating our sensuous desires, inclinations,
and passions to the demands of the good. For the virtuous
capacity by which alone we determine ourselves, is not
self -acquired but innate. "With irresistible power, what is
highest in me points to a Highest of all above and oat of
me ; it compels me to believe the inconceivable, yea, what is
impossible as conception, in myself and out of myself, from
love and through love." Thus the good, true, and beautiful
in myself points by necessity to an inexhaustible fountain
and primal principle of the Good, True, and Beautiful,
which produces the same in me, and in which I participate by
these feelings and through them. Hence the more the Good,
True, and Beautiful, or in a word the Divine, unfolds itself in
us, so much the more does our knowledge of God and our
communion with Him increase and ascend. Eor the one
corresponds exactly to the other. " Where strong personality
appears, the tendency towards the supernatural and the
conviction of God is brought most decidedly to expression
in and by it. Socrates, Christ, F^näon prove to me by
their personality the God whom I worship.-* " We will
not philosophize up to this point, with and from our natural
body ; but if there is a certain knowledge of God possible to
man, there must lie a faculty in his soul which can organize
him up to it." This revelation is essentially immanent ia
man because of his participating in the di\4ne nature, and it
is thus the ground of all belief and of all knowledge. But
as the internal revelation is thus put so high, the external
revelation is put proportionally low. " If God were not
present to us in this internal way, or immediately present
by His image in our innermost self, what is there out of Him
that could make Him known to us ? Could it be done by
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JACOBL 649
imaged, tones, signs, which only enable us to recognise what
is already understood ? What is the Spirit to the Spirit ? "
" A revelation by external appearances or phenomena — let
them be called what they may — can at the highest be related
to the internal original revelation as speech is related to
reason." ** As little as there can be a false God external to
the human soul, just as little can the true God appear
external to it." " For us to have a God who became man
in us and to know another Gt)d is not possible, not even
by receiving better instruction ; for how could we even
understand this instruction." " God must be bom in man
himself if man is to have a living God." Those who demand
an external positive revelation are reckoned by Jacobi as
belonging to " the class of those who are wholly outward."
They assert that they have nothing that has not come into
them from without ; they trust the senses only, and not
the reason and the conscience; it is not the internal, but
the external word that ought to decide regarding what is
true and good. Men — ^they hold — Would know nothing of
God if He had not taught them by extraordinary ambassadors*
These representatives gave men instruction about the divine
attributes, and represented God's omnipotence immediately
before their eyes by miracles. " This corporeal proof by
miracles, is regarded by the outward class of thinkers as
authoritative in respect of all the doctrines proclaimed by
these ambassadors of God ; and it is not only regarded as
the highest proof, but as the only one that in principle
is tenable." If the reality of the miracles is authenticated,
the contents of the doctrine are not to be examined before
the reason and conscience ; power has decided, and conse-
quently unconditional blind subjection is a duty. Without
such subjection there would be no end of erroneous doctrines,
and unity and permanence of faith would never arise. As
the way of inquiry will never lead to the universal acceptance
of the true faith, there remains only the way of authority, and
this compels faith by present, or sufficiently attested, miracles.
Whoever sets himself in opposition to this authority, and
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650 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AÜFKLABÜNG.
asserts that there is in man a higher authority, such as Ümt
of Beason and Law, trusts more to himself than to Grod, and
he is anathema I
These views already indicate the position which Jacobi
takes up in reference to Beligion. Beligion as an inner life
— what is called subjective religion in the terminology ot the
schools — ^is regarded by Jacobi as the highest blossom of his
personal life, the element in which alone he finds his weU-
being. It is this Beligion, as communion with Grod, which
raises us in the feeling of freedom above the natural finite
and sensible existence. It is the only living ground of our
moral life; it is at the same time the foundation of our
knowledge of truth. In short, without Beligion life would
not be worth the living, and as men we would hardly be
raised above the brutes. Beligion is the eternal divine life
in us ; it is the alliance of our immortal spirit with a personal
living God, who makes Himself known to us in the funda-
mental impulse of our nature, or in those rational feelings
which are directed towards the good, the true, and the
beautiful
Jacobi judges of the Positive Beligions much less favour-
ably. This did not arise from his having been in any way
at one with the Aufklärung and its negative reduction of
what was positive in religion to a so-called Beligion of
Beason. The violent polemic against the Philosophy of the
Understanding is indeed specially directed against the so-called
religion of reason, or the theism of the Enlighteners. How,
then, can our understanding attain to the knowledge of Grod,
Freedom, and Immortality ? How can we speak of a religion
and of a living conviction, where there is no inner indwelling
of God, and no fellowship of life and of love ? In order to
escape from this desert of the pure Beligion of Beason to the
Promised Land of better views, or to living Beligion, Jacobi
himself would not shrink from the way over a pons asinorum;
for an external revelation hardly appears to him to be any-
thing better, as we have seen.
Some remarkable hints and indications are found in Jacobi
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JACOBL 651
with reference to the historical development of Beligion.
The whole internal constitution of his nature leads man to
religion, that is, to the knowledge of the Deity and to a
certain worship of Him. The ground of this is not to he
found in the worship of the dead, nor in fear of the powers
of nature. The first expression of the moral organ consists
in the stirrings of longing and devoutness which are called
forth by the magnificent spectacle of the universe, the awe-
inspiring appearance of the sun, of the starry heavens, of the
rainbow, or similar things. As man directs his attention
specially to the object that appears to him as the greatest,
the fairest, and the most splendid, it becomes in his eyes
what is highest Thereby the impulse was likewise given
to actions that indicated a sort of worship. This is the
natural advance of man towards the knowledge of a sublime
Being upon whom he feels himself dependent. When man
attempts to transform his hitherto dim feeling of 6od into
a distinct conception, by the aid of his understanding and
imagination, he gives his Grod a shape and manners; in
other words, man creates God in his own image. From this
effort there then arises a plurality of gods, or Polytheism.
On this stage superstitious belief arises; and from the condi-
tion of an undeveloped understanding — when there are still
mixed up together knowing and believing, trust in the visible
and trust in the invisible — all the surprising phenomena in
tiie history of mankind are explained. Hence it is that we
have crude and refined Fetichism, the worship of animals and
of the stars, the innumerable species of idolatry and super-
stition, and the multitude of absurd and contradictory
systems. Even in this superstitious belief there is divine
truth although it is veiled. The savage who falls down
before the waterfall has the true God before his eyes and in
his heart, and he who kneels with full devotion before an
idoL is more than a philosopher with his abstract conception
of God. — ^With the rise of Philosophy, man neglected his
inner feelings and busied himself only with ideas. Following
the universal impulse to discover the cause of things, man
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652 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AÜFKLAKUNG.
endeavoared to explain the origin of the world by the
hypothesis of a Matter, with which Motion is necessarily
connected by the aid of a hidden Power. Thus the Deity
became dispensable and superstition was expunged, bnt
with it went also genuine belief, and utter and complete
Atheism prevailed. For it is not till long after the worship-
ping of a Deity that Atheism arises ; it presupposes a certain
exercise of the understanding, and it is founded on reflection,
or in a one-sided tendency and application of reflection to
what is natural
This Atheism, however, found its healing in human blink-
ing itself. Socrates first pointed to the inner nature of man,
and here he discovered another world far more rich in its
contents than the sensible world, — a world in which man
learns to know himself as bringing forth being. In Nature,
Socrates beheld laws, and so he came to a highest Lawgiver
who has created things and their laws, the conception of
whom is occasioned by the physical world, but not given by
it. Whoever, like Socrates, came to know the finiteness of
the physical world and the infiniteness of the other world,
and felt himself to be inwardly connected with the latter,
reached true knowledge of God and rational worship of Grod,
'' as far as man is capable of them in the present state."
The Popular Eeligion, however, was opposed to this
philosophical religion. It had fallen a sacrifice to politics,
which modifies gods and oracles, virtue and vice, wisdom and
folly, merely for its own purpose. By mingling some
philosophy with it, a lasting authority was then to be
procured for this religion and its worship; and thus there
arose " that mixture which makes of the Deity a monster of
so many contradictions that it annihilates itself, and generates
a second atheism which has its foundation in a very natural
Unbelief.*'
This second Atheism finds healing in true philosoj^y.
But there then steps a third Atheism to its side which arises
out of the pretensions of a reason that has now become
arrogant. It is that Atheism which Jacobi combats so
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JACOBL 653
emphatically as the necessary consequence of the philosophy
of the Understanding or Eeflection. We can only escape
from it by turning our back with Jacobi upon the science of
the Understanding, and plunging resolutely with a salto mortale
into the Philosophy of Feeling.
A distinction must therefore be made between what is
external or positive, and what is internal, in Beligion. All
theologies and histories of Bevelation are, as regards their
external nature, equally fabulous and erroneous in their
belief; and all interchange of the letter with the spirit, and
all hanging on words, is but superstition and Lama-worship.
As long as our priests preach anything else than the pure,
holy, internal, true doctrine, and as long as they bid us look
to the sky because it fertilizes the earth, thus lowering the
spirit to the clay, so long will they be more hateful than the
Atheist. — On the other hand, all theologies and histories of
Eevelation, as regards their inner substance and mystical
part, are equally true ; for the fear of God and virtue are the
essentials of all religions. And so far the history of humanity
is nothing but a history of Beligion ; as it is, in fact, a gradual
advancing in the knowledge of the essential fellowship of life
with God.
So long as the perceptions of the sensible world are not
yet clearly distinguished from the apprehensions of the super-
sensible, God is viewed as a sensible and finite being. This
is the period of Heathenism. As soon as man comes to the
consciousness of that distinction, he turns himself to the
invisible, to the purely internal truth, to the spirit ; and this
is the period of Christianity. This is also the period of the
Philosophy of Feeling. But it hardly needs to be observed
that the designations "Heathenism" and "Christianity," as
thus used, do not cover completely, but only a parte potiore,
the historical religions called by these names. In the
historical Heathenism there is Christianity in its worship of
the invisible, of the spirit, of what is inward ; and in the
historical Christianity there is Heathenism in the supremacy
of the visible, of the letter, and of what is outward. — The
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654 THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLÄRUNG.
religion of the heatheD, is worship of natore ; the religion of
Christianity, is worship of God ; the former is pantheistic or
naturalistic, the latter is anthropomorphistic Hence Chris-
tianity is an essential constituent, and even a turning-pointy
in the universal history of the world.
Christianity is the living belief in the Might indwelling in
man and superior to nature. Christianity is therefore worship
of Grod and exercise of virtue ; and morality is the character-
istic mark which distinguishes Christianity from Heathenism,
and the worship of Grod from the worship of Idols. Hence
the essence of Christianity is inward regeneration by a higher
power; it is the elevation of the finite nature to the divine.
— The capacity for this elevation lies in our nature. Christ,
"the purest among the mighty, and the mightiest among the
pure," is the sublimest representative of this religious elevation
to God. For God, the living God, can only manifest Himself
in what lives. And hence, in order to remove the infinite
misrelation of man to God, either man must become partici-
pative of a divine nature, or God must assume flesh and
blood. Whoever follows the way to the higher life that has
been shown by Christ, will, like Him, become conscious of
the divine life and of the divine peace.
The scholars and adherents of Jacobi were not insignificant
in number, yet none of them developed the thoughts of the
master in any special way, nor did any of them gain such
a wide influence as to make it necessary to take note of them
here. We shall afterwards have to speak more particularly
of the relation which Fries holds to Jacobi
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INDEX OF PROPER NAMES.
Abslabd, 86-89.
Agricola, Rudolph, 60.
D^illy, Petras, 86.
Alberti, J. Val., 394n, 626.
Albertus Magnus, 82.
Alciati, Giaupaolo, 196.
Alexander Aphrodisiensis, 60.
Alstedt, J. H., 170, 178.
Amalricans, 31.
Amalrich, 43.
Ammon, 640n.
Ammonius Sakkas, 16.
Amyrant, 167.
Anabaptists, 191, 207-212.
Andre«, Job. Val., 243, 278.
Annet, Peter, 364.
Anselro, 29-30.
Anti-Trinitarians, 191.
Anton, Paul, 276.
Apologists, 7-9.
Aristotle (Aristotelianism), 19, 20, 28,
81, 168-178.
Arminius, 171, 269.
Arndt, Job., 272-8.
Amobius, 9.
Arnold, Gottfr., 279.
Arnold (Jesuit), 162.
Athenagoras, 9.
Augustm, 21-22, 27, 281.
Auvergne, WiL of, 42.
Avenarins, 408.
Averroes (Ibn Rosbd), 89, 60.
Avicenna, 222.
B
Bacon, Lord, 286-8.
Bacon, Roger, 41.
Babrdt, Karl Friedr., 646-660.
Baier, 142.
Barclay, Robert, 216.
Bartholomais, Alex., 119.
Basedow, 636.
Bauer, Bruno, 489ik
Baxter, Richard, 214.
Bayle, Pierre, 446-468.
Wk
Beckmann, 177.
B^hines and Beghards, 46.
Bekker, Baltbasar, 399-401.
Bentley, 366.
Berengar of Tours, 36.
Berkeley, 360.
Bernhard of Clairvaux, 48.
Bernhard, 89.
Bessarion, 63.
Betkins, Joachim, 273.
Beurhusius, 170.
Beza, 169.
Biddle, John, 206.
Biel, Gabriel, 35.
Bilfinger, 615.
Blandrate, Giorgio, 196, 198.
Blount, Charles, 289, 291, 314.
Blyenburg, van, 434,
Boccaccio, 49.
Boethius, 22-23, 28, 231.
Böhme, Jacob, 198, 243-266.
Bolsec, 166.
Bonaventura, 48.
Bouillier, Fr., 894n.
Bovillus, Carl, 89.
Boyle, 118, 288.
Breckling, Friedr., 263.
Brescain, Joh. of, 40.
Brixen, 67, 89.
Brockes, Barth. Heinr., 639.
Brown, Robert, 212.
Browne, Sir Thomas, 291, 800-301.
Bracker, 169n.
Brano, Giordano, 66, 93-101.
Buckle, 453.
Buddeus, 440.
Bullinger, 197, 208.
Bullock, 853.
Butler's Hudibras, 291.
Butler, Joseph, 368-9.
Buxtorf, 141.
Cabanis, 461.
Calixtus, G., 168.
Calovius, 140, 141, 206.
Calvin, Joh., 166-168, 196, 198.
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656
lyDIX OF PROPER KAJf£&
Camerer, Theod., 407».
Camillo, Renato, 194.
CampaiielU, Thomai, 4», 66, 101-108
CampanoB, John, 210.
Campbell, 857.
Canz, GottL. 630.
Capellus, 141.
Cardanus, 65, 91-93.
Carbtadt, 225, 281.
Carpov, 630-531.
Carriire, 66ii, 98m,
Oarteaianiain. See Descartes.
Caselius, Job., 170, 178, 179.
Casmann, Otto, 170, 171. 172.
Cassiodorus, 22-23, 28.
Cathari, 39.
Chandler, 358.
Charles I., 264.
Charpentier, Jacques, 119.
Charron, 67.
Cheumitins, 160.
Chioccus, 91.
Chubb, 291, 342-345.
Chytrau«, Dav., 170.
Claudius, MaUhias, 562.
Clemens Alexandrinus, 15.
Coccejiia, 270.
Collins, Anthony, 291, 329-380, 352,
354.
Comte, 454.
Condillac, Etiennc Bonnot de, 460.
Congregationalism, 212.
Conybeare, 357.
Conyza. 198.
Cornhert, 269.
Cramer, Job., 171.
Crell, Job., 199, 205.
Crell, Sam., 206.
Cromwell, 213.
Cudworth, Ralph, 354-355.
Cuffelarius, 435.
Cusanus, Nie, 65-89, 93, 101, 219.
231.
Dale, Antonius van, 399.
Damascenus, Joannes, 19, 22.
Damiani, Petrus, 29.
Dante, 49.
Daijes, 532.
Dasypodius, 170.
David, Dinant, 44.
Davidis, 199.
Deism, Engl., 284-388.
Denk, Job. , 209.
Descartes, 62, 389-393.
Deurboff, Wilh., 398.
Diderot, Denis, 462.
Dionysius Areopagita, 17, 26.
Dippel, Job. Konr., 279, 543.
Dodwell, H., sen., 851.
Dodwell, II.,jun., 292.
DrwMT, Mathams, 170.
Drcydorff, 61».
E
Eberhaid, 536».
Eckhmrt, 45-47, 231.
Edelmann, 439-445, 543.
Eichbom, 559.
Elisabeth of Scbönaa, 48.
Elsvich, Hermann, 169».
Engel, 685».
Engelbrecbt, Hans, 242.
Eo, Wilh., 241.
Erasmos, 58.
Erdmann, Benno, 628».
Emesti, 660.
Engenins IV., 67.
Evremont, Saint^ 447.
Faber Stapulensis, 89.
Fabridns, 170.
Fabridus, Job. Jak., 278.
Falkenbeig, 67.
Fecbner, Herrn. Ad., 248».
Feder, G. H., 686».
Feuerbacb, Lndw., 448».
Fischer, Kuno, 407», 480».
Fladus Illyricus, 139.
Fock, 199».
Fox, George, 214.
Francis I., 119.
Frank, G., 126», 894».
Frank, Sebastian, 226-228, 231.
Franke, Aug. Herrn., 276.
Frankenberg, Abraham v., 262.
Freidliebius, Ericus, 479.
Freigiufl, 170.
Fries, 668», 654.
Frischlin, Nikol., 170.
Frisitts, Paul, 170.
G
Gale, Theo., 854.
Galen, 222.
Gass, W., 61», 125».
Gaunilo, 80.
Geliert, 662.
Gennadius, 60, 61».
Genthe, 477».
Gentile, Val., 196, 198.
Georg of Trapezunt, 60.
Gerbert, 28.
Gerhard, Job., 140, 144, 158, 172.
Gerson, Job., 36.
Gesner, Sal., 174.
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INDEX OF PROPER NAMES.
657
Geulinx, Arnold, 402-404.
Qibeon, Edmund, 356.
Gichtel, Georg, 263.
Gnosticism, 10-16.
Godenius, Rud., 170, 171, 172, 178.
Göze, Job. Melch., 573.
Gomarists, 270.
Gonterius, 162.
Goodwin, Th., 269.
Grauer, Albert, 181.
Gregory of Heimburg, 89.
Gregory VII., 58.
Gregory IX., 31.
Gribaldo, Matteo, 195, 198.
Griesbach, 559.
Grotius, Hugo, 206, 525.
Gninius, Stephan, 241.
Gualther, 198.
Güntber, Owen, 179, 182.
Guthmann, Aegidius, 230.
Hamann, 62, 563, 607-621.
Hamberger, Julius, 243».
Heberle, 138».
He^l, 2, 245.
Heidanus, 398.
Helvetius, 462.
Heppe, H., 268», 436».
Heraclitus, 245.
Herbert of Cberbury, 289, 291, 292-
299 425.
Herder, 62* 563, 585-607.
Herrlinger, 131».
Hermhut Brotherhood, 280.
Hettner, H., 446».
Hildegard of Bingen, 43.
Hobbes, 289, 291, 302-313, 435.
Hochhuth, 271».
Hofmann, Daniel, 178-190.
Hofinann, Melchior, 209.
Hohburg, Chr., 264.
Holbach, 463-468.
Holkot, Robert, 35.
Hollaz, 140, 478.
Homagius, Heinr. Phil, 241.
Hooker, Thorn., 269.
Hoombeck, 206. ,
Hornejus, Conr., 163, 167.
Hossbach, W., 274».
Huber, 61».
Huet, Pierre Daniel, 447.
Hugo of St. Victor, 48.
Humanists, 49, 57.
Hume, Dayid, 292, 359-388.
Huss, Job., 60.
Hütten, Uhich v., 68, 61».
Hutter, 140.
Hypatia, 18.
Ibbot, Benjamin, 366.
Ibn Roshd, see Ayerroes.
VOL. I.
Irving, Edward, 267.
Isidore of Seville, 22.
Jacobi, 62, 408, 436, 563, 621-654.
JsBnichen, 436.
Jamblichus, 17.
Jeanmaire, 4487».
Jeffrey, 353.
Jerusalem, Job. Friedr. Wilh., 642.
Joachim of Floris, 43, 44.
Jodl, 388».
Johannes Damascenus, 19.
Johannes Philoponus, 19.
Joris, David, 210.
Justin Martyr, 8.
Justinian, 19.
Eabbala, 55, 58, 65, 221.
Kant, 2, 61, 62, 476.
Kappelier, 532.
Keckermann, 158, 170, 172.
Kempis, Thomas ä, 60, 231.
Kepler, 48.
Klopstock, 562.
Klose, C. R. W., 439».
Knutzen, Martin, 528».
Knutzen, Matthias, 437, 442.
König, 140.
Köstlin, 125».
Köthen, 530.
Kopemicus, 48.
Koran, 84.
Kosthold, Chr., 435.
Kuhlmann, Quirinus, 263.
Labadie, 274.
Lactantius, 9, 10.
Lampe, Friedr. Ad., 118, 271, 398.
Lange, Fr. Alb., 446.
Lange, Joachim, 280, 533».
Lateran Council, 50, 51.
Lautensack, Paul, 230.
Lavater, Job. Casp., 562.
Law, William, 264».
Leade, Jean, 264.
Lechler, 292».
Leibniz, 62, 101, 118, 173, 476-657.
Lentulus, 397».
Less, 540».
Lessing, 62, 436, 563», 663, 664-686.
Levellers, 286.
Liddel, Duncan, 179.
Linde, Antonius van der, 434».
Lipsius, Justus, 56, 171.
Lobstein, P., 119».
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658
INDEX OF PROPER NAMES.
Locke» John, 291, 315-321, 459, 460.
Löscher, VaL Ernst, 118, 280, 478.
Lnbinns, Eilhard, 174.
Lndovici, 479l^ 528, 5d3fi.
Lütkemann, Joachim, 273.
Lnllos, Raymnndos, 84.
Lnther, Martin, 60, 125-181, 207.
M
Macchiavelli, 49.
Macchiavellists, 105.
Malebranche, 404-407.
Marcianus Capella, 28.
Maresius, Sam., 39 4n.
Marsilius, Ficinos, 53-55.
Marta, Ant, 91.
Martini, Conrad, 176, 178, 183.
Martini, Jakob, 170, 175, 188.
Mastricht, Petrus van, 394n.
Matnro, Bartol., 194.
Maupertiiis, Pierre Loois de, 453-454.
Maximus Confessor, 18.
Meisner, Balthasar, 144, 158, 176.
Melanchthon, Phü., 131-137, 169, 174.
Mendelssohn, Moses, 476, 537-539.
Menno, Simon, 212.
Mentzer, 158.
Meth, E., 242.
Methodists, 282-283.
Mettrie, De la, 446, 461.
Meyer, Ludw., 395n.
Meyfart, 274.
Michaelis, Joh. Day., 559.
Müton, 212.
Minucius Felix, 9-10.
Montaigne, 56.
Moravians, 280-282.
More, Henry, 264, 354.
Morffan, Thomas, 289, 292, 345-351.
Mosheim, 351n.
Müller, H., 273.
Miinzer, Thomas, 225.
Musffios, Joh., 159-167, 435.
Mntianus, 57.
Mylius, 179.
Nagel, Paul, 242.
Neander, 271n.
Neoplatonism, 16.
Newton, 288, 459.
Niclas, Hans, 211.
Nicolai, 536.
Niemeyer, 540n.
Nihusius, Bartholdus, 162.
Noack, Ludw., 292n.
O
Occam, Wilh. of, 31-32, 34.
Occhino, Bern., 196.
Olearins, Joh., 181.
Opel, 23111.
Origen, 15, 231.
Ortuberians, 44.
Oslander, Andr., 138, 241.
Joh. Ad., 394a.
Lncaa, 161, 273.
Ostorodt, 199ti, 205, 206.
Paracelsus, 221-225.
Parmenides, 90.
Patritius, Frandscns, 66, 108-111.
Perkins, William, 268.
Perron, Cardinal du, 162.
Petersen, 279.
Petrarca, 49.
Pfaff, Christ. Matth., 167.
Pfaffrad, Casp., 170, 179.
Pfleiderer, Edm., 388n.
Otto, 563».
Philippo-Ramistsi, 170.
Philoponis, Joannes, 19.
I Pichler, A., 480n.
Pico of Mirandola, 55, 58, 145ft.
{ Pietism, 268.
Pighius, 156.
, Piscator, 170, 178.
I Plato (Platonism), 28.
Pletho, Georgius Gemistus, 52, 61ii.
I Plotinus, 16, 231.
Pomponatius, Petrus, 50-52.
Pope, 566.
Pordage, Job., 264.
Porphyry, 17, 20.
Pra^e, 489n.
Proclus, 17.
Pufendorff, Sam., 525.
Puritonism, 268-269.
Q
Quakers, 214-215.
Quenstedt, 118, 140.
Quistorp, 273. »
R
Rambach, Fr. £b., 355.
Ramus, Petrus (Rannsm), 60, 66, 118-
123, 168-178.
Rappoltus, Fr., 434.
Raymund of Sabunde, 85.
Reimarus, Herm. Sam., 550-557.
Reinbeck, 530, 532.
Renato, Camillo, 194.
Renchlin, Job., 57.
Reusch, 531-532.
Reuter, H., 61t».
Revius, Jak., 394n.
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INDEX OF PROPER NAMES.
659
Ribow, 582.
Richard of St Victor, 43.
Riem, Andr., 545.
Ritschl, A., 188n.
Rixner of Siber, 66n.
Robinson, John, 212.
Rock, Joh. Ft., 446.
Röell, Herrn. AI, 898, 401-402.
Roscellinus, 28.
Rosicrucians, 242-248.
Rost, Georg, 241.
Roth, Joh., 262.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 446, 468-475.
Rnarins, Martin, 205.
Sack, 542.
Sanchez, 57.
Scaliffer, 171.
Schade, Casper, 276.
Georg, 546.
Scharff, 175, 176.
Scharpif, 6772.
Scheffler, Joh., 264.
Scheck, Jak., 170.
Scheibler, Christ., 175.
Schelhammer, Joh., 241.
Schelling, 101, 246.
Scherbius, Phil., 118, 170.
Schilling, Wenceslaus, 187, 188.
Schlee, Ernst, 178n.
Schleiennacher, 408, 434n.
Schlichting, 200, 205.
Schlüter, Gottfr., 181.
Schmalz, YaL, 205.
Schmid, Heinrich, 274w.
Johann, 273.
Xaver, 113n.
Schmidt, C, 131n.
Joh. Lorenz, 543.
Paul Wilhelm, 484».
Schohistics, 26-41.
Schubert, Joh. Ernst, 3, 532.
Schultze, Fritz, 61n.
Schulz, Job. Heinr., 544.
Schumann, 575.
Schuppius, Joh. Balth., 274.
Schweizer, Alex., 156n.
Schwenkfeldt, Casper, 228-230, 231.
Sclei, BarthoL, 230.
Scotus, Job. Duns, 83.
Joh. Erigena, 26, 27.
Scribonius, 170.
Scriver, 273.
Semler, 560.
^neca, 281.
Serena, 321n, 325.
Servetus, Mich., 139n, 217-221.
Shaftesbury, 291, 330-338.
Sigwart, 145».
Silesius, Angelus, 264.
Simon of Toumay, 40.
Simon, Richard, 436.
Slevogt, Paul, 188-189.
Snell, Rud., 171.
Socinus, Faustus, 197-199, 205.
-^— Lelio, 197-199.
Socrates, 245.
Soner, 206.
Spalat, 207.
Spalding, Joh. Joach., 541.
Spangenberg, 282.
Sparrow, 264n.
Spener, Phil. Jak., 274-279, 478.
Spinoza, 62, 101, 326, 417-434.
Stancaro, 198.
Statorius, 199.
Stebbing, 357.
Stephen, Leslie, 292».
Stiefel, Esaj., 242.
Stifel, 209.
Stilling, Jung-, 572.
Stosch (Stossius), 439.
Strauss, D. F., 61», 553»,
Sturm, Job., 170.
Suarez, 174.
, Sulzer, 536.
I Suso, Heinr., 47.
! Swedenborg, 265-267.
I Swift, 291.
Sykes, 353.
Sylvester IL, 28.
Synesius, 18.
Talon, Omer, 119.
Tatian, 8.
Tauler, Job., 47, 225, 231.
Taurellus, Nie, 66, 113-118.
Taylor, K, 264».
Teerstegen, Gerhard, 562.
Telesius, Bern., 65, 66, 89-91, 93.
Teller, Wilh. Abr., 541.
Tellinck, Wüh., 270.
Tertullian, 8, 9.
Tetens, Nie, 536».
Thamer, Theobald, 271-272.
Theobald, Zach., 241.
Tholuck, 125».
Thomas Aquinas, 32-33.
Thomasius, Christ, 526-528.
G., 178».
Tiedemann, 536».
Tillotson, 379.
Tindal, 291, 338-341, 356.
Toland, 291, 321-329.
Trent, Council of, 60, 61.
Turretin, 167.
ü
Ueberfeld, 194, 264.
Urban VIIL, 76.
Ursinus, Zach., 170.
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660
INDEX OF PBOPEB NABfES.
Valdez, Joan, 196.
Vftlla, Laurentiiia, 50.
Vanini, Julias CflBsar, ee, 111-113.
Vayer, Fran^ais de la Mothe le, 447.
Vedelius, Nie, 169-167.
Velthnysen, Lambert, 486n.
Vench, 89.
Vergerio, Pierpaolo, 194.
Yeronius, Fianciscus, 162.
Yerschoor, Jak., 486.
Vives, Ludw., 60.
Volkel, Job., 205.
Voetius, Gisbert, 270.
Voltaire, 446, 458-459.
W
Waddington, Charles, 119».
Walcb, 479fi.
Waldus, Petrus, 60.
Walther, Balth., 262.
Weigel, Erhard, 142.
Valentin, 280, 231-248.
Weingarten, H., 285».
Werdenhagen, Job. Angelins V., 187.
Weasel, Job., 60.
Wettstein, 559.
Whiston, William, 852.
Wickliffe, Job., 60.
William III., 214.
Wissowatios, Andr., 199», 200, 205.
Wittich, Christophe, 897-898, 436».
Woidowski, 206.
Wolflt; Christ, 480, 515-584.
Wolzogen, Ludw., 205.
Woolston, Tb., 853.
Zeller, Ed., 480».
Zimmermann, 241.
Zinzendorf, 280-282.
Zimgiebl, 621».
Zwingli, 145-154.
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THE TRIPARTITE NATURE OF MAN:
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of the work is most happ^, and the execution of it worthy of the idea. On a scheme
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An JExamincUian of the PersoTudüy of Man, to ascertain his Ca/padty
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positions.
' In ''The Philosophical Basis of Theism" Dr. Harris laid the foundation, in the
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on the methods and results won in the past, and on the problems of the present hour.
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question now, and the difficulties he endeavours to meet are not those which were
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using many otners. Certainly it is a volume which no one interested in philosophy or
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T H E
APOSTOLIC AND POST-APOSTOLIC TIMES.
Their Diversify and Unity in Life and Doctrine.
By G. V. LECHLER, D.D.
STj^itti fftittion, tt)Otong]^Ig ISitbiutt antf 1Sit»WSixitUru
Translated by A. J. K. DAVIDSON.
« In the work before us, Lechler works out this conception with great skill, and with
ample historical and oritiofld knowledge. He has had the advantage of all the discussions
of these forty years, and he has made g^d use of them. The book is up to date ; so
thoroughly is this the case, that he has been able to make room for the results which
have been won for tiie early history of Christianity by the discovery of the **Didaoh^**
and of the discussions to which it has given occasion. Nor is it too much to say that
Br. Lechler has neglected nothing fitted to throw light on his great theme. The work
is of the highest vnlvub,*— Spectator,
* It contains a vast amount of historical information, and is replete with judicious
remarks. ... By bring^g under the notice of English readers a work so favourably
thought of in Germany, the translator has conferred a benefit on theologv.*— ^^A^nceuiTi.
* Scholars of all kinds will welcome this new edition of Dr. Lechler^s famous work.
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THE JEWISH
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A STUDY IN THE EARLIEST HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY.
By VINCENT HENRY STANTON, M.A.,
FELLOW, TUTOR« AJXD DIVINITT LBCTURKB OF TKIKITT OOLLBOl, CAMBRTDQg;
LATB HUUBRAH LECTUBSB.
CONTENTS.— Port /. Introductory. Chap. I. The Scope of our Inquiry and iti
Bearing upon Modem Theories of the Rise of Christiani^. IL The
Documents. III. General Views of the History of Messianic E^ectation
among the Jews to the Christian Era. lY. General Character of the Christian
Transformation of the Idea of the Messiah. Y. The Use of the Old Testament
in the EstIt Church. — Part IL The Attitude of Jesus to Messianic Beli^
Chap. I. The Teaching of Jesus concerning the Kingdom of God. XL The
Use by Jesus of the Title «The Son of Man." III. The Claim made hj Jesus
Himself to be the Christ — Pari 111, Messianic Ideas in the Early CHiurch.
Chap. I. The Doctrine of the Office of the Christ in the Early Church. IL
Comnarison in detail of Jewish and Christian Eschatology. IIL Measianie
Propnecy and the Mythical Theory. Epilogue, etc.
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origin of Christianity. We hope that Mr. Stanton will be able to continue his laboon
in uiat most obscure and most Important period, of his competency to deal with whid
he has given such good proof in tlds book.'— (Tüorcfian.
* We welcome this book as a valuable addition to the literature of a most important
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obscure from beginning to end, and we think that no reader of average attainments wül
be able to put the book down without having learnt much from his lucid and scholariy
exposition. —£oc<6fkuli0a/ OoMeUe,
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HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE IN THE
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By Dr. EMIL SCHÜEEE,
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TRANSLATED FBOM THE SECOND EDITION (Revised thbouohout, asd
OEBATLT Ehlaboed) OF * HI8T0B Y OP THE NEW TESTAMENT TIME,'
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by the Author. (The Second Division is complete in itself.)
* Under Professor Schttrer's guidsnce, we are enabled to a large extent to constenct a
social and political framework for the Gk>spel History , and to set it in such a light as to
see new e'vidences of the truthfulness of that history and of its coDtemporaneouaness. . .
The length of our notioe shows our estimate of the value of his work.'— fin^fuik
Churchman,
*■ We gladly welcome the publication of this most valuable work.' — Dubtim Review,
* Most heartOv do we commend this work as an invaluable aid in the intelligent stndy
of the New Testament— i\ro9k;or^onfii«^
'As a handbook for the stndy of the New Testament, the work is invaluable and
unique.*— .OrttMA Quarterly Beview,
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GRIMM'S LEXICON.
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GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON OF THE
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BBINO
ffirtimm'0 tlZ3tIke'0 Clabis 'Snbi STedtamentC
TRANSLATED, REVISED, AND ENLARGED
BY
JOSEPH HENRY THAYEE, D.D.,
BUaSBT PSOFB680B OF KBW TB8TAMBNT OBITIOISIC AND INTBRPBBTATIOV QT THX
DIYINITT SCHOOL OF HARVARD UNIVKRSITT.
EXTRACT FROM PREFACE.
* rnOWARDS the close of the year 1862, the '♦ Arnoldische Buchhandlung "
JL in Leipsdg published the First Part of a Greek-Latin Lexicon of the
New Testament, prepared, upon the basis of the ^'Clavis Noyi Testament!
Philologica'' of C. G. Wilke (second edition, 2 vols. 1851), by PJrofessor 0. L.
WnJBALD GRDOf of Jena, m his Prospectus Professor Grimm announced it
as his purpose not only (in accordance with the improvements in classical lexico-
graphy embodied in the Paris edition of Stephen's Thesaurus and in the fifth
edition of Passow's Dictionary edited by Rost and his coadjutors) to exhibit the
historical growth of a word% significations, and accordin^y in selecting his
vouchers for New Testament usage to show at what time and in what class of
writers a given word became current, but also duly to notice the usage of the
Septuagint and of the Old Testament Apocrypha, and especially to produce a
Lexicon which should correspond to the present condition of textual criticism,
of exegesis, and of biblical theolo^. He devoted more than seven years to his
task. The successive Parts of his work received, as they appeared, the out-
spoken commendation of scholars diverging as widely in their views as Hupfeld
and Hengstenberg; and since its completion in 1868 it has been generally
acknowledged to be by far the best Lexicon of the New Testament extant.'
* I regard it as a work of the greatest importance. ... It seems to me a work show-
ing the most patient diligence, and the most carefully arranged collection of useful and
hel]^ul references.* — Thb Bishop of Gloucbstbr and Bristol.
•?rhe use of Professor Ghriimn*s book for years has convinced me that it is not only
unquestionably the best among existing New Testament Lexicons, but that, apart from
all oomparisons, it is a work (^ the highest intrinsic merit, and one which is admirably
adaptea to initiate a learner into an acquaintance with the language of the New Testa-
ment. It ought to be regarded as one of the first and most necessary requisites for the
study of the New Testament, and consequently for the study of theology in general.* —
Professor Emil SohOrbr.
*> This is indeed a noble volume, and satisfies in these days of advancing scholarship
a very great want. It is oertainly uneaualled in its lexicography, and invaluable in its
literary perfectness. ... It should, will, must make for itself a place in the library of
all those students who want to be thoroughly furnished for the work of understanding,
expounding, and applying the Word of God.* — Evangelical Magazine^
* Undoubtedly the best of its kind. Beautifully printed and well translated, with
some corrections and improvements of the original, it will be prized by students of the
Christian Scripttires.*— ^(Amcsum.
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THE SELF-REVELATION OF GOD.
BY
SAMUEL HARRIS, D.D., LL.D^
PROFmSSOB OP 8T8TB1IATI0 THEOLOGT, TAIM COVLBOM;
AUTHOR OF * THB PHILOSOPHIOAL BA8I8 OF 1
This work is a restatement of the eyidenoe of the existence of God and ol
the reality of His revelation of Himself, as modified by and in hamM>ny witii
the legitimate results of recent thought, and meeting scepticism in its present
positions.
The subject is divided into four parts, the first of which treats of the BeTelatio&
of Grod, in the experience or consciousness of man. The three remaining parts
are concerned with the verification of this fundamental fact, by the otiier revela-
tions which Gkxl makes of Himself, viz. — ^Part II. His Revelation of Himsdf as
the Absolute Being. Part III. His Revelation of Himself as the Personal God
in the Constitution and Course of Nature, and in the Constitution and Histoiy
of Man. Part lY. His Revelation of Himself reconciling the World to Himself
in Christ.
*We admire this work alike for its solid learning, its broad philosophical insist, its
"firm grasp of details, its luminous style, and its apt illustnUions gathered firoim aH
branches of oar literature. No student, who wishes to be fully abreiast of the tiaoes,
should be without this really great \>ook,*^Baptist Magazine,
* A notably luminous and convincing volume.* — Christian Leader,
Just published, in Two Vols., crovm 8w, price 16«.,
THE APOSTOLIC AND POST-APOSTOLIC
TIMES.
Their Diversity and Unity in Life and Doctrine.
By G. V. LECHLEE, D.D.
Translated by A. J. K. DAVIDSON.
* In the work before us. Lechler works out this conception with great skilL and with
ample historical and critical knowledge. He has had the advantage of all the discossioos
of these forty vears, and he has made good use of them. The book is up to date ; so
thoroughly is this the case, that he has been able to make room for the results which
have been won for the early history of Christianity by the discovery of the '^Didach^""
and of the discussions to which it has given occasion. Nor is it too much to say that
Dr. Leohler has neglected nothing fitted to throw light on his great theme. The woik
is of the highest value.*— <^3ectotor.
* It contains a vast amount of historical information, and is replete with judicioiifl
remarks. ... By bringing under the notice of English readers a work so favourably
thought of in Germany, the translator has conferred a benefit on theology.* — A&^en€emn,
^Scholars of all kinds will welcome this new edition of Dr. Lechler's famous work.
It has for long been a standard authority upon the subject which it treats. . • . The
book has not only been " revised,** but actually "re-written ** from end to end.' — LiUrmra
World,
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THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF THE
CHURCH
HISTOBIOALLY AND EXBGBTIOATiT.Y CONSIDERED.
(Eleventh Series of Cunningham Lectures.)
Bt Rbv. D. DOUGLAS BANNERMAN, M.A.
*The Canningham Lecturer has made out an admirable case. His book, indeed,
while not written in a controyersial spirit, but with calm temper, argumentative power
iind abundant learning, is a very forcible yindication of the Presbyterian system, and
one which, we suspect, it will be no easy task to refute, whether from the Bomanist or
the Anglican side,— ScoUman.
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AN INTRODUCTION TO THEOLOGY:
/fs Principles, /fs Branches, /fs Results, and Its Literature.
By ALFRED CAVE, B.A.,
PRDfOIPAL, AND PROFESSOR OF THBOLOOT, OF HAOKNST OOLLEOB, LOITDON.
' We can most heartily recommend this work to students of ever^ degree of attain-
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most saered of the professions, but to all who desire to encourage and systematize their
knowledge and clarify their views of Divine things.' — Noncoviformist and Englisk
* We Imow of no work more likely to prove useful to divinity students. Its arrange-
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ChrtsUan World,
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industry there seems no limit. . . . We can only say that we have rarely read a book
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THE BIBLE
AN
OF THEOCRATIC
W. SIMON,
LIFE.
OUTGROWTH
By D.
PRINCIPAL OF THK CONQRBGATIONAL COLLBOB, EDINBURGH.
' A more valuable .and suggestive book has not recently come into our hands.' —
British Quarterlif Review,
* This book wiU well repay perusal. It contains a great deal of learning as well as
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* A book of absorbing interest, and well worthy of study.* — Methodist New Connexum
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THE IGNATIAN EPISTLES
ENTIRELY SPURIOUa
A Reply to the Right Rev. Dr. Lightfoot. Bishop of Durham.
By W. D. killen, D.D.,
PRINCIPAL OF THB PRBSBTTERIAN THEOLOGICAL FACULTY, IRELAND.
'Dr. Killen has rendered a most valuable service to ^the cause of[ truth by this
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In d«mu 4'o> Ti>>r<f Editmt 'With Svi^«ID«qi> pntf S8m ^
BIBLICO-THEOLOGICAL LEXICON OF NEW
TESTAMENT GI^EEK,
By HERMANN OREMER, D.D.,
FBOFBSSOB OV THSOLOOT Dl TKB UKIV^BSITT OV OBBDrSWAU^
TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF THE SECOND EptTlON
By WILLIAM URWICK^ M.A.
THE SiJPPiBMBHT, WHfCH 18 INOLUOED (H TVM t9W(^ MAf K HAD
8MPARATELY, prm t4ß^
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.
T.4
Since the publication of the lAzge English Bdition of ^o(Q«8or Cremer'a Ltxk»» bj ^
T. Clark in the year 1878, a third German edition (1883), and a fourth in tlie present year
have appeared, containing much additional and valuable matter. Articles upon important
already fully treated have been rearranged and enlarged, and, several new words have oeen Insert^
LUce most German works of th« kkd, tbs Leidcon hs« grown edftioB by edition : it is {
pobably it will stUl grow in years to come. The noble Bni^iak Bdition of 1878 being
it became necessary to embody these Additions in a Supplsmkrt involving the aom^
task of gathering up and rearnuging alterationa and insfilAona under wofd^ already dueoaaed,
together with the i *
added. The ]
matter.
To fsciUtate reference, a kkw and very copious Index of the entire work. Lexicon and &ipple-
ment has been subjoined, enabling the student ^ oonsulft 4ia wiovk '«dtll the same ease as ths
earlier edition, the arrangement of words by Dr. Oiremer not being alphabetical save in groups, and
requiring in any case frequent referenoe to the Index. Hfrs at a glanee it will be seen where any
word is created of in either Part.
One main feature of Dr. Cramer's additions is the cousideration of the Ho^xw B^vxvar
to many Greek words, thus making the Lexicon invaluable to the RebrsSst. To aid him, tbe vt
full and important Hebrew Index, embracing upwards of 800 Hebrew words, and extending o^
several pages, is appended.
lathering up and rearranging alterationa and ins^rtiona under wofd^ ^Ireadr Aincwsfd,
with the simpler work of translating the articles upon words (upwards of 900) Bawly
Phe present Supplement, extending over 823 p^g^, e^bodie^ both claüea of OTljlifrwal
^ It is not too much to say that the Siipplement will greatly enbcnoe tbe ralae of the
original work ; while of this we imagine it needless to add manr words of oommendatioo.
It holds a deservedly high position in the s^timaUoa pf au students of the Saared
tongues.' — Literary Churdiman,
* We particularly call attention to this valuable work.* — CUirgymaiC$ Magcmmo*
* Dr. Gremer^s work is highly and deservedly esteemed in Germany. It gives with
care and thoroughness a complete history, as lar as it goes, of each word and phrase
that it deals with. . . . Dr. Cremer*s explajiations are most lucidly set out* — Cfuardia»,
* It is hardly possible to exa^^gerate the vahie of thiawork to the student of the Greek
Testament . . . The translation is accurate and idiomatic, and the additions to the
lattir edition are considerable and important* — Ohureh BelU,
( We cannot find an important word in our Greek New Testament which is not
discussed with a fulness and discrimination which leaves nothing to be desired.*—
No H conformist,
*- This noble edition in quarto of Cremer*s BibMco^Theologrical Lezioon quite super-
sedes the translation of the first edition of the work. Many of the most important
articles have been re-written and re-arranged.' — British Quaiierly Btview.
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and its extremely fair and toleraht manner. ... It is VUkkAj long to remain the standard
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HIPPOLYTUS AND CALLISTÜS;
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By JOHN J. IGN. VON DÖLLINGBR.
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By ALFRED PLUMMER,
MASTBR OF UNIVSBSITY GOLLBGS, DDBELUC.
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THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF SACRIFICE,
Ttffilnrtlng Inqulilei Into the Origln of Sacdfloe, the Jewish Bitnal, the
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By ALFRED CAVE, B.A.,
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the teaching of the Scripture on an important subject, it cannot fail to oe interesting
aren to those whom it does not convince.^ — Watckman.
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MODERN PANTHEISM.
ESSA Y ON RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY.
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF
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CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
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ethical development only can go on when these two are treated side bv side. TUi
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A POPULAR INTRODUCTION TO THE
HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.
BV Rev. T. G. GRIPPEN.
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mere acquaintance with this department of theological work.* — Freeman,
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ment of Tarying views of doctrine is sometimes very happy, and it sufficiently SmMh
the pathology of theological speculation.' — Wetlej^ MeUiodiat Magatme,
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A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES.
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* This scholarly and elaborate history.'—DicJfctrwon*» Hieological Quarterly,
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or in fiiglish, which approaches the present as to completeness and accuracy/— C%««ik
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JUNI 1991
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History of the Chris-
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religion from the
reforoiation to Kant,
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